static int test_fatalerr(void)
{
SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
SSL *sssl = NULL, *cssl = NULL;
const char *msg = "Dummy";
BIO *wbio = NULL;
int ret = 0, len;
char buf[80];
unsigned char dummyrec[] = {
0x17, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x05, 'D', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y'
};
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_method(), TLS_method(), &sctx, &cctx,
cert, privkey)))
goto err;
/*
* Deliberately set the cipher lists for client and server to be different
* to force a handshake failure.
*/
if (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(sctx, "AES128-SHA"))
|| !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx, "AES256-SHA"))
|| !TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &sssl, &cssl, NULL,
NULL)))
goto err;
wbio = SSL_get_wbio(cssl);
if (!TEST_ptr(wbio)) {
printf("Unexpected NULL bio received\n");
goto err;
}
/* Connection should fail */
if (!TEST_false(create_ssl_connection(sssl, cssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
goto err;
ERR_clear_error();
/* Inject a plaintext record from client to server */
if (!TEST_int_gt(BIO_write(wbio, dummyrec, sizeof(dummyrec)), 0))
goto err;
/* SSL_read()/SSL_write should fail because of a previous fatal error */
if (!TEST_int_le(len = SSL_read(sssl, buf, sizeof(buf - 1)), 0)) {
buf[len] = '\0';
TEST_error("Unexpected success reading data: %s\n", buf);
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_write(sssl, msg, strlen(msg)), 0))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
SSL_free(sssl);
SSL_free(cssl);
SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
return ret;
}
static int check_alerts(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result, SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
{
if (!TEST_int_eq(result->client_alert_sent,
result->client_alert_received)) {
TEST_info("Client sent alert %s but server received %s.",
print_alert(result->client_alert_sent),
print_alert(result->client_alert_received));
/*
* We can't bail here because the peer doesn't always get far enough
* to process a received alert. Specifically, in protocol version
* negotiation tests, we have the following scenario.
* Client supports TLS v1.2 only; Server supports TLS v1.1.
* Client proposes TLS v1.2; server responds with 1.1;
* Client now sends a protocol alert, using TLS v1.2 in the header.
* The server, however, rejects the alert because of version mismatch
* in the record layer; therefore, the server appears to never
* receive the alert.
*/
/* return 0; */
}
if (!TEST_int_eq(result->server_alert_sent,
result->server_alert_received)) {
TEST_info("Server sent alert %s but client received %s.",
print_alert(result->server_alert_sent),
print_alert(result->server_alert_received));
/* return 0; */
}
/* Tolerate an alert if one wasn't explicitly specified in the test. */
if (test_ctx->expected_client_alert
/*
* The info callback alert value is computed as
* (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]
* where the low byte is the alert code and the high byte is other stuff.
*/
&& (result->client_alert_sent & 0xff) != test_ctx->expected_client_alert) {
TEST_error("ClientAlert mismatch: expected %s, got %s.",
print_alert(test_ctx->expected_client_alert),
print_alert(result->client_alert_sent));
return 0;
}
if (test_ctx->expected_server_alert
&& (result->server_alert_sent & 0xff) != test_ctx->expected_server_alert) {
TEST_error("ServerAlert mismatch: expected %s, got %s.",
print_alert(test_ctx->expected_server_alert),
print_alert(result->server_alert_sent));
return 0;
}
if (!TEST_int_le(result->client_num_fatal_alerts_sent, 1))
return 0;
if (!TEST_int_le(result->server_num_fatal_alerts_sent, 1))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
int ret = 0;
static int fbytes_counter = 0;
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
if (use_fake == 0)
return old_rand->bytes(buf, num);
use_fake = 0;
if (!TEST_ptr(tmp = BN_new())
|| !TEST_int_lt(fbytes_counter, OSSL_NELEM(numbers))
|| !TEST_true(BN_hex2bn(&tmp, numbers[fbytes_counter]))
/* tmp might need leading zeros so pad it out */
|| !TEST_int_le(BN_num_bytes(tmp), num)
|| !TEST_true(BN_bn2binpad(tmp, buf, num)))
goto err;
fbytes_counter = (fbytes_counter + 1) % OSSL_NELEM(numbers);
ret = 1;
err:
BN_free(tmp);
return ret;
}
static int sanity_check_bytes(size_t (*rng)(unsigned char *, size_t),
int rounds, int min_failures, int max_retries, int max_zero_words)
{
int testresult = 0;
unsigned char prior[31] = {0}, buf[31] = {0}, check[7];
int failures = 0, zero_words = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
size_t generated = 0;
int retry;
for (retry = 0; retry < max_retries; retry++) {
generated = rng(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (generated == sizeof(buf))
break;
failures++;
}
/*-
* Verify that we don't have too many unexpected runs of zeroes,
* implying that we might be accidentally using the 32-bit RDRAND
* instead of the 64-bit one on 64-bit systems.
