static gcry_err_code_t
elg_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
int flags, int hashalgo)
{
gcry_err_code_t err = GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
ELG_secret_key sk;
(void)algo;
(void)flags;
(void)hashalgo;
if (mpi_is_opaque (data))
return GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
if ((! data)
|| (! skey[0]) || (! skey[1]) || (! skey[2]) || (! skey[3]))
err = GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI;
else
{
sk.p = skey[0];
sk.g = skey[1];
sk.y = skey[2];
sk.x = skey[3];
resarr[0] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.p));
resarr[1] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.p));
sign (resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &sk);
}
return err;
}
/****************
* Returns true if the signature composed of A and B is valid.
*/
static int
verify(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
{
int rc;
gcry_mpi_t t1;
gcry_mpi_t t2;
gcry_mpi_t base[4];
gcry_mpi_t ex[4];
if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( a, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( a, pkey->p ) < 0) )
return 0; /* assertion 0 < a < p failed */
t1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
t2 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
#if 0
/* t1 = (y^a mod p) * (a^b mod p) mod p */
gcry_mpi_powm( t1, pkey->y, a, pkey->p );
gcry_mpi_powm( t2, a, b, pkey->p );
mpi_mulm( t1, t1, t2, pkey->p );
/* t2 = g ^ input mod p */
gcry_mpi_powm( t2, pkey->g, input, pkey->p );
rc = !mpi_cmp( t1, t2 );
#elif 0
/* t1 = (y^a mod p) * (a^b mod p) mod p */
base[0] = pkey->y; ex[0] = a;
base[1] = a; ex[1] = b;
base[2] = NULL; ex[2] = NULL;
mpi_mulpowm( t1, base, ex, pkey->p );
/* t2 = g ^ input mod p */
gcry_mpi_powm( t2, pkey->g, input, pkey->p );
rc = !mpi_cmp( t1, t2 );
#else
/* t1 = g ^ - input * y ^ a * a ^ b mod p */
mpi_invm(t2, pkey->g, pkey->p );
base[0] = t2 ; ex[0] = input;
base[1] = pkey->y; ex[1] = a;
base[2] = a; ex[2] = b;
base[3] = NULL; ex[3] = NULL;
mpi_mulpowm( t1, base, ex, pkey->p );
rc = !mpi_cmp_ui( t1, 1 );
#endif
mpi_free(t1);
mpi_free(t2);
return rc;
}
/* This function returns a new context for Barrett based operations on
the modulus M. This context needs to be released using
_gcry_mpi_barrett_free. If COPY is true M will be transferred to
the context and the user may change M. If COPY is false, M may not
be changed until gcry_mpi_barrett_free has been called. */
mpi_barrett_t
_gcry_mpi_barrett_init (gcry_mpi_t m, int copy)
{
mpi_barrett_t ctx;
gcry_mpi_t tmp;
mpi_normalize (m);
ctx = xcalloc (1, sizeof *ctx);
if (copy)
{
ctx->m = mpi_copy (m);
ctx->m_copied = 1;
}
else
ctx->m = m;
ctx->k = mpi_get_nlimbs (m);
tmp = mpi_alloc (ctx->k + 1);
/* Barrett precalculation: y = floor(b^(2k) / m). */
mpi_set_ui (tmp, 1);
mpi_lshift_limbs (tmp, 2 * ctx->k);
mpi_fdiv_q (tmp, tmp, m);
ctx->y = tmp;
ctx->r1 = mpi_alloc ( 2 * ctx->k + 1 );
ctx->r2 = mpi_alloc ( 2 * ctx->k + 1 );
return ctx;
}
void
mpi_fdiv_q( MPI quot, MPI dividend, MPI divisor )
{
MPI tmp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(quot) );
mpi_fdiv_qr( quot, tmp, dividend, divisor);
mpi_free_gpg(tmp);
}
void
_gcry_mpi_fdiv_q( gcry_mpi_t quot, gcry_mpi_t dividend, gcry_mpi_t divisor )
{
gcry_mpi_t tmp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(quot) );
_gcry_mpi_fdiv_qr( quot, tmp, dividend, divisor);
mpi_free(tmp);
}
void
gcry_mpi_div (gcry_mpi_t quot, gcry_mpi_t rem, gcry_mpi_t dividend, gcry_mpi_t divisor, int round)
{
if (!round)
{
if (!rem)
{
gcry_mpi_t tmp = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs(quot));
_gcry_mpi_tdiv_qr (quot, tmp, dividend, divisor);
mpi_free (tmp);
}
else
_gcry_mpi_tdiv_qr (quot, rem, dividend, divisor);
}
else if (round < 0)
{
if (!rem)
_gcry_mpi_fdiv_q (quot, dividend, divisor);
else if (!quot)
_gcry_mpi_fdiv_r (rem, dividend, divisor);
else
_gcry_mpi_fdiv_qr (quot, rem, dividend, divisor);
}
else
log_bug ("mpi rounding to ceiling not yet implemented\n");
}
/* R = X mod M
Using Barrett reduction. Before using this function
_gcry_mpi_barrett_init must have been called to do the
precalculations. CTX is the context created by this precalculation
and also conveys M. If the Barret reduction could no be done a
straightforward reduction method is used.
