static int x9_62_tests()
{
int ret = 0;
/* set own rand method */
if (!change_rand())
goto x962_err;
if (!TEST_true(x9_62_test_internal(NID_X9_62_prime192v1,
"3342403536405981729393488334694600415596881826869351677613",
"5735822328888155254683894997897571951568553642892029982342")))
goto x962_err;
if (!TEST_true(x9_62_test_internal(NID_X9_62_prime239v1,
"3086361431751678114926225473006680188549593787585317781474"
"62058306432176",
"3238135532097973577080787768312505059318910517550078427819"
"78505179448783")))
goto x962_err;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
if (!TEST_true(x9_62_test_internal(NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1,
"87194383164871543355722284926904419997237591535066528048",
"308992691965804947361541664549085895292153777025772063598")))
goto x962_err;
if (!TEST_true(x9_62_test_internal(NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1,
"2159633321041961198501834003903461262881815148684178964245"
"5876922391552",
"1970303740007316867383349976549972270528498040721988191026"
"49413465737174")))
goto x962_err;
# endif
ret = 1;
x962_err:
if (!TEST_true(restore_rand()))
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
/*-
* This function hijacks the RNG to feed it the chosen ECDSA key and nonce.
* The ECDSA KATs are from:
* - the X9.62 draft (4)
* - NIST CAVP (720)
*
* It uses the low-level ECDSA_sign_setup instead of EVP to control the RNG.
* NB: This is not how applications should use ECDSA; this is only for testing.
*
* Tests the library can successfully:
* - generate public keys that matches those KATs
* - create ECDSA signatures that match those KATs
* - accept those signatures as valid
*/
static int x9_62_tests(int n)
{
int nid, md_nid, ret = 0;
const char *r_in = NULL, *s_in = NULL, *tbs = NULL;
unsigned char *pbuf = NULL, *qbuf = NULL, *message = NULL;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dgst_len = 0;
long q_len, msg_len = 0;
size_t p_len;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
EC_KEY *key = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *signature = NULL;
BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *rp = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].nid;
md_nid = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].md_nid;
r_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].r;
s_in = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].s;
tbs = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].msg;
numbers[0] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].d;
numbers[1] = ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].k;
TEST_info("ECDSA KATs for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())
/* get the message digest */
|| !TEST_ptr(message = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(tbs, &msg_len))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid), NULL))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, message, msg_len))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, digest, &dgst_len))
/* create the key */
|| !TEST_ptr(key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
/* load KAT variables */
|| !TEST_ptr(r = BN_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(s = BN_new())
|| !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&r, r_in))
|| !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&s, s_in))
/* swap the RNG source */
|| !TEST_true(change_rand()))
goto err;
/* public key must match KAT */
use_fake = 1;
if (!TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
|| !TEST_true(p_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(key, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
&pbuf, NULL))
|| !TEST_ptr(qbuf = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(ecdsa_cavs_kats[n].Q, &q_len))
|| !TEST_int_eq(q_len, p_len)
|| !TEST_mem_eq(qbuf, q_len, pbuf, p_len))
goto err;
/* create the signature via ECDSA_sign_setup to avoid use of ECDSA nonces */
use_fake = 1;
if (!TEST_true(ECDSA_sign_setup(key, NULL, &kinv, &rp))
|| !TEST_ptr(signature = ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, dgst_len,
kinv, rp, key))
/* verify the signature */
|| !TEST_int_eq(ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dgst_len, signature, key), 1))
goto err;
/* compare the created signature with the expected signature */
ECDSA_SIG_get0(signature, &sig_r, &sig_s);
if (!TEST_BN_eq(sig_r, r)
|| !TEST_BN_eq(sig_s, s))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
/* restore the RNG source */
if (!TEST_true(restore_rand()))
ret = 0;
OPENSSL_free(message);
OPENSSL_free(pbuf);
OPENSSL_free(qbuf);
EC_KEY_free(key);
ECDSA_SIG_free(signature);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
BN_clear_free(rp);
return ret;
}