*/
size_t j;
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(buf) - 1; j++) {
if (buf[j] == 0 && buf[j+1] == 0) {
zero_words++;
}
}
if (!TEST_int_eq(generated, sizeof(buf)))
goto end;
if (!TEST_false(!memcmp(prior, buf, sizeof(buf))))
goto end;
/* Verify that the last 7 bytes of buf aren't all the same value */
unsigned char *tail = &buf[sizeof(buf) - sizeof(check)];
memset(check, tail[0], 7);
if (!TEST_false(!memcmp(check, tail, sizeof(check))))
goto end;
/* Save the result and make sure it's different next time */
memcpy(prior, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
if (!TEST_int_le(zero_words, max_zero_words))
goto end;
if (!TEST_int_ge(failures, min_failures))
goto end;
testresult = 1;
end:
return testresult;
}
static int client_setup_sni_after_state(void)
{
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *con = NULL;
BIO *rbio;
BIO *wbio;
char *hostname = NULL;
int ret = 0;
/* use TLS_method to blur 'side' */
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
if (!TEST_ptr(ctx))
goto end;
con = SSL_new(ctx);
if (!TEST_ptr(con))
goto end;
rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!TEST_ptr(rbio)|| !TEST_ptr(wbio)) {
BIO_free(rbio);
BIO_free(wbio);
goto end;
}
SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
SSL_set_connect_state(con);
/* set SNI after 'client side' is set */
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, host);
if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_connect(con), 0))
/* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
goto end;
if (!TEST_true(get_sni_from_client_hello(wbio, &hostname)))
/* no SNI in client hello */
goto end;
if (!TEST_str_eq(hostname, host))
/* incorrect SNI value */
goto end;
ret = 1;
end:
OPENSSL_free(hostname);
SSL_free(con);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
/*
* Perform extensive error checking as required by SP800-90.
* Induce several failure modes and check an error condition is set.
*/
static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td)
{
static char zero[sizeof(RAND_DRBG)];
RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
TEST_CTX t;
unsigned char buff[1024];
unsigned int generate_counter_tmp;
int ret = 0;
if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)))
goto err;
/*
* Personalisation string tests
*/
/* Test detection of too large personlisation string */
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, drbg->max_perslen + 1) > 0)
goto err;
/*
* Entropy source tests
*/
/* Test entropy source failure detecion: i.e. returns no data */
t.entropylen = 0;
if (TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen), 0))
goto err;
/* Try to generate output from uninstantiated DRBG */
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test insufficient entropy */
t.entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen - 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test too much entropy */
t.entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen + 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/*
* Nonce tests
*/
/* Test too small nonce */
if (drbg->min_noncelen) {
t.noncelen = drbg->min_noncelen - 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
}
/* Test too large nonce */
if (drbg->max_noncelen) {
t.noncelen = drbg->max_noncelen + 1;
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, td->pers, td->perslen) > 0
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
}
/* Instantiate with valid data, Check generation is now OK */
if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t)
|| !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen)))
goto err;
/* Request too much data for one request */
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, drbg->max_request + 1, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen)))
goto err;
/* Try too large additional input */
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1)))
goto err;
/*
* Check prediction resistance request fails if entropy source
* failure.
