/* VARARGS */
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int c, rem;
char *cmd, *cp, **ap, buf[RSH_BUFSIZ], **argv0, *args, *args_no_x;
char *host = NULL, *user = NULL;
int cc;
boolean_t asrsh = B_FALSE;
struct passwd *pwd;
boolean_t readfrom_rem;
boolean_t readfrom_rfd2;
int one = 1;
int omask;
boolean_t nflag = B_FALSE;
char *krb_realm = NULL;
krb5_flags authopts;
krb5_error_code status;
enum kcmd_proto kcmd_proto = KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL;
uid_t uid = getuid();
c = (argc + 1) * sizeof (char *);
if ((argv0 = malloc(c)) == NULL) {
perror("malloc");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
(void) memcpy(argv0, argv, c);
(void) setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
(void) textdomain(TEXT_DOMAIN);
/*
* Determine command name used to invoke to rlogin(1). Users can
* create links named by a host pointing to the binary and type
* "hostname" to log into that host afterwards.
*/
cmd = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
cmd = (cmd != NULL) ? (cmd + 1) : argv[0];
/*
* Add "remsh" as an alias for "rsh" (System III, V networking
* add-ons often used this name for the remote shell since rsh
* was already taken for the restricted shell). Note that this
* usurps the ability to use "remsh" as the name of a host (by
* symlinking it to rsh), so we go one step farther: if the
* file "/usr/bin/remsh" does not exist, we behave as if "remsh"
* is a host name. If it does exist, we accept "remsh" as an
* "rsh" alias.
*/
if (strcmp(cmd, "remsh") == 0) {
struct stat sb;
if (stat("/usr/bin/remsh", &sb) < 0)
host = cmd;
} else if (strcmp(cmd, "rsh") != 0) {
host = cmd;
}
/* Handle legacy synopsis "rsh hostname options [command]". */
if (host == NULL) {
if (argc < 2)
usage();
if (*argv[1] != '-') {
host = argv[1];
argc--;
argv[1] = argv[0];
argv++;
asrsh = B_TRUE;
}
}
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv,
DEBUGOPTSTRING "8AFKLP:ade:fk:l:nwx")) != -1) {
switch (c) {
#ifdef DEBUG
case 'D':
portnumber = htons(atoi(optarg));
krb5auth_flag++;
break;
#endif /* DEBUG */
case 'F':
if (fflag)
usage_forward();
Fflag = 1;
krb5auth_flag++;
fwdable_done = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'f':
if (Fflag)
usage_forward();
fflag = 1;
krb5auth_flag++;
fwd_done = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'P':
if (strcmp(optarg, "N") == 0)
kcmd_proto = KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "O") == 0)
kcmd_proto = KCMD_OLD_PROTOCOL;
else
die(gettext("rsh: Only -PN or -PO "
"allowed.\n"));
if (rcmdoption_done)
die(gettext("rsh: Only one of -PN and -PO "
"allowed.\n"));
rcmdoption_done = B_TRUE;
krb5auth_flag++;
break;
case 'a':
krb5auth_flag++;
break;
case 'K':
no_krb5auth_flag++;
break;
case 'd':
options |= SO_DEBUG;
break;
case 'k':
krb_realm = optarg;
krb5auth_flag++;
break;
case 'l':
user = optarg;
break;
case 'n':
if (!nflag) {
if (close(STDIN_FILENO) < 0) {
perror("close");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/*
* "STDION_FILENO" defined to 0 by POSIX
* and hence the lowest file descriptor.
* So the open(2) below is guaranteed to
* reopen it because we closed it above.
*/
if (open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY) < 0) {
perror("open");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
nflag = B_TRUE;
}
break;
case 'x':
encrypt_flag = 1;
krb5auth_flag++;
encrypt_done = B_TRUE;
break;
/*
* Ignore the -L, -w, -e and -8 flags to allow aliases with
* rlogin to work. Actually rlogin(1) doesn't understand
* -w either but because "rsh -w hostname command" used
* to work we still accept it.
*/
case '8':
case 'L':
case 'e':
case 'w':
/*
* On the lines of the -L, -w, -e and -8 options above, we
* ignore the -A option too, in order to allow aliases with
* rlogin to work.
*
* Mind you !, the -a option to trigger Kerberos authentication
* in rsh, has a totally different usage in rlogin, its the
* -A option (in rlogin) which needs to be used to talk
* Kerberos.
