/* Check that we are only using keys which don't have
* the string "(insecure!)" or "not secure" or "do not use"
* in one of the user ids
*/
static int
is_insecure( PKT_secret_key *sk )
{
u32 keyid[2];
KBNODE node = NULL, u;
int insecure = 0;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
node = get_pubkeyblock( keyid );
for ( u = node; u; u = u->next ) {
if ( u->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *id = u->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if ( id->attrib_data )
continue; /* skip attribute packets */
if ( strstr( id->name, "(insecure!)" )
|| strstr( id->name, "not secure" )
|| strstr( id->name, "do not use" )
|| strstr( id->name, "(INSECURE!)" ) ) {
insecure = 1;
break;
}
}
}
release_kbnode( node );
return insecure;
}
/* Helper function to check whether the subkey at NODE actually
matches the description at DESC. The function returns true if the
key under question has been specified by an exact specification
(keyID or fingerprint) and does match the one at NODE. It is
assumed that the packet at NODE is either a public or secret
subkey. */
static int
exact_subkey_match_p (KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc, KBNODE node)
{
u32 kid[2];
byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t fprlen;
int result = 0;
switch(desc->mode)
{
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
else
keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, kid);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
fingerprint_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, fpr,&fprlen);
else
fingerprint_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, fpr,&fprlen);
break;
default:
break;
}
switch(desc->mode)
{
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
if (desc->u.kid[1] == kid[1])
result = 1;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
if (desc->u.kid[0] == kid[0] && desc->u.kid[1] == kid[1])
result = 1;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
if (!memcmp (desc->u.fpr, fpr, 16))
result = 1;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
if (!memcmp (desc->u.fpr, fpr, 20))
result = 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
return result;
}
/* Allocate a new subkey list item from NODE. */
static subkey_list_t
new_subkey_list_item (KBNODE node)
{
subkey_list_t list = xcalloc (1, sizeof *list);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, list->kid);
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, list->kid);
return list;
}
/****************
* Get the session key from a pubkey enc paket and return
* it in DEK, which should have been allocated in secure memory.
*/
int
get_session_key( PKT_pubkey_enc *k, DEK *dek )
{
PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
int rc;
rc = check_pubkey_algo( k->pubkey_algo );
if( rc )
goto leave;
if( (k->keyid[0] || k->keyid[1]) && !opt.try_all_secrets ) {
sk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
sk->pubkey_algo = k->pubkey_algo; /* we want a pubkey with this algo*/
if( !(rc = get_seckey( sk, k->keyid )) )
rc = get_it( k, dek, sk, k->keyid );
}
else { /* anonymous receiver: Try all available secret keys */
void *enum_context = NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
for(;;) {
if( sk )
free_secret_key( sk );
sk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
rc=enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, sk, 1);
if( rc ) {
rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
break;
}
if( sk->pubkey_algo != k->pubkey_algo )
continue;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
log_info(_("anonymous receiver; trying secret key %08lX ...\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1] );
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 1 ); /* ask only once */
if( !rc )
rc = get_it( k, dek, sk, keyid );
if( !rc ) {
log_info(_("okay, we are the anonymous recipient.\n") );
break;
}
}
enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, NULL, 0 ); /* free context */
}
leave:
if( sk )
free_secret_key( sk );
return rc;
}
/****************
* Check the secret key
* Ask up to 3 (or n) times for a correct passphrase
* If n is negative, disable the key info prompt and make n=abs(n)
*/
int
check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
{
int rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
int i,mode;
if (sk && sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
return 0; /* Let the scdaemon handle this. */
if(n<0)
{
n=abs(n);
mode=1;
}
else
mode=0;
if( n < 1 )
n = 3; /* Use the default value */
for(i=0; i < n && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE; i++ ) {
int canceled = 0;
const char *tryagain = NULL;
if (i) {
tryagain = N_("Invalid passphrase; please try again");
log_info (_("%s ...\n"), _(tryagain));
}
rc = do_check( sk, tryagain, mode, &canceled );
if ( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE
&& is_status_enabled () ) {
u32 kid[2];
char buf[50];
keyid_from_sk( sk, kid );
sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX", (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1]);
write_status_text( STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE, buf );
}
if( have_static_passphrase() || canceled)
break;
}
if( !rc )
write_status( STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE );
return rc;
}
/* Returns true if NODE is a subkey and contained in LIST. */
static int
subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list_t list, KBNODE node)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
{
u32 kid[2];
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
else
keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, kid);
for (; list; list = list->next)
if (list->kid[0] == kid[0] && list->kid[1] == kid[1])
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* Get the session key from a pubkey enc packet and return
* it in DEK, which should have been allocated in secure memory.