*/
t.entropylen = 0;
if (TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Instantiate again with valid data */
if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
generate_counter_tmp = drbg->generate_counter;
drbg->generate_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
/* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */
t.entropycnt = 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !TEST_int_eq(t.entropycnt, 1)
|| !TEST_int_eq(drbg->generate_counter, generate_counter_tmp + 1)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/*
* Check prediction resistance request fails if entropy source
* failure.
*/
t.entropylen = 0;
if (!TEST_false(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 1,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test reseed counter works */
if (!instantiate(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
generate_counter_tmp = drbg->generate_counter;
drbg->generate_counter = drbg->reseed_interval;
/* Generate output and check entropy has been requested for reseed */
t.entropycnt = 0;
if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->exlen, 0,
td->adin, td->adinlen))
|| !TEST_int_eq(t.entropycnt, 1)
|| !TEST_int_eq(drbg->generate_counter, generate_counter_tmp + 1)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/*
* Explicit reseed tests
*/
/* Test explicit reseed with too large additional input */
if (!init(drbg, td, &t)
|| RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1, 0) > 0)
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with entropy source failure */
t.entropylen = 0;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with too much entropy */
if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
t.entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen + 1;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Test explicit reseed with too little entropy */
if (!init(drbg, td, &t))
goto err;
t.entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen - 1;
if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0)
|| !uninstantiate(drbg))
goto err;
/* Standard says we have to check uninstantiate really zeroes */
if (!TEST_mem_eq(zero, sizeof(drbg->data), &drbg->data, sizeof(drbg->data)))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
uninstantiate(drbg);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
return ret;
}
static int test_siphash(int idx)
{
SIPHASH siphash;
TESTDATA test = tests[idx];
unsigned char key[SIPHASH_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char in[64];
size_t inlen = test.idx;
unsigned char *expected = test.expected.data;
size_t expectedlen = test.expected.size;
unsigned char out[SIPHASH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
size_t i;
if (expectedlen != SIPHASH_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE &&
expectedlen != SIPHASH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) {
TEST_info("size %zu vs %d and %d", expectedlen,
SIPHASH_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE, SIPHASH_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (!TEST_int_le(inlen, sizeof(in)))
return 0;
/* key and in data are 00 01 02 ... */
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(key); i++)
key[i] = (unsigned char)i;
for (i = 0; i < inlen; i++)
in[i] = (unsigned char)i;
if (!TEST_true(SipHash_Init(&siphash, key, expectedlen, 0, 0)))
return 0;
SipHash_Update(&siphash, in, inlen);
if (!TEST_true(SipHash_Final(&siphash, out, expectedlen))
|| !TEST_mem_eq(out, expectedlen, expected, expectedlen))
return 0;
if (inlen > 16) {
if (!TEST_true(SipHash_Init(&siphash, key, expectedlen, 0, 0)))
return 0;
SipHash_Update(&siphash, in, 1);
SipHash_Update(&siphash, in+1, inlen-1);
if (!TEST_true(SipHash_Final(&siphash, out, expectedlen)))
return 0;
if (!TEST_mem_eq(out, expectedlen, expected, expectedlen)) {
TEST_info("SipHash test #%d/1+(N-1) failed.", idx);
return 0;
}
}
if (inlen > 32) {
size_t half = inlen / 2;
if (!TEST_true(SipHash_Init(&siphash, key, expectedlen, 0, 0)))
return 0;
SipHash_Update(&siphash, in, half);
SipHash_Update(&siphash, in+half, inlen-half);
if (!TEST_true(SipHash_Final(&siphash, out, expectedlen)))
return 0;
if (!TEST_mem_eq(out, expectedlen, expected, expectedlen)) {
TEST_info("SipHash test #%d/2 failed.", idx);
return 0;
}
for (half = 16; half < inlen; half += 16) {
if (!TEST_true(SipHash_Init(&siphash, key, expectedlen, 0, 0)))
return 0;
SipHash_Update(&siphash, in, half);
SipHash_Update(&siphash, in+half, inlen-half);
if (!TEST_true(SipHash_Final(&siphash, out, expectedlen)))
return 0;
if (!TEST_mem_eq(out, expectedlen, expected, expectedlen)) {
TEST_info("SipHash test #%d/%zu+%zu failed.",
idx, half, inlen-half);
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
static int test_client_hello(int currtest)
{
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *con = NULL;
BIO *rbio;
BIO *wbio;
long len;
unsigned char *data;
PACKET pkt = {0}, pkt2 = {0}, pkt3 = {0};
char *dummytick = "Hello World!";
unsigned int type = 0;
int testresult = 0;
size_t msglen;
BIO *sessbio = NULL;
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
if (currtest == TEST_ADD_PADDING_AND_PSK)
return 1;
#endif
/*
* For each test set up an SSL_CTX and SSL and see what ClientHello gets
* produced when we try to connect
*/
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method());
if (!TEST_ptr(ctx))
goto end;
switch(currtest) {
case TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG:
/* Testing for session tickets <= TLS1.2; not relevant for 1.3 */
if (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION)))
goto end;
break;
case TEST_ADD_PADDING_AND_PSK:
case TEST_ADD_PADDING:
case TEST_PADDING_NOT_NEEDED:
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING);
/*
* Add lots of ciphersuites so that the ClientHello is at least
* F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN bytes long - meaning padding will be
* needed. Also add some dummy ALPN protocols in case we still don't
* have enough.