We assume that these conditions are met:
Input: x =(x_2k-1 ...x_0)_b
m =(m_k-1 ....m_0)_b with m_k-1 != 0
Output: r = x mod m
*/
void
_gcry_mpi_mod_barrett (gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t x, mpi_barrett_t ctx)
{
gcry_mpi_t m = ctx->m;
int k = ctx->k;
gcry_mpi_t y = ctx->y;
gcry_mpi_t r1 = ctx->r1;
gcry_mpi_t r2 = ctx->r2;
int sign;
mpi_normalize (x);
if (mpi_get_nlimbs (x) > 2*k )
{
mpi_mod (r, x, m);
return;
}
sign = x->sign;
x->sign = 0;
/* 1. q1 = floor( x / b^k-1)
* q2 = q1 * y
* q3 = floor( q2 / b^k+1 )
* Actually, we don't need qx, we can work direct on r2
*/
mpi_set ( r2, x );
mpi_rshift_limbs ( r2, k-1 );
mpi_mul ( r2, r2, y );
mpi_rshift_limbs ( r2, k+1 );
/* 2. r1 = x mod b^k+1
* r2 = q3 * m mod b^k+1
* r = r1 - r2
* 3. if r < 0 then r = r + b^k+1
*/
mpi_set ( r1, x );
if ( r1->nlimbs > k+1 ) /* Quick modulo operation. */
r1->nlimbs = k+1;
mpi_mul ( r2, r2, m );
if ( r2->nlimbs > k+1 ) /* Quick modulo operation. */
r2->nlimbs = k+1;
mpi_sub ( r, r1, r2 );
if ( mpi_has_sign ( r ) )
{
if (!ctx->r3)
{
ctx->r3 = mpi_alloc ( k + 2 );
mpi_set_ui (ctx->r3, 1);
mpi_lshift_limbs (ctx->r3, k + 1 );
}
mpi_add ( r, r, ctx->r3 );
}
/* 4. while r >= m do r = r - m */
while ( mpi_cmp( r, m ) >= 0 )
mpi_sub ( r, r, m );
x->sign = sign;
}
gcry_mpi_t
gcry_mpi_set( gcry_mpi_t w, const gcry_mpi_t u )
{
if( !w )
w = _gcry_mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(u) );
_gcry_mpi_set( w, (gcry_mpi_t)u );
return w;
}
static gcry_err_code_t
ecc_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
{
gpg_err_code_t err;
ECC_secret_key sk;
(void)algo;
if (!data || !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] || !skey[4]
|| !skey[5] || !skey[6] )
return GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI;
sk.E.p = skey[0];
sk.E.a = skey[1];
sk.E.b = skey[2];
point_init (&sk.E.G);
err = os2ec (&sk.E.G, skey[3]);
if (err)
{
point_free (&sk.E.G);
return err;
}
sk.E.n = skey[4];
point_init (&sk.Q);
err = os2ec (&sk.Q, skey[5]);
if (err)
{
point_free (&sk.E.G);
point_free (&sk.Q);
return err;
}
sk.d = skey[6];
resarr[0] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.E.p));
resarr[1] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.E.p));
err = sign (data, &sk, resarr[0], resarr[1]);
if (err)
{
mpi_free (resarr[0]);
mpi_free (resarr[1]);
resarr[0] = NULL; /* Mark array as released. */
}
point_free (&sk.E.G);
point_free (&sk.Q);
return err;
}
int
elg_encrypt( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *pkey )
{
ELG_public_key pk;
if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
if( !data || !pkey[0] || !pkey[1] || !pkey[2] )
return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
pk.p = pkey[0];
pk.g = pkey[1];
pk.y = pkey[2];
resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( pk.p ) );
resarr[1] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( pk.p ) );
do_encrypt( resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &pk );
return 0;
}
int
mpi_fdiv_q( MPI quot, MPI dividend, MPI divisor )
{
MPI tmp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(quot) );
if (!tmp)
return -ENOMEM;
mpi_fdiv_qr( quot, tmp, dividend, divisor);
mpi_free(tmp);
return 0;
}
/****************
* Test whether the secret key is valid.
