int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
unsigned flags;
char *opt_shell = NULL;
char *opt_command = NULL;
const char *opt_username = "******";
struct passwd *pw;
uid_t cur_uid = getuid();
const char *tty;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
char user_buf[64];
#endif
const char *old_user;
flags = getopt32(argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell);
//argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argv[0] && LONE_DASH(argv[0])) {
flags |= SU_OPT_l;
argv++;
}
/* get user if specified */
if (argv[0]) {
opt_username = argv[0];
argv++;
}
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
/* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to
* identify the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell.
* But getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry.
* in this case resort to getpwuid. */
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
old_user = user_buf;
if (getlogin_r(user_buf, sizeof(user_buf)) != 0)
#endif
{
pw = getpwuid(cur_uid);
old_user = pw ? xstrdup(pw->pw_name) : "";
}
tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2);
if (!tty) {
tty = "none";
}
openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
}
pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username);
if (cur_uid == 0 || correct_password(pw)) {
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
'+', tty, old_user, opt_username);
} else {
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
'-', tty, old_user, opt_username);
bb_error_msg_and_die("incorrect password");
}
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
closelog();
}
if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp)) {
/* -s SHELL is not given, but "preserve env" opt is */
opt_shell = getenv("SHELL");
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS
if (opt_shell && cur_uid != 0 && pw->pw_shell && restricted_shell(pw->pw_shell)) {
/* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is
* probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't
* compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
* shell. */
bb_error_msg("using restricted shell");
opt_shell = NULL; /* ignore -s PROG */
}
/* else: user can run whatever he wants via "su -s PROG USER".
* This is safe since PROG is run under user's uid/gid. */
#endif
if (!opt_shell)
opt_shell = pw->pw_shell;
change_identity(pw);
setup_environment(opt_shell,
((flags & SU_OPT_l) / SU_OPT_l * SETUP_ENV_CLEARENV)
+ (!(flags & SU_OPT_mp) * SETUP_ENV_CHANGEENV),
pw);
IF_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(NULL);)
int su_main ( int argc, char **argv )
{
unsigned long flags;
char *opt_shell = 0;
char *opt_command = 0;
char *opt_username = DEFAULT_USER;
char **opt_args = 0;
struct passwd *pw;
uid_t cur_uid = getuid();
#if defined( SYSLOG_SUCCESS ) || defined( SYSLOG_FAILURE )
const char *tty;
const char *old_user;
#endif
flags = bb_getopt_ulflags(argc, argv, "mplc:s:",
&opt_command, &opt_shell);
#define SU_OPT_m (3)
#define SU_OPT_p (3)
#define SU_OPT_l (4)
if (optind < argc && argv[optind][0] == '-' && argv[optind][1] == 0) {
flags |= SU_OPT_l;
++optind;
}
/* get user if specified */
if ( optind < argc )
opt_username = argv [optind++];
if ( optind < argc )
opt_args = argv + optind;
#if defined( SYSLOG_SUCCESS ) || defined( SYSLOG_FAILURE )
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
/* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to identify
the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell. */
old_user = getlogin ( );
if ( !old_user )
#endif
{
/* getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry.
Resort to getpwuid. */
pw = getpwuid ( cur_uid );
old_user = ( pw ? pw->pw_name : "" );
}
tty = ttyname ( 2 );
if(!tty)
tty = "none";
openlog ( bb_applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH );
#endif
pw = getpwnam ( opt_username );
if ( !pw )
bb_error_msg_and_die ( "user %s does not exist", opt_username );
/* Make sure pw->pw_shell is non-NULL. It may be NULL when NEW_USER
is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP), but that doesn't have
a default shell listed. */
if ( !pw->pw_shell || !pw->pw_shell [0] )
pw->pw_shell = (char *) DEFAULT_SHELL;
if ((( cur_uid == 0 ) || correct_password ( pw ))) {
log_su_successful(pw->pw_uid, old_user, tty );
} else {
log_su_failure (pw->pw_uid, old_user, tty );
bb_error_msg_and_die ( "incorrect password" );
}
#if defined( SYSLOG_SUCCESS ) || defined( SYSLOG_FAILURE )
closelog();
#endif
if ( !opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_p))
opt_shell = getenv ( "SHELL" );
if ( opt_shell && cur_uid && restricted_shell ( pw->pw_shell )) {
/* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is
probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't
compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
shell. */
fputs ( "using restricted shell\n", stderr );
opt_shell = 0;
}
if ( !opt_shell )
opt_shell = pw->pw_shell;
change_identity ( pw );
setup_environment(opt_shell, flags & SU_OPT_l, !(flags & SU_OPT_p), pw);
#if ENABLE_SELINUX
set_current_security_context(NULL);
#endif
run_shell(opt_shell, flags & SU_OPT_l, opt_command, (const char**)opt_args);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