*/
int
get_session_key( PKT_pubkey_enc *k, DEK *dek )
{
PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
int rc;
rc = openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (k->pubkey_algo, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC);
if( rc )
goto leave;
if( (k->keyid[0] || k->keyid[1]) && !opt.try_all_secrets ) {
sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
sk->pubkey_algo = k->pubkey_algo; /* we want a pubkey with this algo*/
if( !(rc = get_seckey( sk, k->keyid )) )
rc = get_it( k, dek, sk, k->keyid );
}
else { /* anonymous receiver: Try all available secret keys */
void *enum_context = NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
char *p;
for(;;) {
if( sk )
free_secret_key( sk );
sk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
rc=enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, sk, 1, 0);
if( rc ) {
rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
break;
}
if( sk->pubkey_algo != k->pubkey_algo )
continue;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
log_info(_("anonymous recipient; trying secret key %s ...\n"),
keystr(keyid));
if(!opt.try_all_secrets && !is_status_enabled())
{
p=get_last_passphrase();
set_next_passphrase(p);
xfree(p);
}
rc = check_secret_key( sk, opt.try_all_secrets?1:-1 ); /* ask
only
once */
if( !rc )
{
rc = get_it( k, dek, sk, keyid );
/* Successfully checked the secret key (either it was
a card, had no passphrase, or had the right
passphrase) but couldn't decrypt the session key,
so thus that key is not the anonymous recipient.
Move the next passphrase into last for the next
round. We only do this if the secret key was
successfully checked as in the normal case,
check_secret_key handles this for us via
passphrase_to_dek */
if(rc)
next_to_last_passphrase();
}
if( !rc )
{
log_info(_("okay, we are the anonymous recipient.\n") );
break;
}
}
enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, NULL, 0, 0 ); /* free context */
}
leave:
if( sk )
free_secret_key( sk );
return rc;
}
/*
* Search through the keyring(s), starting at the current position,
* for a keyblock which contains one of the keys described in the DESC array.
*/
int
keyring_search (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,
size_t ndesc, size_t *descindex)
{
int rc;
PACKET pkt;
int save_mode;
off_t offset, main_offset;
size_t n;
int need_uid, need_words, need_keyid, need_fpr, any_skip;
int pk_no, uid_no;
int initial_skip;
int use_offtbl;
PKT_user_id *uid = NULL;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
u32 aki[2];
/* figure out what information we need */
need_uid = need_words = need_keyid = need_fpr = any_skip = 0;
for (n=0; n < ndesc; n++)
{
switch (desc[n].mode)
{
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND:
need_uid = 1;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS:
need_uid = 1;
need_words = 1;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
need_keyid = 1;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
need_fpr = 1;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST:
/* always restart the search in this mode */
keyring_search_reset (hd);
break;
default: break;
}
if (desc[n].skipfnc)
{
any_skip = 1;
need_keyid = 1;
}
}
rc = prepare_search (hd);
if (rc)
return rc;
use_offtbl = !hd->secret && kr_offtbl;
if (!use_offtbl)
;
else if (!kr_offtbl_ready)
need_keyid = 1;
else if (ndesc == 1 && desc[0].mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID)
{
struct off_item *oi;
oi = lookup_offset_hash_table (kr_offtbl, desc[0].u.kid);
if (!oi)
{ /* We know that we don't have this key */
hd->found.kr = NULL;
hd->current.eof = 1;
return -1;
}
/* We could now create a positive search status and return.
