int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void))
{
OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *newhand;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) && !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)
{
union {
void *sym;
void (*func)(void);
} handlersym;
handlersym.func = handler;
# ifdef DSO_WIN32
{
HMODULE handle = NULL;
BOOL ret;
/*
* We don't use the DSO route for WIN32 because there is a better
* way
*/
ret = GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS
| GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_PIN,
handlersym.sym, &handle);
if (!ret)
return 0;
}
# else
/*
* Deliberately leak a reference to the handler. This will force the
* library/code containing the handler to remain loaded until we run the
* atexit handler. If -znodelete has been used then this is
* unnecessary.
*/
{
DSO *dso = NULL;
ERR_set_mark();
dso = DSO_dsobyaddr(handlersym.sym, DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE);
DSO_free(dso);
ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
# endif
}
#endif
newhand = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newhand));
if (newhand == NULL)
return 0;
newhand->handler = handler;
newhand->next = stop_handlers;
stop_handlers = newhand;
return 1;
}
/*
* syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
* returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
*/
static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
/*
* Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
* get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
*
* 2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14
*
* which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
* between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
*/
/*
* Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
*
* Known OSs that should support this:
* - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
* - Solaris since 11.3
* - OpenBSD since 5.6
* - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
* - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
*/
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
if (getentropy != NULL)
return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
# else
union {
void *p;
int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
} p_getentropy;
/*
* We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
* call this function often.
*/
ERR_set_mark();
p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
ERR_pop_to_mark();
if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
# endif
/* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
# if defined(__linux) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
return syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
# else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
# endif
}
/*
* syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
* returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or <= 0 on error.
*/
int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
/*
* Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
*
* Known OSs that should support this:
* - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
* - Solaris since 11.3
* - OpenBSD since 5.6
* - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
* - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
*/
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
extern int getentropy(void *bufer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
if (getentropy != NULL)
return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
# else
union {
void *p;
int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
} p_getentropy;
/*
* We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
* call this function often.
*/
ERR_set_mark();
p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
ERR_pop_to_mark();
if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
# endif
/* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
# if defined(__linux) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
return (int)syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
# endif
# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
return (int)sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
# endif
return -1;
}
/* Minor tweak to operation: free up EVP_PKEY */
static int pubkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *exarg)
{
if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST) {
X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval;
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey);
} else if (operation == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) {
/* Attempt to decode public key and cache in pubkey structure. */
X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = (X509_PUBKEY *)*pval;
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey->pkey);
/*
* Opportunistically decode the key but remove any non fatal errors
* from the queue. Subsequent explicit attempts to decode/use the key
* will return an appropriate error.
*/
ERR_set_mark();
if (x509_pubkey_decode(&pubkey->pkey, pubkey) == -1)
return 0;
ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
return 1;
}
static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
BIO *bio;
X509 *x;
bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
if (bio == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (certs == NULL) {
BIO_free(bio);
return NULL;
}
ERR_set_mark();
do {
x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) {
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
BIO_free(bio);
return NULL;
} else if (x == NULL) {
/*
* We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors
* generated
*/
ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
} while (x != NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
return certs;
}
int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags,
unsigned long cflag)
{
long l;
int ret = 0, i;
char *m = NULL, mlch = ' ';
int nmindent = 0;
ASN1_INTEGER *bs;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const char *neg;
if ((nmflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) {
mlch = '\n';
nmindent = 12;
}
if (nmflags == X509_FLAG_COMPAT)
nmindent = 16;
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER)) {
if (BIO_write(bp, "Certificate:\n", 13) <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_write(bp, " Data:\n", 10) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION)) {
l = X509_get_version(x);
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sVersion: %lu (0x%lx)\n", "", l + 1, l) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL)) {
if (BIO_write(bp, " Serial Number:", 22) <= 0)
goto err;
bs = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
if (bs->length <= (int)sizeof(long)) {