*/
case 'A':
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (host == NULL) {
if (argc == 0)
usage();
argc--;
host = *argv++;
asrsh = B_TRUE;
}
if (argc == 0) {
(void) setreuid(uid, uid);
if (nflag)
usage();
if (asrsh)
*argv0 = "rlogin";
(void) execv(rlogin_path, argv0);
perror(rlogin_path);
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("No local rlogin "
"program found.\n"));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (__init_suid_priv(0, PRIV_NET_PRIVADDR, NULL) == -1) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
gettext("Insufficient privileges, "
"rsh must be set-uid root\n"));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
pwd = getpwuid(uid);
if (pwd == NULL) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("who are you?\n"));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (user == NULL)
user = pwd->pw_name;
/*
* if the user disables krb5 on the cmdline (-K), then skip
* all krb5 setup.
*
* if the user does not disable krb5 or enable krb5 on the
* cmdline, check krb5.conf to see if it should be enabled.
*/
if (no_krb5auth_flag) {
krb5auth_flag = 0;
Fflag = fflag = encrypt_flag = 0;
} else if (!krb5auth_flag) {
/* is autologin set in krb5.conf? */
status = krb5_init_context(&bsd_context);
/* don't sweat failure here */
if (!status) {
/*
* note that the call to profile_get_options_boolean
* with autologin_option can affect value of
* krb5auth_flag
*/
(void) profile_get_options_boolean(bsd_context->profile,
appdef,
autologin_option);
}
}
if (krb5auth_flag) {
if (!bsd_context) {
status = krb5_init_context(&bsd_context);
if (status) {
com_err("rsh", status,
"while initializing krb5");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
/*
* Get our local realm to look up local realm options.
*/
status = krb5_get_default_realm(bsd_context, &realmdef[1]);
if (status) {
com_err("rsh", status,
gettext("while getting default realm"));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/*
* Check the realms section in krb5.conf for encryption,
* forward & forwardable info
*/
profile_get_options_boolean(bsd_context->profile, realmdef,
option);
/*
* Check the appdefaults section
*/
profile_get_options_boolean(bsd_context->profile, appdef,
option);
profile_get_options_string(bsd_context->profile, appdef,
rcmdversion);
/*
* Set the *_flag variables, if the corresponding *_done are
* set to 1, because we dont want the config file values
* overriding the command line options.
*/
if (encrypt_done)
encrypt_flag = 1;
if (fwd_done) {
fflag = 1;
Fflag = 0;
} else if (fwdable_done) {
Fflag = 1;
fflag = 0;
}
if (!rcmdoption_done && (rcmdproto != NULL)) {
if (strncmp(rcmdproto, "rcmdv2", 6) == 0) {
kcmd_proto = KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL;
} else if (strncmp(rcmdproto, "rcmdv1", 6) == 0) {
kcmd_proto = KCMD_OLD_PROTOCOL;
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Unrecognized "
"KCMD protocol (%s)"), rcmdproto);
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
if (encrypt_flag && (!krb5_privacy_allowed())) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("rsh: Encryption not "
"supported.\n"));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
/*
* Connect with the service (shell/kshell) on the daemon side
*/
if (portnumber == 0) {
while (!init_service(krb5auth_flag)) {
/*
* Connecting to the 'kshell' service failed,
* fallback to normal rsh; Reset all KRB5 flags
* and connect to 'shell' service on the server
*/
krb5auth_flag = 0;
encrypt_flag = fflag = Fflag = 0;
}
}
cc = encrypt_flag ? strlen(dash_x) : 0;
for (ap = argv; *ap != NULL; ap++)
cc += strlen(*ap) + 1;
cp = args = malloc(cc);
if (cp == NULL)
perror("malloc");
if (encrypt_flag) {
int length;
length = strlcpy(args, dash_x, cc);
cp += length;
cc -= length;
}
args_no_x = args;
for (ap = argv; *ap != NULL; ap++) {
int length;
length = strlcpy(cp, *ap, cc);
assert(length < cc);
cp += length;
cc -= length;
if (ap[1] != NULL) {
*cp++ = ' ';
cc--;
}
}
if (krb5auth_flag) {
authopts = AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED;
/*
* Piggy-back forwarding flags on top of authopts;
* they will be reset in kcmd
*/
if (fflag || Fflag)
authopts |= OPTS_FORWARD_CREDS;
if (Fflag)
authopts |= OPTS_FORWARDABLE_CREDS;
status = kcmd(&rem, &host, portnumber,
pwd->pw_name, user,
args, &rfd2, "host", krb_realm,
bsd_context, &auth_context, &cred,
NULL, /* No need for sequence number */
NULL, /* No need for server seq # */
authopts,
1, /* Always set anyport */
&kcmd_proto);
if (status != 0) {
/*
* If new protocol requested, we dont fallback to
* less secure ones.
