/*
Plaintext data has been processed as a response to MATRIXSSL_APP_DATA or
MATRIXSSL_RECEIVED_ALERT return codes from matrixSslReceivedData()
Return:
< 0 on error
0 if there is no more incoming ssl data in the buffer
Caller should take whatever action is appropriate to the specific
protocol implementation, eg. read for more data, close, etc.
> 0 error code is same meaning as from matrixSslReceivedData()
In this case, ptbuf and ptlen will be modified and caller should
handle return code identically as from matrixSslReceivedData()
This is the case when more than one SSL record is in the buffer
*/
int32 matrixSslProcessedData(ssl_t *ssl, unsigned char **ptbuf, uint32 *ptlen)
{
uint32 ctlen;
if (!ssl || !ptbuf || !ptlen) {
return PS_ARG_FAIL;
}
*ptbuf = NULL;
*ptlen = 0;
psAssert(ssl->insize > 0 && ssl->inbuf != NULL);
/* Move any remaining data to the beginning of the buffer */
if (ssl->inlen > 0) {
ctlen = ssl->rec.len + ssl->recordHeadLen;
#if defined(USE_TLS_1_2) && defined(USE_AES_GCM)
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_GMAC_R) {
/* This overhead was removed from rec.len after the decryption
to keep buffer logic working. */
ctlen += TLS_GCM_TAG_LEN + ssl->nonceCtrLen;
}
#endif
memmove(ssl->inbuf, ssl->inbuf + ctlen, ssl->inlen);
}
/* Shrink inbuf to default size once inlen < default size */
revertToDefaultBufsize(ssl, SSL_INBUF);
/* If there's more data, try to decode it here and return that code */
if (ssl->inlen > 0) {
/* NOTE: ReceivedData cannot return 0 */
return matrixSslReceivedData(ssl, 0, ptbuf, ptlen);
}
return MATRIXSSL_SUCCESS;
}
/*
Plaintext data has been processed as a response to MATRIXSSL_APP_DATA or
MATRIXSSL_RECEIVED_ALERT return codes from matrixSslReceivedData()
Return:
< 0 on error
0 if there is no more incoming ssl data in the buffer
Caller should take whatever action is appropriate to the specific
protocol implementation, eg. read for more data, close, etc.
> 0 error code is same meaning as from matrixSslReceivedData()
In this case, ptbuf and ptlen will be modified and caller should
handle return code identically as from matrixSslReceivedData()
This is the case when more than one SSL record is in the buffer
*/
int32 matrixSslProcessedData(ssl_t *ssl, unsigned char **ptbuf, uint32 *ptlen)
{
uint32 ctlen;
if (!ssl || !ptbuf || !ptlen) {
return PS_ARG_FAIL;
}
*ptbuf = NULL;
*ptlen = 0;
psAssert(ssl->insize > 0 && ssl->inbuf != NULL);
/* Move any remaining data to the beginning of the buffer */
if (ssl->inlen > 0) {
ctlen = ssl->rec.len + ssl->recordHeadLen;
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_AEAD_R) {
/* This overhead was removed from rec.len after the decryption
to keep buffer logic working. */
/* TODO: This is for checking async or not. If async, this length
tweak never happens. Need a more generic way to look for
blocking or not */
ctlen += AEAD_TAG_LEN(ssl) + AEAD_NONCE_LEN(ssl);
}
memmove(ssl->inbuf, ssl->inbuf + ctlen, ssl->inlen);
}
/* Shrink inbuf to default size once inlen < default size */
revertToDefaultBufsize(ssl, SSL_INBUF);
/* If there's more data, try to decode it here and return that code */
if (ssl->inlen > 0) {
/* NOTE: ReceivedData cannot return 0 */
return matrixSslReceivedData(ssl, 0, ptbuf, ptlen);
}
return MATRIXSSL_SUCCESS;
}
/*
Caller has received data from the network and is notifying the SSL layer
*/
int32 matrixSslReceivedData(ssl_t *ssl, uint32 bytes, unsigned char **ptbuf,
uint32 *ptlen)
{
unsigned char *buf, *prevBuf;
int32 rc, decodeRet, size, sanity, decodeErr;
uint32 processed, start, len, reqLen;
unsigned char alertLevel, alertDesc;
unsigned char *p;
