int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct group *gr;
struct stat st;
int ask, ch, cnt, fflag, hflag, pflag, sflag, quietlog, rootlogin, rval;
uid_t uid, saved_uid;
gid_t saved_gid, saved_gids[NGROUPS_MAX];
int nsaved_gids;
#ifdef notdef
char *domain;
#endif
char *p, *ttyn;
const char *pwprompt;
char tbuf[MAXPATHLEN + 2], tname[sizeof(_PATH_TTY) + 10];
char localhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
int need_chpass, require_chpass;
int login_retries = DEFAULT_RETRIES,
login_backoff = DEFAULT_BACKOFF;
time_t pw_warntime = _PASSWORD_WARNDAYS * SECSPERDAY;
char *loginname = NULL;
#ifdef KERBEROS5
int Fflag;
krb5_error_code kerror;
#endif
#if defined(KERBEROS5)
int got_tickets = 0;
#endif
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
char *shell = NULL;
login_cap_t *lc = NULL;
#endif
tbuf[0] = '\0';
rval = 0;
pwprompt = NULL;
nested = NULL;
need_chpass = require_chpass = 0;
(void)signal(SIGALRM, timedout);
(void)alarm(timeout);
(void)signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
(void)signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
(void)setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0);
openlog("login", 0, LOG_AUTH);
/*
* -p is used by getty to tell login not to destroy the environment
* -f is used to skip a second login authentication
* -h is used by other servers to pass the name of the remote host to
* login so that it may be placed in utmp/utmpx and wtmp/wtmpx
* -a in addition to -h, a server may supply -a to pass the actual
* server address.
* -s is used to force use of S/Key or equivalent.
*/
if (gethostname(localhost, sizeof(localhost)) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "couldn't get local hostname: %m");
strcpy(hostname, "amnesiac");
}
#ifdef notdef
domain = strchr(localhost, '.');
#endif
localhost[sizeof(localhost) - 1] = '\0';
fflag = hflag = pflag = sflag = 0;
have_ss = 0;
#ifdef KERBEROS5
Fflag = 0;
have_forward = 0;
#endif
uid = getuid();
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "a:Ffh:ps")) != -1)
switch (ch) {
case 'a':
if (uid)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "-a option: %s", strerror(EPERM));
decode_ss(optarg);
#ifdef notdef
(void)sockaddr_snprintf(optarg,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), "%a", (void *)&ss);
#endif
break;
case 'F':
#ifdef KERBEROS5
Fflag = 1;
#endif
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'f':
fflag = 1;
break;
case 'h':
if (uid)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "-h option: %s", strerror(EPERM));
hflag = 1;
#ifdef notdef
if (domain && (p = strchr(optarg, '.')) != NULL &&
strcasecmp(p, domain) == 0)
*p = '\0';
#endif
hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'p':
pflag = 1;
break;
case 's':
sflag = 1;
break;
default:
case '?':
usage();
break;
}
setproctitle(NULL);
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (*argv) {
username = loginname = *argv;
ask = 0;
} else
ask = 1;
#ifdef F_CLOSEM
(void)fcntl(3, F_CLOSEM, 0);
#else
for (cnt = getdtablesize(); cnt > 2; cnt--)
(void)close(cnt);
#endif
ttyn = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO);
if (ttyn == NULL || *ttyn == '\0') {
(void)snprintf(tname, sizeof(tname), "%s??", _PATH_TTY);
ttyn = tname;
}
if ((tty = strstr(ttyn, "/pts/")) != NULL)
++tty;
else if ((tty = strrchr(ttyn, '/')) != NULL)
++tty;
else
tty = ttyn;
if (issetugid()) {
nested = strdup(user_from_uid(getuid(), 0));
if (nested == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "strdup: %m");
sleepexit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
/* Get "login-retries" and "login-backoff" from default class */
if ((lc = login_getclass(NULL)) != NULL) {
login_retries = (int)login_getcapnum(lc, "login-retries",
DEFAULT_RETRIES, DEFAULT_RETRIES);
login_backoff = (int)login_getcapnum(lc, "login-backoff",
DEFAULT_BACKOFF, DEFAULT_BACKOFF);
login_close(lc);
lc = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifdef KERBEROS5
kerror = krb5_init_context(&kcontext);
if (kerror) {
/*
* If Kerberos is not configured, that is, we are
* not using Kerberos, do not log the error message.
* However, if Kerberos is configured, and the
* context init fails for some other reason, we need
* to issue a no tickets warning to the user when the
* login succeeds.
*/
if (kerror != ENXIO) { /* XXX NetBSD-local Heimdal hack */
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"%s when initializing Kerberos context",
error_message(kerror));
krb5_configured = 1;
}
login_krb5_get_tickets = 0;
}
#endif /* KERBEROS5 */
for (cnt = 0;; ask = 1) {
#if defined(KERBEROS5)
if (login_krb5_get_tickets)
k5destroy();
#endif
if (ask) {
fflag = 0;
loginname = getloginname();
}
rootlogin = 0;
#ifdef KERBEROS5
if ((instance = strchr(loginname, '/')) != NULL)
*instance++ = '\0';
else
instance = __UNCONST("");
#endif
username = trimloginname(loginname);
/*
* Note if trying multiple user names; log failures for
* previous user name, but don't bother logging one failure
* for nonexistent name (mistyped username).
*/
if (failures && strcmp(tbuf, username)) {
if (failures > (pwd ? 0 : 1))
badlogin(tbuf);
failures = 0;
}
(void)strlcpy(tbuf, username, sizeof(tbuf));
pwd = getpwnam(username);
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
/*
* Establish the class now, before we might goto
* within the next block. pwd can be NULL since it
* falls back to the "default" class if it is.
*/
lc = login_getclass(pwd ? pwd->pw_class : NULL);
#endif
/*
* if we have a valid account name, and it doesn't have a
* password, or the -f option was specified and the caller
* is root or the caller isn't changing their uid, don't
* authenticate.