*/
if (currtest == TEST_ADD_PADDING
&& (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, "ALL"))
|| !TEST_false(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx,
(unsigned char *)alpn_prots,
sizeof(alpn_prots) - 1))))
goto end;
break;
default:
goto end;
}
con = SSL_new(ctx);
if (!TEST_ptr(con))
goto end;
if (currtest == TEST_ADD_PADDING_AND_PSK) {
sessbio = BIO_new_file(sessionfile, "r");
if (!TEST_ptr(sessbio)) {
TEST_info("Unable to open session.pem");
goto end;
}
sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(sessbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!TEST_ptr(sess)) {
TEST_info("Unable to load SSL_SESSION");
goto end;
}
/*
* We reset the creation time so that we don't discard the session as
* too old.
*/
if (!TEST_true(SSL_SESSION_set_time(sess, time(NULL)))
|| !TEST_true(SSL_set_session(con, sess)))
goto end;
}
rbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
wbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!TEST_ptr(rbio)|| !TEST_ptr(wbio)) {
BIO_free(rbio);
BIO_free(wbio);
goto end;
}
SSL_set_bio(con, rbio, wbio);
SSL_set_connect_state(con);
if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
if (!TEST_true(SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(con, dummytick,
strlen(dummytick))))
goto end;
}
if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_connect(con), 0)) {
/* This shouldn't succeed because we don't have a server! */
goto end;
}
len = BIO_get_mem_data(wbio, (char **)&data);
if (!TEST_true(PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, data, len))
/* Skip the record header */
|| !PACKET_forward(&pkt, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
goto end;
msglen = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
/* Skip the handshake message header */
if (!TEST_true(PACKET_forward(&pkt, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
/* Skip client version and random */
|| !TEST_true(PACKET_forward(&pkt, CLIENT_VERSION_LEN
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
/* Skip session id */
|| !TEST_true(PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
/* Skip ciphers */
|| !TEST_true(PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &pkt2))
/* Skip compression */
|| !TEST_true(PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &pkt2))
/* Extensions len */
|| !TEST_true(PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &pkt2)))
goto end;
/* Loop through all extensions */
while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt2)) {
if (!TEST_true(PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt2, &type))
|| !TEST_true(PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt2, &pkt3)))
goto end;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (currtest == TEST_SET_SESSION_TICK_DATA_VER_NEG) {
if (TEST_true(PACKET_equal(&pkt3, dummytick,
strlen(dummytick)))) {
/* Ticket data is as we expected */
testresult = 1;
}
goto end;
}
}
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) {
if (!TEST_false(currtest == TEST_PADDING_NOT_NEEDED))
goto end;
else if (TEST_true(currtest == TEST_ADD_PADDING
|| currtest == TEST_ADD_PADDING_AND_PSK))
testresult = TEST_true(msglen == F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN);
}
}
if (currtest == TEST_PADDING_NOT_NEEDED)
testresult = 1;
end:
SSL_free(con);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
BIO_free(sessbio);
return testresult;
}
/*-
* Positive and negative ECDSA testing through EVP interface:
* - EVP_DigestSign (this is the one-shot version)
* - EVP_DigestVerify
*
* Tests the library can successfully:
* - create a key
* - create a signature
* - accept that signature