if (!ssl || !ptbuf || !ptlen) {
return PS_ARG_FAIL;
}
psAssert(ssl->outsize > 0 && ssl->outbuf != NULL);
psAssert(ssl->insize > 0 && ssl->inbuf != NULL);
*ptbuf = NULL;
*ptlen = 0;
ssl->inlen += bytes;
if (ssl->inlen == 0) {
return PS_SUCCESS; /* Nothing to do. Basically a poll */
}
/* This is outside the loop b/c we may want to parse within inbuf later */
buf = ssl->inbuf;
DECODE_MORE:
/* Parameterized sanity check to avoid infinite loops */
if (matrixSslHandshakeIsComplete(ssl)) {
/* Minimum possible record size once negotiated */
sanity = ssl->inlen / (SSL3_HEADER_LEN + MD5_HASH_SIZE);
} else {
/* Even with an SSLv2 hello, the sanity check will let 1 pass through */
sanity = ssl->inlen / (SSL3_HEADER_LEN + SSL3_HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LEN);
}
if (sanity-- < 0) {
return PS_PROTOCOL_FAIL; /* We've tried to decode too many times */
}
len = ssl->inlen;
size = ssl->insize - (buf - ssl->inbuf);
prevBuf = buf;
decodeRet = matrixSslDecode(ssl, &buf, &len, size, &start, &reqLen,
&decodeErr, &alertLevel, &alertDesc);
/*
Convenience for the cases that expect buf to have moved
- calculate the number of encoded bytes that were decoded
*/
processed = buf - prevBuf;
rc = PS_PROTOCOL_FAIL;
switch (decodeRet) {
case MATRIXSSL_SUCCESS:
ssl->inlen -= processed;
if (ssl->inlen > 0) {
psAssert(buf > ssl->inbuf);
/*
Pack ssl->inbuf so there is immediate maximum room for potential
outgoing data that needs to be written
*/
memmove(ssl->inbuf, buf, ssl->inlen);
buf = ssl->inbuf;
goto DECODE_MORE; /* More data in buffer to process */
}
/*
In this case, we've parsed a finished message and no additional data is
available to parse. We let the client know the handshake is complete,
which can be used as a trigger to begin for example a HTTP request.
*/
if (!(ssl->bFlags & BFLAG_HS_COMPLETE)) {
if (matrixSslHandshakeIsComplete(ssl)) {
ssl->bFlags |= BFLAG_HS_COMPLETE;
#ifdef USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL
matrixSslGetSessionId(ssl, ssl->sid);
#endif /* USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL */
rc = MATRIXSSL_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE;
} else {
rc = MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_RECV; /* Need to recv more handshake data */
}
} else {
#ifdef USE_DTLS
rc = MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_RECV; /* Got FINISHED without CCS */
#else
/* This is an error - we shouldn't get here */
#endif
}
break;
#ifdef USE_DTLS
case DTLS_RETRANSMIT:
/* Only request a resend if last record in buffer */
ssl->inlen -= processed;
if (ssl->inlen > 0) {
psAssert(buf > ssl->inbuf);
/*
Pack ssl->inbuf so there is immediate maximum room for potential
outgoing data that needs to be written
*/
memmove(ssl->inbuf, buf, ssl->inlen);
buf = ssl->inbuf;
goto DECODE_MORE; /* More data in buffer to process */
}
/* Flight will be rebuilt when matrixDtlsGetOutdata is called while
outbuf is empty. This is the return case where we are actually
seeing a repeat handshake message so we know something was lost in
flight. */
return MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_SEND;
#endif
case SSL_SEND_RESPONSE:
#ifdef ENABLE_FALSE_START
/*
If FALSE START is supported, there may be APPLICATION_DATA directly
following the FINISHED message, even though we haven't sent our
CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC or FINISHED message. This is signalled by buf
having been moved forward, and our response being put directly into
ssl->outbuf, rather than in buf (ssl->inbuf). Return a REQUEST_SEND
so that the data in outbuf is flushed before the remaining data in
ssl->inbuf is parsed.