*/
if (pwd) {
if (pwd->pw_uid == 0)
rootlogin = 1;
if (fflag && (uid == 0 || uid == pwd->pw_uid)) {
/* already authenticated */
#ifdef KERBEROS5
if (login_krb5_get_tickets && Fflag)
k5_read_creds(username);
#endif
break;
} else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '\0') {
/* pretend password okay */
rval = 0;
goto ttycheck;
}
}
fflag = 0;
(void)setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, -4);
#ifdef SKEY
if (skey_haskey(username) == 0) {
static char skprompt[80];
const char *skinfo = skey_keyinfo(username);
(void)snprintf(skprompt, sizeof(skprompt),
"Password [ %s ]:",
skinfo ? skinfo : "error getting challenge");
pwprompt = skprompt;
} else
#endif
pwprompt = "Password:"******"Login incorrect or refused on this "
"terminal.\n");
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"LOGIN %s REFUSED FROM %s ON TTY %s",
pwd->pw_name, hostname, tty);
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
"LOGIN %s REFUSED ON TTY %s",
pwd->pw_name, tty);
continue;
}
if (pwd && !rval)
break;
(void)printf("Login incorrect or refused on this "
"terminal.\n");
failures++;
cnt++;
/*
* We allow login_retries tries, but after login_backoff
* we start backing off. These default to 10 and 3
* respectively.
*/
if (cnt > login_backoff) {
if (cnt >= login_retries) {
badlogin(username);
sleepexit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
sleep((u_int)((cnt - login_backoff) * 5));
}
}
/* committed to login -- turn off timeout */
(void)alarm((u_int)0);
endpwent();
/* if user not super-user, check for disabled logins */
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
if (!login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", rootlogin))
checknologin(login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", NULL, NULL));
#else
if (!rootlogin)
checknologin(NULL);
#endif
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
quietlog = login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0);
#else
quietlog = 0;
#endif
/* Temporarily give up special privileges so we can change */
/* into NFS-mounted homes that are exported for non-root */
/* access and have mode 7x0 */
saved_uid = geteuid();
saved_gid = getegid();
nsaved_gids = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, saved_gids);
(void)setegid(pwd->pw_gid);
initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid);
(void)seteuid(pwd->pw_uid);
if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0)) {
(void)printf("Home directory %s required\n",
pwd->pw_dir);
sleepexit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
#endif
(void)printf("No home directory %s!\n", pwd->pw_dir);
if (chdir("/") == -1)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
pwd->pw_dir = __UNCONST("/");
(void)printf("Logging in with home = \"/\".\n");
}
if (!quietlog)
quietlog = access(_PATH_HUSHLOGIN, F_OK) == 0;
/* regain special privileges */
(void)seteuid(saved_uid);
setgroups(nsaved_gids, saved_gids);
(void)setegid(saved_gid);
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
pw_warntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn",
_PASSWORD_WARNDAYS * SECSPERDAY,
_PASSWORD_WARNDAYS * SECSPERDAY);
#endif
(void)gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
if (pwd->pw_expire) {
if (now.tv_sec >= pwd->pw_expire) {
(void)printf("Sorry -- your account has expired.\n");
sleepexit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (pwd->pw_expire - now.tv_sec < pw_warntime &&
!quietlog)
(void)printf("Warning: your account expires on %s",
ctime(&pwd->pw_expire));
}
if (pwd->pw_change) {
if (pwd->pw_change == _PASSWORD_CHGNOW)
need_chpass = 1;
else if (now.tv_sec >= pwd->pw_change) {
(void)printf("Sorry -- your password has expired.\n");
sleepexit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (pwd->pw_change - now.tv_sec < pw_warntime &&
!quietlog)
(void)printf("Warning: your password expires on %s",
ctime(&pwd->pw_change));
}
/* Nothing else left to fail -- really log in. */
update_db(quietlog, rootlogin, fflag);
(void)chown(ttyn, pwd->pw_uid,
(gr = getgrnam(TTYGRPNAME)) ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid);
if (ttyaction(ttyn, "login", pwd->pw_name))
(void)printf("Warning: ttyaction failed.\n");
#if defined(KERBEROS5)
/* Fork so that we can call kdestroy */
if (! login_krb5_retain_ccache && has_ccache)
dofork();
#endif
/* Destroy environment unless user has requested its preservation. */
if (!pflag)
environ = envinit;
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
if (nested == NULL && setusercontext(lc, pwd, pwd->pw_uid,
LOGIN_SETLOGIN) != 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "setusercontext failed");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (setusercontext(lc, pwd, pwd->pw_uid,
(LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETLOGIN))) != 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "setusercontext failed");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
#else
(void)setgid(pwd->pw_gid);
initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid);
if (nested == NULL && setlogin(pwd->pw_name) < 0)
syslog(LOG_ERR, "setlogin() failure: %m");
/* Discard permissions last so can't get killed and drop core. */
if (rootlogin)
(void)setuid(0);
else
(void)setuid(pwd->pw_uid);
#endif
if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0')
pwd->pw_shell = __UNCONST(_PATH_BSHELL);
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
if ((shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
if ((shell = strdup(shell)) == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Cannot alloc mem");
sleepexit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
pwd->pw_shell = shell;
}
#endif
(void)setenv("HOME", pwd->pw_dir, 1);
(void)setenv("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell, 1);
if (term[0] == '\0') {
const char *tt = stypeof(tty);
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
if (tt == NULL)
tt = login_getcapstr(lc, "term", NULL, NULL);
#endif
/* unknown term -> "su" */
(void)strlcpy(term, tt != NULL ? tt : "su", sizeof(term));
}
(void)setenv("TERM", term, 0);
(void)setenv("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name, 1);
(void)setenv("USER", pwd->pw_name, 1);
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
setusercontext(lc, pwd, pwd->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH);
#else
(void)setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 0);
#endif
#ifdef KERBEROS5
if (krb5tkfile_env)
(void)setenv("KRB5CCNAME", krb5tkfile_env, 1);
#endif
/* If fflag is on, assume caller/authenticator has logged root login. */
if (rootlogin && fflag == 0) {
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "ROOT LOGIN (%s) ON %s FROM %s",
username, tty, hostname);
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "ROOT LOGIN (%s) ON %s",
username, tty);
}
#if defined(KERBEROS5)
if (KERBEROS_CONFIGURED && !quietlog && notickets == 1)
(void)printf("Warning: no Kerberos tickets issued.\n");
#endif
if (!quietlog) {
const char *fname;
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
fname = login_getcapstr(lc, "copyright", NULL, NULL);
if (fname != NULL && access(fname, F_OK) == 0)
motd(fname);
else
#endif
(void)printf("%s", copyrightstr);
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
fname = login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", NULL, NULL);
if (fname == NULL || access(fname, F_OK) != 0)
#endif
fname = _PATH_MOTDFILE;
motd(fname);
(void)snprintf(tbuf,
sizeof(tbuf), "%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pwd->pw_name);
if (stat(tbuf, &st) == 0 && st.st_size != 0)
(void)printf("You have %smail.\n",
(st.st_mtime > st.st_atime) ? "new " : "");
}
#ifdef LOGIN_CAP
login_close(lc);
#endif
(void)signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
(void)signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
(void)signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
(void)signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
tbuf[0] = '-';
(void)strlcpy(tbuf + 1, (p = strrchr(pwd->pw_shell, '/')) ?