* - reject that signature with a different public key
* - reject that signature if its length is not correct
* - reject that signature after modifying the message
* - accept that signature after un-modifying the message
* - reject that signature after modifying the signature
* - accept that signature after un-modifying the signature
*/
static int test_builtin(int n)
{
EC_KEY *eckey_neg = NULL, *eckey = NULL;
unsigned char dirt, offset, tbs[128];
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey_neg = NULL, *pkey = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
size_t sig_len;
int nid, ret = 0;
nid = curves[n].nid;
/* skip built-in curves where ord(G) is not prime */
if (nid == NID_ipsec4 || nid == NID_ipsec3) {
TEST_info("skipped: ECDSA unsupported for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
return 1;
}
TEST_info("testing ECDSA for curve %s", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
if (!TEST_ptr(mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())
/* get some random message data */
|| !TEST_true(RAND_bytes(tbs, sizeof(tbs)))
/* real key */
|| !TEST_ptr(eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
|| !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey))
|| !TEST_ptr(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new())
|| !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey))
/* fake key for negative testing */
|| !TEST_ptr(eckey_neg = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid))
|| !TEST_true(EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey_neg))
|| !TEST_ptr(pkey_neg = EVP_PKEY_new())
|| !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey_neg, eckey_neg)))
goto err;
sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey);
if (!TEST_ptr(sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len))
/* create a signature */
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)))
|| !TEST_int_le(sig_len, ECDSA_size(eckey))
/* negative test, verify with wrong key, 0 return */
|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey_neg))
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0)
/* negative test, verify with wrong signature length, -1 return */
|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len - 1, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), -1)
/* positive test, verify with correct key, 1 return */
|| !TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1))
goto err;
/* muck with the message, test it fails with 0 return */
tbs[0] ^= 1;
if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 0))
goto err;
/* un-muck and test it verifies */
tbs[0] ^= 1;
if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1))
goto err;
/*-
* Muck with the ECDSA signature. The DER encoding is one of:
* - 30 LL 02 ..
* - 30 81 LL 02 ..
*
* - Sometimes this mucks with the high level DER sequence wrapper:
* in that case, DER-parsing of the whole signature should fail.
*
* - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.r:
* in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.r should fail.
*
* - Sometimes this mucks with the DER-encoding of ECDSA.s:
* in that case, DER-parsing of ECDSA.s should fail.
*
* - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.r:
* in that case, the signature verification should fail.
*
* - Sometimes this mucks with ECDSA.s:
* in that case, the signature verification should fail.
*
* The usual case is changing the integer value of ECDSA.r or ECDSA.s.
* Because the ratio of DER overhead to signature bytes is small.
* So most of the time it will be one of the last two cases.
*
* In any case, EVP_PKEY_verify should not return 1 for valid.
