Result
CheckIssuerIndependentProperties(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
const BackCert& cert,
PRTime time,
KeyUsage requiredKeyUsageIfPresent,
KeyPurposeId requiredEKUIfPresent,
const CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy,
unsigned int subCACount,
/*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
{
Result rv;
const EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA = cert.endEntityOrCA;
rv = trustDomain.GetCertTrust(endEntityOrCA, requiredPolicy, cert.GetDER(),
trustLevel);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (trustLevel == TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted) {
return Result::ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT;
}
if (trustLevel != TrustLevel::TrustAnchor &&
trustLevel != TrustLevel::InheritsTrust) {
// The TrustDomain returned a trust level that we weren't expecting.
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
}
// 4.2.1.1. Authority Key Identifier is ignored (see bug 965136).
// 4.2.1.2. Subject Key Identifier is ignored (see bug 965136).
// 4.2.1.3. Key Usage
rv = CheckKeyUsage(endEntityOrCA, cert.GetKeyUsage(),
requiredKeyUsageIfPresent);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.4. Certificate Policies
rv = CheckCertificatePolicies(endEntityOrCA, cert.GetCertificatePolicies(),
cert.GetInhibitAnyPolicy(), trustLevel,
requiredPolicy);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.5. Policy Mappings are not supported; see the documentation about
// policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// 4.2.1.6. Subject Alternative Name dealt with during name constraint
// checking and during name verification (CERT_VerifyCertName).
// 4.2.1.7. Issuer Alternative Name is not something that needs checking.
// 4.2.1.8. Subject Directory Attributes is not something that needs
// checking.
// 4.2.1.9. Basic Constraints.
rv = CheckBasicConstraints(endEntityOrCA, cert.GetBasicConstraints(),
cert.GetVersion(), trustLevel, subCACount);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.10. Name Constraints is dealt with in during path building.
// 4.2.1.11. Policy Constraints are implicitly supported; see the
// documentation about policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
rv = CheckExtendedKeyUsage(endEntityOrCA, cert.GetExtKeyUsage(),
requiredEKUIfPresent);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.13. CRL Distribution Points is not supported, though the
// TrustDomain's CheckRevocation method may parse it and process it
// on its own.
// 4.2.1.14. Inhibit anyPolicy is implicitly supported; see the documentation
// about policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// IMPORTANT: This check must come after the other checks in order for error
// ranking to work correctly.
rv = CheckValidity(cert.GetValidity(), time);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
return Success;
}
Result
CheckIssuerIndependentProperties(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
BackCert& cert,
PRTime time,
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
KeyUsages requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
SECOidTag requiredEKUIfPresent,
SECOidTag requiredPolicy,
unsigned int subCACount,
/*optional out*/ TrustDomain::TrustLevel* trustLevelOut)
{
Result rv;
TrustDomain::TrustLevel trustLevel;
rv = MapSECStatus(trustDomain.GetCertTrust(endEntityOrCA,
requiredPolicy,
cert.GetNSSCert(),
&trustLevel));
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (trustLevel == TrustDomain::ActivelyDistrusted) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT);
return RecoverableError;
}
if (trustLevel != TrustDomain::TrustAnchor &&
trustLevel != TrustDomain::InheritsTrust) {
// The TrustDomain returned a trust level that we weren't expecting.
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
return FatalError;
}
if (trustLevelOut) {
*trustLevelOut = trustLevel;
}
bool isTrustAnchor = endEntityOrCA == MustBeCA &&
trustLevel == TrustDomain::TrustAnchor;
PLArenaPool* arena = cert.GetArena();
if (!arena) {
return FatalError;
}
// 4.2.1.1. Authority Key Identifier is ignored (see bug 965136).
// 4.2.1.2. Subject Key Identifier is ignored (see bug 965136).
// 4.2.1.3. Key Usage
rv = CheckKeyUsage(endEntityOrCA, isTrustAnchor, cert.encodedKeyUsage,
requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent, arena);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.4. Certificate Policies
rv = CheckCertificatePolicies(cert, endEntityOrCA, isTrustAnchor,
requiredPolicy);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.5. Policy Mappings are not supported; see the documentation about
// policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// 4.2.1.6. Subject Alternative Name dealt with during name constraint
// checking and during name verification (CERT_VerifyCertName).