int login_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char tty[BUFSIZ];
char full_tty[200];
char fromhost[512];
char username[USERNAME_SIZE];
const char *tmp;
int amroot;
int flag;
int failed;
int count=0;
struct passwd *pw, pw_copy;
#ifdef CONFIG_WHEEL_GROUP
struct group *grp;
#endif
int opt_preserve = 0;
int opt_fflag = 0;
char *opt_host = 0;
int alarmstarted = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
security_context_t stat_sid = NULL, sid = NULL, old_tty_sid=NULL, new_tty_sid=NULL;
#endif
username[0]=0;
amroot = ( getuid ( ) == 0 );
signal ( SIGALRM, alarm_handler );
alarm ( TIMEOUT );
alarmstarted = 1;
while (( flag = getopt(argc, argv, "f:h:p")) != EOF ) {
switch ( flag ) {
case 'p':
opt_preserve = 1;
break;
case 'f':
/*
* username must be a separate token
* (-f root, *NOT* -froot). --marekm
*/
if ( optarg != argv[optind-1] )
bb_show_usage( );
if ( !amroot ) /* Auth bypass only if real UID is zero */
bb_error_msg_and_die ( "-f permission denied" );
safe_strncpy(username, optarg, USERNAME_SIZE);
opt_fflag = 1;
break;
case 'h':
opt_host = optarg;
break;
default:
bb_show_usage( );
}
}
if (optind < argc) // user from command line (getty)
safe_strncpy(username, argv[optind], USERNAME_SIZE);
if ( !isatty ( 0 ) || !isatty ( 1 ) || !isatty ( 2 ))
return EXIT_FAILURE; /* Must be a terminal */
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
checkutmp ( !amroot );
#endif
tmp = ttyname ( 0 );
if ( tmp && ( strncmp ( tmp, "/dev/", 5 ) == 0 ))
safe_strncpy ( tty, tmp + 5, sizeof( tty ));
else if ( tmp && *tmp == '/' )
safe_strncpy ( tty, tmp, sizeof( tty ));
else
safe_strncpy ( tty, "UNKNOWN", sizeof( tty ));
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
if ( amroot )
memset ( utent.ut_host, 0, sizeof utent.ut_host );
#endif
if ( opt_host ) {
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
safe_strncpy ( utent.ut_host, opt_host, sizeof( utent. ut_host ));
#endif
snprintf ( fromhost, sizeof( fromhost ) - 1, " on `%.100s' from `%.200s'", tty, opt_host );
}
else
snprintf ( fromhost, sizeof( fromhost ) - 1, " on `%.100s'", tty );
setpgrp();
openlog ( "login", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_AUTH );
while ( 1 ) {
failed = 0;
if ( !username[0] )
if(!login_prompt ( username ))
return EXIT_FAILURE;
if ( !alarmstarted && ( TIMEOUT > 0 )) {
alarm ( TIMEOUT );
alarmstarted = 1;
}
if (!( pw = getpwnam ( username ))) {
pw_copy.pw_name = "UNKNOWN";
pw_copy.pw_passwd = "!";
opt_fflag = 0;
failed = 1;
} else
pw_copy = *pw;
pw = &pw_copy;
if (( pw-> pw_passwd [0] == '!' ) || ( pw-> pw_passwd[0] == '*' ))
failed = 1;
if ( opt_fflag ) {
opt_fflag = 0;
goto auth_ok;
}
if (!failed && ( pw-> pw_uid == 0 ) && ( !check_tty ( tty )))
failed = 1;
/* Don't check the password if password entry is empty (!) */
if ( !pw-> pw_passwd[0] )
goto auth_ok;
/* authorization takes place here */
if ( correct_password ( pw ))
goto auth_ok;
failed = 1;
auth_ok:
if ( !failed)
break;
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
puts("Login incorrect");
username[0] = 0;
if ( ++count == 3 ) {
syslog ( LOG_WARNING, "invalid password for `%s'%s\n", pw->pw_name, fromhost);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
alarm ( 0 );
if ( check_nologin ( pw-> pw_uid == 0 ))
return EXIT_FAILURE;
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
setutmp ( username, tty );
#endif
if ( *tty != '/' )
snprintf ( full_tty, sizeof( full_tty ) - 1, "/dev/%s", tty);
else
safe_strncpy ( full_tty, tty, sizeof( full_tty ) - 1 );
#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
if (is_selinux_enabled())
{
struct stat st;
int rc;
if (get_default_context(username, NULL, &sid))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to get SID for %s\n", username);
exit(1);
}
rc = getfilecon(full_tty,&stat_sid);
freecon(stat_sid);
if ((rc<0) || (stat(full_tty, &st)<0))
{
fprintf(stderr, "stat_secure(%.100s) failed: %.100s\n", full_tty, strerror(errno));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (security_compute_relabel (sid, old_tty_sid, SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_sid) != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "security_change_sid(%.100s) failed: %.100s\n", full_tty, strerror(errno));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if(setfilecon(full_tty, new_tty_sid) != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "chsid(%.100s, %s) failed: %.100s\n", full_tty, new_tty_sid, strerror(errno));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
freecon(sid);
freecon(old_tty_sid);
freecon(new_tty_sid);
}
#endif
if ( !is_my_tty ( full_tty ))
syslog ( LOG_ERR, "unable to determine TTY name, got %s\n", full_tty );
/* Try these, but don't complain if they fail
* (for example when the root fs is read only) */
chown ( full_tty, pw-> pw_uid, pw-> pw_gid );
chmod ( full_tty, 0600 );
change_identity ( pw );
tmp = pw-> pw_shell;
if(!tmp || !*tmp)
tmp = DEFAULT_SHELL;
setup_environment ( tmp, 1, !opt_preserve, pw );
motd ( );
signal ( SIGALRM, SIG_DFL ); /* default alarm signal */
if ( pw-> pw_uid == 0 )
syslog ( LOG_INFO, "root login %s\n", fromhost );
#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
set_current_security_context(sid);
#endif
run_shell ( tmp, 1, 0, 0); /* exec the shell finally. */
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}