int esp_rijndael_schedule(const struct esp_algorithm *algo, struct secasvar *sav) { keyInstance *k; k = (keyInstance *)sav->sched; if (rijndael_makeKey(&k[0], DIR_DECRYPT, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) * 8, _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) < 0) return -1; if (rijndael_makeKey(&k[1], DIR_ENCRYPT, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc) * 8, _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) < 0) return -1; return 0; }
int esp_aes_schedule( __unused const struct esp_algorithm *algo, struct secasvar *sav) { lck_mtx_assert(sadb_mutex, LCK_MTX_ASSERT_OWNED); aes_ctx *ctx = (aes_ctx*)sav->sched; aes_decrypt_key((const unsigned char *) _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc), &ctx->decrypt); aes_encrypt_key((const unsigned char *) _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc), &ctx->encrypt); return 0; }
static int esp_cast128_schedule(const struct esp_algorithm *algo, struct secasvar *sav) { cast128_setkey((cast128_key *)sav->sched, _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)); return 0; }
static int esp_blowfish_schedule(const struct esp_algorithm *algo, struct secasvar *sav) { BF_set_key((BF_KEY *)sav->sched, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc), _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)); return 0; }
static int esp_des_schedule(const struct esp_algorithm *algo, struct secasvar *sav) { if (des_key_sched((des_cblock *)_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), *(des_key_schedule *)sav->sched)) return EINVAL; else return 0; }
/* * Paranoia. */ static int esp_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) { /* NB: ah_zerorize free's the crypto session state */ int error = ah_zeroize(sav); if (sav->key_enc) memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), 0, _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)); sav->tdb_encalgxform = NULL; sav->tdb_xform = NULL; return error; }
static int esp_3des_schedule( __unused const struct esp_algorithm *algo, struct secasvar *sav) { LCK_MTX_ASSERT(sadb_mutex, LCK_MTX_ASSERT_OWNED); if (des3_ecb_key_sched((des_cblock *)_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), (des3_ecb_key_schedule *)sav->sched)) return EINVAL; else return 0; }
/* * Paranoia. */ static int esp_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) { /* NB: ah_zerorize free's the crypto session state */ int error = ah_zeroize(sav); if (sav->key_enc) bzero(_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc), _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc)); /* NB: sav->iv is freed elsewhere, even though we malloc it! */ sav->tdb_encalgxform = NULL; sav->tdb_xform = NULL; return error; }
/* * Paranoia. * * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). */ int ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) { int err; if (sav->key_auth) bzero(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; sav->tdb_xform = NULL; return err; }
/* * NB: public for use by esp_init. */ int ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria) { const struct auth_hash *thash; int keylen; thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); if (thash == NULL) { DPRINTF(("ah_init: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", sav->alg_auth)); return EINVAL; } /* * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions * later during protocol processing. */ /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { DPRINTF(("ah_init: replay state block inconsistency, " "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); return EINVAL; } if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { DPRINTF(("ah_init: no authentication key for %s " "algorithm\n", thash->name)); return EINVAL; } keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { DPRINTF(("ah_init: invalid keylength %d, algorithm " "%s requires keysize %d\n", keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); return EINVAL; } sav->tdb_xform = xsp; sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; /* Initialize crypto session. */ memset(cria, 0, sizeof (*cria)); cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); return 0; }
static int esp_3des_schedule(const struct esp_algorithm *algo, struct secasvar *sav) { int error; des_key_schedule *p; int i; u_int8_t *k; p = (des_key_schedule *)sav->sched; k = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { error = des_key_sched((des_cblock *)(k + 8 * i), p[i]); if (error) return EINVAL; } return 0; }
static int esp_descbc_mature(struct secasvar *sav) { const struct esp_algorithm *algo; if (!(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) && (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature: " "algorithm incompatible with 4 octets IV length\n")); return 1; } if (!sav->key_enc) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_descbc_mature: no key is given.\n")); return 1; } algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); if (!algo) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_descbc_mature: unsupported algorithm.\n")); return 1; } if (_KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) < algo->keymin || _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc) > algo->keymax) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_descbc_mature: invalid key length %d.\n", _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc))); return 1; } /* weak key check */ if (des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc))) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_descbc_mature: weak key was passed.\n")); return 1; } return 0; }