* Returns: true if this is a valid key.
*/
static int
check_secret_key( RSA_secret_key *sk )
{
int rc;
gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->p)*2 );
mpi_mul(temp, sk->p, sk->q );
rc = mpi_cmp( temp, sk->n );
mpi_free(temp);
return !rc;
}
/****************
* Test whether the secret key is valid.
* Returns: if this is a valid key.
*/
static int
check_secret_key( ELG_secret_key *sk )
{
int rc;
gcry_mpi_t y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->y) );
gcry_mpi_powm( y, sk->g, sk->x, sk->p );
rc = !mpi_cmp( y, sk->y );
mpi_free( y );
return rc;
}
static void
sign(gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, gcry_mpi_t input, ELG_secret_key *skey )
{
gcry_mpi_t k;
gcry_mpi_t t = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
gcry_mpi_t inv = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
gcry_mpi_t p_1 = mpi_copy(skey->p);
/*
* b = (t * inv) mod (p-1)
* b = (t * inv(k,(p-1),(p-1)) mod (p-1)
* b = (((M-x*a) mod (p-1)) * inv(k,(p-1),(p-1))) mod (p-1)
*
*/
mpi_sub_ui(p_1, p_1, 1);
k = gen_k( skey->p, 0 /* no small K ! */ );
gcry_mpi_powm( a, skey->g, k, skey->p );
mpi_mul(t, skey->x, a );
mpi_subm(t, input, t, p_1 );
mpi_invm(inv, k, p_1 );
mpi_mulm(b, t, inv, p_1 );
#if 0
if( DBG_CIPHER )
{
log_mpidump("elg sign p= ", skey->p);
log_mpidump("elg sign g= ", skey->g);
log_mpidump("elg sign y= ", skey->y);
log_mpidump("elg sign x= ", skey->x);
log_mpidump("elg sign k= ", k);
log_mpidump("elg sign M= ", input);
log_mpidump("elg sign a= ", a);
log_mpidump("elg sign b= ", b);
}
#endif
mpi_free(k);
mpi_free(t);
mpi_free(inv);
mpi_free(p_1);
}
gcry_err_code_t
_gcry_elg_encrypt (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr,
gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, int flags)
{
gcry_err_code_t err = GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
ELG_public_key pk;
(void)algo;
(void)flags;
if ((! data) || (! pkey[0]) || (! pkey[1]) || (! pkey[2]))
err = GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI;
else
{
pk.p = pkey[0];
pk.g = pkey[1];
pk.y = pkey[2];
resarr[0] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (pk.p));
resarr[1] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (pk.p));
do_encrypt (resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &pk);
}
return err;
}
/****************
* Barrett precalculation: y = floor(b^(2k) / m)
*/
static gcry_mpi_t
init_barrett( gcry_mpi_t m, int *k, gcry_mpi_t *r1, gcry_mpi_t *r2 )
{
gcry_mpi_t tmp;
mpi_normalize( m );
*k = mpi_get_nlimbs( m );
tmp = mpi_alloc( *k + 1 );
mpi_set_ui( tmp, 1 );
mpi_lshift_limbs( tmp, 2 * *k );
mpi_fdiv_q( tmp, tmp, m );
*r1 = mpi_alloc( 2* *k + 1 );
*r2 = mpi_alloc( 2* *k + 1 );
return tmp;
}
gcry_err_code_t
_gcry_elg_sign (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *resarr, gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
{
gcry_err_code_t err = GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
ELG_secret_key sk;
(void)algo;
if ((! data)
|| (! skey[0]) || (! skey[1]) || (! skey[2]) || (! skey[3]))
err = GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI;
else
{
sk.p = skey[0];
sk.g = skey[1];
sk.y = skey[2];
sk.x = skey[3];
resarr[0] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.p));
resarr[1] = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.p));
sign (resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &sk);
}
return err;
}
/****************
* Barrett reduction: We assume that these conditions are met:
* Given x =(x_2k-1 ...x_0)_b
* m =(m_k-1 ....m_0)_b with m_k-1 != 0
* Output r = x mod m
* Before using this function init_barret must be used to calucalte y and k.
