krb5_error_code
handle_authdata (krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_data *req_pkt,
krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_authdata_systems *authdata_sys;
int i;
const char *emsg;
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_DEBUG, "handling authdata");
for (authdata_sys = authdata_systems, i = 0; authdata_sys != NULL && i < n_authdata_systems; i++) {
if (authdata_sys[i].handle_authdata && authdata_sys[i].type != -1) {
retval = authdata_sys[i].handle_authdata(context, client, req_pkt, request,
enc_tkt_reply);
if (retval) {
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (context, retval);
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "authdata (%s) handling failure: %s",
authdata_sys[i].name, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message (context, emsg);
} else {
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_DEBUG, ".. .. ok");
}
}
}
return 0;
}
static void
log_badauth_display_status_1(char *m, OM_uint32 code, int type)
{
OM_uint32 gssstat, minor_stat;
gss_buffer_desc msg;
OM_uint32 msg_ctx;
msg_ctx = 0;
while (1) {
gssstat = gss_display_status(&minor_stat, code, type, GSS_C_NULL_OID,
&msg_ctx, &msg);
if (gssstat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s Cannot decode status %d"), m,
(int)code);
return;
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s %.*s", m, (int)msg.length,
(char *)msg.value);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &msg);
if (!msg_ctx)
break;
}
}
/* Callback from GSSRPC for authentication failures */
void
log_badauth(OM_uint32 major, OM_uint32 minor, SVCXPRT *xprt, char *data)
{
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Authentication attempt failed: %s, "
"GSS-API error strings are:"),
client_addr(xprt));
log_badauth_display_status_1(" ", major, GSS_C_GSS_CODE);
log_badauth_display_status_1(" ", minor, GSS_C_MECH_CODE);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _(" GSS-API error strings complete."));
}
int init_dict(kadm5_config_params *params)
{
int fd,
len,
i;
char *p,
*t;
struct stat sb;
if(word_list != NULL && word_block != NULL)
return KADM5_OK;
if (! (params->mask & KADM5_CONFIG_DICT_FILE)) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "No dictionary file specified, continuing "
"without one.");
return KADM5_OK;
}
if ((fd = open(params->dict_file, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
"WARNING! Cannot find dictionary file %s, "
"continuing without one.", params->dict_file);
return KADM5_OK;
} else
return errno;
}
set_cloexec_fd(fd);
if (fstat(fd, &sb) == -1) {
close(fd);
return errno;
}
if ((word_block = (char *) malloc(sb.st_size + 1)) == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if (read(fd, word_block, sb.st_size) != sb.st_size)
return errno;
(void) close(fd);
word_block[sb.st_size] = '\0';
p = word_block;
len = sb.st_size;
while(len > 0 && (t = memchr(p, '\n', len)) != NULL) {
*t = '\0';
len -= t - p + 1;
p = t + 1;
word_count++;
}
if ((word_list = (char **) malloc(word_count * sizeof(char *))) == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
p = word_block;
for (i = 0; i < word_count; i++) {
word_list[i] = p;
p += strlen(p) + 1;
}
qsort(word_list, word_count, sizeof(char *), word_compare);
return KADM5_OK;
}
/* Open and parse the ACL file. */
static krb5_error_code
load_acl_file(krb5_context context, const char *fname, struct acl_state *state)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
FILE *fp;
char *line;
struct acl_entry **entry_slot;
int lineno, incr;
state->list = NULL;
/* Open the ACL file for reading. */
fp = fopen(fname, "r");
if (fp == NULL) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s while opening ACL file %s"),
error_message(errno), fname);
ret = errno;
k5_setmsg(context, errno, _("Cannot open %s: %s"), fname,
error_message(ret));
return ret;
}
set_cloexec_file(fp);
lineno = 1;
incr = 0;
entry_slot = &state->list;
/* Get a non-comment line. */
while ((line = get_line(fp, fname, &lineno, &incr)) != NULL) {
/* Parse it. Fail out on syntax error. */
*entry_slot = parse_line(context, line, fname);
if (*entry_slot == NULL) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: syntax error at line %d <%.10s...>"),
fname, lineno, line);
k5_setmsg(context, EINVAL,
_("%s: syntax error at line %d <%.10s...>"),
fname, lineno, line);
free_acl_entries(state);
free(line);
fclose(fp);
return EINVAL;
}
entry_slot = &(*entry_slot)->next;
free(line);
}
fclose(fp);
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
handle_authdata (krb5_context context,
unsigned int flags,
krb5_db_entry *client,
krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_db_entry *krbtgt,
krb5_keyblock *client_key,
krb5_keyblock *server_key,
krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key,
krb5_data *req_pkt,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_const_principal for_user_princ,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply)
{
krb5_error_code code = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n_authdata_systems; i++) {
const krb5_authdata_systems *asys = &authdata_systems[i];
if (isflagset(enc_tkt_reply->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS) &&
!isflagset(asys->flags, AUTHDATA_FLAG_ANONYMOUS))
continue;
switch (asys->type) {
case AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V0:
/* V0 was only in AS-REQ code path */
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_AS_REQ)
continue;
code = (*asys->handle_authdata.v0)(context, client, req_pkt,
request, enc_tkt_reply);
break;
case AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V2:
code = (*asys->handle_authdata.v2)(context, flags,
client, server, krbtgt,
client_key, server_key, krbtgt_key,
req_pkt, request, for_user_princ,
enc_tkt_request,
enc_tkt_reply);
break;
default:
code = 0;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
const char *emsg;
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (context, code);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("authdata (%s) handling failure: %s"),
asys->name, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message (context, emsg);
if (asys->flags & AUTHDATA_FLAG_CRITICAL)
break;
}
}
return code;
}
char * v4_klog( int type, const char *format, ...)
{
int logpri = LOG_INFO;
va_list pvar;
va_start(pvar, format);
switch (type) {
case L_ERR_SEXP:
case L_ERR_NKY:
case L_ERR_NUN:
case L_ERR_UNK:
case L_KRB_PERR:
logpri = LOG_ERR;
case L_INI_REQ:
case L_NTGT_INTK:
case L_TKT_REQ:
case L_APPL_REQ:
strcpy(log_text, "PROCESS_V4:");
vsprintf(log_text+strlen(log_text), format, pvar);
krb5_klog_syslog(logpri, "%s", log_text);
default:
/* ignore the other types... */
;
}
va_end(pvar);
return(log_text);
}
/*
* Output a message to stderr and the admin server log, and exit with status 1.
* msg should not be punctuated. If code is given, msg should indicate what
* operation was taking place in the present progressive. Otherwise msg should
* be capitalized and should indicate what went wrong.
*/
static void
fail_to_start(krb5_error_code code, const char *msg)
{
const char *errmsg;
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", progname);
if (code) {
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, code);
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: %s while %s, aborting\n"), progname, errmsg,
msg);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s while %s, aborting\n"), errmsg, msg);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: %s, aborting\n"), progname, msg);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s, aborting"), msg);
}
exit(1);
}
static void
log_failure(krb5_context context,
const char *name,
const char *function,
krb5_error_code ret)
{
const char *e = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "kadm5_hook %s failed postcommit %s: %s",
name, function, e);
krb5_free_error_message(context, e);
}
/* Dispatch routine for set/change password */
void
dispatch(void *handle, struct sockaddr *local_saddr,
const krb5_fulladdr *remote_faddr, krb5_data *request, int is_tcp,
verto_ctx *vctx, loop_respond_fn respond, void *arg)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_keytab kt = NULL;
kadm5_server_handle_t server_handle = (kadm5_server_handle_t)handle;
krb5_fulladdr local_faddr;
krb5_address **local_kaddrs = NULL, local_kaddr_buf;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
if (local_saddr == NULL) {
ret = krb5_os_localaddr(server_handle->context, &local_kaddrs);
if (ret != 0)
goto egress;
local_faddr.address = local_kaddrs[0];
local_faddr.port = 0;
} else {
local_faddr.address = &local_kaddr_buf;
init_addr(&local_faddr, local_saddr);
}
ret = krb5_kt_resolve(server_handle->context, "KDB:", &kt);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("chpw: Couldn't open admin keytab %s"),
krb5_get_error_message(server_handle->context, ret));
goto egress;
}
response = k5alloc(sizeof(krb5_data), &ret);
if (response == NULL)
goto egress;
ret = process_chpw_request(server_handle->context,
handle,
server_handle->params.realm,
kt,
&local_faddr,
remote_faddr,
request,
response);
egress:
if (ret)
krb5_free_data(server_handle->context, response);
krb5_free_addresses(server_handle->context, local_kaddrs);
krb5_kt_close(server_handle->context, kt);
(*respond)(arg, ret, ret == 0 ? response : NULL);
}
static void
finish_dispatch(void *arg, krb5_error_code code, krb5_data *response)
{
struct dispatch_state *state = arg;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
#ifndef NOCACHE
/* Remove our NULL cache entry to indicate request completion. */
kdc_remove_lookaside(kdc_context, state->request);
#endif
if (state->is_tcp == 0 && response &&
response->length > max_dgram_reply_size) {
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, response);
response = NULL;
code = make_too_big_error(&response);
if (code)
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "error constructing "
"KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG error: %s",
error_message(code));
}
#ifndef NOCACHE
/* put the response into the lookaside buffer */
else if (!code && response)
kdc_insert_lookaside(state->request, response);
#endif
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, code, response);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(struct server_handle *handle, krb5_data *pkt,
const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_keyblock *header_key = NULL;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *stkt_server = NULL;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime = 0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_principal cprinc = NULL, sprinc = NULL, altcprinc = NULL;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
int errcode;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* TGT */
krb5_enc_tkt_part *subject_tkt = NULL; /* TGT or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry *client = NULL, *header_server = NULL;
krb5_db_entry *local_tgt, *local_tgt_storage = NULL;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
krb5_boolean is_referral;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = NULL;
krb5_audit_state *au_state = NULL;
krb5_data **auth_indicators = NULL;
memset(&reply, 0, sizeof(reply));
memset(&reply_encpart, 0, sizeof(reply_encpart));
memset(&ticket_reply, 0, sizeof(ticket_reply));
memset(&enc_tkt_reply, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply));