p + 1 : pwd->pw_shell, sizeof(tbuf) - 1);
/* Wait to change password until we're unprivileged */
if (need_chpass) {
if (!require_chpass)
(void)printf(
"Warning: your password has expired. Please change it as soon as possible.\n");
else {
int status;
(void)printf(
"Your password has expired. Please choose a new one.\n");
switch (fork()) {
case -1:
warn("fork");
sleepexit(EXIT_FAILURE);
case 0:
execl(_PATH_BINPASSWD, "passwd", NULL);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
default:
if (wait(&status) == -1 ||
WEXITSTATUS(status))
sleepexit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
}
#ifdef KERBEROS5
if (login_krb5_get_tickets)
k5_write_creds();
#endif
execlp(pwd->pw_shell, tbuf, NULL);
err(EXIT_FAILURE, "%s", pwd->pw_shell);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg, **environ;
struct group *gr;
register int ch;
register char *p;
int ask, fflag, hflag, pflag, cnt, errsv;
int quietlog, passwd_req;
char *domain, *ttyn;
char tbuf[MAXPATHLEN + 2], tname[sizeof(_PATH_TTY) + 10];
char *termenv;
char *childArgv[10];
char *buff;
int childArgc = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H
int retcode;
pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
struct pam_conv conv = { misc_conv, NULL };
pid_t childPid;
#else
char *salt, *pp;
#endif
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
char vcsn[20], vcsan[20];
#endif
pid = getpid();
signal(SIGALRM, timedout);
alarm((unsigned int)timeout);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain(PACKAGE);
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0);
initproctitle(argc, argv);
/*
* -p is used by getty to tell login not to destroy the environment
* -f is used to skip a second login authentication
* -h is used by other servers to pass the name of the remote
* host to login so that it may be placed in utmp and wtmp
*/
gethostname(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf));
xstrncpy(thishost, tbuf, sizeof(thishost));
domain = index(tbuf, '.');
username = tty_name = hostname = NULL;
fflag = hflag = pflag = 0;
passwd_req = 1;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "fh:p")) != -1)
switch (ch) {
case 'f':
fflag = 1;
break;
case 'h':
if (getuid()) {
fprintf(stderr,
_("login: -h for super-user only.\n"));
exit(1);
}
hflag = 1;
if (domain && (p = index(optarg, '.')) &&
strcasecmp(p, domain) == 0)
*p = 0;
hostname = strdup(optarg); /* strdup: Ambrose C. Li */
{
struct hostent *he = gethostbyname(hostname);
/* he points to static storage; copy the part we use */
hostaddress[0] = 0;
if (he && he->h_addr_list && he->h_addr_list[0])
memcpy(hostaddress, he->h_addr_list[0],
sizeof(hostaddress));
}
break;
case 'p':
pflag = 1;
break;
case '?':
default:
fprintf(stderr,
_("usage: login [-fp] [username]\n"));
exit(1);
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (*argv) {
char *p = *argv;
username = strdup(p);
ask = 0;
/* wipe name - some people mistype their password here */
/* (of course we are too late, but perhaps this helps a little ..) */
while(*p)
*p++ = ' ';
} else
ask = 1;
for (cnt = getdtablesize(); cnt > 2; cnt--)
close(cnt);
ttyn = ttyname(0);
if (ttyn == NULL || *ttyn == '\0') {
/* no snprintf required - see definition of tname */
sprintf(tname, "%s??", _PATH_TTY);
ttyn = tname;
}
check_ttyname(ttyn);
if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
tty_name = ttyn+5;
else
tty_name = ttyn;
if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/tty", 8) == 0)
tty_number = ttyn+8;
else {
char *p = ttyn;
while (*p && !isdigit(*p)) p++;
tty_number = p;
}
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
/* find names of Virtual Console devices, for later mode change */
snprintf(vcsn, sizeof(vcsn), "/dev/vcs%s", tty_number);
snprintf(vcsan, sizeof(vcsan), "/dev/vcsa%s", tty_number);
#endif
/* set pgid to pid */
setpgrp();
/* this means that setsid() will fail */
{
struct termios tt, ttt;
tcgetattr(0, &tt);
ttt = tt;
ttt.c_cflag &= ~HUPCL;
/* These can fail, e.g. with ttyn on a read-only filesystem */
chown(ttyn, 0, 0);
chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE);
/* Kill processes left on this tty */
tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&ttt);
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* so vhangup() wont kill us */
vhangup();
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
/* open stdin,stdout,stderr to the tty */
opentty(ttyn);
/* restore tty modes */
tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&tt);
}
openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
#if 0
/* other than iso-8859-1 */
printf("\033(K");
fprintf(stderr,"\033(K");
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H
/*
* username is initialized to NULL
* and if specified on the command line it is set.
