/* * Check if this packet has an active SA and needs to be dropped instead * of forwarded. * Called from ip_input(). * 1 = drop packet, 0 = forward packet. */ int ip_ipsec_fwd(struct mbuf *m) { #ifdef IPSEC struct m_tag *mtag; struct tdb_ident *tdbi; struct secpolicy *sp; int error; mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_DONE, NULL); if (mtag != NULL) { tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *)(mtag + 1); sp = ipsec_getpolicy(tdbi, IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND); } else { sp = ipsec_getpolicybyaddr(m, IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND, IP_FORWARDING, &error); } if (sp == NULL) { /* NB: can happen if error */ /*XXX error stat???*/ DPRINTF(("ip_input: no SP for forwarding\n")); /*XXX*/ return 1; } /* * Check security policy against packet attributes. */ error = ipsec_in_reject(sp, m); KEY_FREESP(&sp); if (error) { IPSTAT_INC(ips_cantforward); return 1; } #endif /* IPSEC */ return 0; }
/* * Check if protocol type doesn't have a further header and do IPSEC * decryption or reject right now. Protocols with further headers get * their IPSEC treatment within the protocol specific processing. * Called from ip6_input(). * 1 = drop packet, 0 = continue processing packet. */ int ip6_ipsec_input(struct mbuf *m, int nxt) { #ifdef IPSEC struct m_tag *mtag; struct tdb_ident *tdbi; struct secpolicy *sp; int s, error; /* * enforce IPsec policy checking if we are seeing last header. * note that we do not visit this with protocols with pcb layer * code - like udp/tcp/raw ip. */ if ((inet6sw[ip6_protox[nxt]].pr_flags & PR_LASTHDR) != 0 && ipsec6_in_reject(m, NULL)) { /* * Check if the packet has already had IPsec processing * done. If so, then just pass it along. This tag gets * set during AH, ESP, etc. input handling, before the * packet is returned to the ip input queue for delivery. */ mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_DONE, NULL); s = splnet(); if (mtag != NULL) { tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *)(mtag + 1); sp = ipsec_getpolicy(tdbi, IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND); } else { sp = ipsec_getpolicybyaddr(m, IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND, IP_FORWARDING, &error); } if (sp != NULL) { /* * Check security policy against packet attributes. */ error = ipsec_in_reject(sp, m); KEY_FREESP(&sp); } else { /* XXX error stat??? */ error = EINVAL; DPRINTF(("%s: no SP, packet discarded\n", __func__));/*XXX*/ return 1; } splx(s); if (error) return 1; } #endif /* IPSEC */ return 0; }
/* * * Called from ip_output(). * 1 = drop packet, 0 = continue processing packet, * -1 = packet was reinjected and stop processing packet */ int ip_ipsec_output(struct mbuf **m, struct inpcb *inp, int *flags, int *error) { #ifdef IPSEC struct secpolicy *sp = NULL; struct ip *ip = mtod(*m, struct ip *); struct tdb_ident *tdbi; struct m_tag *mtag; int s; /* * Check the security policy (SP) for the packet and, if * required, do IPsec-related processing. There are two * cases here; the first time a packet is sent through * it will be untagged and handled by ipsec4_checkpolicy. * If the packet is resubmitted to ip_output (e.g. after * AH, ESP, etc. processing), there will be a tag to bypass * the lookup and related policy checking. */ mtag = m_tag_find(*m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_PENDING_TDB, NULL); s = splnet(); if (mtag != NULL) { tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *)(mtag + 1); sp = ipsec_getpolicy(tdbi, IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND); if (sp == NULL) *error = -EINVAL; /* force silent drop */ m_tag_delete(*m, mtag); } else { sp = ipsec4_checkpolicy(*m, IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND, *flags, error, inp); } /* * There are four return cases: * sp != NULL apply IPsec policy * sp == NULL, error == 0 no IPsec handling needed * sp == NULL, error == -EINVAL discard packet w/o error * sp == NULL, error != 0 discard packet, report error */ if (sp != NULL) { /* Loop detection, check if ipsec processing already done */ KASSERT(sp->req != NULL, ("ip_output: no ipsec request")); for (mtag = m_tag_first(*m); mtag != NULL; mtag = m_tag_next(*m, mtag)) { if (mtag->m_tag_cookie != MTAG_ABI_COMPAT) continue; if (mtag->m_tag_id != PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_OUT_DONE && mtag->m_tag_id != PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_OUT_CRYPTO_NEEDED) continue; /* * Check if policy has an SA associated with it. * This can happen when an SP has yet to acquire * an SA; e.g. on first reference. If it occurs, * then we let ipsec4_process_packet do its thing. */ if (sp->req->sav == NULL) break; tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *)(mtag + 1); if (tdbi->spi == sp->req->sav->spi && tdbi->proto == sp->req->sav->sah->saidx.proto && bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sp->req->sav->sah->saidx.dst, sizeof (union sockaddr_union)) == 