* However the problem is that another instance of gpg may
* have changed the keyring so that the offsets are not valid
* anymore - therefore we don't do it
*/
}
if (need_words)
{
const char *name = NULL;
log_debug ("word search mode does not yet work\n");
/* FIXME: here is a long standing bug in our function and in addition we
just use the first search description */
for (n=0; n < ndesc && !name; n++)
{
if (desc[n].mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS)
name = desc[n].u.name;
}
assert (name);
if ( !hd->word_match.name || strcmp (hd->word_match.name, name) )
{
/* name changed */
xfree (hd->word_match.name);
xfree (hd->word_match.pattern);
hd->word_match.name = xstrdup (name);
hd->word_match.pattern = prepare_word_match (name);
}
name = hd->word_match.pattern;
}
init_packet(&pkt);
save_mode = set_packet_list_mode(0);
hd->found.kr = NULL;
main_offset = 0;
pk_no = uid_no = 0;
initial_skip = 1; /* skip until we see the start of a keyblock */
while (!(rc=search_packet (hd->current.iobuf, &pkt, &offset, need_uid)))
{
byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t an;
if (pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
{
main_offset = offset;
pk_no = uid_no = 0;
initial_skip = 0;
}
if (initial_skip)
{
free_packet (&pkt);
continue;
}
pk = NULL;
sk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
if ( pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
pk = pkt.pkt.public_key;
++pk_no;
if (need_fpr) {
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
while (an < 20) /* fill up to 20 bytes */
afp[an++] = 0;
}
if (need_keyid)
keyid_from_pk (pk, aki);
if (use_offtbl && !kr_offtbl_ready)
update_offset_hash_table (kr_offtbl, aki, main_offset);
}
else if (pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
uid = pkt.pkt.user_id;
++uid_no;
}
else if ( pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
{
sk = pkt.pkt.secret_key;
++pk_no;
if (need_fpr) {
fingerprint_from_sk (sk, afp, &an);
while (an < 20) /* fill up to 20 bytes */
afp[an++] = 0;
}
if (need_keyid)
keyid_from_sk (sk, aki);
}
for (n=0; n < ndesc; n++)
{
switch (desc[n].mode) {
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NONE:
BUG ();
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS:
if ( uid && !compare_name (desc[n].mode,
desc[n].u.name,
uid->name, uid->len))
goto found;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
if ((pk||sk) && desc[n].u.kid[1] == aki[1])
goto found;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
if ((pk||sk) && desc[n].u.kid[0] == aki[0]
&& desc[n].u.kid[1] == aki[1])
goto found;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
if ((pk||sk) && !memcmp (desc[n].u.fpr, afp, 16))
goto found;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
if ((pk||sk) && !memcmp (desc[n].u.fpr, afp, 20))
goto found;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST:
if (pk||sk)
goto found;
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT:
if (pk||sk)
goto found;
break;
default:
rc = G10ERR_INV_ARG;
goto found;
}
}
free_packet (&pkt);
continue;
found:
/* Record which desc we matched on. Note this value is only
meaningful if this function returns with no errors. */
if(descindex)
*descindex=n;
for (n=any_skip?0:ndesc; n < ndesc; n++)
{
if (desc[n].skipfnc
&& desc[n].skipfnc (desc[n].skipfncvalue, aki, uid))
break;
}
if (n == ndesc)
goto real_found;
free_packet (&pkt);
}
real_found:
if (!rc)
{
hd->found.offset = main_offset;
hd->found.kr = hd->current.kr;
hd->found.pk_no = (pk||sk)? pk_no : 0;
hd->found.uid_no = uid? uid_no : 0;
}
else if (rc == -1)
{
hd->current.eof = 1;
/* if we scanned all keyrings, we are sure that
* all known key IDs are in our offtbl, mark that. */
if (use_offtbl && !kr_offtbl_ready)
{
KR_NAME kr;
/* First set the did_full_scan flag for this keyring (ignore
secret keyrings) */
for (kr=kr_names; kr; kr = kr->next)
{
if (!kr->secret && hd->resource == kr)
{
kr->did_full_scan = 1;
break;
}
}
/* Then check whether all flags are set and if so, mark the
offtbl ready */
for (kr=kr_names; kr; kr = kr->next)
{
if (!kr->secret && !kr->did_full_scan)
break;
}
if (!kr)
kr_offtbl_ready = 1;
}
}
else
hd->current.error = rc;
free_packet(&pkt);
set_packet_list_mode(save_mode);
return rc;
}
void
show_photos(const struct user_attribute *attrs,
int count,PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_secret_key *sk,
PKT_user_id *uid)
{
#ifndef DISABLE_PHOTO_VIEWER
int i;
struct expando_args args;
u32 len;
u32 kid[2]={0,0};
memset(&args,0,sizeof(args));
args.pk=pk;
args.sk=sk;
args.validity_info=get_validity_info(pk,uid);
args.validity_string=get_validity_string(pk,uid);
if(pk)
keyid_from_pk(pk,kid);
else if(sk)
keyid_from_sk(sk,kid);
for(i=0;i<count;i++)