*/
if ((ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_FALSE_START) && buf != prevBuf) {
ssl->inlen -= processed;
psAssert(ssl->inlen > 0);
psAssert((uint32)ssl->inlen == start);
psAssert(buf > ssl->inbuf);
memmove(ssl->inbuf, buf, ssl->inlen); /* Pack ssl->inbuf */
buf = ssl->inbuf;
return MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_SEND;
}
#endif
/*
This must be handshake data (or alert) or we'd be in PROCESS_DATA
so there is no way there is anything left inside inbuf to process.
...so processed isn't valid because the output params are outbuf
related and we simply reset inlen
*/
ssl->inlen = 0;
/* If alert, close connection after sending */
if (alertDesc != SSL_ALERT_NONE) {
ssl->bFlags |= BFLAG_CLOSE_AFTER_SENT;
}
psAssert(prevBuf == buf);
psAssert(ssl->insize >= (int32)len);
psAssert(start == 0);
psAssert(buf == ssl->inbuf);
if (ssl->outlen > 0) {
/* If data's in outbuf, append inbuf. This is a corner case that
can happen if application data is queued but then incoming data
is processed and discovered to be a re-handshake request.
matrixSslDecode will have constructed the response flight but
we don't want to forget about the app data we haven't sent */
if (ssl->outlen + (int32)len > ssl->outsize) {
if ((p = psRealloc(ssl->outbuf, ssl->outlen + len,
ssl->bufferPool)) == NULL) {
return PS_MEM_FAIL;
}
ssl->outbuf = p;
ssl->outsize = ssl->outlen + len;
}
memcpy(ssl->outbuf + ssl->outlen, ssl->inbuf, len);
ssl->outlen += len;
} else { /* otherwise, swap inbuf and outbuf */
buf = ssl->outbuf; ssl->outbuf = ssl->inbuf; ssl->inbuf = buf;
ssl->outlen = len;
len = ssl->outsize; ssl->outsize = ssl->insize; ssl->insize = len;
buf = ssl->inbuf;
len = ssl->outlen;
}
rc = MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_SEND; /* We queued data to send out */
break;
case MATRIXSSL_ERROR:
if (decodeErr >= 0) {
//printf("THIS SHOULD BE A NEGATIVE VALUE?\n");
}
return decodeErr; /* Will be a negative value */
case SSL_ALERT:
if (alertLevel == SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL) {
psTraceIntInfo("Received FATAL alert %d.\n", alertDesc);
} else {
/* Closure notify is the normal case */
if (alertDesc == SSL_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
psTraceInfo("Normal SSL closure alert\n");
} else {
psTraceIntInfo("Received WARNING alert %d\n", alertDesc);
}
}
/* Let caller access the 2 data bytes (severity and description) */
#ifdef USE_TLS_1_1
/* Been ignoring the explicit IV up to this final return point. */
if ((ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_READ_SECURE) &&
(ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_TLS_1_1) && (ssl->enBlockSize > 1)) {
prevBuf += ssl->enBlockSize;
}
#endif /* USE_TLS_1_1 */
psAssert(len == 2);
*ptbuf = prevBuf;
*ptlen = len;
ssl->inlen -= processed;
return MATRIXSSL_RECEIVED_ALERT;
case SSL_PARTIAL:
if (reqLen > SSL_MAX_BUF_SIZE) {
return PS_MEM_FAIL;
}
if (reqLen > (uint32)ssl->insize) {
if ((p = psRealloc(ssl->inbuf, reqLen, ssl->bufferPool)) == NULL) {
return PS_MEM_FAIL;
}
ssl->inbuf = p;
ssl->insize = reqLen;
buf = ssl->inbuf;
/* Don't need to change inlen */
}
rc = MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_RECV; /* Expecting more data */
break;
/* We've got outgoing data that's larger than our buffer */
case SSL_FULL:
if (reqLen > SSL_MAX_BUF_SIZE) {
return PS_MEM_FAIL;
}
/* We balk if we get a large handshake message */
if (reqLen > SSL_MAX_PLAINTEXT_LEN &&
!matrixSslHandshakeIsComplete(ssl)) {
if (reqLen > SSL_MAX_PLAINTEXT_LEN) {
return PS_MEM_FAIL;
}
}
/*
Can't envision any possible case where there is remaining data
in inbuf to process and are getting SSL_FULL.