* Returns: false = no error
* true = can't perform barret reduction
*/
static int
calc_barrett( gcry_mpi_t r, gcry_mpi_t x, gcry_mpi_t m, gcry_mpi_t y, int k, gcry_mpi_t r1, gcry_mpi_t r2 )
{
int xx = k > 3 ? k-3:0;
mpi_normalize( x );
if( mpi_get_nlimbs(x) > 2*k )
return 1; /* can't do it */
/* 1. q1 = floor( x / b^k-1)
* q2 = q1 * y
* q3 = floor( q2 / b^k+1 )
* Actually, we don't need qx, we can work direct on r2
*/
mpi_set( r2, x );
mpi_rshift_limbs( r2, k-1 );
mpi_mul( r2, r2, y );
mpi_rshift_limbs( r2, k+1 );
/* 2. r1 = x mod b^k+1
* r2 = q3 * m mod b^k+1
* r = r1 - r2
* 3. if r < 0 then r = r + b^k+1
*/
mpi_set( r1, x );
if( r1->nlimbs > k+1 ) /* quick modulo operation */
r1->nlimbs = k+1;
mpi_mul( r2, r2, m );
if( r2->nlimbs > k+1 ) /* quick modulo operation */
r2->nlimbs = k+1;
mpi_sub( r, r1, r2 );
if( mpi_has_sign (r) ) {
gcry_mpi_t tmp;
tmp = mpi_alloc( k + 2 );
mpi_set_ui( tmp, 1 );
mpi_lshift_limbs( tmp, k+1 );
mpi_add( r, r, tmp );
mpi_free(tmp);
}
/* 4. while r >= m do r = r - m */
while( mpi_cmp( r, m ) >= 0 )
mpi_sub( r, r, m );
return 0;
}
gcry_mpi_t
gcry_mpi_set( gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u)
{
mpi_ptr_t wp, up;
mpi_size_t usize = u->nlimbs;
int usign = u->sign;
if (!w)
w = _gcry_mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(u) );
RESIZE_IF_NEEDED(w, usize);
wp = w->d;
up = u->d;
MPN_COPY( wp, up, usize );
w->nlimbs = usize;
w->flags = u->flags;
w->sign = usign;
return w;
}
int
elg_decrypt( int algo, MPI *result, MPI *data, MPI *skey )
{
ELG_secret_key sk;
if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
if( !data[0] || !data[1]
|| !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] )
return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
sk.p = skey[0];
sk.g = skey[1];
sk.y = skey[2];
sk.x = skey[3];
*result = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
decrypt( *result, data[0], data[1], &sk );
return 0;
}
static void
decrypt(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t a, gcry_mpi_t b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
{
gcry_mpi_t t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( skey->p ) );
/* output = b/(a^x) mod p */
gcry_mpi_powm( t1, a, skey->x, skey->p );
mpi_invm( t1, t1, skey->p );
mpi_mulm( output, b, t1, skey->p );
#if 0
if( DBG_CIPHER )
{
log_mpidump("elg decrypted x= ", skey->x);
log_mpidump("elg decrypted p= ", skey->p);
log_mpidump("elg decrypted a= ", a);
log_mpidump("elg decrypted b= ", b);
log_mpidump("elg decrypted M= ", output);
}
#endif
mpi_free(t1);
}
gcry_err_code_t
_gcry_elg_decrypt (int algo, gcry_mpi_t *result,
gcry_mpi_t *data, gcry_mpi_t *skey, int flags)
{
gcry_err_code_t err = GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
ELG_secret_key sk;
(void)algo;
(void)flags;
if ((! data[0]) || (! data[1])
|| (! skey[0]) || (! skey[1]) || (! skey[2]) || (! skey[3]))
err = GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI;
else
{
sk.p = skey[0];
sk.g = skey[1];
sk.y = skey[2];
sk.x = skey[3];
*result = mpi_alloc_secure (mpi_get_nlimbs (sk.p));
decrypt (*result, data[0], data[1], &sk);
}
return err;
}
gcry_mpi_t
_gcry_mpi_set (gcry_mpi_t w, gcry_mpi_t u)
{
mpi_ptr_t wp, up;
mpi_size_t usize = u->nlimbs;
int usign = u->sign;
if (!w)
w = _gcry_mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(u) );
if (mpi_is_immutable (w))
{
mpi_immutable_failed ();
return w;
}
RESIZE_IF_NEEDED(w, usize);
wp = w->d;
up = u->d;
MPN_COPY( wp, up, usize );
w->nlimbs = usize;
w->flags = u->flags;
w->flags &= ~(16|32); /* Reset the immutable and constant flags. */
w->sign = usign;
return w;
}
/*
* Generate a random secret exponent K less than Q.