0) { /* * No IPsec processing is needed, free * reference to SP. * * NB: null pointer to avoid free at * done: below. */ KEY_FREESP(&sp), sp = NULL; splx(s); goto done; } } /* * Do delayed checksums now because we send before * this is done in the normal processing path. */ if ((*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA) { in_delayed_cksum(*m); (*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_DELAY_DATA; } #ifdef SCTP if ((*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_SCTP) { sctp_delayed_cksum(*m, (uint32_t)(ip->ip_hl << 2)); (*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_SCTP; } #endif ip->ip_len = htons(ip->ip_len); ip->ip_off = htons(ip->ip_off); /* NB: callee frees mbuf */ *error = ipsec4_process_packet(*m, sp->req, *flags, 0); if (*error == EJUSTRETURN) { /* * We had a SP with a level of 'use' and no SA. We * will just continue to process the packet without * IPsec processing and return without error. */ *error = 0; ip->ip_len = ntohs(ip->ip_len); ip->ip_off = ntohs(ip->ip_off); goto done; } /* * Preserve KAME behaviour: ENOENT can be returned * when an SA acquire is in progress. Don't propagate * this to user-level; it confuses applications. * * XXX this will go away when the SADB is redone. */ if (*error == ENOENT) *error = 0; splx(s); goto reinjected; } else { /* sp == NULL */ splx(s); if (*error != 0) { /* * Hack: -EINVAL is used to signal that a packet * should be silently discarded. This is typically * because we asked key management for an SA and * it was delayed (e.g. kicked up to IKE). */ if (*error == -EINVAL) *error = 0; goto bad; } else { /* No IPsec processing for this packet. */ } } done: if (sp != NULL) KEY_FREESP(&sp); return 0; reinjected: if (sp != NULL) KEY_FREESP(&sp); return -1; bad: if (sp != NULL) KEY_FREESP(&sp); return 1; #endif /* IPSEC */ return 0; }
int ip6_ipsec_output(struct mbuf **m, struct inpcb *inp, int *flags, int *error, struct ifnet **ifp, struct secpolicy **sp) { #ifdef IPSEC struct tdb_ident *tdbi; struct m_tag *mtag; /* XXX int s; */ if (sp == NULL) return 1; mtag = m_tag_find(*m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_PENDING_TDB, NULL); if (mtag != NULL) { tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *)(mtag + 1); *sp = ipsec_getpolicy(tdbi, IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND); if (*sp == NULL) *error = -EINVAL; /* force silent drop */ m_tag_delete(*m, mtag); } else { *sp = ipsec4_checkpolicy(*m, IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND, *flags, error, inp); } /* * There are four return cases: * sp != NULL apply IPsec policy * sp == NULL, error == 0 no IPsec handling needed * sp == NULL, error == -EINVAL discard packet w/o error * sp == NULL, error != 0 discard packet, report error */ if (*sp != NULL) { /* Loop detection, check if ipsec processing already done */ KASSERT((*sp)->req != NULL, ("ip_output: no ipsec request")); for (mtag = m_tag_first(*m); mtag != NULL; mtag = m_tag_next(*m, mtag)) { if (mtag->m_tag_cookie != MTAG_ABI_COMPAT) continue; if (mtag->m_tag_id != PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_OUT_DONE && mtag->m_tag_id != PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_OUT_CRYPTO_NEEDED) continue; /* * Check if policy has an SA associated with it. * This can happen when an SP has yet to acquire * an SA; e.g. on first reference. If it occurs, * then we let ipsec4_process_packet do its thing. */ if ((*sp)->req->sav == NULL) break; tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *)(mtag + 1); if (tdbi->spi == (*sp)->req->sav->spi && tdbi->proto == (*sp)->req->sav->sah->saidx.proto && bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &(*sp)->req->sav->sah->saidx.dst, sizeof (union sockaddr_union)) == 0) { /* * No IPsec processing is needed, free * reference to SP. * * NB: null pointer to avoid free at * done: below. */ KEY_FREESP(sp), *sp = NULL; /* XXX splx(s); */ goto done; } } /* * Do delayed checksums now because we send before * this is done in the normal processing path. */ if ((*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA) { ipseclog((LOG_DEBUG, "%s: we do not support IPv4 over IPv6", __func__)); #ifdef INET in_delayed_cksum(*m); #endif (*m)->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_DELAY_DATA; } /* * Preserve KAME behaviour: ENOENT can be returned * when an SA acquire is in progress. Don't propagate * this to user-level; it confuses applications. * * XXX this will go away when the SADB is redone. */ if (*error == ENOENT) *error = 0; goto do_ipsec; } else { /* sp == NULL */ if (*error != 0) { /* * Hack: -EINVAL is used to signal that a packet * should be silently discarded. This is typically * because we asked key management for an SA and * it was delayed (e.g. kicked up to IKE). */ if (*error == -EINVAL) *error = 0; goto bad; } else { /* No IPsec processing for this packet. */ } } done: return 0; do_ipsec: return -1; bad: return 1; #endif /* IPSEC */ return 0; }