*/
ssl->inlen = 0;
/* Grow inbuf */
if (reqLen > (uint32)ssl->insize) {
len = ssl->inbuf - buf;
if ((p = psRealloc(ssl->inbuf, reqLen, ssl->bufferPool)) == NULL) {
return PS_MEM_FAIL;
}
ssl->inbuf = p;
ssl->insize = reqLen;
buf = ssl->inbuf + len;
/* Note we leave inlen untouched here */
} else {
psTraceInfo("Encoding error. Possible wrong flight messagSize\n");
return PS_PROTOCOL_FAIL; /* error in our encoding */
}
goto DECODE_MORE;
case SSL_PROCESS_DATA:
/*
Possible we received a finished message and app data in the same
flight. In this case, the caller is not notified that the handshake
is complete, but rather is notified that there is application data to
process.
*/
if (!(ssl->bFlags & BFLAG_HS_COMPLETE) &&
matrixSslHandshakeIsComplete(ssl)) {
ssl->bFlags |= BFLAG_HS_COMPLETE;
#ifdef USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL
matrixSslGetSessionId(ssl, ssl->sid);
#endif /* USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL */
}
/*
. prevbuf points to start of unencrypted data
. buf points to start of any remaining unencrypted data
. start is length of remaining encrypted data yet to decode
. len is length of unencrypted data ready for user processing
*/
ssl->inlen -= processed;
psAssert((uint32)ssl->inlen == start);
/* Call user plaintext data handler */
#ifdef USE_TLS_1_1
/* Been ignoring the explicit IV up to this final return point. */
/* NOTE: This test has been on enBlockSize for a very long time but
it looks like it should be on deBlockSize since this a decryption.
Changed and added an assert to see if these ever don't match */
psAssert(ssl->enBlockSize == ssl->deBlockSize);
if ((ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_READ_SECURE) &&
(ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_TLS_1_1) && (ssl->deBlockSize > 1)) {
len -= ssl->deBlockSize;
prevBuf += ssl->deBlockSize;
}
/* END enBlockSize to deBlockSize change */
#endif /* USE_TLS_1_1 */
*ptbuf = prevBuf;
*ptlen = len;
#ifdef USE_DTLS
/*
This flag is used in conjuction with flightDone in the buffer
management API set to determine whether we are still in a handshake
state for attempting flight resends. If we are getting app data we
know for certain we are out of the hs states. Testing HandshakeComplete
is not enough because you never know if the other side got FINISHED.
*/
if (ssl->flags & SSL_FLAGS_DTLS) {
ssl->appDataExch = 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_ZLIB_COMPRESSION
if (ssl->compression > 0) {
return MATRIXSSL_APP_DATA_COMPRESSED;
}
#endif
return MATRIXSSL_APP_DATA;
} /* switch decodeRet */
if (ssl->inlen > 0 && (buf != ssl->inbuf)) {
psAssert(0);
}
/*
Shrink inbuf to default size once inlen < default size, and we aren't
expecting any more data in the buffer. If SSL_PARTIAL, don't shrink the
buffer, since we expect to fill it up shortly.
*/
if (decodeRet != SSL_PARTIAL) {
revertToDefaultBufsize(ssl, SSL_INBUF);
}
return rc;
}
/*
Caller is indicating 'bytes' of data was written
*/
int32 matrixSslSentData(ssl_t *ssl, uint32 bytes)
{
int32 rc;
if (!ssl) {
return PS_ARG_FAIL;
}
if (bytes == 0) {
if (ssl->outlen > 0) {
return MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_SEND;
} else {
return MATRIXSSL_SUCCESS; /* Nothing to do */
}
}
psAssert(ssl->outsize > 0 && ssl->outbuf != NULL);
ssl->outlen -= bytes;
rc = MATRIXSSL_SUCCESS;
if (ssl->outlen > 0) {
memmove(ssl->outbuf, ssl->outbuf + bytes, ssl->outlen);
/* This was changed during 3.7.1 DTLS work. The line below used to be:
rc = MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_SEND; and it was possible for it to be
overridden with HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE below. This was a problem
if only the ChangeCipherSpec portion of the final flight was
just set becuase matrixSslHandshakeIsComplete would return 1
because the state looks right. However, there would still be a
FINISHED message sitting in outbuf when COMPLETE is returned.