if(attrs[i].type==ATTRIB_IMAGE &&
parse_image_header(&attrs[i],&args.imagetype,&len))
{
char *command,*name;
struct exec_info *spawn;
int offset=attrs[i].len-len;
#ifdef FIXED_PHOTO_VIEWER
opt.photo_viewer=FIXED_PHOTO_VIEWER;
#else
if(!opt.photo_viewer)
opt.photo_viewer=get_default_photo_command();
#endif
/* make command grow */
command=pct_expando(opt.photo_viewer,&args);
if(!command)
goto fail;
name=xmalloc(16+strlen(EXTSEP_S)+
strlen(image_type_to_string(args.imagetype,0))+1);
/* Make the filename. Notice we are not using the image
encoding type for more than cosmetics. Most external image
viewers can handle a multitude of types, and even if one
cannot understand a particular type, we have no way to know
which. The spec permits this, by the way. -dms */
#ifdef USE_ONLY_8DOT3
sprintf(name,"%08lX" EXTSEP_S "%s",(ulong)kid[1],
image_type_to_string(args.imagetype,0));
#else
sprintf(name,"%08lX%08lX" EXTSEP_S "%s",(ulong)kid[0],(ulong)kid[1],
image_type_to_string(args.imagetype,0));
#endif
if(exec_write(&spawn,NULL,command,name,1,1)!=0)
{
xfree(name);
goto fail;
}
#ifdef __riscos__
riscos_set_filetype_by_mimetype(spawn->tempfile_in,
image_type_to_string(args.imagetype,2));
#endif
xfree(name);
fwrite(&attrs[i].data[offset],attrs[i].len-offset,1,spawn->tochild);
if(exec_read(spawn)!=0)
{
exec_finish(spawn);
goto fail;
}
if(exec_finish(spawn)!=0)
goto fail;
}
return;
fail:
log_error(_("unable to display photo ID!\n"));
#endif
}
static int
xxxx_do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
int *canceled )
{
gpg_error_t err;
byte *buffer;
u16 csum=0;
int i, res;
size_t nbytes;
if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
DEK *dek = NULL;
u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */
gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd=NULL;
PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
return GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_SECKEY;
}
if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE )
BUG();
if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
log_info(_("protection algorithm %d%s is not supported\n"),
sk->protect.algo,sk->protect.algo==1?" (IDEA)":"" );
return GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
}
if(gcry_md_test_algo (sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo))
{
log_info(_("protection digest %d is not supported\n"),
sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo);
return GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
}
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0;
if (!sk->flags.primary)
{
keyid[2] = sk->main_keyid[0];
keyid[3] = sk->main_keyid[1];
}
dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo,
&sk->protect.s2k, mode,
tryagain_text, canceled );
if (!dek && canceled && *canceled)
return GPG_ERR_CANCELED;
err = openpgp_cipher_open (&cipher_hd, sk->protect.algo,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
(GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
| (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC)));
if (err)
log_fatal ("cipher open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) );
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
if (err)
log_fatal ("set key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) );
xfree(dek);
save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
gcry_cipher_setiv ( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
csum = 0;
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
int ndata;
unsigned int ndatabits;
byte *p, *data;
u16 csumc = 0;
i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
assert ( gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ));
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque ( sk->skey[i], &ndatabits );
ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
if ( ndata > 1 )
csumc = buf16_to_u16 (p+ndata-2);
data = xmalloc_secure ( ndata );
gcry_cipher_decrypt ( cipher_hd, data, ndata, p, ndata );
gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
p = data;
if (sk->protect.sha1chk) {
/* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect
tampering with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa
attack */
sk->csum = 0;
csum = 1;
if( ndata < 20 )
log_error("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n");
else {
gcry_md_hd_t h;
if ( gcry_md_open (&h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1))
BUG(); /* Algo not available. */
gcry_md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
gcry_md_final (h);
if (!memcmp (gcry_md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1),
data + ndata - 20, 20) )
{
/* Digest does match. We have to keep the old
style checksum in sk->csum, so that the
test used for unprotected keys does work.