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* Save pointer to client-requested service principal, in case of
* errors before a successful call to search_sprinc(). */
sprinc = request->server;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
}
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
kdc_active_realm = setup_server_realm(handle, request->server);
if (kdc_active_realm == NULL) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(kdc_active_realm, &state);
if (errcode !=0) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Initialize audit state. */
errcode = kau_init_kdc_req(kdc_context, request, from, &au_state);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(handle->kdc_err_context, request);
return errcode;
}
/* Seed the audit trail with the request ID and basic information. */
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(kdc_active_realm,
request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&header_server, &header_key, &subkey,
&pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2)
cprinc = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, header_ticket,
&au_state->tkt_in_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state, NULL);
/* Reset sprinc because kdc_find_fast() can replace request. */
sprinc = request->server;
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "FIND_FAST";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = get_local_tgt(kdc_context, &sprinc->realm, header_server,
&local_tgt, &local_tgt_storage);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_LOCAL_TGT";
goto cleanup;
}
/* Ignore (for now) the request modification due to FAST processing. */
au_state->request = request;
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
au_state->stage = SRVC_PRINC;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_ALIAS_OK);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
errcode = search_sprinc(kdc_active_realm, request, s_flags, &server,
&status);
if (errcode != 0)
goto cleanup;
sprinc = server->princ;
/* If we got a cross-realm TGS which is not the requested server, we are
* issuing a referral (or alternate TGT, which we treat similarly). */
is_referral = is_cross_tgs_principal(server->princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, server->princ);
au_state->stage = VALIDATE_POL;
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(kdc_active_realm,
request, *server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status, &e_data))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
if (retval == KDC_ERR_POLICY || retval == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(kdc_active_realm, header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&status);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL || errcode != 0) {
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
au_state->s4u2self_user = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
au_state->status = status;
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
au_state->s4u2self_user = NULL;
}
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
if (is_referral) {
/* The requesting server appears to no longer exist, and we found
* a referral instead. Treat this as a server lookup failure. */
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Deal with user-to-user and constrained delegation */
errcode = decrypt_2ndtkt(kdc_active_realm, request, c_flags,
&stkt_server, &status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_active_realm,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
stkt_server,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode == KDC_ERR_POLICY || errcode == KDC_ERR_BADOPTION)
au_state->violation = PROT_CONSTRAINT;
else if (errcode)
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
au_state->status = status;
retval = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&au_state->evid_tkt_id);
if (retval) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
errcode = retval;
goto cleanup;
}
kau_s4u2proxy(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
assert(client == NULL); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = stkt_server;
stkt_server = NULL;
} else if (request->kdc_options & KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, stkt_server);
stkt_server = NULL;
} else
assert(stkt_server == NULL);
au_state->stage = ISSUE_TKT;
errcode = gen_session_key(kdc_active_realm, request, server, &session_key,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
/*
* subject_tkt will refer to the evidence ticket (for constrained
* delegation) or the TGT. The distinction from header_enc_tkt is
* necessary because the TGS signature only protects some fields:
* the others could be forged by a malicious server.
*/
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION))
subject_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
else
subject_tkt = header_enc_tkt;
authtime = subject_tkt->times.authtime;
/* Extract auth indicators from the subject ticket, except for S4U2Proxy
* requests (where the client didn't authenticate). */
if (s4u_x509_user == NULL) {
errcode = get_auth_indicators(kdc_context, subject_tkt, local_tgt,
&auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "GET_AUTH_INDICATORS";
goto cleanup;
}
}
errcode = check_indicators(kdc_context, server, auth_indicators);
if (errcode) {
status = "HIGHER_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server->princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = OPTS2FLAGS(request->kdc_options);
enc_tkt_reply.flags |= COPY_TKT_FLAGS(header_enc_tkt->flags);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/* Indicate support for encrypted padata (RFC 6806). */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP);
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/*
* It should be noted that local policy may affect the
* processing of any of these flags. For example, some
* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (client != NULL &&
isflagset(client->attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* Forwardable flag is propagated along referral path.
*/
else if (!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server->attributes,
KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED) ||
isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
/* We don't currently handle issuing anonymous tickets based on
* non-anonymous ones, so just ignore the option. */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS) &&
!isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_timestamp old_starttime;
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_starttime = enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime ?
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime : enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - old_starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
kdc_get_ticket_endtime(kdc_active_realm, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime, request->till,
client, server, &enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime);
}
kdc_get_ticket_renewtime(kdc_active_realm, request, header_enc_tkt, client,
server, &enc_tkt_reply);
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header or evidence ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
altcprinc = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
altcprinc = subject_tkt->client;
} else {
altcprinc = NULL;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Convert server.key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* try to lookup the client principal so plugins can add additional
* authorization information.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(client == NULL); /* should not have been set already */
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal(kdc_context, subject_tkt->client,
c_flags, &client);
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = subject_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
krb5_realm_compare(kdc_context, header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "VALIDATE_TRANSIT_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
memset(&enc_tkt_reply.transited, 0, sizeof(enc_tkt_reply.transited));
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TO_TRANSITED_LIST";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
server, header_server);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_active_realm,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else {
log_tgs_badtrans(kdc_context, cprinc, sprinc,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, errcode);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("not checking transit path"));
if (kdc_active_realm->realm_reject_bad_transit &&
!isflagset(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
au_state->violation = LOCAL_POLICY;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context, c_flags, client, server,
header_server, local_tgt,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
header_key,
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
subject_tkt,
auth_indicators,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
altcprinc = client2;
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
au_state->status = status;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, FALSE, au_state);
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
kau_u2u(kdc_context, TRUE, au_state);
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCRYPT_TICKET";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
au_state->stage = ENCR_REP;
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
krb5int_find_pa_data(kdc_context, request->padata,
KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
au_state->status = status;
}
kau_s4u2self(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrentry.magic = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_RESPONSE";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state,
subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "MAKE_FAST_REPLY_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, pkt, request,
reply_key, server, &reply_encpart,
is_referral &&
isflagset(s_flags,
KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE));
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kau_make_tkt_id(kdc_context, &ticket_reply, &au_state->tkt_out_id);
if (errcode) {
status = "GENERATE_TICKET_ID";
goto cleanup;
}
if (kdc_fast_hide_client(state))
reply.client = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
au_state->status = status;
if (!errcode)
au_state->reply = &reply;
kau_tgs_req(kdc_context, errcode ? FALSE : TRUE, au_state);
kau_free_kdc_req(au_state);
log_tgs_req(kdc_context, from, request, &reply, cprinc,
sprinc, altcprinc, authtime,
c_flags, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > KRB_ERR_MAX)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
(server != NULL) ? server->princ : NULL,
response, status, e_data);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, header_server);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, local_tgt_storage);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (header_key != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, header_key);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, e_data);
k5_free_data_ptr_list(auth_indicators);
return retval;
}
/*
* Parse a restrictions field. Return NULL on failure.