* Therefore, we are safe not setting it to anything
*/
retcode = pam_start("login",username, &conv, &pamh);
if(retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, _("login: PAM Failure, aborting: %s\n"),
pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Couldn't initialize PAM: %s"),
pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
exit(99);
}
/* hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
depending on how much we know */
retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostname);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
/*
* [email protected]: Provide a user prompt to PAM
* so that the "login: "******"Password: "******"login: "******"\033(K");
fprintf(stderr,"\033(K");
#endif
/* if fflag == 1, then the user has already been authenticated */
if (fflag && (getuid() == 0))
passwd_req = 0;
else
passwd_req = 1;
if(passwd_req == 1) {
int failcount=0;
/* if we didn't get a user on the command line, set it to NULL */
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username);
if (!username)
pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, NULL);
/* there may be better ways to deal with some of these
conditions, but at least this way I don't think we'll
be giving away information... */
/* Perhaps someday we can trust that all PAM modules will
pay attention to failure count and get rid of MAX_LOGIN_TRIES? */
retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
while((failcount++ < PAM_MAX_LOGIN_TRIES) &&
((retcode == PAM_AUTH_ERR) ||
(retcode == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) ||
(retcode == PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT) ||
(retcode == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL))) {
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username);
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("FAILED LOGIN %d FROM %s FOR %s, %s"),
failcount, hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname);
fprintf(stderr,_("Login incorrect\n\n"));
pam_set_item(pamh,PAM_USER,NULL);
retcode = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
}
if (retcode != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username);
if (retcode == PAM_MAXTRIES)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%d) FROM %s FOR "
"%s, %s"), failcount, hostname, username,
pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,_("FAILED LOGIN SESSION FROM %s FOR %s, %s"),
hostname, username, pam_strerror(pamh, retcode));
logbtmp(tty_name, username, hostname);
fprintf(stderr,_("\nLogin incorrect\n"));
pam_end(pamh, retcode);
exit(0);
}
retcode = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
if(retcode == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
retcode = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
}
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
}
/*
* Grab the user information out of the password file for future usage
* First get the username that we are actually using, though.
*/
retcode = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **) &username);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
if (!username || !*username) {
fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession setup problem, abort.\n"));
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("NULL user name in %s:%d. Abort."),
__FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
exit(1);
}
if (!(pwd = getpwnam(username))) {
fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession setup problem, abort.\n"));
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Invalid user name \"%s\" in %s:%d. Abort."),
username, __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Create a copy of the pwd struct - otherwise it may get
* clobbered by PAM
*/
memcpy(&pwdcopy, pwd, sizeof(*pwd));
pwd = &pwdcopy;
pwd->pw_name = strdup(pwd->pw_name);
pwd->pw_passwd = strdup(pwd->pw_passwd);
pwd->pw_gecos = strdup(pwd->pw_gecos);
pwd->pw_dir = strdup(pwd->pw_dir);
pwd->pw_shell = strdup(pwd->pw_shell);
if (!pwd->pw_name || !pwd->pw_passwd || !pwd->pw_gecos ||
!pwd->pw_dir || !pwd->pw_shell) {
fprintf(stderr, _("login: Out of memory\n"));
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Out of memory");
pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
exit(1);
}
username = pwd->pw_name;
/*
* Initialize the supplementary group list.
* This should be done before pam_setcred because
* the PAM modules might add groups during pam_setcred.
*/
if (initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "initgroups: %m");
fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession setup problem, abort.\n"));
pam_end(pamh, PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
exit(1);
}
retcode = pam_open_session(pamh, 0);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
#else /* ! HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H */
for (cnt = 0;; ask = 1) {
if (ask) {
fflag = 0;
getloginname();
}
/* Dirty patch to fix a gigantic security hole when using
yellow pages. This problem should be solved by the
libraries, and not by programs, but this must be fixed
urgently! If the first char of the username is '+', we
avoid login success.
Feb 95 <*****@*****.**> */
if (username[0] == '+') {
puts(_("Illegal username"));
badlogin(username);
sleepexit(1);
}
/* (void)strcpy(tbuf, username); why was this here? */
if ((pwd = getpwnam(username))) {
# ifdef SHADOW_PWD
struct spwd *sp;
if ((sp = getspnam(username)))
pwd->pw_passwd = sp->sp_pwdp;
# endif
salt = pwd->pw_passwd;
} else
salt = "xx";
if (pwd) {
initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid);
checktty(username, tty_name, pwd); /* in checktty.c */
}
/* if user not super-user, check for disabled logins */
if (pwd == NULL || pwd->pw_uid)
checknologin();
/*
* Disallow automatic login to root; if not invoked by
* root, disallow if the uid's differ.
*/
if (fflag && pwd) {
int uid = getuid();
passwd_req = pwd->pw_uid == 0 ||
(uid && uid != pwd->pw_uid);
}
/*
* If trying to log in as root, but with insecure terminal,
* refuse the login attempt.
*/
if (pwd && pwd->pw_uid == 0 && !rootterm(tty_name)) {
fprintf(stderr,
_("%s login refused on this terminal.\n"),
pwd->pw_name);
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("LOGIN %s REFUSED FROM %s ON TTY %s"),
pwd->pw_name, hostname, tty_name);
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("LOGIN %s REFUSED ON TTY %s"),
pwd->pw_name, tty_name);
continue;
}
/*
* If no pre-authentication and a password exists
* for this user, prompt for one and verify it.
*/
if (!passwd_req || (pwd && !*pwd->pw_passwd))
break;
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, -4);
pp = getpass(_("Password: "******"CRYPTO", 6) == 0) {
if (pwd && cryptocard()) break;
}
# endif /* CRYPTOCARD */
p = crypt(pp, salt);
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0);
# ifdef KERBEROS
/*
* If not present in pw file, act as we normally would.
* If we aren't Kerberos-authenticated, try the normal
* pw file for a password. If that's ok, log the user
* in without issueing any tickets.
*/
if (pwd && !krb_get_lrealm(realm,1)) {
/*
* get TGT for local realm; be careful about uid's
* here for ticket file ownership
*/
setreuid(geteuid(),pwd->pw_uid);
kerror = krb_get_pw_in_tkt(pwd->pw_name, "", realm,
"krbtgt", realm, DEFAULT_TKT_LIFE, pp);
setuid(0);
if (kerror == INTK_OK) {
memset(pp, 0, strlen(pp));
notickets = 0; /* user got ticket */
break;
}
}
# endif /* KERBEROS */
memset(pp, 0, strlen(pp));
if (pwd && !strcmp(p, pwd->pw_passwd))
break;
printf(_("Login incorrect\n"));
badlogin(username); /* log ALL bad logins */
failures++;
/* we allow 10 tries, but after 3 we start backing off */
if (++cnt > 3) {
if (cnt >= 10) {
sleepexit(1);
}
sleep((unsigned int)((cnt - 3) * 5));
}
}
#endif /* !HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H */
/* committed to login -- turn off timeout */
alarm((unsigned int)0);
endpwent();
/* This requires some explanation: As root we may not be able to
read the directory of the user if it is on an NFS mounted
filesystem. We temporarily set our effective uid to the user-uid
making sure that we keep root privs. in the real uid.