*/
if (kcmd_proto == KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("rsh: kcmdv2 "
"to host %s failed - %s\n"
"Fallback to normal rsh denied."),
host, error_message(status));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* check NO_TKT_FILE or equivalent... */
if (status != -1) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
gettext("rsh: kcmd to host %s failed - %s\n"
"trying normal rsh...\n\n"),
host, error_message(status));
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
gettext("trying normal rsh...\n"));
}
/*
* kcmd() failed, so we now fallback to normal rsh,
* after resetting the KRB5 flags and the 'args' array
*/
krb5auth_flag = 0;
encrypt_flag = fflag = Fflag = 0;
args = args_no_x;
(void) init_service(B_FALSE);
} else {
/*
* Set up buffers for desread and deswrite.
*/
desinbuf.data = des_inbuf;
desoutbuf.data = des_outbuf;
desinbuf.length = sizeof (des_inbuf);
desoutbuf.length = sizeof (des_outbuf);
session_key = &cred->keyblock;
if (kcmd_proto == KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL) {
status = krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(
bsd_context,
auth_context,
&session_key);
if (status) {
com_err("rsh", status,
"determining subkey for session");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (session_key == NULL) {
com_err("rsh", 0, "no subkey "
"negotiated for connection");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
eblock.crypto_entry = session_key->enctype;
eblock.key = (krb5_keyblock *)session_key;
init_encrypt(encrypt_flag, bsd_context, kcmd_proto,
&desinbuf, &desoutbuf, CLIENT, &eblock);
if (encrypt_flag) {
char *s = gettext("This rsh session is using "
"encryption for all data transmissions.");
(void) write(STDERR_FILENO, s, strlen(s));
(void) write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r\n", 2);
}
}
}
/*
* Don't merge this with the "if" statement above because
* "krb5auth_flag" might be set to false inside it.
*/
if (!krb5auth_flag) {
rem = rcmd_af(&host, portnumber, pwd->pw_name, user, args,
&rfd2, AF_INET6);
if (rem < 0)
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
__priv_relinquish();
if (rfd2 < 0) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("rsh: can't establish "
"stderr\n"));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (options & SO_DEBUG) {
if (setsockopt(rem, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, (char *)&one,
sizeof (one)) < 0)
perror("rsh: setsockopt (stdin)");
if (setsockopt(rfd2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, (char *)&one,
sizeof (one)) < 0)
perror("rsh: setsockopt (stderr)");
}
omask = sigblock(mask(SIGINT)|mask(SIGQUIT)|mask(SIGTERM));
if (sigdisp(SIGINT) != SIG_IGN)
(void) sigset(SIGINT, sendsig);
if (sigdisp(SIGQUIT) != SIG_IGN)
(void) sigset(SIGQUIT, sendsig);
if (sigdisp(SIGTERM) != SIG_IGN)
(void) sigset(SIGTERM, sendsig);
if (nflag) {
(void) shutdown(rem, SHUT_WR);
} else {
child_pid = fork();
if (child_pid < 0) {
perror("rsh: fork");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (!encrypt_flag) {
(void) ioctl(rfd2, FIONBIO, &one);
(void) ioctl(rem, FIONBIO, &one);
}
if (child_pid == 0) {
/* Child */
fd_set remset;
char *bp;
int wc;
(void) close(rfd2);
reread:
errno = 0;
cc = read(0, buf, sizeof (buf));
if (cc <= 0)
goto done;
bp = buf;
rewrite:
FD_ZERO(&remset);
FD_SET(rem, &remset);
if (select(rem + 1, NULL, &remset, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
perror("rsh: select");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
goto rewrite;
}
if (!FD_ISSET(rem, &remset))
goto rewrite;
writeiv = B_FALSE;
wc = desrshwrite(rem, bp, cc);
if (wc < 0) {
if (errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
goto rewrite;
goto done;
}
cc -= wc;
bp += wc;
if (cc == 0)
goto reread;
goto rewrite;
done:
(void) shutdown(rem, SHUT_WR);
return (EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
}
#define MAX(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
sigsetmask(omask);
readfrom_rem = B_TRUE;