/* * ESP output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). */ static int esp_output( struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp, int skip, int protoff ) { struct enc_xform *espx; struct auth_hash *esph; int hlen, rlen, plen, padding, blks, alen, i, roff; struct mbuf *mo = (struct mbuf *) NULL; struct tdb_crypto *tc; struct secasvar *sav; struct secasindex *saidx; unsigned char *pad; u_int8_t prot; int error, maxpacketsize; struct cryptodesc *crde = NULL, *crda = NULL; struct cryptop *crp; SPLASSERT(net, "esp_output"); sav = isr->sav; KASSERT(sav != NULL, ("esp_output: null SA")); esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform; espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform; KASSERT(espx != NULL, ("esp_output: null encoding xform")); if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen; else hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen; rlen = m->m_pkthdr.len - skip; /* Raw payload length. */ /* * NB: The null encoding transform has a blocksize of 4 * so that headers are properly aligned. */ blks = espx->blocksize; /* IV blocksize */ /* XXX clamp padding length a la KAME??? */ padding = ((blks - ((rlen + 2) % blks)) % blks) + 2; plen = rlen + padding; /* Padded payload length. */ if (esph) alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN; else alen = 0; espstat.esps_output++; saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) { #ifdef INET case AF_INET: maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; break; #endif /* INET */ #ifdef INET6 case AF_INET6: maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; break; #endif /* INET6 */ default: DPRINTF(("esp_output: unknown/unsupported protocol " "family %d, SA %s/%08lx\n", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); espstat.esps_nopf++; error = EPFNOSUPPORT; goto bad; } if (skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen > maxpacketsize) { DPRINTF(("esp_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " "(len %u, max len %u)\n", ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), skip + hlen + rlen + padding + alen, maxpacketsize)); espstat.esps_toobig++; error = EMSGSIZE; goto bad; } /* Update the counters. */ espstat.esps_obytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip; m = m_clone(m); if (m == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); espstat.esps_hdrops++; error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } /* Inject ESP header. */ mo = m_makespace(m, skip, hlen, &roff); if (mo == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_output: failed to inject %u byte ESP hdr for SA " "%s/%08lx\n", hlen, ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); espstat.esps_hdrops++; /* XXX diffs from openbsd */ error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } /* Initialize ESP header. */ bcopy((caddr_t) &sav->spi, mtod(mo, caddr_t) + roff, sizeof(u_int32_t)); if (sav->replay) { u_int32_t replay = htonl(++(sav->replay->count)); bcopy((caddr_t) &replay, mtod(mo, caddr_t) + roff + sizeof(u_int32_t), sizeof(u_int32_t)); } /* * Add padding -- better to do it ourselves than use the crypto engine, * although if/when we support compression, we'd have to do that. */ pad = (u_char *) m_pad(m, padding + alen); if (pad == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_output: m_pad failed for SA %s/%08lx\n", ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); m = NULL; /* NB: free'd by m_pad */ error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } /* * Add padding: random, zero, or self-describing. * XXX catch unexpected setting */ switch (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_PMASK) { case SADB_X_EXT_PRAND: (void) read_random(pad, padding - 2); break; case SADB_X_EXT_PZERO: bzero(pad, padding - 2); break; case SADB_X_EXT_PSEQ: for (i = 0; i < padding - 2; i++) pad[i] = i+1; break; } /* Fix padding length and Next Protocol in padding itself. */ pad[padding - 2] = padding - 2; m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), pad + padding - 1); /* Fix Next Protocol in IPv4/IPv6 header. */ prot = IPPROTO_ESP; m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (u_char *) &prot); /* Get crypto descriptors. */ crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1); if (crp == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n")); espstat.esps_crypto++; error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } if (espx) { crde = crp->crp_desc; crda = crde->crd_next; /* Encryption descriptor. */ crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen; crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen); crde->crd_flags = CRD_F_ENCRYPT; crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen; /* Encryption operation. */ crde->crd_alg = espx->type; crde->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); crde->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); /* XXX Rounds ? */ } else crda = crp->crp_desc; /* IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto), M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); if (tc == NULL) { crypto_freereq(crp); DPRINTF(("esp_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); espstat.esps_crypto++; error = ENOBUFS; goto bad; } /* Callback parameters */ tc->tc_isr = isr; tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; tc->tc_dst = saidx->dst; tc->tc_proto = saidx->proto; /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m; crp->crp_callback = esp_output_cb; crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc; crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; if (esph) { /* Authentication descriptor. */ crda->crd_skip = skip; crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen); crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen; /* Authentication operation. */ crda->crd_alg = esph->type; crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); } return crypto_dispatch(crp); bad: if (m) m_freem(m); return (error); }