*
* Allowed restrictions are:
* [+-]flagname (recognized by krb5_flagspec_to_mask)
* flag is forced to indicated value
* -clearpolicy policy is forced clear
* -policy pol policy is forced to be "pol"
* -{expire,pwexpire,maxlife,maxrenewlife} deltat
* associated value will be forced to
* MIN(deltat, requested value)
*/
static struct kadm5_auth_restrictions *
parse_restrictions(const char *str, const char *fname)
{
char *copy = NULL, *token, *arg, *save;
const char *delims = "\t\n\f\v\r ,";
krb5_deltat delta;
struct kadm5_auth_restrictions *rs;
copy = strdup(str);
if (copy == NULL)
return NULL;
rs = calloc(1, sizeof(*rs));
if (rs == NULL) {
free(copy);
return NULL;
}
rs->forbid_attrs = ~(krb5_flags)0;
for (token = strtok_r(copy, delims, &save); token != NULL;
token = strtok_r(NULL, delims, &save)) {
if (krb5_flagspec_to_mask(token, &rs->require_attrs,
&rs->forbid_attrs) == 0) {
rs->mask |= KADM5_ATTRIBUTES;
continue;
}
if (strcmp(token, "-clearpolicy") == 0) {
rs->mask |= KADM5_POLICY_CLR;
continue;
}
/* Everything else needs an argument. */
arg = strtok_r(NULL, delims, &save);
if (arg == NULL)
goto error;
if (strcmp(token, "-policy") == 0) {
if (rs->policy != NULL)
goto error;
rs->policy = strdup(arg);
if (rs->policy == NULL)
goto error;
rs->mask |= KADM5_POLICY;
continue;
}
/* All other arguments must be a deltat. */
if (krb5_string_to_deltat(arg, &delta) != 0)
goto error;
if (strcmp(token, "-expire") == 0) {
rs->princ_lifetime = delta;
rs->mask |= KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME;
} else if (strcmp(token, "-pwexpire") == 0) {
rs->pw_lifetime = delta;
rs->mask |= KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION;
} else if (strcmp(token, "-maxlife") == 0) {
rs->max_life = delta;
rs->mask |= KADM5_MAX_LIFE;
} else if (strcmp(token, "-maxrenewlife") == 0) {
rs->max_renewable_life = delta;
rs->mask |= KADM5_MAX_RLIFE;
} else {
goto error;
}
}
free(copy);
return rs;
error:
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s: invalid restrictions: %s"), fname, str);
free(copy);
free(rs->policy);
free(rs);
return NULL;
}
krb5_error_code
verify_securid_data_2(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
krb5_sam_response_2 *sr2,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply, krb5_pa_data *pa,
krb5_sam_challenge_2 **sc2_out)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
int new_pin = 0;
krb5_key_data *client_key_data = NULL;
krb5_keyblock client_key;
krb5_data scratch;
krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2 *esre2 = NULL;
struct securid_track_data sid_track_data, *trackp = NULL;
krb5_data tmp_data;
SDI_HANDLE sd_handle = SDI_HANDLE_NONE;
krb5_sam_challenge_2 *sc2p = NULL;
char *cp, *user = NULL;
char *securid_user = NULL;
char passcode[LENPRNST+1];
char max_pin_len, min_pin_len, alpha_pin;
memset(&client_key, 0, sizeof(client_key));
memset(&scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
*sc2_out = NULL;
retval = krb5_unparse_name(context, client->princ, &user);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while unparsing client name in verify_securid_data_2");
return retval;
}
if ((sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.data == NULL) ||
(sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length <= 0)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
"No preauth data supplied in "
"verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, client,
sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.enctype,
KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL,
sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.kvno,
&client_key_data);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while getting client key in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, client_key_data,
&client_key, NULL);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while decrypting client key in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
user);
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length;
scratch.data = k5alloc(scratch.length, &retval);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
retval = krb5_c_decrypt(context, &client_key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_RESPONSE, 0,
&sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad, &scratch);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while decrypting SAD in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = decode_krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2(&scratch, &esre2);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while decoding SAD in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
esre2 = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (sr2->sam_nonce != esre2->sam_nonce) {
com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"while checking nonce in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
if (esre2->sam_sad.length == 0 || esre2->sam_sad.data == NULL) {
com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"No SecurID passcode in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Copy out SAD to null-terminated buffer */
memset(passcode, 0, sizeof(passcode));
if (esre2->sam_sad.length > (sizeof(passcode) - 1)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"SecurID passcode/PIN too long (%d bytes) in "
"verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
esre2->sam_sad.length, user);
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(passcode, esre2->sam_sad.data, esre2->sam_sad.length);
securid_user = strdup(user);
if (!securid_user) {
retval = ENOMEM;
com_err("krb5kdc", ENOMEM,
"while copying user name in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
cp = strchr(securid_user, '@');
if (cp != NULL)
*cp = '\0';
/* Check for any track_id data that may have state from a previous attempt
* at SecurID authentication. */
if (sr2->sam_track_id.data && (sr2->sam_track_id.length > 0)) {
krb5_data track_id_data;
memset(&track_id_data, 0, sizeof(track_id_data));
retval = securid_decrypt_track_data_2(context, client,
&sr2->sam_track_id,
&track_id_data);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while decrypting SecurID trackID in "
"verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
if (track_id_data.length < sizeof (struct securid_track_data)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
com_err("krb5kdc", retval, "Length of track data incorrect");
goto cleanup;
}
trackp = (struct securid_track_data *)track_id_data.data;
if(trackp->hostid != gethostid()) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Unexpected challenge response");
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD;
goto cleanup;
}
switch(trackp->state) {
case SECURID_STATE_INITIAL:
goto initial;
break;
case SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN_AGAIN:
{
int pin1_len, pin2_len;
trackp->handle = ntohl(trackp->handle);
pin2_len = strlen(passcode);
pin1_len = strlen(trackp->passcode);
if ((pin1_len != pin2_len) ||
(memcmp(passcode, trackp->passcode, pin1_len) != 0)) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "New SecurID PIN Failed for user "
"%s: PIN mis-match", user);
break;
}
retval = SD_Pin(trackp->handle, passcode);
SD_Close(trackp->handle);
if (retval == ACM_NEW_PIN_ACCEPTED) {
enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH;
enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "SecurID PIN Accepted for %s in "
"verify_securid_data_2",
securid_user);
retval = 0;
} else {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"SecurID PIN Failed for user %s (AceServer "
"returns %d) in verify_securid_data_2",
user, retval);
}
break;
}
case SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN: {
krb5_sam_challenge_2_body sc2b;
sc2p = k5alloc(sizeof *sc2p, &retval);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
memset(sc2p, 0, sizeof(*sc2p));
memset(&sc2b, 0, sizeof(sc2b));
sc2b.sam_type = PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID;
sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data = NEW_PIN_AGAIN_message;
sc2b.sam_response_prompt.length =
strlen(sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data);
sc2b.sam_flags = KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD;
sc2b.sam_etype = client_key.enctype;
tmp_data.data = (char *)&sc2b.sam_nonce;
tmp_data.length = sizeof(sc2b.sam_nonce);
if ((retval = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &tmp_data))) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while making nonce for SecurID new "
"PIN2 SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)", user);
goto cleanup;
}
sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN_AGAIN;
sid_track_data.handle = trackp->handle;
sid_track_data.hostid = gethostid();
/* Should we complain if sizes don't work ?? */
memcpy(sid_track_data.passcode, passcode,
sizeof(sid_track_data.passcode));
tmp_data.data = (char *)&sid_track_data;
tmp_data.length = sizeof(sid_track_data);
if ((retval = securid_encrypt_track_data_2(context, client,
&tmp_data,
&sc2b.sam_track_id))) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while encrypting NEW PIN2 SecurID "
"track data for SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
securid_user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = securid_make_sam_challenge_2_and_cksum(context, sc2p,
&sc2b,
&client_key);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while making cksum for "
"SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (new PIN2) (%s)", securid_user);
goto cleanup;
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"Requesting verification of new PIN for user %s",
securid_user);
*sc2_out = sc2p;
sc2p = NULL;
/*sc2_out may be set even on error path*/
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
goto cleanup;
}
case SECURID_STATE_NEXT_CODE:
trackp->handle = ntohl(trackp->handle);
retval = SD_Next(trackp->handle, passcode);
SD_Close(trackp->handle);
if (retval == ACM_OK) {
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH | TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Next SecurID Code Accepted for "
"user %s", securid_user);
retval = 0;
} else {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Next SecurID Code Failed for user "
"%s (AceServer returns %d) in "
"verify_securid_data_2", user, retval);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
}
break;
}
} else { /* No track data, this is first of N attempts */
initial:
retval = SD_Init(&sd_handle);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"SD_Init() returns error %d in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
retval, securid_user);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = SD_Lock(sd_handle, securid_user);
if (retval != ACM_OK) {
SD_Close(sd_handle);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"SD_Lock() failed (AceServer returns %d) for %s",
retval, securid_user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = SD_Check(sd_handle, passcode, securid_user);
switch (retval) {
case ACM_OK:
SD_Close(sd_handle);
enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH;
enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "SecurID passcode accepted for user %s",
user);
retval = 0;
break;
case ACM_ACCESS_DENIED:
SD_Close(sd_handle);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "AceServer returns Access Denied for "
"user %s (SAM2)", user);
goto cleanup;
case ACM_NEW_PIN_REQUIRED:
new_pin = 1;
/*fall through*/
case ACM_NEXT_CODE_REQUIRED: {
krb5_sam_challenge_2_body sc2b;
sc2p = k5alloc(sizeof *sc2p, &retval);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
memset(sc2p, 0, sizeof(*sc2p));
memset(&sc2b, 0, sizeof(sc2b));
sc2b.sam_type = PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID;
sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data = NEXT_PASSCODE_message;
sc2b.sam_response_prompt.length =
strlen(sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data);
sc2b.sam_flags = KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD;
sc2b.sam_etype = client_key.enctype;
if (new_pin) {
if ((AceGetMaxPinLen(sd_handle, &max_pin_len) == ACE_SUCCESS)
&& (AceGetMinPinLen(sd_handle,
&min_pin_len) == ACE_SUCCESS)
&& (AceGetAlphanumeric(sd_handle,
&alpha_pin) == ACE_SUCCESS)) {
sprintf(PIN_message,
"New PIN must contain %d to %d %sdigits",
min_pin_len, max_pin_len,
(alpha_pin == 0) ? "" : "alphanumeric ");
sc2b.sam_challenge_label.data = PIN_message;
sc2b.sam_challenge_label.length =
strlen(sc2b.sam_challenge_label.data);
} else {
sc2b.sam_challenge_label.length = 0;
}
}
tmp_data.data = (char *)&sc2b.sam_nonce;
tmp_data.length = sizeof(sc2b.sam_nonce);
if ((retval = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &tmp_data))) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while making nonce for SecurID SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
user);
goto cleanup;
}
if (new_pin)
sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN;
else
sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_NEXT_CODE;
sid_track_data.handle = htonl(sd_handle);
sid_track_data.hostid = gethostid();
tmp_data.data = (char *)&sid_track_data;
tmp_data.length = sizeof(sid_track_data);
retval = securid_encrypt_track_data_2(context, client, &tmp_data,
&sc2b.sam_track_id);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while encrypting SecurID track "
"data for SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
securid_user);
goto cleanup;
}
retval = securid_make_sam_challenge_2_and_cksum(context, sc2p,
&sc2b,
&client_key);
if (retval) {
com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
"while making cksum for SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
securid_user);
}
if (new_pin)
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "New SecurID PIN required for "
"user %s", securid_user);
else
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Next SecurID passcode required "
"for user %s", securid_user);
*sc2_out = sc2p;
sc2p = NULL;
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
/*sc2_out is permitted as an output on error path*/
goto cleanup;
}
default:
com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
"AceServer returns unknown error code %d "
"in verify_securid_data_2\n", retval);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
} /* no track_id data */
cleanup:
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &client_key);
free(scratch.data);
krb5_free_enc_sam_response_enc_2(context, esre2);
free(user);
free(securid_user);
free(trackp);
krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2p);
return retval;
}
static void
finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
{
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_key_data *client_key;
krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
const char *emsg = 0;
int did_log = 0;
register int i;
krb5_enctype useenctype;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
if (errcode)
goto egress;
if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client,
*state->server, state->kdc_time,
&state->status))) {
errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Convert server->key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*
* server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Find the appropriate client key. We search in the order specified
* by request keytype list.