ERR_set_mark();
l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs);
ERR_pop_to_mark();
} else {
l = -1;
}
if (l != -1) {
if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
l = -l;
neg = "-";
} else
neg = "";
if (BIO_printf(bp, " %s%lu (%s0x%lx)\n", neg, l, neg, l) <= 0)
goto err;
} else {
neg = (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) ? " (Negative)" : "";
if (BIO_printf(bp, "\n%12s%s", "", neg) <= 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%c", bs->data[i],
((i + 1 == bs->length) ? '\n' : ':')) <= 0)
goto err;
}
}
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME)) {
X509_ALGOR *tsig_alg = X509_get0_tbs_sigalg(x);
if (X509_signature_print(bp, tsig_alg, NULL) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER)) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, " Issuer:%c", mlch) <= 0)
goto err;
if (X509_NAME_print_ex(bp, X509_get_issuer_name(x), nmindent, nmflags)
< 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY)) {
if (BIO_write(bp, " Validity\n", 17) <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_write(bp, " Not Before: ", 24) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_TIME_print(bp, X509_get_notBefore(x)))
goto err;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n Not After : ", 25) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_TIME_print(bp, X509_get_notAfter(x)))
goto err;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT)) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, " Subject:%c", mlch) <= 0)
goto err;
if (X509_NAME_print_ex
(bp, X509_get_subject_name(x), nmindent, nmflags) < 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY)) {
X509_PUBKEY *xpkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x);
ASN1_OBJECT *xpoid;
X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&xpoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpkey);
if (BIO_write(bp, " Subject Public Key Info:\n", 33) <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%12sPublic Key Algorithm: ", "") <= 0)
goto err;
if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, xpoid) <= 0)
goto err;
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
goto err;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bp, "%12sUnable to load Public Key\n", "");
ERR_print_errors(bp);
} else {
EVP_PKEY_print_public(bp, pkey, 16, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_IDS)) {
ASN1_BIT_STRING *iuid, *suid;
X509_get0_uids(&iuid, &suid, x);
if (iuid != NULL) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sIssuer Unique ID: ", "") <= 0)
goto err;
if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, iuid, 12))
goto err;
}
if (suid != NULL) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%8sSubject Unique ID: ", "") <= 0)
goto err;
if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, suid, 12))
goto err;
}
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS))
X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "X509v3 extensions",
X509_get0_extensions(x), cflag, 8);
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP)) {
X509_ALGOR *sig_alg;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig;
X509_get0_signature(&sig, &sig_alg, x);
if (X509_signature_print(bp, sig_alg, sig) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_AUX)) {
if (!X509_aux_print(bp, x, 0))
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(m);
return (ret);
}
ENGINE *
engine_table_select_tmp(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid, const char *f, int l)
#endif
{
ENGINE *ret = NULL;
ENGINE_PILE tmplate, *fnd = NULL;
int initres, loop = 0;
if (!(*table)) {
#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, nothing "
"registered!\n", f, l, nid);
#endif
return NULL;
}
ERR_set_mark();
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
/* Check again inside the lock otherwise we could race against cleanup
* operations. But don't worry about a fprintf(stderr). */
if (!int_table_check(table, 0))
goto end;
tmplate.nid = nid;
fnd = lh_ENGINE_PILE_retrieve(&(*table)->piles, &tmplate);
if (!fnd)
goto end;
if (fnd->funct && engine_unlocked_init(fnd->funct)) {
#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, using "
"ENGINE '%s' cached\n", f, l, nid, fnd->funct->id);
#endif
ret = fnd->funct;
goto end;
}
if (fnd->uptodate) {
ret = fnd->funct;
goto end;
}
trynext:
ret = sk_ENGINE_value(fnd->sk, loop++);
if (!ret) {
#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, no "
"registered implementations would initialise\n", f, l, nid);
#endif
goto end;
}
/* Try to initialise the ENGINE? */
if ((ret->funct_ref > 0) || !(table_flags & ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT))
initres = engine_unlocked_init(ret);
else
initres = 0;
if (initres) {
/* Update 'funct' */
if ((fnd->funct != ret) && engine_unlocked_init(ret)) {
/* If there was a previous default we release it. */
if (fnd->funct)
engine_unlocked_finish(fnd->funct, 0);
fnd->funct = ret;
#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, "
"setting default to '%s'\n", f, l, nid, ret->id);
#endif
}
#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, using "
"newly initialised '%s'\n", f, l, nid, ret->id);
#endif
goto end;
}
goto trynext;
end:
/* If it failed, it is unlikely to succeed again until some future
* registrations have taken place. In all cases, we cache. */
if (fnd)
fnd->uptodate = 1;
#ifdef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG
if (ret)
fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, caching "
"ENGINE '%s'\n", f, l, nid, ret->id);
else
fprintf(stderr, "engine_table_dbg: %s:%d, nid=%d, caching "
"'no matching ENGINE'\n", f, l, nid);
#endif
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
/* Whatever happened, any failed init()s are not failures in this
* context, so clear our error state. */
ERR_pop_to_mark();
return ret;
}
int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void))
{
OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *newhand;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) \
&& !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)\
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PINSHARED)
{
union {
void *sym;
void (*func)(void);
} handlersym;
handlersym.func = handler;
# ifdef DSO_WIN32
{
HMODULE handle = NULL;
BOOL ret;
/*
* We don't use the DSO route for WIN32 because there is a better
* way
*/
ret = GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS
| GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_PIN,
handlersym.sym, &handle);
if (!ret)
return 0;
}
# else
/*
* Deliberately leak a reference to the handler. This will force the
* library/code containing the handler to remain loaded until we run the
* atexit handler. If -znodelete has been used then this is
* unnecessary.