A portable solution would require a fork(), but we rely on Linux
having the BSD setreuid() */
{
char tmpstr[MAXPATHLEN];
uid_t ruid = getuid();
gid_t egid = getegid();
/* avoid snprintf - old systems do not have it, or worse,
have a libc in which snprintf is the same as sprintf */
if (strlen(pwd->pw_dir) + sizeof(_PATH_HUSHLOGIN) + 2 > MAXPATHLEN)
quietlog = 0;
else {
sprintf(tmpstr, "%s/%s", pwd->pw_dir, _PATH_HUSHLOGIN);
setregid(-1, pwd->pw_gid);
setreuid(0, pwd->pw_uid);
quietlog = (access(tmpstr, R_OK) == 0);
setuid(0); /* setreuid doesn't do it alone! */
setreuid(ruid, 0);
setregid(-1, egid);
}
}
/* for linux, write entries in utmp and wtmp */
{
struct utmp ut;
struct utmp *utp;
utmpname(_PATH_UTMP);
setutent();
/* Find pid in utmp.
login sometimes overwrites the runlevel entry in /var/run/utmp,
confusing sysvinit. I added a test for the entry type, and the problem
was gone. (In a runlevel entry, st_pid is not really a pid but some number
calculated from the previous and current runlevel).
Michael Riepe <*****@*****.**>
*/
while ((utp = getutent()))
if (utp->ut_pid == pid
&& utp->ut_type >= INIT_PROCESS
&& utp->ut_type <= DEAD_PROCESS)
break;
/* If we can't find a pre-existing entry by pid, try by line.
BSD network daemons may rely on this. (anonymous) */
if (utp == NULL) {
setutent();
ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
strncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
utp = getutline(&ut);
}
if (utp) {
memcpy(&ut, utp, sizeof(ut));
} else {
/* some gettys/telnetds don't initialize utmp... */
memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
}
if (ut.ut_id[0] == 0)
strncpy(ut.ut_id, tty_number, sizeof(ut.ut_id));
strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
xstrncpy(ut.ut_line, tty_name, sizeof(ut.ut_line));
#ifdef _HAVE_UT_TV /* in <utmpbits.h> included by <utmp.h> */
gettimeofday(&ut.ut_tv, NULL);
#else
{
time_t t;
time(&t);
ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
/* glibc2 #defines it as ut_tv.tv_sec */
}
#endif
ut.ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
ut.ut_pid = pid;
if (hostname) {
xstrncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
if (hostaddress[0])
memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, hostaddress, sizeof(ut.ut_addr));
}
pututline(&ut);
endutent();
#if HAVE_UPDWTMP
updwtmp(_PATH_WTMP, &ut);
#else
#if 0
/* The O_APPEND open() flag should be enough to guarantee
atomic writes at end of file. */
{
int wtmp;
if((wtmp = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_APPEND|O_WRONLY)) >= 0) {
write(wtmp, (char *)&ut, sizeof(ut));
close(wtmp);
}
}
#else
/* Probably all this locking below is just nonsense,
and the short version is OK as well. */
{
int lf, wtmp;
if ((lf = open(_PATH_WTMPLOCK, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY, 0660)) >= 0) {
flock(lf, LOCK_EX);
if ((wtmp = open(_PATH_WTMP, O_APPEND|O_WRONLY)) >= 0) {
write(wtmp, (char *)&ut, sizeof(ut));
close(wtmp);
}
flock(lf, LOCK_UN);
close(lf);
}
}
#endif
#endif
}
dolastlog(quietlog);
chown(ttyn, pwd->pw_uid,
(gr = getgrnam(TTYGRPNAME)) ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid);
chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE);
#ifdef LOGIN_CHOWN_VCS
/* if tty is one of the VC's then change owner and mode of the
special /dev/vcs devices as well */
if (consoletty(0)) {
chown(vcsn, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid));
chown(vcsan, pwd->pw_uid, (gr ? gr->gr_gid : pwd->pw_gid));
chmod(vcsn, TTY_MODE);
chmod(vcsan, TTY_MODE);
}
#endif
setgid(pwd->pw_gid);
if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0')
pwd->pw_shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
/* preserve TERM even without -p flag */
{
char *ep;
if(!((ep = getenv("TERM")) && (termenv = strdup(ep))))
termenv = "dumb";
}
/* destroy environment unless user has requested preservation */
if (!pflag)
{
environ = (char**)malloc(sizeof(char*));
memset(environ, 0, sizeof(char*));
}
setenv("HOME", pwd->pw_dir, 0); /* legal to override */
if(pwd->pw_uid)
setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1);
else
setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH_ROOT, 1);
setenv("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell, 1);
setenv("TERM", termenv, 1);
/* mailx will give a funny error msg if you forget this one */
{
char tmp[MAXPATHLEN];
/* avoid snprintf */
if (sizeof(_PATH_MAILDIR) + strlen(pwd->pw_name) + 1 < MAXPATHLEN) {
sprintf(tmp, "%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pwd->pw_name);
setenv("MAIL",tmp,0);
}
}
/* LOGNAME is not documented in login(1) but
HP-UX 6.5 does it. We'll not allow modifying it.
*/
setenv("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name, 1);
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H
{
int i;
char ** env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
if (env != NULL) {
for (i=0; env[i]; i++) {
putenv(env[i]);
/* D(("env[%d] = %s", i,env[i])); */
}
}
}
#endif
setproctitle("login", username);
if (!strncmp(tty_name, "ttyS", 4))
syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DIALUP AT %s BY %s"), tty_name, pwd->pw_name);
/* allow tracking of good logins.