*/
client_key = NULL;
useenctype = 0;
for (i = 0; i < state->request->nktypes; i++) {
useenctype = state->request->ktype[i];
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(useenctype))
continue;
if (!krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->client,
useenctype, -1, 0, &client_key))
break;
}
if (!(client_key)) {
/* Cannot find an appropriate key */
state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto egress;
}
state->rock.client_key = client_key;
/* convert client.key_data into a real key */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
client_key,
&state->client_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_CLIENT_KEY";
goto egress;
}
state->client_keyblock.enctype = useenctype;
/* Start assembling the response */
state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP;
state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */
state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply;
state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key;
if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client,
&state->reply_encpart.last_req))) {
state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ";
goto egress;
}
state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce;
state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client);
state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags;
state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location
* is used for ktime
*/
state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times;
state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time;
state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs;
state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before
* authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key
*/
errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt,
state->request, &state->reply,
&state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
state->c_flags,
state->client,
state->server,
state->server,
&state->client_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
state->req_pkt,
state->request,
NULL, /* for_user_princ */
NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */
&state->enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock,
&state->ticket_reply);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCRYPTING_TICKET";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate,
state->request,
&state->reply,
state->client_keyblock.enctype);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "fast response handling";
goto egress;
}
/* now encode/encrypt the response */
state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock,
&as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "generating reply key";
goto egress;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request,
as_encrypting_key, state->server,
&state->reply_encpart, FALSE);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP,
&state->reply_encpart, 0,
as_encrypting_key,
&state->reply, &response);
state->reply.enc_part.kvno = client_key->key_data_kvno;
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
goto egress;
}
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->from, state->request, &state->reply,
state->client, state->cname, state->server,
state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0);
did_log = 1;
egress:
if (errcode != 0)
assert (state->status != 0);
free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context);
if (as_encrypting_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
if (state->status) {
log_as_req(kdc_context,
state->from, state->request, &state->reply, state->client,
state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime,
state->status, errcode, emsg);
did_log = 1;
}
if (errcode) {
if (state->status == 0) {
state->status = emsg;
}
if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) {
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request,
errcode, state->e_data,
state->typed_e_data,
((state->client != NULL) ?
state->client->princ : NULL),
&response, state->status);
state->status = 0;
}
}
if (emsg)
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context,
state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock);
if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock);
if (state->reply.padata != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata);
if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (state->cname != NULL)
free(state->cname);
if (state->sname != NULL)
free(state->sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server);
if (state->session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key);
if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) {
memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0,
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
}
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body);
kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate);
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request);
assert(did_log != 0);
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_context kcontext;
kdc_realm_t *realm;
verto_ctx *ctx;
int tcp_listen_backlog;
int errout = 0;
int i;
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
if (strrchr(argv[0], '/'))
argv[0] = strrchr(argv[0], '/')+1;
shandle.kdc_realmlist = malloc(sizeof(kdc_realm_t *) *
KRB5_KDC_MAX_REALMS);
if (shandle.kdc_realmlist == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: cannot get memory for realm list\n"), argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
memset(shandle.kdc_realmlist, 0,
(size_t) (sizeof(kdc_realm_t *) * KRB5_KDC_MAX_REALMS));
/*
* A note about Kerberos contexts: This context, "kcontext", is used
* for the KDC operations, i.e. setup, network connection and error
* reporting. The per-realm operations use the "realm_context"
* associated with each realm.
*/
retval = krb5int_init_context_kdc(&kcontext);
if (retval) {
com_err(argv[0], retval, _("while initializing krb5"));
exit(1);
}
krb5_klog_init(kcontext, "kdc", argv[0], 1);
shandle.kdc_err_context = kcontext;
kdc_progname = argv[0];
/* N.B.: After this point, com_err sends output to the KDC log
file, and not to stderr. We use the kdc_err wrapper around
com_err to ensure that the error state exists in the context
known to the krb5_klog callback. */
initialize_kdc5_error_table();
/*
* Scan through the argument list
*/
initialize_realms(kcontext, argc, argv, &tcp_listen_backlog);
#ifndef NOCACHE
retval = kdc_init_lookaside(kcontext);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing lookaside cache"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
#endif
ctx = loop_init(VERTO_EV_TYPE_NONE);
if (!ctx) {
kdc_err(kcontext, ENOMEM, _("while creating main loop"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
load_preauth_plugins(&shandle, kcontext, ctx);
load_authdata_plugins(kcontext);
retval = setup_sam();
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing SAM"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
/* Add each realm's listener addresses to the loop. */
for (i = 0; i < shandle.kdc_numrealms; i++) {
realm = shandle.kdc_realmlist[i];
if (*realm->realm_listen != '\0') {
retval = loop_add_udp_address(KRB5_DEFAULT_PORT,
realm->realm_listen);
if (retval)
goto net_init_error;
}
if (*realm->realm_tcp_listen != '\0') {
retval = loop_add_tcp_address(KRB5_DEFAULT_PORT,
realm->realm_tcp_listen);
if (retval)
goto net_init_error;
}
}
if (workers == 0) {
retval = loop_setup_signals(ctx, &shandle, reset_for_hangup);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing signal handlers"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
}
if ((retval = loop_setup_network(ctx, &shandle, kdc_progname,
tcp_listen_backlog))) {
net_init_error:
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing network"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
if (!nofork && daemon(0, 0)) {
kdc_err(kcontext, errno, _("while detaching from tty"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
if (pid_file != NULL) {
retval = write_pid_file(pid_file);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while creating PID file"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
}
if (workers > 0) {
finish_realms();
retval = create_workers(ctx, workers);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, errno, _("creating worker processes"));
return 1;
}
/* We get here only in a worker child process; re-initialize realms. */
initialize_realms(kcontext, argc, argv, NULL);
}
/* Initialize audit system and audit KDC startup. */
retval = load_audit_modules(kcontext);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while loading audit plugin module(s)"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("commencing operation"));
if (nofork)
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: starting...\n"), kdc_progname);
kau_kdc_start(kcontext, TRUE);
verto_run(ctx);
loop_free(ctx);
kau_kdc_stop(kcontext, TRUE);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("shutting down"));
unload_preauth_plugins(kcontext);
unload_authdata_plugins(kcontext);
unload_audit_modules(kcontext);
krb5_klog_close(kcontext);
finish_realms();
if (shandle.kdc_realmlist)
free(shandle.kdc_realmlist);
#ifndef NOCACHE
kdc_free_lookaside(kcontext);
#endif
krb5_free_context(kcontext);
return errout;
}
void
krb5_iprop_prog_1(struct svc_req *rqstp,
register SVCXPRT *transp)
{
union {
kdb_last_t iprop_get_updates_1_arg;
} argument;
char *result;
bool_t (*_xdr_argument)(), (*_xdr_result)();
char *(*local)(/* union XXX *, struct svc_req * */);
char *whoami = "krb5_iprop_prog_1";
if (!check_iprop_rpcsec_auth(rqstp)) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
"authentication attempt failed: %s, RPC authentication flavor %d",
inet_ntoa(rqstp->rq_xprt->xp_raddr.sin_addr),
rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor);
svcerr_weakauth(transp);
return;
}
switch (rqstp->rq_proc) {
case NULLPROC:
(void) svc_sendreply(transp, xdr_void,
(char *)NULL);
return;
case IPROP_GET_UPDATES:
_xdr_argument = xdr_kdb_last_t;
_xdr_result = xdr_kdb_incr_result_t;
local = (char *(*)()) iprop_get_updates_1_svc;
break;
case IPROP_FULL_RESYNC:
_xdr_argument = xdr_void;
_xdr_result = xdr_kdb_fullresync_result_t;
local = (char *(*)()) iprop_full_resync_1_svc;
break;
default:
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("RPC unknown request: %d (%s)"),
rqstp->rq_proc, whoami);
svcerr_noproc(transp);
return;
}
(void) memset((char *)&argument, 0, sizeof (argument));
if (!svc_getargs(transp, _xdr_argument, (caddr_t)&argument)) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("RPC svc_getargs failed (%s)"),
whoami);
svcerr_decode(transp);
return;
}
result = (*local)(&argument, rqstp);
if (_xdr_result && result != NULL &&
!svc_sendreply(transp, _xdr_result, result)) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("RPC svc_sendreply failed (%s)"),
whoami);
svcerr_systemerr(transp);
}
if (!svc_freeargs(transp, _xdr_argument, (caddr_t)&argument)) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("RPC svc_freeargs failed (%s)"),
whoami);
exit(1);
}
if (rqstp->rq_proc == IPROP_GET_UPDATES) {
/* LINTED */
kdb_incr_result_t *r = (kdb_incr_result_t *)result;
if (r->ret == UPDATE_OK) {
ulog_free_entries(r->updates.kdb_ulog_t_val,
r->updates.kdb_ulog_t_len);
r->updates.kdb_ulog_t_val = NULL;
r->updates.kdb_ulog_t_len = 0;
}
}
}
krb5_error_code
dispatch(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_kdc_req *as_req;
krb5_int32 now, now_usec;
/* decode incoming packet, and dispatch */
#ifndef NOCACHE
/* try the replay lookaside buffer */
if (kdc_check_lookaside(pkt, response)) {
/* a hit! */
const char *name = 0;
char buf[46];
name = inet_ntop (ADDRTYPE2FAMILY (from->address->addrtype),
from->address->contents, buf, sizeof (buf));
if (name == 0)
name = "[unknown address type]";
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"DISPATCH: repeated (retransmitted?) request from %s, resending previous response",
name);
return 0;
}
#endif
retval = krb5_crypto_us_timeofday(&now, &now_usec);
if (retval == 0) {
krb5_int32 usec_difference = now_usec-last_usec;
krb5_data data;
if(last_os_random == 0)
last_os_random = now;
/* Grab random data from OS every hour*/
if(now-last_os_random >= 60*60) {
krb5_c_random_os_entropy(kdc_context, 0, NULL);
last_os_random = now;
}
data.length = sizeof(krb5_int32);
data.data = (void *) &usec_difference;
krb5_c_random_add_entropy(kdc_context,
KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_TIMING, &data);
last_usec = now_usec;
}
/* try TGS_REQ first; they are more common! */
if (krb5_is_tgs_req(pkt)) {
retval = process_tgs_req(pkt, from, response);
} else if (krb5_is_as_req(pkt)) {
if (!(retval = decode_krb5_as_req(pkt, &as_req))) {
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data
* pointer.