readfrom_rfd2 = B_TRUE;
(void) sigset(SIGPIPE, sigpipehandler);
do {
fd_set readyset;
FD_ZERO(&readyset);
if (readfrom_rem)
FD_SET(rem, &readyset);
if (readfrom_rfd2)
FD_SET(rfd2, &readyset);
if (select(MAX(rem, rfd2) + 1, &readyset, NULL, NULL,
NULL) < 0) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
perror("rsh: select");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
continue;
}
if (FD_ISSET(rfd2, &readyset)) {
errno = 0;
readiv = B_TRUE;
cc = desrshread(rfd2, buf, sizeof (buf));
if (cc <= 0) {
if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
readfrom_rfd2 = B_FALSE;
} else {
(void) write(STDERR_FILENO, buf, cc);
}
}
if (FD_ISSET(rem, &readyset)) {
errno = 0;
readiv = B_FALSE;
cc = desrshread(rem, buf, sizeof (buf));
if (cc <= 0) {
if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
readfrom_rem = B_FALSE;
} else
(void) write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, cc);
}
} while (readfrom_rem || readfrom_rfd2);
if (!nflag)
(void) kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
return (EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int c;
char *cp, *cmd, *name = NULL;
struct passwd *pwd;
uid_t uid;
int options = 0, oldmask;
int on = 1;
speed_t speed = 0;
int getattr_ret;
char *tmp;
int sock;
krb5_flags authopts;
krb5_error_code status;
enum kcmd_proto kcmd_proto = KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL;
(void) setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
#if !defined(TEXT_DOMAIN)
#define TEXT_DOMAIN "SYS_TEST"
#endif
(void) textdomain(TEXT_DOMAIN);
if (__init_suid_priv(0, PRIV_NET_PRIVADDR, NULL) == -1) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
gettext("Insufficient privileges, "
"rlogin must be set-uid root\n"));
exit(1);
}
{
int it;
if ((getattr_ret = tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &savetty)) < 0)
perror("tcgetattr");
it = ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, I_FIND, "ttcompat");
if (it < 0) {
perror("ioctl I_FIND ttcompat");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (it == 0) {
if (ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, I_PUSH, "ttcompat") < 0) {
perror("ioctl I_PUSH ttcompat");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
ttcompat = B_TRUE;
}
}
/*
* Determine command name used to invoke to rlogin(1). Users can
* create links named by a host pointing to the binary and type
* "hostname" to log into that host afterwards.
*/
cmd = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
cmd = (cmd != NULL) ? (cmd + 1) : argv[0];
if (strcmp(cmd, rlogin) == 0) {
if (argc < 2)
usage();
if (*argv[1] != '-') {
host = argv[1];
argc--;
argv[1] = argv[0];
argv++;
}
} else {
host = cmd;
}
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv,
DEBUGOPTSTRING "8AEFLP:ade:fk:l:x")) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case '8':
eight = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'A':
krb5auth_flag = B_TRUE;
break;
#ifdef DEBUG
case 'D':
portnumber = htons(atoi(optarg));
krb5auth_flag = B_TRUE;
break;
#endif /* DEBUG */
case 'E':
nocmdchar = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'F':
if (fflag)
usage_forward();
Fflag = 1;
krb5auth_flag = B_TRUE;
fwdable_done = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'f':
if (Fflag)
usage_forward();
fflag = 1;
krb5auth_flag = B_TRUE;
fwd_done = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'L':
litout = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'P':
if (strcmp(optarg, "N") == 0)
kcmd_proto = KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "O") == 0)
kcmd_proto = KCMD_OLD_PROTOCOL;
else
die(gettext("rlogin: Only -PN or -PO "
"allowed.\n"));
if (rcmdoption_done)
die(gettext("rlogin: Only one of -PN and -PO "
"allowed.\n"));
rcmdoption_done = B_TRUE;
krb5auth_flag = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'a':
/*
* Force the remote host to prompt for a password by sending
* a NULL username. This option is mutually exclusive with
* the -A, -x, -f, -F, -k <realm> options.