-steve philp ([email protected]) */
if (pwd->pw_uid == 0) {
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s FROM %s"),
tty_name, hostname);
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("ROOT LOGIN ON %s"), tty_name);
} else {
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s FROM %s"), tty_name,
pwd->pw_name, hostname);
else
syslog(LOG_INFO, _("LOGIN ON %s BY %s"), tty_name,
pwd->pw_name);
}
if (!quietlog) {
motd();
#ifdef LOGIN_STAT_MAIL
/*
* This turns out to be a bad idea: when the mail spool
* is NFS mounted, and the NFS connection hangs, the
* login hangs, even root cannot login.
* Checking for mail should be done from the shell.
*/
{
struct stat st;
char *mail;
mail = getenv("MAIL");
if (mail && stat(mail, &st) == 0 && st.st_size != 0) {
if (st.st_mtime > st.st_atime)
printf(_("You have new mail.\n"));
else
printf(_("You have mail.\n"));
}
}
#endif
}
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_MISC_H
/*
* We must fork before setuid() because we need to call
* pam_close_session() as root.
*/
childPid = fork();
if (childPid < 0) {
int errsv = errno;
/* error in fork() */
fprintf(stderr, _("login: failure forking: %s"), strerror(errsv));
PAM_END;
exit(0);
}
if (childPid) {
/* parent - wait for child to finish, then cleanup session */
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGTTIN, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGTTOU, SIG_IGN);
wait(NULL);
PAM_END;
exit(0);
}
/* child */
/*
* Problem: if the user's shell is a shell like ash that doesnt do
* setsid() or setpgrp(), then a ctrl-\, sending SIGQUIT to every
* process in the pgrp, will kill us.
*/
/* start new session */
setsid();
/* make sure we have a controlling tty */
opentty(ttyn);
openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV); /* reopen */
/*
* TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group.
*/
if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1))
syslog(LOG_ERR, _("TIOCSCTTY failed: %m"));
#endif
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
/* discard permissions last so can't get killed and drop core */
if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0 && pwd->pw_uid) {
syslog(LOG_ALERT, _("setuid() failed"));
exit(1);
}
/* wait until here to change directory! */
if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
printf(_("No directory %s!\n"), pwd->pw_dir);
if (chdir("/"))
exit(0);
pwd->pw_dir = "/";
printf(_("Logging in with home = \"/\".\n"));
}
/* if the shell field has a space: treat it like a shell script */
if (strchr(pwd->pw_shell, ' ')) {
buff = malloc(strlen(pwd->pw_shell) + 6);
if (!buff) {
fprintf(stderr, _("login: no memory for shell script.\n"));
exit(0);
}
strcpy(buff, "exec ");
strcat(buff, pwd->pw_shell);
childArgv[childArgc++] = "/bin/sh";
childArgv[childArgc++] = "-sh";
childArgv[childArgc++] = "-c";
childArgv[childArgc++] = buff;
} else {
tbuf[0] = '-';
xstrncpy(tbuf + 1, ((p = rindex(pwd->pw_shell, '/')) ?
p + 1 : pwd->pw_shell),
sizeof(tbuf)-1);
childArgv[childArgc++] = pwd->pw_shell;
childArgv[childArgc++] = tbuf;
}
childArgv[childArgc++] = NULL;
execvp(childArgv[0], childArgv + 1);
errsv = errno;
if (!strcmp(childArgv[0], "/bin/sh"))
fprintf(stderr, _("login: couldn't exec shell script: %s.\n"),
strerror(errsv));
else
fprintf(stderr, _("login: no shell: %s.\n"), strerror(errsv));
exit(0);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg, **environ;
register int ch;
register char *p;
int ask, fflag, hflag, pflag, cnt, errsv;
int quietlog, passwd_req;
char *domain, *ttyn;
char tbuf[MAXPATHLEN + 2], tname[sizeof(_PATH_TTY) + 10];
char *termenv;
char *childArgv[10];
char *buff;
int childArgc = 0;
char *salt, *pp;
pid = getpid();
signal(SIGALRM, timedout);
alarm((unsigned int)timeout);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 0);
/*
* -p is used by getty to tell login not to destroy the environment
* -f is used to skip a second login authentication
* -h is used by other servers to pass the name of the remote
* host to login so that it may be placed in utmp and wtmp
*/
gethostname(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf));
xstrncpy(thishost, tbuf, sizeof(thishost));
domain = index(tbuf, '.');
username = tty_name = hostname = NULL;
fflag = hflag = pflag = 0;
passwd_req = 1;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "fh:p")) != -1)
switch (ch) {
case 'f':
fflag = 1;
break;
case 'h':
if (getuid()) {
fprintf(stderr,
"login: -h for super-user only.\n");
exit(1);
}
hflag = 1;
if (domain && (p = index(optarg, '.')) &&
strcasecmp(p, domain) == 0)
*p = 0;
hostname = strdup(optarg); /* strdup: Ambrose C. Li */
{
struct hostent *he = gethostbyname(hostname);
/* he points to static storage; copy the part we use */
hostaddress[0] = 0;
if (he && he->h_addr_list && he->h_addr_list[0])
memcpy(hostaddress, he->h_addr_list[0],
sizeof(hostaddress));
}
break;
case 'p':
pflag = 1;
break;
case '?':
default:
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: login [-fp] [username]\n");
exit(1);
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (*argv) {
char *p = *argv;
username = strdup(p);
ask = 0;
/* wipe name - some people mistype their password here */
/* (of course we are too late, but perhaps this helps a little ..) */
while(*p)
*p++ = ' ';
} else
ask = 1;
for (cnt = getdtablesize(); cnt > 2; cnt--)
close(cnt);
ttyn = ttyname(0);
if (ttyn == NULL || *ttyn == '\0') {
/* no snprintf required - see definition of tname */
sprintf(tname, "%s??", _PATH_TTY);
ttyn = tname;
}
check_ttyname(ttyn);
if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
tty_name = ttyn+5;
else
tty_name = ttyn;
if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/tty", 8) == 0)
tty_number = ttyn+8;
else {
char *p = ttyn;
while (*p && !isdigit(*p)) p++;
tty_number = p;
}
/* set pgid to pid */
setpgrp();
/* this means that setsid() will fail */
{
struct termios tt, ttt;
tcgetattr(0, &tt);
ttt = tt;
ttt.c_cflag &= ~HUPCL;
/* These can fail, e.g. with ttyn on a read-only filesystem */
chown(ttyn, 0, 0);
chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE);
/* Kill processes left on this tty */
tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&ttt);
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* so vhangup() wont kill us */
//vhangup();
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
/* open stdin,stdout,stderr to the tty */
opentty(ttyn);
/* restore tty modes */
tcsetattr(0,TCSAFLUSH,&tt);
}
openlog("login", LOG_ODELAY, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
#if 0
/* other than iso-8859-1 */
printf("\033(K");
fprintf(stderr,"\033(K");
#endif
for (cnt = 0;; ask = 1) {
if (ask) {
fflag = 0;
getloginname();
}
/* Dirty patch to fix a gigantic security hole when using
yellow pages. This problem should be solved by the
libraries, and not by programs, but this must be fixed
urgently! If the first char of the username is '+', we
avoid login success.