* process_as_req frees the request if it is called
*/
if (!(retval = setup_server_realm(as_req->server))) {
retval = process_as_req(as_req, pkt, from, response);
}
else krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, as_req);
}
}
else
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE;
#ifndef NOCACHE
/* put the response into the lookaside buffer */
if (!retval && *response != NULL)
kdc_insert_lookaside(pkt, *response);
#endif
return retval;
}
static int
check_iprop_rpcsec_auth(struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
/* XXX Since the client can authenticate against any principal in
the database, we need to do a sanity check. Only checking for
"kiprop" now, but that means theoretically the client could be
authenticating to kiprop on some other machine. */
/* Code taken from kadm_rpc_svc.c, tweaked. */
gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_context kctx;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
gss_name_t name;
krb5_principal princ;
int ret, success;
krb5_data *c1, *c2, *realm;
gss_buffer_desc gss_str;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
size_t slen;
char *sdots;
success = 0;
handle = (kadm5_server_handle_t)global_server_handle;
if (rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor != RPCSEC_GSS)
return 0;
ctx = rqstp->rq_svccred;
maj_stat = gss_inquire_context(&min_stat, ctx, NULL, &name,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "check_rpcsec_auth: "
"failed inquire_context, stat=%u", maj_stat);
log_badauth(maj_stat, min_stat,
&rqstp->rq_xprt->xp_raddr, NULL);
goto fail_name;
}
kctx = handle->context;
ret = gss_to_krb5_name_1(rqstp, kctx, name, &princ, &gss_str);
if (ret == 0)
goto fail_name;
slen = gss_str.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
/*
* Since we accept with GSS_C_NO_NAME, the client can authenticate
* against the entire kdb. Therefore, ensure that the service
* name is something reasonable.
*/
if (krb5_princ_size(kctx, princ) != 2)
goto fail_princ;
c1 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 0);
c2 = krb5_princ_component(kctx, princ, 1);
realm = krb5_princ_realm(kctx, princ);
if (strncmp(handle->params.realm, realm->data, realm->length) == 0
&& strncmp("kiprop", c1->data, c1->length) == 0) {
success = 1;
}
fail_princ:
if (!success) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "bad service principal %.*s%s",
(int) slen, (char *) gss_str.value, sdots);
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &gss_str);
krb5_free_principal(kctx, princ);
fail_name:
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name);
return success;
}
/* Parse the four fields of an ACL entry and return a structure representing
* it. Log a message and return NULL on error. */
static struct acl_entry *
parse_entry(krb5_context context, const char *client, const char *ops,
const char *target, const char *rs, const char *line,
const char *fname)
{
struct acl_entry *entry;
const char *op;
char rop;
int t;
entry = calloc(1, sizeof(*entry));
if (entry == NULL)
return NULL;
for (op = ops; *op; op++) {
rop = isupper((unsigned char)*op) ? tolower((unsigned char)*op) : *op;
for (t = 0; acl_op_table[t].op; t++) {
if (rop == acl_op_table[t].op) {
if (rop == *op)
entry->op_allowed |= acl_op_table[t].mask;
else
entry->op_allowed &= ~acl_op_table[t].mask;
break;
}
}
if (!acl_op_table[t].op) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("Unrecognized ACL operation '%c' in %s"),
*op, line);
goto error;
}
}
if (strcmp(client, "*") != 0) {
if (krb5_parse_name(context, client, &entry->client) != 0) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Cannot parse client principal '%s'"),
client);
goto error;
}
}
if (target != NULL && strcmp(target, "*") != 0) {
if (krb5_parse_name(context, target, &entry->target) != 0) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Cannot parse target principal '%s'"),
target);
goto error;
}
}
if (rs != NULL) {
entry->rs = parse_restrictions(rs, fname);
if (entry->rs == NULL)
goto error;
}
return entry;
error:
free_acl_entry(entry);
return NULL;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_context kcontext;
verto_ctx *ctx;
int errout = 0;
int i;
setlocale(LC_MESSAGES, "");
if (strrchr(argv[0], '/'))
argv[0] = strrchr(argv[0], '/')+1;
if (!(kdc_realmlist = (kdc_realm_t **) malloc(sizeof(kdc_realm_t *) *
KRB5_KDC_MAX_REALMS))) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: cannot get memory for realm list\n"), argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
memset(kdc_realmlist, 0,
(size_t) (sizeof(kdc_realm_t *) * KRB5_KDC_MAX_REALMS));
/*
* A note about Kerberos contexts: This context, "kcontext", is used
* for the KDC operations, i.e. setup, network connection and error
* reporting. The per-realm operations use the "realm_context"
* associated with each realm.
*/
retval = krb5int_init_context_kdc(&kcontext);
if (retval) {
com_err(argv[0], retval, _("while initializing krb5"));
exit(1);
}
krb5_klog_init(kcontext, "kdc", argv[0], 1);
kdc_err_context = kcontext;
kdc_progname = argv[0];
/* N.B.: After this point, com_err sends output to the KDC log
file, and not to stderr. We use the kdc_err wrapper around
com_err to ensure that the error state exists in the context
known to the krb5_klog callback. */
initialize_kdc5_error_table();
/*
* Scan through the argument list
*/
initialize_realms(kcontext, argc, argv);
ctx = loop_init(VERTO_EV_TYPE_NONE);
if (!ctx) {
kdc_err(kcontext, ENOMEM, _("while creating main loop"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
load_preauth_plugins(kcontext);
load_authdata_plugins(kcontext);
retval = setup_sam();
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing SAM"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
/* Handle each realm's ports */
for (i=0; i<kdc_numrealms; i++) {
char *cp = kdc_realmlist[i]->realm_ports;
int port;
while (cp && *cp) {
if (*cp == ',' || isspace((int) *cp)) {
cp++;
continue;
}
port = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (cp == 0)
break;
retval = loop_add_udp_port(port);
if (retval)
goto net_init_error;
}
cp = kdc_realmlist[i]->realm_tcp_ports;
while (cp && *cp) {
if (*cp == ',' || isspace((int) *cp)) {
cp++;
continue;
}
port = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (cp == 0)
break;
retval = loop_add_tcp_port(port);
if (retval)
goto net_init_error;
}
}
/*
* Setup network listeners. Disallow network reconfig in response to
* routing socket messages if we're using worker processes, since the
* children won't be able to re-open the listener sockets. Hopefully our
* platform has pktinfo support and doesn't need reconfigs.
*/
if (workers == 0) {
retval = loop_setup_routing_socket(ctx, NULL, kdc_progname);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing routing socket"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
retval = loop_setup_signals(ctx, NULL, reset_for_hangup);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing signal handlers"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
}
if ((retval = loop_setup_network(ctx, NULL, kdc_progname))) {
net_init_error:
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while initializing network"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
if (!nofork && daemon(0, 0)) {
kdc_err(kcontext, errno, _("while detaching from tty"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
if (pid_file != NULL) {
retval = write_pid_file(pid_file);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, retval, _("while creating PID file"));
finish_realms();
return 1;
}
}
if (workers > 0) {
finish_realms();
retval = create_workers(ctx, workers);
if (retval) {
kdc_err(kcontext, errno, _("creating worker processes"));
return 1;
}
/* We get here only in a worker child process; re-initialize realms. */
initialize_realms(kcontext, argc, argv);
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("commencing operation"));
if (nofork)
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: starting...\n"), kdc_progname);
verto_run(ctx);
loop_free(ctx);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("shutting down"));
unload_preauth_plugins(kcontext);
unload_authdata_plugins(kcontext);
krb5_klog_close(kdc_context);
finish_realms();
if (kdc_realmlist)
free(kdc_realmlist);
#ifndef NOCACHE
kdc_free_lookaside(kcontext);
#endif
krb5_free_context(kcontext);
return errout;
}
kdb_incr_result_t *
iprop_get_updates_1_svc(kdb_last_t *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static kdb_incr_result_t ret;
char *whoami = "iprop_get_updates_1";
int kret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = global_server_handle;
char *client_name = 0, *service_name = 0;
char obuf[256] = {0};
/* default return code */
ret.ret = UPDATE_ERROR;
DPRINT(("%s: start, last_sno=%lu\n", whoami,
(unsigned long) arg->last_sno));
if (!handle) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: server handle is NULL"),
whoami);
goto out;
}
{
gss_buffer_desc client_desc, service_desc;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_desc, &service_desc) < 0) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: setup_gss_names failed"),
whoami);
goto out;
}
client_name = buf_to_string(&client_desc);
service_name = buf_to_string(&service_desc);
if (client_name == NULL || service_name == NULL) {
free(client_name);
free(service_name);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s: out of memory recording principal names",
whoami);
goto out;
}
}
DPRINT(("%s: clprinc=`%s'\n\tsvcprinc=`%s'\n",
whoami, client_name, service_name));
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_IPROP,
NULL,
NULL)) {
ret.ret = UPDATE_PERM_DENIED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, LOG_UNAUTH, whoami,
"<null>", client_name, service_name,
client_addr(rqstp));
goto out;
}
kret = ulog_get_entries(handle->context, *arg, &ret);
if (ret.ret == UPDATE_OK) {
(void) snprintf(obuf, sizeof (obuf),
_("%s; Incoming SerialNo=%lu; Outgoing SerialNo=%lu"),
replystr(ret.ret),
(unsigned long)arg->last_sno,
(unsigned long)ret.lastentry.last_sno);
} else {
(void) snprintf(obuf, sizeof (obuf),
_("%s; Incoming SerialNo=%lu; Outgoing SerialNo=N/A"),
replystr(ret.ret),
(unsigned long)arg->last_sno);
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, LOG_DONE, whoami,
obuf,
((kret == 0) ? "success" : error_message(kret)),
client_name, service_name,
client_addr(rqstp));
out:
if (nofork)
debprret(whoami, ret.ret, ret.lastentry.last_sno);
free(client_name);
free(service_name);
return (&ret);
}
/* Callback from GSSRPC for miscellaneous errors */
static void
log_miscerr(struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg, char *error, char *data)
{
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Miscellaneous RPC error: %s, %s"),
client_addr(rqst->rq_xprt), error);
}
/* Callback from GSSRPC for garbled/forged/replayed/etc messages. */
static void
log_badverf(gss_name_t client_name, gss_name_t server_name,
struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg, char *data)
{
static const struct {
rpcproc_t proc;
const char *proc_name;
} proc_names[] = {
{1, "CREATE_PRINCIPAL"},
{2, "DELETE_PRINCIPAL"},
{3, "MODIFY_PRINCIPAL"},
{4, "RENAME_PRINCIPAL"},
{5, "GET_PRINCIPAL"},
{6, "CHPASS_PRINCIPAL"},
{7, "CHRAND_PRINCIPAL"},
{8, "CREATE_POLICY"},
{9, "DELETE_POLICY"},
{10, "MODIFY_POLICY"},
{11, "GET_POLICY"},
{12, "GET_PRIVS"},
{13, "INIT"},
{14, "GET_PRINCS"},
{15, "GET_POLS"},
{16, "SETKEY_PRINCIPAL"},
{17, "SETV4KEY_PRINCIPAL"},
{18, "CREATE_PRINCIPAL3"},
{19, "CHPASS_PRINCIPAL3"},
{20, "CHRAND_PRINCIPAL3"},
{21, "SETKEY_PRINCIPAL3"},
{22, "PURGEKEYS"},
{23, "GET_STRINGS"},
{24, "SET_STRING"}
};
OM_uint32 minor;
gss_buffer_desc client, server;
gss_OID gss_type;
const char *a;
rpcproc_t proc;
unsigned int i;
const char *procname;
size_t clen, slen;
char *cdots, *sdots;
client.length = 0;
client.value = NULL;
server.length = 0;
server.value = NULL;
(void)gss_display_name(&minor, client_name, &client, &gss_type);
(void)gss_display_name(&minor, server_name, &server, &gss_type);
if (client.value == NULL) {
client.value = "(null)";
clen = sizeof("(null)") - 1;
} else {
clen = client.length;
}
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
if (server.value == NULL) {
server.value = "(null)";
slen = sizeof("(null)") - 1;
} else {
slen = server.length;
}
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
a = client_addr(rqst->rq_xprt);
proc = msg->rm_call.cb_proc;
procname = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(proc_names) / sizeof(*proc_names); i++) {
if (proc_names[i].proc == proc) {
procname = proc_names[i].proc_name;
break;
}
}
if (procname != NULL) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("WARNING! Forged/garbled request: %s, claimed "
"client = %.*s%s, server = %.*s%s, addr = %s"),
procname, (int)clen, (char *)client.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)server.value, sdots, a);
} else {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("WARNING! Forged/garbled request: %d, claimed "
"client = %.*s%s, server = %.*s%s, addr = %s"),
proc, (int)clen, (char *)client.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)server.value, sdots, a);
}
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &client);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &server);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry server;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