*/
null_local_username = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'd':
options |= SO_DEBUG;
break;
case 'e': {
int c;
cp = optarg;
if ((c = *cp) != '\\') {
cmdchar = c;
} else {
c = cp[1];
if (c == '\0' || c == '\\') {
cmdchar = '\\';
} else if (c >= '0' && c <= '7') {
long lc;
lc = strtol(&cp[1], NULL, 8);
if (lc < 0 || lc > 255)
die(gettext("rlogin: octal "
"escape character %s too "
"large.\n"), cp);
cmdchar = (char)lc;
} else {
die(gettext("rlogin: unrecognized "
"escape character option %s.\n"),
cp);
}
}
break;
}
case 'k':
krb_realm = optarg;
krb5auth_flag = B_TRUE;
break;
case 'l':
name = optarg;
break;
case 'x':
encrypt_flag = 1;
krb5auth_flag = B_TRUE;
encrypt_done = B_TRUE;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (host == NULL) {
if (argc == 0)
usage();
argc--;
host = *argv++;
}
if (argc > 0)
usage();
pwd = getpwuid(uid = getuid());
if (pwd == NULL) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("getpwuid(): can not find "
"password entry for user id %d."), uid);
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (name == NULL)
name = pwd->pw_name;
/*
* If the `-a' option is issued on the cmd line, we reset all
* flags associated with other KRB5 specific options, since
* the -a option is mutually exclusive with the rest.
*/
if (null_local_username) {
krb5auth_flag = B_FALSE;
fflag = Fflag = encrypt_flag = 0;
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Note: The -a option nullifies "
"all other Kerberos-specific\noptions "
"you may have used.\n"));
}
if (krb5auth_flag) {
status = krb5_init_context(&bsd_context);
if (status) {
com_err(rlogin, status, gettext("while initializing"
" krb5"));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/*
* Set up buffers for desread and deswrite.
*/
desinbuf.data = des_inbuf;
desoutbuf.data = des_outbuf;
desinbuf.length = sizeof (des_inbuf);
desoutbuf.length = sizeof (des_outbuf);
/*
* Get our local realm to look up local realm options.
*/
status = krb5_get_default_realm(bsd_context, &realmdef[1]);
if (status) {
com_err(rlogin, status,
gettext("while getting default realm"));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/*
* Check the realms section in krb5.conf for encryption,
* forward & forwardable info
*/
profile_get_options_boolean(bsd_context->profile, realmdef,
option);
/*
* Check the appdefaults section
*/
profile_get_options_boolean(bsd_context->profile, appdef,
option);
profile_get_options_string(bsd_context->profile, appdef,
rcmdversion);
/*
* Set the *_flag variables, if the corresponding *_done are
* set to 1, because we dont want the config file values
* overriding the command line options.
*/
if (encrypt_done)
encrypt_flag = 1;
if (fwd_done) {
fflag = 1;
Fflag = 0;
} else if (fwdable_done) {
Fflag = 1;
fflag = 0;
}
if (!rcmdoption_done && (rcmdproto != NULL)) {
if (strncmp(rcmdproto, "rcmdv2", 6) == 0) {
kcmd_proto = KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL;
} else if (strncmp(rcmdproto, "rcmdv1", 6) == 0) {
kcmd_proto = KCMD_OLD_PROTOCOL;
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("Unrecognized "
"KCMD protocol (%s)"), rcmdproto);
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
if (encrypt_flag && (!krb5_privacy_allowed())) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("rlogin: "******"Encryption not supported.\n"));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
if (port_number == 0) {
if (krb5auth_flag) {
struct servent *sp;
/*
* If the krb5auth_flag is set (via -A, -f, -F, -k) &
* if there is an entry in /etc/services for Kerberos
* login, attempt to login with Kerberos. If we fail
* at any step, use the standard rlogin
*/
sp = getservbyname(encrypt_flag ?
"eklogin" : "klogin", "tcp");
if (sp == NULL) {
port_number = encrypt_flag ?
htons(2105) : htons(543);
} else {
port_number = sp->s_port;
}
} else {
port_number = htons(IPPORT_LOGINSERVER);
}
}
cp = getenv("TERM");
if (cp) {
(void) strncpy(term, cp, sizeof (term));
term[sizeof (term) - 1] = '\0';
}
if (getattr_ret == 0) {
speed = cfgetospeed(&savetty);
/*
* "Be conservative in what we send" -- Only send baud rates
* which at least all 4.x BSD derivatives are known to handle
* correctly.