Feb 95 <*****@*****.**> */
if (username[0] == '+') {
puts("Illegal username");
badlogin(username);
sleepexit(1);
}
/* (void)strcpy(tbuf, username); why was this here? */
if ((pwd = getpwnam(username))) {
salt = pwd->pw_passwd;
} else
salt = (char *) "xx";
if (pwd) {
initgroups(username, pwd->pw_gid);
}
/* if user not super-user, check for disabled logins */
if (pwd == NULL || pwd->pw_uid)
checknologin();
/*
* Disallow automatic login to root; if not invoked by
* root, disallow if the uid's differ.
*/
if (fflag && pwd) {
int uid = getuid();
passwd_req = pwd->pw_uid == 0 ||
(uid && uid != pwd->pw_uid);
}
/*
* If no pre-authentication and a password exists
* for this user, prompt for one and verify it.
*/
if (!passwd_req || (pwd && !*pwd->pw_passwd))
break;
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, -4);
pp = getpass("Password: "******"Login incorrect\n");
badlogin(username); /* log ALL bad logins */
failures++;
/* we allow 10 tries, but after 3 we start backing off */
if (++cnt > 3) {
if (cnt >= 10) {
sleepexit(1);
}
sleep((unsigned int)((cnt - 3) * 5));
}
}
/* committed to login -- turn off timeout */
alarm((unsigned int)0);
endpwent();
/* This requires some explanation: As root we may not be able to
read the directory of the user if it is on an NFS mounted
filesystem. We temporarily set our effective uid to the user-uid
making sure that we keep root privs. in the real uid.
A portable solution would require a fork(), but we rely on Linux
having the BSD setreuid() */
quietlog = 0;
dolastlog(quietlog);
chown(ttyn, pwd->pw_uid, pwd->pw_gid);
chmod(ttyn, TTY_MODE);
setgid(pwd->pw_gid);
if (*pwd->pw_shell == '\0')
pwd->pw_shell = (char *)_PATH_BSHELL;
/* preserve TERM even without -p flag */
{
char *ep;
if(!((ep = getenv("TERM")) && (termenv = strdup(ep))))
termenv = (char *) "dumb";
}
/* destroy environment unless user has requested preservation */
if (!pflag)
{
environ = (char**)malloc(sizeof(char*));
memset(environ, 0, sizeof(char*));
}
setenv("HOME", pwd->pw_dir, 0); /* legal to override */
if(pwd->pw_uid)
setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1);
else
setenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH_ROOT, 1);
setenv("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell, 1);
setenv("TERM", termenv, 1);
/* mailx will give a funny error msg if you forget this one */
{
char tmp[MAXPATHLEN];
/* avoid snprintf */
if (sizeof(_PATH_MAILDIR) + strlen(pwd->pw_name) + 1 < MAXPATHLEN) {
sprintf(tmp, "%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pwd->pw_name);
setenv("MAIL",tmp,0);
}
}
/* LOGNAME is not documented in login(1) but
HP-UX 6.5 does it. We'll not allow modifying it.
*/
setenv("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name, 1);
if (!strncmp(tty_name, "ttyS", 4))
syslog(LOG_INFO, "DIALUP AT %s BY %s", tty_name, pwd->pw_name);
/* allow tracking of good logins.
-steve philp ([email protected]) */
if (pwd->pw_uid == 0) {
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "ROOT LOGIN ON %s FROM %s",
tty_name, hostname);
else
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "ROOT LOGIN ON %s", tty_name);
} else {
if (hostname)
syslog(LOG_INFO, "LOGIN ON %s BY %s FROM %s", tty_name,
pwd->pw_name, hostname);
else
syslog(LOG_INFO, "LOGIN ON %s BY %s", tty_name,
pwd->pw_name);
}
if (!quietlog) {
struct stat st;
char *mail;
mail = getenv("MAIL");
if (mail && stat(mail, &st) == 0 && st.st_size != 0) {
if (st.st_mtime > st.st_atime)
printf("You have new mail.\n");
else
printf("You have mail.\n");
}
}
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
/* discard permissions last so can't get killed and drop core */
if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid) < 0 && pwd->pw_uid) {
syslog(LOG_ALERT, "setuid() failed");
exit(1);
}
/* wait until here to change directory! */
if (chdir(pwd->pw_dir) < 0) {
printf("No directory %s!\n", pwd->pw_dir);
if (chdir("/"))
exit(0);
pwd->pw_dir = (char *) "/";
printf("Logging in with home = \"/\".\n");
}
/* if the shell field has a space: treat it like a shell script */
if (strchr(pwd->pw_shell, ' ')) {
buff = malloc(strlen(pwd->pw_shell) + 6);
if (!buff) {
fprintf(stderr, "login: no memory for shell script.\n");
exit(0);
}
strcpy(buff, "exec ");
strcat(buff, pwd->pw_shell);
childArgv[childArgc++] = (char *) "/bin/sh";
childArgv[childArgc++] = (char *) "-sh";
childArgv[childArgc++] = (char *) "-c";
childArgv[childArgc++] = buff;
} else {
tbuf[0] = '-';
xstrncpy(tbuf + 1, ((p = rindex(pwd->pw_shell, '/')) ?