/* * ESP input processing, called (eventually) through the protocol switch. */ static int esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) { struct auth_hash *esph; struct enc_xform *espx; struct tdb_ident *tdbi; struct tdb_crypto *tc; int plen, alen, hlen; struct m_tag *mtag; struct newesp *esp; struct cryptodesc *crde; struct cryptop *crp; SPLASSERT(net, "esp_input"); KASSERT(sav != NULL, ("esp_input: null SA")); KASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL, ("esp_input: null encoding xform")); KASSERT((skip&3) == 0 && (m->m_pkthdr.len&3) == 0, ("esp_input: misaligned packet, skip %u pkt len %u", skip, m->m_pkthdr.len)); /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ IP6_EXTHDR_GET(esp, struct newesp *, m, skip, sizeof (struct newesp)); esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform; espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform; /* Determine the ESP header length */ if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen; else hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen; /* Authenticator hash size */ alen = esph ? AH_HMAC_HASHLEN : 0; /* * Verify payload length is multiple of encryption algorithm * block size. * * NB: This works for the null algorithm because the blocksize * is 4 and all packets must be 4-byte aligned regardless * of the algorithm. */ plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen); if ((plen & (espx->blocksize - 1)) || (plen <= 0)) { DPRINTF(("esp_input: " "payload of %d octets not a multiple of %d octets," " SA %s/%08lx\n", plen, espx->blocksize, ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); espstat.esps_badilen++; m_freem(m); return EINVAL; } /* * Check sequence number. */ if (esph && sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(esp->esp_seq), sav)) { DPRINTF(("esp_input: packet replay check for %s\n", ipsec_logsastr(sav))); /*XXX*/ espstat.esps_replay++; m_freem(m); return ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ } /* Update the counters */ espstat.esps_ibytes += m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hlen - alen; /* Find out if we've already done crypto */ for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL); mtag != NULL; mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) { tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1); if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto && tdbi->spi == sav->spi && !bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst, sizeof(union sockaddr_union))) break; } /* Get crypto descriptors */ crp = crypto_getreq(esph && espx ? 2 : 1); if (crp == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n")); espstat.esps_crypto++; m_freem(m); return ENOBUFS; } /* Get IPsec-specific opaque pointer */ if (esph == NULL || mtag != NULL) tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto), M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); else tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + alen, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); if (tc == NULL) { crypto_freereq(crp); DPRINTF(("esp_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); espstat.esps_crypto++; m_freem(m); return ENOBUFS; } tc->tc_ptr = (caddr_t) mtag; if (esph) { struct cryptodesc *crda = crp->crp_desc; KASSERT(crda != NULL, ("esp_input: null ah crypto descriptor")); /* Authentication descriptor */ crda->crd_skip = skip; crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + alen); crda->crd_inject = m->m_pkthdr.len - alen; crda->crd_alg = esph->type; crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); /* Copy the authenticator */ if (mtag == NULL) m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, (caddr_t) (tc + 1)); /* Chain authentication request */ crde = crda->crd_next; } else { crde = crp->crp_desc; } /* Crypto operation descriptor */ crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length */ crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m; crp->crp_callback = esp_input_cb; crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc; /* These are passed as-is to the callback */ tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; tc->tc_protoff = protoff; tc->tc_skip = skip; /* Decryption descriptor */ if (espx) { KASSERT(crde != NULL, ("esp_input: null esp crypto descriptor")); crde->crd_skip = skip + hlen; crde->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len - (skip + hlen + alen); crde->crd_inject = skip + hlen - sav->ivlen; crde->crd_alg = espx->type; crde->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); crde->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); /* XXX Rounds ? */ } if (mtag == NULL) return crypto_dispatch(crp); else return esp_input_cb(crp); }
/* * esp_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. */ static int esp_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp) { struct enc_xform *txform; struct cryptoini cria, crie; int keylen; int error; txform = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); if (txform == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_init: unsupported encryption algorithm %d\n", sav->alg_enc)); return EINVAL; } if (sav->key_enc == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_init: no encoding key for %s algorithm\n", txform->name)); return EINVAL; } if ((sav->flags&(SADB_X_EXT_OLD|SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) == SADB_X_EXT_IV4B) { DPRINTF(("esp_init: 4-byte IV not supported with protocol\n")); return EINVAL; } keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc); if (txform->minkey > keylen || keylen > txform->maxkey) { DPRINTF(("esp_init: invalid key length %u, must be in " "the range [%u..%u] for algorithm %s\n", keylen, txform->minkey, txform->maxkey, txform->name)); return EINVAL; } /* * NB: The null xform needs a non-zero blocksize to keep the * crypto code happy but if we use it to set ivlen then * the ESP header will be processed incorrectly. The * compromise is to force it to zero here. */ sav->ivlen = (txform == &enc_xform_null ? 