* NOTE: This code assumes new termios speed values will
* be "higher" speeds.
*/
if (speed > B38400)
speed = B38400;
}
/*
* Only put the terminal speed info in if we have room
* so we don't overflow the buffer, and only if we have
* a speed we recognize.
*/
if (speed > 0 && speed < sizeof (speeds)/sizeof (char *) &&
strlen(term) + strlen("/") + strlen(speeds[speed]) + 1 <
sizeof (term)) {
(void) strcat(term, "/");
(void) strcat(term, speeds[speed]);
}
(void) sigset(SIGPIPE, (sigdisp_t)lostpeer);
/* will use SIGUSR1 for window size hack, so hold it off */
oldmask = sigblock(sigmask(SIGURG) | sigmask(SIGUSR1));
/*
* Determine if v4 literal address and if so store it to one
* side. This is to correct the undesired behaviour of rcmd_af
* which converts a passed in v4 literal address to a v4 mapped
* v6 literal address. If it was a v4 literal we then re-assign
* it to host.
*/
tmp = NULL;
if (inet_addr(host) != (in_addr_t)-1)
tmp = host;
if (krb5auth_flag) {
authopts = AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED;
/* Piggy-back forwarding flags on top of authopts; */
/* they will be reset in kcmd */
if (fflag || Fflag)
authopts |= OPTS_FORWARD_CREDS;
if (Fflag)
authopts |= OPTS_FORWARDABLE_CREDS;
status = kcmd(&sock, &host, port_number,
null_local_username ? "" : pwd->pw_name,
name, term, NULL,
"host", krb_realm, bsd_context, &auth_context,
&cred,
NULL, /* No need for sequence number */
NULL, /* No need for server seq # */
authopts,
0, /* Not any port # */
&kcmd_proto);
if (status != 0) {
/*
* If new protocol requested, we dont fallback to
* less secure ones.
*/
if (kcmd_proto == KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("rlogin: kcmdv2 "
"to host %s failed - %s\n"
"Fallback to normal rlogin denied."),
host, error_message(status));
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (status != -1) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, gettext("rlogin: kcmd "
"to host %s failed - %s,\n"
"trying normal rlogin...\n\n"),
host, error_message(status));
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
gettext("trying normal rlogin...\n"));
}
/*
* kcmd() failed, so we have to
* fallback to normal rlogin
*/
port_number = htons(IPPORT_LOGINSERVER);
krb5auth_flag = B_FALSE;
fflag = Fflag = encrypt_flag = 0;
null_local_username = B_FALSE;
} else {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
gettext("connected with Kerberos V5\n"));
/*
* Setup eblock for desread and deswrite.
*/
session_key = &cred->keyblock;
if (kcmd_proto == KCMD_NEW_PROTOCOL) {
status = krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(
bsd_context,
auth_context,
&session_key);
if (status) {
com_err(rlogin, status,
"determining subkey for session");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (session_key == NULL) {
com_err(rlogin, 0,
"no subkey negotiated for "
"connection");
return (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
eblock.crypto_entry = session_key->enctype;
eblock.key = (krb5_keyblock *)session_key;
init_encrypt(encrypt_flag, bsd_context, kcmd_proto,
&desinbuf, &desoutbuf, CLIENT, &eblock);
rem = sock;
if (rem < 0)
pop(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
/*
* Don't merge this with the "if" statement above because
* "krb5auth_flag" might be set to false inside it.
*/
if (!krb5auth_flag) {
rem = rcmd_af(&host, port_number,
null_local_username ? "" : pwd->pw_name,
name, term, NULL, AF_INET6);
if (rem < 0)
pop(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* Never need our privilege again */
__priv_relinquish();
if (tmp != NULL)
host = tmp;
if (options & SO_DEBUG &&
setsockopt(rem, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, (char *)&on,
sizeof (on)) < 0)
perror("rlogin: setsockopt (SO_DEBUG)");
{
int bufsize = 8192;
(void) setsockopt(rem, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, (char *)&bufsize,
sizeof (int));
}
doit(oldmask);
return (0);
}