*/
offset = tbs[0] % sig_len;
dirt = tbs[1] ? tbs[1] : 1;
sig[offset] ^= dirt;
if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
|| !TEST_int_ne(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1))
goto err;
/* un-muck and test it verifies */
sig[offset] ^= dirt;
if (!TEST_true(EVP_MD_CTX_reset(mctx))
|| !TEST_true(EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, pkey))
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, sig, sig_len, tbs, sizeof(tbs)), 1))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey_neg);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
OPENSSL_free(sig);
return ret;
}
static int test_tls13ccs(int tst)
{
SSL_CTX *sctx = NULL, *cctx = NULL;
SSL *sssl = NULL, *cssl = NULL;
int ret = 0;
const char msg[] = "Dummy data";
char buf[80];
size_t written, readbytes;
SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
chseen = shseen = sccsseen = ccsaftersh = ccsbeforesh = 0;
sappdataseen = cappdataseen = badccs = badvers = badsessid = 0;
chsessidlen = 0;
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
TLS1_VERSION, 0,
&sctx, &cctx, cert, privkey))
|| !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(sctx,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)))
goto err;
/*
* Test 0: Simple Handshake
* Test 1: Simple Handshake, client middlebox compat mode disabled
* Test 2: Simple Handshake, server middlebox compat mode disabled
* Test 3: HRR Handshake
* Test 4: HRR Handshake, client middlebox compat mode disabled
* Test 5: HRR Handshake, server middlebox compat mode disabled
* Test 6: Early data handshake
* Test 7: Early data handshake, client middlebox compat mode disabled
* Test 8: Early data handshake, server middlebox compat mode disabled
* Test 9: Early data then HRR
* Test 10: Early data then HRR, client middlebox compat mode disabled
* Test 11: Early data then HRR, server middlebox compat mode disabled
*/
switch (tst) {
case 0:
case 3:
case 6:
case 9:
break;
case 1:
case 4:
case 7:
case 10:
SSL_CTX_clear_options(cctx, SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT);
break;
case 2:
case 5:
case 8:
case 11:
SSL_CTX_clear_options(sctx, SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT);
break;
default:
TEST_error("Invalid test value");
goto err;
}
if (tst >= 6) {
/* Get a session suitable for early_data */
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &sssl, &cssl, NULL, NULL))
|| !TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(sssl, cssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
goto err;
sess = SSL_get1_session(cssl);
if (!TEST_ptr(sess))
goto err;
SSL_shutdown(cssl);
SSL_shutdown(sssl);
SSL_free(sssl);
SSL_free(cssl);
sssl = cssl = NULL;
}
if ((tst >= 3 && tst <= 5) || tst >= 9) {
/* HRR handshake */
if (!TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(sctx, "P-256")))
goto err;
}
s_to_c_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_watchccs_filter());
c_to_s_fbio = BIO_new(bio_f_watchccs_filter());
if (!TEST_ptr(s_to_c_fbio)
|| !TEST_ptr(c_to_s_fbio)) {
BIO_free(s_to_c_fbio);
BIO_free(c_to_s_fbio);
goto err;
}
/* BIOs get freed on error */
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &sssl, &cssl, s_to_c_fbio,
c_to_s_fbio)))
goto err;
if (tst >= 6) {
/* Early data */
if (!TEST_true(SSL_set_session(cssl, sess))
|| !TEST_true(SSL_write_early_data(cssl, msg, strlen(msg),
&written))
|| (tst <= 8
&& !TEST_int_eq(SSL_read_early_data(sssl, buf, sizeof(buf),
&readbytes),
SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS)))
goto err;
if (tst <= 8) {
if (!TEST_int_gt(SSL_connect(cssl), 0))
goto err;
} else {
if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_connect(cssl), 0))
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_read_early_data(sssl, buf, sizeof(buf),
&readbytes),
SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH))
goto err;
}
/* Perform handshake (or complete it if doing early data ) */
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(sssl, cssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
goto err;
/*
* Check there were no unexpected CCS messages, all record versions
* were as expected, and that the session ids were reflected by the server
* correctly.
*/
if (!TEST_false(badccs) || !TEST_false(badvers) || !TEST_false(badsessid))
goto err;
switch (tst) {
case 0:
if (!TEST_true(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_true(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_false(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_gt(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 1:
if (!TEST_true(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_false(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_false(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_eq(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 2:
if (!TEST_false(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_true(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_false(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_gt(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 3:
if (!TEST_true(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_true(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_false(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_gt(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 4:
if (!TEST_true(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_false(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_false(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_eq(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 5:
if (!TEST_false(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_true(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_false(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_gt(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 6:
if (!TEST_true(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_false(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_true(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_gt(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 7:
if (!TEST_true(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_false(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_false(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_eq(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 8:
if (!TEST_false(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_false(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_true(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_gt(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 9:
if (!TEST_true(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_false(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_true(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_gt(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 10:
if (!TEST_true(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_false(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_false(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_eq(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
case 11:
if (!TEST_false(sccsseen)
|| !TEST_false(ccsaftersh)
|| !TEST_true(ccsbeforesh)
|| !TEST_size_t_gt(chsessidlen, 0))
goto err;
break;
default:
TEST_error("Invalid test value");
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
SSL_free(sssl);
SSL_free(cssl);
SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
return ret;
}