0 : txform->blocksize); sav->iv = (caddr_t) malloc(sav->ivlen, M_XDATA, M_WAITOK); if (sav->iv == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_init: no memory for IV\n")); return EINVAL; } key_randomfill(sav->iv, sav->ivlen); /*XXX*/ /* * Setup AH-related state. */ if (sav->alg_auth != 0) { error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); if (error) return error; } /* NB: override anything set in ah_init0 */ sav->tdb_xform = xsp; sav->tdb_encalgxform = txform; /* Initialize crypto session. */ bzero(&crie, sizeof (crie)); crie.cri_alg = sav->tdb_encalgxform->type; crie.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); crie.cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); /* XXX Rounds ? */ if (sav->tdb_authalgxform && sav->tdb_encalgxform) { /* init both auth & enc */ crie.cri_next = &cria; error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &crie, crypto_support); } else if (sav->tdb_encalgxform) { error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &crie, crypto_support); } else if (sav->tdb_authalgxform) { error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, crypto_support); } else { /* XXX cannot happen? */ DPRINTF(("esp_init: no encoding OR authentication xform!\n")); error = EINVAL; } return error; }
/* * esp_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. */ static int esp_init(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp) { const struct enc_xform *txform; struct cryptoini cria, crie; int keylen; int error; txform = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); if (txform == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_init: unsupported encryption algorithm %d\n", sav->alg_enc)); return EINVAL; } if (sav->key_enc == NULL) { DPRINTF(("esp_init: no encoding key for %s algorithm\n", txform->name)); return EINVAL; } if ((sav->flags&(SADB_X_EXT_OLD|SADB_X_EXT_IV4B)) == SADB_X_EXT_IV4B) { DPRINTF(("esp_init: 4-byte IV not supported with protocol\n")); return EINVAL; } keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_enc); if (txform->minkey > keylen || keylen > txform->maxkey) { DPRINTF(("esp_init: invalid key length %u, must be in " "the range [%u..%u] for algorithm %s\n", keylen, txform->minkey, txform->maxkey, txform->name)); return EINVAL; } sav->ivlen = txform->ivsize; /* * Setup AH-related state. */ if (sav->alg_auth != 0) { error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); if (error) return error; } /* NB: override anything set in ah_init0 */ sav->tdb_xform = xsp; sav->tdb_encalgxform = txform; if (sav->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM16 || sav->alg_enc == SADB_X_EALG_AESGMAC) { switch (keylen) { case 20: sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES128GMAC; sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_gmac_aes_128; break; case 28: sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES192GMAC; sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_gmac_aes_192; break; case 36: sav->alg_auth = SADB_X_AALG_AES256GMAC; sav->tdb_authalgxform = &auth_hash_gmac_aes_256; break; } memset(&cria, 0, sizeof(cria)); cria.cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; cria.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); cria.cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); } /* Initialize crypto session. */ memset(&crie, 0, sizeof (crie)); crie.cri_alg = sav->tdb_encalgxform->type; crie.cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_enc); crie.cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_enc); /* XXX Rounds ? */ if (sav->tdb_authalgxform && sav->tdb_encalgxform) { /* init both auth & enc */ crie.cri_next = &cria; error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &crie, crypto_support); } else if (sav->tdb_encalgxform) { error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &crie, crypto_support); } else if (sav->tdb_authalgxform) { error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, crypto_support); } else { /* XXX cannot happen? */ DPRINTF(("esp_init: no encoding OR authentication xform!\n")); error = EINVAL; } return error; }
static int esp_cbc_mature(struct secasvar *sav) { int keylen; const struct esp_algorithm *algo; if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature: algorithm incompatible with esp-old\n")); return 1; } if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_DERIV) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature: algorithm incompatible with derived\n")); return 1; } if (!sav->key_enc) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature: no key is given.\n")); return 1; } algo = esp_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_enc); if (!algo) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature: unsupported algorithm.\n")); return 1; } keylen = sav->key_enc->sadb_key_bits; if (keylen < algo->keymin || algo->keymax < keylen) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature %s: invalid key length %d.\n", algo->name, sav->key_enc->sadb_key_bits)); return 1; } switch (sav->alg_enc) { case SADB_EALG_3DESCBC: /* weak key check */ if (des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc)) || des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)(_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc) + 8)) || des_is_weak_key((des_cblock *)(_KEYBUF(sav->key_enc) + 16))) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature %s: weak key was passed.\n", algo->name)); return 1; } break; case SADB_X_EALG_RIJNDAELCBC: /* allows specific key sizes only */ if (!(keylen == 128 || keylen == 192 || keylen == 256)) { ipseclog((LOG_ERR, "esp_cbc_mature %s: invalid key length %d.\n", algo->name, keylen)); return 1; } break; } return 0; }