*/
{
DSO *dso = NULL;
ERR_set_mark();
dso = DSO_dsobyaddr(handlersym.sym, DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE);
/* See same code above in ossl_init_base() for an explanation. */
OSSL_TRACE1(INIT,
"atexit: obtained DSO reference? %s\n",
(dso == NULL ? "No!" : "Yes."));
DSO_free(dso);
ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
# endif
}
#endif
if ((newhand = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newhand))) == NULL) {
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_ATEXIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
newhand->handler = handler;
newhand->next = stop_handlers;
stop_handlers = newhand;
return 1;
}
int CryptoManager::verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
int err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
SSL* ssl = (SSL*)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
SSLVerifyData* verifyData = (SSLVerifyData*)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, CryptoManager::idxVerifyData);
// TODO: we should make sure that the trusted certificate store never overules KeyPrint, if present, because certificate pinning on an individual certificate is a stronger method of verification.
// verifyData is unset only when KeyPrint has been pinned and we are not skipping errors due to incomplete chains
// we can fail here f.ex. if the certificate has expired but is still pinned with KeyPrint
if (!verifyData)
return preverify_ok;
bool allowUntrusted = verifyData->first;
string keyp = verifyData->second;
if (!keyp.empty()) {
X509* cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
if (!cert)
return 0;
string kp2(keyp);
if (kp2.compare(0, 12, "trusted_keyp") == 0) {
// Possible follow up errors, after verification of a partial chain
if (err == X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED || err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE) {
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_OK);
return 1;
}
} else if (kp2.compare(0, 7, "SHA256/") != 0)
return allowUntrusted ? 1 : 0;
ByteVector kp = ssl::X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha256());
ByteVector kp2v(kp.size());
Encoder::fromBase32(&kp2[7], &kp2v[0], kp2v.size());
if (std::equal(kp.begin(), kp.end(), kp2v.begin())) {
// KeyPrint validated, we can get rid of it (to avoid unnecessary passes)
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, CryptoManager::idxVerifyData, NULL);
if (err != X509_V_OK) {
// This is the right way to get the certificate store, although it is rather roundabout
X509_STORE* store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl));
dcassert(store == ctx->ctx);
// Hide the potential library error about trying to add a dupe
ERR_set_mark();
if (X509_STORE_add_cert(store, cert)) {
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_OK);
X509_verify_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
} else ERR_pop_to_mark();
// KeyPrint was not root certificate or we don't have the issuer certificate, the best we can do is trust the pinned KeyPrint
if (err == X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN || err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY || err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT) {
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_OK);
// Set this to allow ignoring any follow up errors caused by the incomplete chain
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, CryptoManager::idxVerifyData, &CryptoManager::trustedKeyprint);
return 1;
}
}
return (err == X509_V_OK) ? 1 : 0;
} else {
if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx) > 0)
return 1;
}
}
if (allowUntrusted) {
/*
// We let untrusted certificates through unconditionally, when allowed, but we like to complain
if (!preverify_ok && err != X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT) {
X509* cert = NULL;
if ((cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)) != NULL) {
X509_NAME* subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
string tmp, line;
tmp = getNameEntryByNID(subject, NID_commonName);
if (!tmp.empty()) {
CID certCID(tmp);
if (certCID)
tmp = Util::listToString(ClientManager::getInstance()->getNicks(certCID));
line += (!line.empty() ? ", " : "") + tmp;
}
tmp = getNameEntryByNID(subject, NID_organizationName);
if (!tmp.empty())
line += (!line.empty() ? ", " : "") + tmp;
ByteVector kp = ssl::X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha256());
string keyp = "SHA256/" + Encoder::toBase32(&kp[0], kp.size());
LogManager::getInstance()->message(STRING_F(VERIFY_CERT_FAILED, line % X509_verify_cert_error_string(err) % keyp), LogManager::LOG_INFO);
}
}*/
return 1;
}
return preverify_ok;
}