This test gets used when we are adding new
keys. */
sk->csum = csum = checksum (data, ndata-20);
}
gcry_md_close (h);
}
}
else {
if( ndata < 2 ) {
log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
sk->csum = 0;
csum = 1;
}
else {
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
/* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
}
}
}
/* Must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
because the length may have an arbitrary value */
if( sk->csum == csum ) {
for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
if ( gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP,
p, ndata, &nbytes))
{
/* Checksum was okay, but not correctly
decrypted. */
sk->csum = 0;
csum = 1;
break;
}
ndata -= nbytes;
p += nbytes;
}
/* Note: at this point ndata should be 2 for a simple
checksum or 20 for the sha1 digest */
}
xfree(data);
}
else {
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
byte *p;
size_t ndata;
unsigned int ndatabits;
assert (gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE));
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndatabits);
ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
assert (ndata >= 2);
assert (ndata == ((p[0] << 8 | p[1]) + 7)/8 + 2);
buffer = xmalloc_secure (ndata);
gcry_cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
buffer[0] = p[0];
buffer[1] = p[1];
gcry_cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, ndata-2,
p+2, ndata-2);
csum += checksum (buffer, ndata);
gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]);
err = gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP,
buffer, ndata, &ndata );
xfree (buffer);
if (err)
{
/* Checksum was okay, but not correctly
decrypted. */
sk->csum = 0;
csum = 1;
break;
}
/* csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); */
}
}
gcry_cipher_close ( cipher_hd );
/* Now let's see whether we have used the correct passphrase. */
if( csum != sk->csum ) {
copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, NULL, sk->pubkey_algo );
free_secret_key( save_sk );
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
}
/* The checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself. */
res = pk_check_secret_key ( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
if( res ) {
copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, NULL, sk->pubkey_algo );
free_secret_key( save_sk );
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
}
free_secret_key( save_sk );
sk->is_protected = 0;
}
else { /* not protected, assume it is okay if the checksum is okay */
csum = 0;
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
}
if( csum != sk->csum )
return GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM;
}
return 0;
}
/* If keyblock_out is non-NULL, AND the exit code is zero, then it
contains a pointer to the first keyblock found and exported. No
other keyblocks are exported. The caller must free it. */
static int
do_export_stream( IOBUF out, strlist_t users, int secret,
KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options, int *any )
{
int rc = 0;
PACKET pkt;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KBNODE kbctx, node;
size_t ndesc, descindex;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc = NULL;
subkey_list_t subkey_list = NULL; /* Track alreay processed subkeys. */
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
strlist_t sl;
int indent = 0;
*any = 0;
init_packet( &pkt );
kdbhd = keydb_new (secret);
if (!users) {
ndesc = 1;
desc = xcalloc ( ndesc, sizeof *desc );
desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
}
else {
for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++)
;
desc = xmalloc ( ndesc * sizeof *desc);
for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next) {
if (classify_user_id (sl->d, desc+ndesc))
ndesc++;
else
log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
sl->d, g10_errstr (G10ERR_INV_USER_ID));
}
/* It would be nice to see which of the given users did
actually match one in the keyring. To implement this we
need to have a found flag for each entry in desc and to set
this we must check all those entries after a match to mark
all matched one - currently we stop at the first match. To
do this we need an extra flag to enable this feature so */
}
#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
if (secret) {
log_error (_("exporting secret keys not allowed\n"));
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
goto leave;
}
#endif
while (!(rc = keydb_search2 (kdbhd, desc, ndesc, &descindex))) {
int sha1_warned=0,skip_until_subkey=0;
u32 sk_keyid[2];
if (!users)
desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
/* Read the keyblock. */
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock );
if( rc ) {
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
if((node=find_kbnode(keyblock,PKT_SECRET_KEY)))
{
PKT_secret_key *sk=node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk(sk,sk_keyid);
/* We can't apply GNU mode 1001 on an unprotected key. */
if( secret == 2 && !sk->is_protected )
{
log_info(_("key %s: not protected - skipped\n"),
keystr(sk_keyid));
continue;
}
/* No v3 keys with GNU mode 1001. */
if( secret == 2 && sk->version == 3 )
{
log_info(_("key %s: PGP 2.x style key - skipped\n"),
keystr(sk_keyid));
continue;
}
/* It does not make sense to export a key with a primary
key on card using a non-key stub. We simply skip those
keys when used with --export-secret-subkeys. */
if (secret == 2 && sk->is_protected
&& sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 )
{
log_info(_("key %s: key material on-card - skipped\n"),
keystr(sk_keyid));
continue;
}
}
else
{
/* It's a public key export, so do the cleaning if
requested. Note that both export-clean and
export-minimal only apply to UID sigs (0x10, 0x11,
0x12, and 0x13). A designated revocation is never
stripped, even with export-minimal set. */
if(options&EXPORT_CLEAN)
clean_key(keyblock,opt.verbose,options&EXPORT_MINIMAL,NULL,NULL);
}
/* And write it. */
for( kbctx=NULL; (node = walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0 )); ) {
if( skip_until_subkey )
{
if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
skip_until_subkey=0;
else
continue;
}
/* We used to use comment packets, but not any longer. In
case we still have comments on a key, strip them here
before we call build_packet(). */
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_COMMENT )
continue;
/* Make sure that ring_trust packets never get exported. */
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
continue;
/* If exact is set, then we only export what was requested
(plus the primary key, if the user didn't specifically
request it). */
if(desc[descindex].exact
&& (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY))
{
if (!exact_subkey_match_p (desc+descindex, node))
{
/* Before skipping this subkey, check whether any
other description wants an exact match on a
subkey and include that subkey into the output
too. Need to add this subkey to a list so that
it won't get processed a second time.