int nprincs = 0;
krb5_boolean more;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *tmp = 0;
const char *fromstring = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
/* krb5_address *noaddrarray[1]; */
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
char ktypestr[128];
char rep_etypestr[128];
char fromstringbuf[70];
session_key.contents = 0;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ)
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
ktypes2str(ktypestr, sizeof(ktypestr),
request->nktypes, request->ktype);
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
fromstring = inet_ntop(ADDRTYPE2FAMILY(from->address->addrtype),
from->address->contents,
fromstringbuf, sizeof(fromstringbuf));
if (!fromstring)
fromstring = "<unknown>";
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
/* errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &req_authdat); */
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket, &subkey);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
nprincs = 1;
if ((errcode = get_principal(kdc_context, request->server, &server,
&nprincs, &more))) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
nprincs = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (more) {
status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (nprincs != 1) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass && krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) {
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
krb5_data *server_1 =
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
krb5_data *tgs_1 =
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
firstpass = 0;
goto tgt_again;
}
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime))
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime =
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0; /* optional...don't put it in */
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime)));
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags,
TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till,
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server.max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
/* assemble any authorization data */
if (request->authorization_data.ciphertext.data) {
krb5_data scratch;
scratch.length = request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length;
if (!(scratch.data =
malloc(request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length))) {
status = "AUTH_NOMEM";
errcode = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_c_decrypt(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SESSKEY,
0, &request->authorization_data,
&scratch))) {
status = "AUTH_ENCRYPT_FAIL";
free(scratch.data);
goto cleanup;
}
/* scratch now has the authorization data, so we decode it */
errcode = decode_krb5_authdata(&scratch, &(request->unenc_authdata));
free(scratch.data);
if (errcode) {
status = "AUTH_DECODE";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode =
concat_authorization_data(request->unenc_authdata,
header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data,
&enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data))) {
status = "CONCAT_AUTH";
goto cleanup;
}
} else
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data =
header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_ticket->enc_part2->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = krb5_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_ticket->enc_part2->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
"bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
"via '%.*s%s'",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots);
else {
const char *emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
"unexpected error checking transit from "
"'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &tmp)))
tmp = 0;
if (tmp != NULL)
limit_string(tmp);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ %s: 2ND_TKT_MISMATCH: "
"authtime %d, %s for %s, 2nd tkt client %s",
fromstring, authtime,
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tmp ? tmp : "<unknown>");
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
if ((errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, t2enc->session,
&ticket_reply))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
st_idx++;
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
* in the database) */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
&master_keyblock,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
reply.padata = 0; /* always */
reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0; /* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
is used for ktime */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0; /* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
subkey ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
if (status) {
const char * emsg = NULL;
if (!errcode)
rep_etypes2str(rep_etypestr, sizeof(rep_etypestr), &reply);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ (%s) %s: %s: authtime %d, "
"%s%s %s for %s%s%s",
ktypestr,
fromstring, status, authtime,
!errcode ? rep_etypestr : "",
!errcode ? "," : "",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
errcode ? ", " : "",
errcode ? emsg : "");
if (errcode)
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(request, header_ticket, errcode,
fromstring, response, status);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (cname)
free(cname);
if (sname)
free(sname);
if (nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
if (session_key.contents)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (subkey)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
return retval;
}
/*
* The request seems to be for a ticket-granting service somewhere else,
* but we don't have a ticket for the final TGS. Try to give the requestor
* some intermediate realm.
*/
static void
find_alternate_tgs(krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_boolean *more, int *nprincs)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal *plist, *pl2;
krb5_data tmp;
*nprincs = 0;
*more = FALSE;
/*
* Call to krb5_princ_component is normally not safe but is so
* here only because find_alternate_tgs() is only called from
* somewhere that has already checked the number of components in
* the principal.
*/
if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, request->server),
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1),
&plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR)))
return;
/* move to the end */
for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++);
/* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we
ignore it */
while (--pl2 > plist) {
*nprincs = 1;
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = get_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, server, nprincs, more);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
if (retval) {
*nprincs = 0;
*more = FALSE;
krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
return;
}
if (*more) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
continue;
} else if (*nprincs == 1) {
/* Found it! */
krb5_principal tmpprinc;
char *sname;
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmpprinc))) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
continue;
}
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
request->server = tmpprinc;
if (krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname)) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ: issuing alternate <un-unparseable> TGT");
} else {
limit_string(sname);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ: issuing TGT %s", sname);
free(sname);
}
krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
return;
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server, *nprincs);
continue;
}
*nprincs = 0;
*more = FALSE;
krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
return;
}
/*
* Create num worker processes and return successfully in each child. The
* parent process will act as a supervisor and will only return from this
* function in error cases.
*/
static krb5_error_code
create_workers(verto_ctx *ctx, int num)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
int i, status;
pid_t pid, *pids;
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
struct sigaction s_action;
#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
/*
* Setup our signal handlers which will forward to the children.
* These handlers will be overriden in the child processes.
*/
#ifdef POSIX_SIGNALS
(void) sigemptyset(&s_action.sa_mask);
s_action.sa_flags = 0;
s_action.sa_handler = on_monitor_signal;
(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &s_action, (struct sigaction *) NULL);
(void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &s_action, (struct sigaction *) NULL);
(void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &s_action, (struct sigaction *) NULL);
s_action.sa_handler = on_monitor_sighup;
(void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &s_action, (struct sigaction *) NULL);
#else /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
signal(SIGINT, on_monitor_signal);
signal(SIGTERM, on_monitor_signal);
signal(SIGQUIT, on_monitor_signal);
signal(SIGHUP, on_monitor_sighup);
#endif /* POSIX_SIGNALS */
/* Create child worker processes; return in each child. */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("creating %d worker processes"), num);
pids = calloc(num, sizeof(pid_t));
if (pids == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
verto_reinitialize(ctx);
retval = loop_setup_signals(ctx, NULL, reset_for_hangup);
if (retval) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Unable to initialize signal "
"handlers in pid %d"), pid);
return retval;
}
/* Avoid race condition */
if (signal_received)
exit(0);
/* Return control to main() in the new worker process. */
free(pids);
return 0;
}
if (pid == -1) {
/* Couldn't fork enough times. */
status = errno;
terminate_workers(pids, i);
free(pids);
return status;
}
pids[i] = pid;
}
/* We're going to use our own main loop here. */
loop_free(ctx);
/* Supervise the worker processes. */
while (!signal_received) {
/* Wait until a worker process exits or we get a signal. */
pid = wait(&status);
if (pid >= 0) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("worker %ld exited with status %d"),
(long) pid, status);
/* Remove the pid from the table. */
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (pids[i] == pid)
pids[i] = -1;
}
/* When one worker process exits, terminate them all, so that KDC
* crashes behave similarly with or without worker processes. */
break;
}
/* Propagate HUP signal to worker processes if we received one. */
if (sighup_received) {
sighup_received = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (pids[i] != -1)
kill(pids[i], SIGHUP);
}
}
}
if (signal_received)
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("signal %d received in supervisor"),
signal_received);
terminate_workers(pids, num);
free(pids);
exit(0);
}
kdb_fullresync_result_t *
iprop_full_resync_1_svc(/* LINTED */ void *argp, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static kdb_fullresync_result_t ret;
char *tmpf = 0;
char *ubuf = 0;
char clhost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN] = {0};
int pret, fret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = global_server_handle;
OM_uint32 min_stat;
gss_name_t name = NULL;
char *client_name = NULL, *service_name = NULL;
char *whoami = "iprop_full_resync_1";
/* default return code */
ret.ret = UPDATE_ERROR;
if (!handle) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: server handle is NULL"),
whoami);
goto out;
}
DPRINT(("%s: start\n", whoami));
{
gss_buffer_desc client_desc, service_desc;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_desc, &service_desc) < 0) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: setup_gss_names failed"),
whoami);
goto out;
}
client_name = buf_to_string(&client_desc);
service_name = buf_to_string(&service_desc);
if (client_name == NULL || service_name == NULL) {
free(client_name);
free(service_name);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
"%s: out of memory recording principal names",
whoami);
goto out;
}
}
DPRINT(("%s: clprinc=`%s'\n\tsvcprinc=`%s'\n",
whoami, client_name, service_name));
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_IPROP,
NULL,
NULL)) {
ret.ret = UPDATE_PERM_DENIED;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, LOG_UNAUTH, whoami,
"<null>", client_name, service_name,
client_addr(rqstp));
goto out;
}
if (!getclhoststr(client_name, clhost, sizeof (clhost))) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: getclhoststr failed"),
whoami);
goto out;
}
/*
* construct db dump file name; kprop style name + clnt fqdn
*/
if (asprintf(&tmpf, "%s_%s", KPROP_DEFAULT_FILE, clhost) < 0) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: unable to construct db dump file name; out of memory"),
whoami);
goto out;
}
/*
* note the -i; modified version of kdb5_util dump format
* to include sno (serial number)
*/
if (asprintf(&ubuf, "%s dump -i %s", KPROPD_DEFAULT_KDB5_UTIL,
tmpf) < 0) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: cannot construct kdb5 util dump string too long; out of memory"),
whoami);
goto out;
}
/*
* Fork to dump the db and xfer it to the slave.