This seemed like a bigger problem than just the DTLS test case
that caught it. If the transport layer of straight TLS sent off
only the CCS message for some reason, this would cause the same
odd combo of COMPLETE but with a FINISHED message that hasn't
been sent.
It seems fine to return REQUEST_SEND whenever there is data left
in the outgoing buffer but it is suspecious it wasn't written
this way to begin with so maybe there was another corner case
the COMPLETE was solving. Hope not.
In any case, it looks safe to make this a global change but if you
are reading this because you are trying to track down a change in
behavior in matrixSslSentData, maybe this documentation will help.
*/
return MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_SEND;
}
/* If there's nothing left to flush, reallocate the buffer smaller. */
if ((ssl->outlen == 0) && (ssl->bFlags & BFLAG_CLOSE_AFTER_SENT)) {
/* We want to close the connection now */
rc = MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_CLOSE;
} else {
revertToDefaultBufsize(ssl, SSL_OUTBUF);
}
/* Indicate the handshake is complete, in this case, the finished message
is being/has been just sent. Occurs in session resumption. */
if (!(ssl->bFlags & BFLAG_HS_COMPLETE) &&
matrixSslHandshakeIsComplete(ssl)) {
ssl->bFlags |= BFLAG_HS_COMPLETE;
#ifdef USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL
matrixSslGetSessionId(ssl, ssl->sid);
#endif /* USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL */
rc = MATRIXSSL_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE;
#ifdef USE_SSL_INFORMATIONAL_TRACE
/* Client side resumed completion or server standard completion */
matrixSslPrintHSDetails(ssl);
#endif
}
return rc;
}
/*
Caller is indicating 'bytes' of data was written
*/
int32 matrixSslSentData(ssl_t *ssl, uint32 bytes)
{
int32 rc;
if (!ssl) {
return PS_ARG_FAIL;
}
if (bytes == 0) {
if (ssl->outlen > 0) {
return MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_SEND;
} else {
return MATRIXSSL_SUCCESS; /* Nothing to do */
}
}
psAssert(ssl->outsize > 0 && ssl->outbuf != NULL);
ssl->outlen -= bytes;
rc = MATRIXSSL_SUCCESS;
if (ssl->outlen > 0) {
memmove(ssl->outbuf, ssl->outbuf + bytes, ssl->outlen);
rc = MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_SEND;
}
/* If there's nothing left to flush, reallocate the buffer smaller. */
if ((ssl->outlen == 0) && (ssl->bFlags & BFLAG_CLOSE_AFTER_SENT)) {
/* We want to close the connection now */
rc = MATRIXSSL_REQUEST_CLOSE;
} else {
revertToDefaultBufsize(ssl, SSL_OUTBUF);
}
/* Indicate the handshake is complete, in this case, the finished message
is being/has been just sent. Occurs in session resumption. */
if (!(ssl->bFlags & BFLAG_HS_COMPLETE) &&
matrixSslHandshakeIsComplete(ssl)) {
ssl->bFlags |= BFLAG_HS_COMPLETE;
#ifdef USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL
matrixSslGetSessionId(ssl, ssl->sid);
#endif /* USE_CLIENT_SIDE_SSL */
rc = MATRIXSSL_HANDSHAKE_COMPLETE;
#ifdef USE_SSL_INFORMATIONAL_TRACE
/* Client side resumed completion or server standard completion */
matrixSslPrintHSDetails(ssl);
#endif
#ifdef USE_UNIFIED_PKCS11
/* Too ugly to track DTLS client/server/normal/resumed/rehandshake cases
for deleting old crypto session objects for the minimum lifecycle
so we're just looking for any leftover cases here when we are
certain handshake is complete.
NOTE: It is possible this oldCrypt will still be needed if the
final flight is the CCS/FINISHED pair only and the application
has built in the smarts to resend if no app data is received. This
problem would manifest itself in a failed cipher init and the
solution would be to hold off this free until application data
is exchanged */
if (ssl->sec.oldCrypt != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
ssl->sec.oldCrypt != ssl->sec.pkcs11Ses) {
pkcs11CloseSession(ssl->sec.oldCrypt);
ssl->sec.oldCrypt = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
#endif
}
return rc;
}