So the first step here is to check that list and
skip in any case if the key is in that list.
We need this whole mess because the import
function is not able to merge secret keys and
thus it is useless to output them as two
separate keys and have import merge them. */
if (subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list, node))
skip_until_subkey = 1; /* Already processed this one. */
else
{
size_t j;
for (j=0; j < ndesc; j++)
if (j != descindex && desc[j].exact
&& exact_subkey_match_p (desc+j, node))
break;
if (!(j < ndesc))
skip_until_subkey = 1; /* No other one matching. */
}
}
if(skip_until_subkey)
continue;
/* Mark this one as processed. */
{
subkey_list_t tmp = new_subkey_list_item (node);
tmp->next = subkey_list;
subkey_list = tmp;
}
}
if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
/* do not export packets which are marked as not
exportable */
if(!(options&EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS)
&& !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable)
continue; /* not exportable */
/* Do not export packets with a "sensitive" revocation
key unless the user wants us to. Note that we do
export these when issuing the actual revocation
(see revoke.c). */
if(!(options&EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS)
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys;i++)
if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[i]->class & 0x40)
break;
if(i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys)
continue;
}
}
/* Don't export attribs? */
if( !(options&EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES) &&
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) {
/* Skip until we get to something that is not an attrib
or a signature on an attrib */
while(kbctx->next && kbctx->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE) {
kbctx=kbctx->next;
}
continue;
}
if( secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
{
/* We don't want to export the secret parts of the
* primary key, this is done by using GNU protection mode 1001
*/
int save_mode = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode;
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = 1001;
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
rc = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
else
rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = save_mode;
}
else if (secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
&& (opt.export_options&EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD))
{
/* If the subkey is protected reset the passphrase to
export an unprotected subkey. This feature is
useful in cases of a subkey copied to an unattended
machine where a passphrase is not required. */
PKT_secret_key *sk_save, *sk;
sk_save = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
sk = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk_save);
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
log_info (_("about to export an unprotected subkey\n"));
switch (is_secret_key_protected (sk))
{
case -1:
rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
break;
case 0:
break;
default:
if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
; /* No secret parts. */
else if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 )
; /* Card key stub. */
else
{
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
}
break;
}
if (rc)
{
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save;
free_secret_key (sk);
log_error (_("failed to unprotect the subkey: %s\n"),
g10_errstr (rc));
goto leave;
}
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
rc = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
else
rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save;
free_secret_key (sk);
}
else
{
/* Warn the user if the secret key or any of the secret
subkeys are protected with SHA1 and we have
simple_sk_checksum set. */
if(!sha1_warned && opt.simple_sk_checksum &&
(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY ||
node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) &&
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.sha1chk)
{
/* I hope this warning doesn't confuse people. */
log_info(_("WARNING: secret key %s does not have a "
"simple SK checksum\n"),keystr(sk_keyid));
sha1_warned=1;
}
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
rc = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
else
rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
}
if( rc ) {
log_error("build_packet(%d) failed: %s\n",
node->pkt->pkttype, g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
}
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT) && indent)
{
for (; indent; indent--)
iobuf_put (out, ')');
iobuf_put (out, '\n');
}
++*any;
if(keyblock_out)
{
*keyblock_out=keyblock;
break;
}
}
/****************
* Delete a public or secret key from a keyring.
* r_sec_avail will be set if a secret key is available and the public
* key can't be deleted for that reason.