p + 1 : pwd->pw_shell),
sizeof(tbuf)-1);
childArgv[childArgc++] = pwd->pw_shell;
childArgv[childArgc++] = tbuf;
}
childArgv[childArgc++] = NULL;
execvp(childArgv[0], childArgv + 1);
errsv = errno;
if (!strcmp(childArgv[0], "/bin/sh"))
fprintf(stderr, "login: couldn't exec shell script: %s.\n",
strerror(errsv));
else
fprintf(stderr, "login: no shell: %s.\n", strerror(errsv));
exit(0);
}
static void
do_login(const struct passwd *pwd, char *tty, char *ttyn)
{
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
struct spwd *sp;
#endif
int rootlogin = (pwd->pw_uid == 0);
gid_t tty_gid;
struct group *gr;
const char *home_dir;
int i;
if(!rootlogin)
checknologin();
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
sp = getspnam(pwd->pw_name);
#endif
update_utmp(pwd->pw_name, remote_host ? remote_host : "",
tty, ttyn);
gr = getgrnam ("tty");
if (gr != NULL)
tty_gid = gr->gr_gid;
else
tty_gid = pwd->pw_gid;
if (chown (ttyn, pwd->pw_uid, tty_gid) < 0) {
warn("chown %s", ttyn);
if (rootlogin == 0)
exit (1);
}
if (chmod (ttyn, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP) < 0) {
warn("chmod %s", ttyn);
if (rootlogin == 0)
exit (1);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOGIN
if(setlogin(pwd->pw_name)){
warn("setlogin(%s)", pwd->pw_name);
if(rootlogin == 0)
exit(1);
}
#endif
if(rootlogin == 0) {
const char *file = login_conf_get_string("limits");
if(file == NULL)
file = _PATH_LIMITS_CONF;
read_limits_conf(file, pwd);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
if (setpcred (pwd->pw_name, NULL) == -1)
warn("setpcred(%s)", pwd->pw_name);
#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
#ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
if(initgroups(pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_gid)){
warn("initgroups(%s, %u)", pwd->pw_name, (unsigned)pwd->pw_gid);
if(rootlogin == 0)
exit(1);
}
#endif
if(do_osfc2_magic(pwd->pw_uid))
exit(1);
if(setgid(pwd->pw_gid)){
warn("setgid(%u)", (unsigned)pwd->pw_gid);
if(rootlogin == 0)
exit(1);
}
if(setuid(pwd->pw_uid) || (pwd->pw_uid != 0 && setuid(0) == 0)) {
warn("setuid(%u)", (unsigned)pwd->pw_uid);
if(rootlogin == 0)
exit(1);
}
/* make sure signals are set to default actions, apparently some
OS:es like to ignore SIGINT, which is not very convenient */
for (i = 1; i < NSIG; ++i)
signal(i, SIG_DFL);
/* all kinds of different magic */
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
check_shadow(pwd, sp);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_GETUDBNAM) && defined(HAVE_SETLIM)
{
struct udb *udb;
long t;
const long maxcpu = 46116860184; /* some random constant */
udb = getudbnam(pwd->pw_name);
if(udb == UDB_NULL)
errx(1, "Failed to get UDB entry.");
t = udb->ue_pcpulim[UDBRC_INTER];
if(t == 0 || t > maxcpu)
t = CPUUNLIM;
else
t *= 100 * CLOCKS_PER_SEC;
if(limit(C_PROC, 0, L_CPU, t) < 0)
warn("limit C_PROC");
t = udb->ue_jcpulim[UDBRC_INTER];
if(t == 0 || t > maxcpu)
t = CPUUNLIM;
else
t *= 100 * CLOCKS_PER_SEC;
if(limit(C_JOBPROCS, 0, L_CPU, t) < 0)
warn("limit C_JOBPROCS");
nice(udb->ue_nice[UDBRC_INTER]);
}
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SGI_GETCAPABILITYBYNAME) && defined(HAVE_CAP_SET_PROC)
/* XXX SGI capability hack IRIX 6.x (x >= 0?) has something
called capabilities, that allow you to give away
permissions (such as chown) to specific processes. From 6.5
this is default on, and the default capability set seems to
not always be the empty set. The problem is that the
runtime linker refuses to do just about anything if the
process has *any* capabilities set, so we have to remove
them here (unless otherwise instructed by /etc/capability).
In IRIX < 6.5, these functions was called sgi_cap_setproc,
etc, but we ignore this fact (it works anyway). */
{
struct user_cap *ucap = sgi_getcapabilitybyname(pwd->pw_name);
cap_t cap;
if(ucap == NULL)
cap = cap_from_text("all=");
else
cap = cap_from_text(ucap->ca_default);
if(cap == NULL)
err(1, "cap_from_text");
if(cap_set_proc(cap) < 0)
err(1, "cap_set_proc");
cap_free(cap);
free(ucap);
}
#endif
home_dir = pwd->pw_dir;
if (chdir(home_dir) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "No home directory \"%s\"!\n", pwd->pw_dir);
if (chdir("/"))
exit(0);
home_dir = "/";
fprintf(stderr, "Logging in with home = \"/\".\n");
}
#ifdef KRB5
if (auth == AUTH_KRB5) {
krb5_start_session (pwd);
}
krb5_get_afs_tokens (pwd);
krb5_finish ();
#endif /* KRB5 */
add_env("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH);
{
const char *str = login_conf_get_string("environment");
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if(str == NULL) {
login_read_env(_PATH_ETC_ENVIRONMENT);
} else {
while(strsep_copy(&str, ",", buf, sizeof(buf)) != -1) {
if(buf[0] == '\0')
continue;
login_read_env(buf);
}
}
}
{
const char *str = login_conf_get_string("motd");
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if(str != NULL) {
while(strsep_copy(&str, ",", buf, sizeof(buf)) != -1) {
if(buf[0] == '\0')
continue;
show_file(buf);
}
} else {
str = login_conf_get_string("welcome");
if(str != NULL)
show_file(str);
}
}
add_env("HOME", home_dir);
add_env("USER", pwd->pw_name);
add_env("LOGNAME", pwd->pw_name);
add_env("SHELL", pwd->pw_shell);
exec_shell(pwd->pw_shell, rootlogin);
}