* (the fork allows parent to return quickly and the child
* acts like a callback to the slave).
*/
fret = fork();
DPRINT(("%s: fork=%d (%d)\n", whoami, fret, getpid()));
switch (fret) {
case -1: /* error */
if (nofork) {
perror(whoami);
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: fork failed: %s"),
whoami,
error_message(errno));
goto out;
case 0: /* child */
DPRINT(("%s: run `%s' ...\n", whoami, ubuf));
(void) signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* run kdb5_util(1M) dump for IProp */
/* XXX popen can return NULL; is pclose(NULL) okay? */
pret = pclose(popen(ubuf, "w"));
DPRINT(("%s: pclose=%d\n", whoami, pret));
if (pret != 0) {
/* XXX popen/pclose may not set errno
properly, and the error could be from the
subprocess anyways. */
if (nofork) {
perror(whoami);
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: pclose(popen) failed: %s"),
whoami,
error_message(errno));
goto out;
}
DPRINT(("%s: exec `kprop -f %s %s' ...\n",
whoami, tmpf, clhost));
/* XXX Yuck! */
if (getenv("KPROP_PORT"))
pret = execl(KPROPD_DEFAULT_KPROP, "kprop", "-f", tmpf,
"-P", getenv("KPROP_PORT"),
clhost, NULL);
else
pret = execl(KPROPD_DEFAULT_KPROP, "kprop", "-f", tmpf,
clhost, NULL);
if (pret == -1) {
if (nofork) {
perror(whoami);
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR,
_("%s: exec failed: %s"),
whoami,
error_message(errno));
goto out;
}
default: /* parent */
ret.ret = UPDATE_OK;
/* not used by slave (sno is retrieved from kdb5_util dump) */
ret.lastentry.last_sno = 0;
ret.lastentry.last_time.seconds = 0;
ret.lastentry.last_time.useconds = 0;
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, LOG_DONE, whoami,
"<null>",
"success",
client_name, service_name,
client_addr(rqstp));
goto out;
}
out:
if (nofork)
debprret(whoami, ret.ret, 0);
free(client_name);
free(service_name);
if (name)
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name);
free(tmpf);
free(ubuf);
return (&ret);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry server;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
int nprincs = 0;
krb5_boolean more;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
krb5_keyblock *reply_key = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *mkey_ptr;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *altcname = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part *header_enc_tkt = NULL; /* ticket granting or evidence ticket */
krb5_db_entry client, krbtgt;
int c_nprincs = 0, k_nprincs = 0;
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user *s4u_x509_user = NULL; /* protocol transition request */
krb5_authdata **kdc_issued_auth_data = NULL; /* auth data issued by KDC */
unsigned int c_flags = 0, s_flags = 0; /* client/server KDB flags */
char *s4u_name = NULL;
krb5_boolean is_referral, db_ref_done = FALSE;
const char *emsg = NULL;
krb5_data *tgs_1 =NULL, *server_1 = NULL;
krb5_principal krbtgt_princ;
krb5_kvno ticket_kvno = 0;
struct kdc_request_state *state = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa_tgs_req; /*points into request*/
krb5_data scratch;
session_key.contents = NULL;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket,
&krbtgt, &k_nprincs, &subkey, &pa_tgs_req);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = kdc_make_rstate(&state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "making state";
goto cleanup;
}
scratch.length = pa_tgs_req->length;
scratch.data = (char *) pa_tgs_req->contents;
errcode = kdc_find_fast(&request, &scratch, subkey, header_ticket->enc_part2->session, state);
if (errcode !=0) {
status = "kdc_find_fast";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Pointer to the encrypted part of the header ticket, which may be
* replaced to point to the encrypted part of the evidence ticket
* if constrained delegation is used. This simplifies the number of
* special cases for constrained delegation.
*/
header_enc_tkt = header_ticket->enc_part2;
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE)) {
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
setflag(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE);
}
db_ref_done = FALSE;
ref_tgt_again:
nprincs = 1;
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
request->server,
s_flags,
&server,
&nprincs,
&more);
if (errcode) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
nprincs = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (more) {
status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (nprincs != 1) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass ) {
if ( krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) { /* Principal is a name of krb ticket service */
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
server_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
tgs_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
firstpass = 0;
goto tgt_again;
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
} else if ( db_ref_done == FALSE) {
retval = prep_reprocess_req(request, &krbtgt_princ);
if (!retval) {
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, request->server);
retval = krb5_copy_principal(kdc_context, krbtgt_princ, &(request->server));
if (!retval) {
db_ref_done = TRUE;
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
goto ref_tgt_again;
}
}
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!is_local_principal(header_enc_tkt->client))
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM);
is_referral = krb5_is_tgs_principal(server.princ) &&
!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, tgs_server, server.princ);
/* Check for protocol transition */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_context,
request,
header_enc_tkt->client,
&server,
subkey,
header_enc_tkt->session,
kdc_time,
&s4u_x509_user,
&client,
&c_nprincs,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION);
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY |
KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
krb5_db_entry st_client;
int st_nprincs = 0;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
c_flags,
TRUE, /* match_enctype */
&st_client,
&st_nprincs,
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
/* Do constrained delegation protocol and authorization checks */
errcode = kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_context,
request,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2,
&st_client,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
request->server,
&status);
if (errcode)
goto cleanup;
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION);
assert(krb5_is_tgs_principal(header_ticket->server));
/* From now on, use evidence ticket as header ticket */
header_enc_tkt = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* assured by kdc_process_s4u2self_req() */
client = st_client;
c_nprincs = st_nprincs;
} else {
/* "client" is not used for user2user */
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &st_client, st_nprincs);
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
if (is_referral)
ticket_reply.server = server.princ;
else
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_AS_DELEGATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE);
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_enc_tkt->times.starttime))
header_enc_tkt->times.starttime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_enc_tkt->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0;/* optional...don't put it in */
reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
/*
* If S4U2Self principal is not forwardable, then mark ticket as
* unforwardable. This behaviour matches Windows, but it is
* different to the MIT AS-REQ path, which returns an error
* (KDC_ERR_POLICY) if forwardable tickets cannot be issued.
*
* Consider this block the S4U2Self equivalent to
* validate_forwardable().
*/
if (c_nprincs &&
isflagset(client.attributes, KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
/*
* OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE must be set on the service requesting
* S4U2Self in order for forwardable tickets to be returned.
*/
else if (!is_referral &&
!isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_OK_TO_AUTH_AS_DELEGATE))
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
}
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
assert(isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) == 0);
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
header_enc_tkt->times.endtime)));
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till, header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_enc_tkt->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server.max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_enc_tkt->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user->user_id.user, &s4u_name);
} else if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client, &s4u_name);
} else {
errcode = 0;
}
if (errcode) {
status = "UNPARSING S4U CLIENT";
goto cleanup;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
encrypting_key = *(t2enc->session);
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0,/* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist, &server,
&mkey_ptr))) {
krb5_keylist_node *tmp_mkey_list;
/* try refreshing master key list */
/* XXX it would nice if we had the mkvno here for optimization */
if (krb5_db_fetch_mkey_list(kdc_context, master_princ,
&master_keyblock, 0, &tmp_mkey_list) == 0) {
krb5_dbe_free_key_list(kdc_context, master_keylist);
master_keylist = tmp_mkey_list;
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(kdc_context, master_keylist,
&server, &mkey_ptr))) {
status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
status = "FINDING_MASTER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
* in the database) */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
mkey_ptr,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION)) {
/*
* Don't allow authorization data to be disabled if constrained
* delegation is requested. We don't want to deny the server
* the ability to validate that delegation was used.
*/
clear(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED);
}
if (isflagset(server.attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) == 0) {
/*
* If we are not doing protocol transition/constrained delegation
* and there was no authorization data included, try to lookup
* the client principal as it may be mapped to a local account.
*
* Always validate authorization data for constrained delegation
* because we must validate the KDC signatures.