*/
static int
do_delete_key( const char *username, int secret, int force, int *r_sec_avail )
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KBNODE node;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (secret);
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
int okay=0;
int yes;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
int exactmatch;
*r_sec_avail = 0;
/* search the userid */
classify_user_id (username, &desc);
exactmatch = (desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
|| desc.mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20);
rc = desc.mode? keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1):G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
if (rc) {
log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"), username, g10_errstr (rc));
write_status_text( STATUS_DELETE_PROBLEM, "1" );
goto leave;
}
/* read the keyblock */
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock );
if (rc) {
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY:PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node ) {
log_error("Oops; key not found anymore!\n");
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
goto leave;
}
if( secret )
{
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
}
else
{
/* public */
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
if(!force)
{
rc = seckey_available( keyid );
if( !rc )
{
*r_sec_avail = 1;
rc = -1;
goto leave;
}
else if( rc != G10ERR_NO_SECKEY )
log_error("%s: get secret key: %s\n", username, g10_errstr(rc) );
else
rc = 0;
}
}
if( rc )
rc = 0;
else if (opt.batch && exactmatch)
okay++;
else if( opt.batch && secret )
{
log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode\n"));
log_info (_("(unless you specify the key by fingerprint)\n"));
}
else if( opt.batch && opt.answer_yes )
okay++;
else if( opt.batch )
{
log_error(_("can't do this in batch mode without \"--yes\"\n"));
log_info (_("(unless you specify the key by fingerprint)\n"));
}
else {
if( secret )
print_seckey_info( sk );
else
print_pubkey_info(NULL, pk );
tty_printf( "\n" );
yes = cpr_get_answer_is_yes( secret? "delete_key.secret.okay"
: "delete_key.okay",
_("Delete this key from the keyring? (y/N) "));
if( !cpr_enabled() && secret && yes ) {
/* I think it is not required to check a passphrase; if
* the user is so stupid as to let others access his secret keyring
* (and has no backup) - it is up him to read some very
* basic texts about security.
*/
yes = cpr_get_answer_is_yes("delete_key.secret.okay",
_("This is a secret key! - really delete? (y/N) "));
}
if( yes )
okay++;
}
if( okay ) {
rc = keydb_delete_keyblock (hd);
if (rc) {
log_error (_("deleting keyblock failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
goto leave;
}
/* Note that the ownertrust being cleared will trigger a
revalidation_mark(). This makes sense - only deleting keys
that have ownertrust set should trigger this. */
if (!secret && pk && clear_ownertrusts (pk)) {
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("ownertrust information cleared\n"));
}
}
leave:
keydb_release (hd);
release_kbnode (keyblock);
return rc;
}
static void
list_keyblock_colon( KBNODE keyblock, int secret )
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
u32 keyid[2];
int any=0;
int trustletter = 0;
int ulti_hack = 0;
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node ) {
log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
dump_kbnode( keyblock );
return;
}
if( secret ) {
pk = NULL;
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
printf("sec:u:%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
sk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID here */ );
}
else {
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sk = NULL;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
fputs( "pub:", stdout );
trustletter = 0;
if ( !pk->is_valid )
putchar ('i');
else if ( pk->is_revoked )
putchar ('r');
else if ( pk->has_expired )
putchar ('e');
else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
;
else {
trustletter = query_trust_info( pk, NULL );
if( trustletter == 'u' )
ulti_hack = 1;
putchar(trustletter);
}
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
if( pk->local_id )
printf("%lu", pk->local_id );
putchar(':');
if( pk->local_id && !opt.fast_list_mode
&& !opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
putchar( get_ownertrust_info( pk->local_id ) );
putchar(':');
}
if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
/* do not merge the first uid with the primary key */
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint )
fingerprint( pk, sk );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk, keyid );
any = 1;
}
for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
/*
* Fixme: We need a is_valid flag here too
*/
if( any ) {
if ( node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
printf("uid:r::::::::");
else if ( opt.no_expensive_trust_checks ) {
printf("uid:::::::::");
}
else {
byte namehash[20];
if( pk && !ulti_hack ) {
if( node->pkt->pkt.user_id->photo )
rmd160_hash_buffer( namehash,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->photo,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->photolen);
else
rmd160_hash_buffer( namehash,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
trustletter = query_trust_info( pk, namehash );
}
else
trustletter = 'u';
printf("uid:%c::::::::", trustletter);
}
}
print_string( stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':' );
putchar(':');
if (any)
putchar('\n');
else {
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint )
fingerprint( pk, sk );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk, keyid );
any = 1;
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint )
fingerprint( pk, sk ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_pk( pk2, keyid2 );
fputs ("sub:", stdout );
if ( !pk2->is_valid )
putchar ('i');
else if ( pk2->is_revoked )
putchar ('r');
else if ( pk2->has_expired )
putchar ('e');
else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
;
else {
printf("%c", trustletter );
}