// 4.2.1.7. Issuer Alternative Name is not something that needs checking.
// 4.2.1.8. Subject Directory Attributes is not something that needs
// checking.
// 4.2.1.9. Basic Constraints.
rv = CheckBasicConstraints(cert, endEntityOrCA, isTrustAnchor, subCACount);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.10. Name Constraints is dealt with in during path building.
// 4.2.1.11. Policy Constraints are implicitly supported; see the
// documentation about policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
rv = CheckExtendedKeyUsage(endEntityOrCA, cert.encodedExtendedKeyUsage,
requiredEKUIfPresent);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.13. CRL Distribution Points is not supported, though the
// TrustDomain's CheckRevocation method may parse it and process it
// on its own.
// 4.2.1.14. Inhibit anyPolicy is implicitly supported; see the documentation
// about policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// IMPORTANT: This check must come after the other checks in order for error
// ranking to work correctly.
rv = CheckTimes(cert.GetNSSCert(), time);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
return Success;
}
Result
CheckIssuerIndependentProperties(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
const BackCert& cert,
Time time,
KeyUsage requiredKeyUsageIfPresent,
KeyPurposeId requiredEKUIfPresent,
const CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy,
unsigned int subCACount,
/*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
{
Result rv;
const EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA = cert.endEntityOrCA;
// Check the cert's trust first, because we want to minimize the amount of
// processing we do on a distrusted cert, in case it is trying to exploit
// some bug in our processing.
rv = trustDomain.GetCertTrust(endEntityOrCA, requiredPolicy, cert.GetDER(),
trustLevel);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (trustLevel == TrustLevel::TrustAnchor &&
endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity &&
requiredEKUIfPresent == KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning) {
// OCSP signer certificates can never be trust anchors, especially
// since we don't support designated OCSP responders. All of the checks
// below that are dependent on trustLevel rely on this overriding of the
// trust level for OCSP signers.
trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
}
switch (trustLevel) {
case TrustLevel::InheritsTrust:
rv = CheckSignatureAlgorithm(trustDomain, endEntityOrCA,
cert.GetSignedData(), cert.GetSignature());
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
break;
case TrustLevel::TrustAnchor:
// We don't even bother checking signatureAlgorithm or signature for
// syntactic validity for trust anchors, because we don't use those
// fields for anything, and because the trust anchor might be signed
// with a signature algorithm we don't actually support.
break;
case TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted:
return Result::ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT;
}
// Check the SPKI early, because it is one of the most selective properties
// of the certificate due to SHA-1 deprecation and the deprecation of
// certificates with keys weaker than RSA 2048.
Reader spki(cert.GetSubjectPublicKeyInfo());
rv = der::Nested(spki, der::SEQUENCE, [&](Reader& r) {
return CheckSubjectPublicKeyInfo(r, trustDomain, endEntityOrCA);
});
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
rv = der::End(spki);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.1. Authority Key Identifier is ignored (see bug 965136).
// 4.2.1.2. Subject Key Identifier is ignored (see bug 965136).
// 4.2.1.3. Key Usage
rv = CheckKeyUsage(endEntityOrCA, cert.GetKeyUsage(),
requiredKeyUsageIfPresent);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.4. Certificate Policies
rv = CheckCertificatePolicies(endEntityOrCA, cert.GetCertificatePolicies(),
cert.GetInhibitAnyPolicy(), trustLevel,
requiredPolicy);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.5. Policy Mappings are not supported; see the documentation about
// policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// 4.2.1.6. Subject Alternative Name dealt with during name constraint
// checking and during name verification (CERT_VerifyCertName).
// 4.2.1.7. Issuer Alternative Name is not something that needs checking.
// 4.2.1.8. Subject Directory Attributes is not something that needs
// checking.
// 4.2.1.9. Basic Constraints.
rv = CheckBasicConstraints(endEntityOrCA, cert.GetBasicConstraints(),
cert.GetVersion(), trustLevel, subCACount);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.10. Name Constraints is dealt with in during path building.