*/
if (!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U) &&
header_enc_tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
/* Generate authorization data so we can include it in ticket */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC);
/* Map principals from foreign (possibly non-AD) realms */
setflag(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_MAP_PRINCIPALS);
assert(c_nprincs == 0); /* should not have been looked up already */
c_nprincs = 1;
errcode = krb5_db_get_principal_ext(kdc_context,
header_enc_tkt->client,
c_flags,
&client,
&c_nprincs,
&more);
/*
* We can ignore errors because the principal may be a
* valid cross-realm principal for which we have no local
* mapping. But we do want to check that at most one entry
* was returned.
*/
if (errcode == 0 && (more || c_nprincs > 1)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (errcode) {
c_nprincs = 0;
}
}
}
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
!isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM))
enc_tkt_reply.client = s4u_x509_user->user_id.user;
else
enc_tkt_reply.client = header_enc_tkt->client;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
c_flags,
(c_nprincs != 0) ? &client : NULL,
&server,
(k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL,
subkey != NULL ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&encrypting_key, /* U2U or server key */
pkt,
request,
s4u_x509_user ?
s4u_x509_user->user_id.user : NULL,
header_enc_tkt,
&enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)", errcode);
status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_referral && isflagset(s_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE)) {
errcode = return_svr_referral_data(kdc_context,
&server, &reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_enc_tkt->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_enc_tkt->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM)) {
errcode = validate_transit_path(kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client,
&server,
(k_nprincs != 0) ? &krbtgt : NULL);
if (errcode) {
status = "NON_TRANSITIVE";
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = kdc_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_enc_tkt->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
"bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
"via '%.*s%s'",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots);
else {
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
"unexpected error checking transit from "
"'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &altcname)))
altcname = 0;
if (altcname != NULL)
limit_string(altcname);
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
status = "2ND_TKT_MISMATCH";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
st_idx++;
} else {
ticket_kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
if (!isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY))
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = ticket_kvno;
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
reply.padata = 0;/* always */
if (isflagset(c_flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION) &&
find_pa_data(request->padata, KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER) != NULL) {
errcode = kdc_make_s4u2self_rep(kdc_context,
subkey,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
s4u_x509_user,
&reply,
&reply_encpart);
if (errcode) {
status = "KDC_RETURN_S4U2SELF_PADATA";
goto cleanup;
}
}
reply.client = enc_tkt_reply.client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;/* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
is used for ktime */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_enc_tkt->times.authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0;/* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state, request, &reply,
subkey?subkey->enctype:header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype);
if (errcode !=0 ) {
status = "Preparing FAST padata";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode =kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state, subkey?subkey:header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "generating reply key";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
reply_key,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
assert(status != NULL);
if (reply_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, reply_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
log_tgs_req(from, request, &reply, cname, sname, altcname, authtime,
c_flags, s4u_name, status, errcode, emsg);
if (errcode) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
emsg = NULL;
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(state, request, header_ticket, errcode,
nprincs ? server.princ : NULL,
response, status);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket != NULL)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request != NULL)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (state)
kdc_free_rstate(state);
if (cname != NULL)
free(cname);
if (sname != NULL)
free(sname);
if (nprincs != 0)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
if (session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (k_nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &krbtgt, k_nprincs);
if (c_nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &client, c_nprincs);
if (s4u_x509_user != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(kdc_context, s4u_x509_user);
if (kdc_issued_auth_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context, kdc_issued_auth_data);
if (s4u_name != NULL)
free(s4u_name);
if (subkey != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
if (reply.padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply.padata);
if (reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, reply_encpart.enc_padata);
return retval;
}
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
OM_uint32 minor_status;
gss_buffer_desc in_buf;
gss_OID nt_krb5_name_oid = (gss_OID)GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME;
auth_gssapi_name names[4];
kadm5_config_params params;
verto_ctx *vctx;
const char *pid_file = NULL;
char **db_args = NULL, **tmpargs;
int ret, i, db_args_size = 0, strong_random = 1, proponly = 0;
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
setvbuf(stderr, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
names[0].name = names[1].name = names[2].name = names[3].name = NULL;
names[0].type = names[1].type = names[2].type = names[3].type =
nt_krb5_name_oid;
progname = (strrchr(argv[0], '/') != NULL) ? strrchr(argv[0], '/') + 1 :
argv[0];
memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
argc--, argv++;
while (argc) {
if (strcmp(*argv, "-x") == 0) {
argc--, argv++;
if (!argc)
usage();
db_args_size++;
tmpargs = realloc(db_args, sizeof(char *) * (db_args_size + 1));
if (tmpargs == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: cannot initialize. Not enough "
"memory\n"), progname);
exit(1);
}
db_args = tmpargs;
db_args[db_args_size - 1] = *argv;
db_args[db_args_size] = NULL;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-r") == 0) {
argc--, argv++;
if (!argc)
usage();
params.realm = *argv;
params.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_REALM;
argc--, argv++;
continue;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-m") == 0) {
params.mkey_from_kbd = 1;
params.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_MKEY_FROM_KBD;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-nofork") == 0) {
nofork = 1;
#ifdef USE_PASSWORD_SERVER
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-passwordserver") == 0) {
kadm5_set_use_password_server();
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_IPROP
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-proponly") == 0) {
proponly = 1;
#endif
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-port") == 0) {
argc--, argv++;
if (!argc)
usage();
params.kadmind_port = atoi(*argv);
params.mask |= KADM5_CONFIG_KADMIND_PORT;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-P") == 0) {
argc--, argv++;
if (!argc)
usage();
pid_file = *argv;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-W") == 0) {
strong_random = 0;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-p") == 0) {
argc--, argv++;
if (!argc)
usage();
kdb5_util = *argv;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-F") == 0) {
argc--, argv++;
if (!argc)
usage();
dump_file = *argv;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-K") == 0) {
argc--, argv++;
if (!argc)
usage();
kprop = *argv;
} else if (strcmp(*argv, "-k") == 0) {
argc--, argv++;
if (!argc)
usage();
kprop_port = *argv;
} else {
break;
}
argc--, argv++;
}
if (argc != 0)
usage();
ret = kadm5_init_krb5_context(&context);
if (ret) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: %s while initializing context, aborting\n"),
progname, error_message(ret));
exit(1);
}
krb5_klog_init(context, "admin_server", progname, 1);
ret = kadm5_init(context, "kadmind", NULL, NULL, ¶ms,
KADM5_STRUCT_VERSION, KADM5_API_VERSION_4, db_args,
&global_server_handle);
if (ret)
fail_to_start(ret, _("initializing"));
ret = kadm5_get_config_params(context, 1, ¶ms, ¶ms);
if (ret)
fail_to_start(ret, _("getting config parameters"));
if (!(params.mask & KADM5_CONFIG_REALM))
fail_to_start(0, _("Missing required realm configuration"));
if (!(params.mask & KADM5_CONFIG_ACL_FILE))
fail_to_start(0, _("Missing required ACL file configuration"));
ret = setup_loop(proponly, &vctx);
if (ret)
fail_to_start(ret, _("initializing network"));
names[0].name = build_princ_name(KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, params.realm);
names[1].name = build_princ_name(KADM5_CHANGEPW_SERVICE, params.realm);
if (names[0].name == NULL || names[1].name == NULL)
fail_to_start(0, _("Cannot build GSSAPI auth names"));
ret = setup_kdb_keytab();
if (ret)
fail_to_start(0, _("Cannot set up KDB keytab"));
if (svcauth_gssapi_set_names(names, 2) == FALSE)
fail_to_start(0, _("Cannot set GSSAPI authentication names"));
/* if set_names succeeded, this will too */
in_buf.value = names[1].name;
in_buf.length = strlen(names[1].name) + 1;
(void)gss_import_name(&minor_status, &in_buf, nt_krb5_name_oid,
&gss_changepw_name);
svcauth_gssapi_set_log_badauth2_func(log_badauth, NULL);
svcauth_gssapi_set_log_badverf_func(log_badverf, NULL);
svcauth_gssapi_set_log_miscerr_func(log_miscerr, NULL);
svcauth_gss_set_log_badauth2_func(log_badauth, NULL);
svcauth_gss_set_log_badverf_func(log_badverf, NULL);
svcauth_gss_set_log_miscerr_func(log_miscerr, NULL);
if (svcauth_gss_set_svc_name(GSS_C_NO_NAME) != TRUE)
fail_to_start(0, _("Cannot initialize GSSAPI service name"));
ret = acl_init(context, params.acl_file);
if (ret)
fail_to_start(ret, _("initializing ACL file"));
if (!nofork && daemon(0, 0) != 0)
fail_to_start(errno, _("spawning daemon process"));
if (pid_file != NULL) {
ret = write_pid_file(pid_file);
if (ret)
fail_to_start(ret, _("creating PID file"));
}
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("Seeding random number generator"));
ret = krb5_c_random_os_entropy(context, strong_random, NULL);
if (ret)
fail_to_start(ret, _("getting random seed"));
if (params.iprop_enabled == TRUE) {
ulog_set_role(context, IPROP_MASTER);
ret = ulog_map(context, params.iprop_logfile, params.iprop_ulogsize);
if (ret)
fail_to_start(ret, _("mapping update log"));
if (nofork) {
fprintf(stderr,
_("%s: create IPROP svc (PROG=%d, VERS=%d)\n"),
progname, KRB5_IPROP_PROG, KRB5_IPROP_VERS);
}
}
if (kprop_port == NULL)
kprop_port = getenv("KPROP_PORT");
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("starting"));
if (nofork)
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: starting...\n"), progname);
verto_run(vctx);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("finished, exiting"));
/* Clean up memory, etc */
svcauth_gssapi_unset_names();
kadm5_destroy(global_server_handle);
loop_free(vctx);
acl_finish(context);
(void)gss_release_name(&minor_status, &gss_changepw_name);
(void)gss_release_name(&minor_status, &gss_oldchangepw_name);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
free(names[i].name);
krb5_klog_close(context);
krb5_free_context(context);
exit(2);
}