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:",
nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),
pk2->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
colon_datestr_from_pk( pk2 ),
colon_strtime (pk2->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */
);
if( pk->local_id ) /* use the local_id of the main key??? */
printf("%lu", pk->local_id );
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk2, NULL, NULL);
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint > 1 )
fingerprint( pk2, NULL );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk2, keyid2 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint )
fingerprint( pk, sk ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_sk( sk2, keyid2 );
printf("ssb::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::::",
nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),
sk2->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
colon_datestr_from_sk( sk2 ),
colon_strtime (sk2->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID */ );
print_capabilities (NULL, sk2, NULL);
putchar ('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint > 1 )
fingerprint( NULL, sk2 );
}
else if( opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc;
char *sigstr;
if( !any ) { /* no user id, (maybe a revocation follows)*/
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 )
fputs("[revoked]:", stdout);
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
fputs("[key binding]:", stdout);
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 )
fputs("[subkey revoked]:", stdout);
else
putchar (':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint )
fingerprint( pk, sk );
any=1;
}
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
sigstr = "rev";
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
sigstr = "sig";
else {
printf("sig::::::::::%02x:\n",sig->sig_class );
continue;
}
if( opt.check_sigs ) {
fflush(stdout);
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
switch( rc ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
}
else {
rc = 0;
sigrc = ' ';
}
fputs( sigstr, stdout );
putchar(':');
if( sigrc != ' ' )
putchar(sigrc);
printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s::::", sig->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)sig->keyid[0],
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], colon_datestr_from_sig(sig));
if( sigrc == '%' )
printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
print_string( stdout, p, n, ':' );
m_free(p);
}
printf(":%02x:\n", sig->sig_class );
/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
}
}
if( !any ) {/* oops, no user id */
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
}
}
static void
list_keyblock_print ( KBNODE keyblock, int secret )
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
u32 keyid[2];
int any=0;
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node ) {
log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
dump_kbnode( keyblock );
return;
}
if( secret ) {
pk = NULL;
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
printf("sec %4u%c/%08lX %s ", nbits_from_sk( sk ),
pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1],
datestr_from_sk( sk ) );
}
else {
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sk = NULL;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
printf("pub %4u%c/%08lX %s ", nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1],
datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
}
for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
if( any )
printf("uid%*s", 28, "");
if ( node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
fputs ("[revoked] ", stdout);
print_utf8_string( stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
putchar('\n');
if( !any ) {
if( opt.fingerprint )
fingerprint( pk, sk );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk, keyid );
any = 1;
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint )
fingerprint( pk, sk ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_pk( pk2, keyid2 );
printf("sub %4u%c/%08lX %s", nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),
pubkey_letter( pk2->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid2[1],
datestr_from_pk( pk2 ) );
if( pk2->expiredate ) {
printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_pk( pk2 ) );
}
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint > 1 )
fingerprint( pk2, NULL );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk2, keyid2 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint )
fingerprint( pk, sk ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_sk( sk2, keyid2 );
printf("ssb %4u%c/%08lX %s\n", nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),
pubkey_letter( sk2->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid2[1],
datestr_from_sk( sk2 ) );
if( opt.fingerprint > 1 )
fingerprint( NULL, sk2 );
}
else if( opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc;
char *sigstr;
if( !any ) { /* no user id, (maybe a revocation follows)*/
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 )
puts("[revoked]");
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
puts("[key binding]");
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 )
puts("[subkey revoked]");
else
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint )
fingerprint( pk, sk );
any=1;
}
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
sigstr = "rev";
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
sigstr = "sig";
else {
printf("sig "
"[unexpected signature class 0x%02x]\n",sig->sig_class );
continue;
}
if( opt.check_sigs ) {
fflush(stdout);
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
switch( rc ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
}
else {
rc = 0;
sigrc = ' ';
}
fputs( sigstr, stdout );
printf("%c %08lX %s ",
sigrc, (ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig));
if( sigrc == '%' )
printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
print_utf8_string( stdout, p, n );
m_free(p);
}
putchar('\n');
/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
}
}
putchar('\n');
}