// 4.2.1.11. Policy Constraints are implicitly supported; see the
// documentation about policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
rv = CheckExtendedKeyUsage(endEntityOrCA, cert.GetExtKeyUsage(),
requiredEKUIfPresent);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.13. CRL Distribution Points is not supported, though the
// TrustDomain's CheckRevocation method may parse it and process it
// on its own.
// 4.2.1.14. Inhibit anyPolicy is implicitly supported; see the documentation
// about policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// IMPORTANT: This check must come after the other checks in order for error
// ranking to work correctly.
Time notBefore(Time::uninitialized);
Time notAfter(Time::uninitialized);
rv = CheckValidity(cert.GetValidity(), time, ¬Before, ¬After);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
rv = trustDomain.CheckValidityIsAcceptable(notBefore, notAfter, endEntityOrCA,
requiredEKUIfPresent);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
return Success;
}
Result
CheckIssuerIndependentProperties(TrustDomain& trustDomain,
BackCert& cert,
PRTime time,
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
KeyUsages requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent,
KeyPurposeId requiredEKUIfPresent,
const CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy,
unsigned int subCACount,
/*optional out*/ TrustLevel* trustLevelOut)
{
Result rv;
TrustLevel trustLevel;
rv = MapSECStatus(trustDomain.GetCertTrust(endEntityOrCA,
requiredPolicy,
cert.GetNSSCert(),
&trustLevel));
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (trustLevel == TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted) {
return Fail(RecoverableError, SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT);
}
if (trustLevel != TrustLevel::TrustAnchor &&
trustLevel != TrustLevel::InheritsTrust) {
// The TrustDomain returned a trust level that we weren't expecting.
PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR);
return FatalError;
}
if (trustLevelOut) {
*trustLevelOut = trustLevel;
}
// XXX: Good enough for now. There could be an illegal explicit version
// number or one we don't support, but we can safely treat those all as v3
// for now since processing of v3 certificates is strictly more strict than
// processing of v1 certificates.
der::Version version = (!cert.GetNSSCert()->version.data &&
!cert.GetNSSCert()->version.len) ? der::Version::v1
: der::Version::v3;
PLArenaPool* arena = cert.GetArena();
if (!arena) {
return FatalError;
}
// 4.2.1.1. Authority Key Identifier is ignored (see bug 965136).
// 4.2.1.2. Subject Key Identifier is ignored (see bug 965136).
// 4.2.1.3. Key Usage
rv = CheckKeyUsage(endEntityOrCA, cert.encodedKeyUsage,
requiredKeyUsagesIfPresent, arena);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.4. Certificate Policies
rv = CheckCertificatePolicies(endEntityOrCA, cert.encodedCertificatePolicies,
cert.encodedInhibitAnyPolicy, trustLevel,
requiredPolicy);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.5. Policy Mappings are not supported; see the documentation about
// policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// 4.2.1.6. Subject Alternative Name dealt with during name constraint
// checking and during name verification (CERT_VerifyCertName).
// 4.2.1.7. Issuer Alternative Name is not something that needs checking.
// 4.2.1.8. Subject Directory Attributes is not something that needs
// checking.
// 4.2.1.9. Basic Constraints.
rv = CheckBasicConstraints(endEntityOrCA, cert.encodedBasicConstraints,
version, trustLevel, subCACount);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.10. Name Constraints is dealt with in during path building.
// 4.2.1.11. Policy Constraints are implicitly supported; see the
// documentation about policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// 4.2.1.12. Extended Key Usage
rv = CheckExtendedKeyUsage(endEntityOrCA, cert.encodedExtendedKeyUsage,
requiredEKUIfPresent);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
// 4.2.1.13. CRL Distribution Points is not supported, though the
// TrustDomain's CheckRevocation method may parse it and process it
// on its own.
// 4.2.1.14. Inhibit anyPolicy is implicitly supported; see the documentation
// about policy enforcement in pkix.h.
// IMPORTANT: This check must come after the other checks in order for error
// ranking to work correctly.
rv = CheckTimes(cert.GetNSSCert(), time);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
return Success;
}