* Note that ECDSA uses this code also to generate D.
*/
gcry_mpi_t
_gcry_dsa_gen_k (gcry_mpi_t q, int security_level)
{
gcry_mpi_t k = mpi_alloc_secure (mpi_get_nlimbs (q));
unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits (q);
unsigned int nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
char *rndbuf = NULL;
/* To learn why we don't use mpi_mod to get the requested bit size,
read the paper: "The Insecurity of the Digital Signature
Algorithm with Partially Known Nonces" by Nguyen and Shparlinski.
Journal of Cryptology, New York. Vol 15, nr 3 (2003) */
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("choosing a random k of %u bits at seclevel %d\n",
nbits, security_level);
for (;;)
{
if ( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 )
{
xfree (rndbuf);
rndbuf = _gcry_random_bytes_secure (nbytes, security_level);
}
else
{ /* Change only some of the higher bits. We could improve
this by directly requesting more memory at the first call
to get_random_bytes() and use these extra bytes here.
However the required management code is more complex and
thus we better use this simple method. */
char *pp = _gcry_random_bytes_secure (4, security_level);
memcpy (rndbuf, pp, 4);
xfree (pp);
}
_gcry_mpi_set_buffer (k, rndbuf, nbytes, 0);
/* Make sure we have the requested number of bits. This code
looks a bit funny but it is easy to understand if you
consider that mpi_set_highbit clears all higher bits. We
don't have a clear_highbit, thus we first set the high bit
and then clear it again. */
if (mpi_test_bit (k, nbits-1))
mpi_set_highbit (k, nbits-1);
else
{
mpi_set_highbit (k, nbits-1);
mpi_clear_bit (k, nbits-1);
}
if (!(mpi_cmp (k, q) < 0)) /* check: k < q */
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("\tk too large - again\n");
continue; /* no */
}
if (!(mpi_cmp_ui (k, 0) > 0)) /* check: k > 0 */
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("\tk is zero - again\n");
continue; /* no */
}
break; /* okay */
}
xfree (rndbuf);
return k;
}
/****************
* Public key operation. Encrypt INPUT with PKEY and put result into OUTPUT.
*
* c = m^e mod n
*
* Where c is OUTPUT, m is INPUT and e,n are elements of PKEY.
*/
static void
public(gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input, RSA_public_key *pkey )
{
if( output == input ) /* powm doesn't like output and input the same */
{
gcry_mpi_t x = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(input)*2 );
mpi_powm( x, input, pkey->e, pkey->n );
mpi_set(output, x);
mpi_free(x);
}
else
mpi_powm( output, input, pkey->e, pkey->n );
}
#if 0
static void
stronger_key_check ( RSA_secret_key *skey )
{
gcry_mpi_t t = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
gcry_mpi_t t1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
gcry_mpi_t t2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
/****************
* Calculate the multiplicative inverse X of A mod N
* That is: Find the solution x for
* 1 = (a*x) mod n
*/
int mpi_invm(MPI x, const MPI a, const MPI n)
{
/* Extended Euclid's algorithm (See TAOPC Vol II, 4.5.2, Alg X)
* modified according to Michael Penk's solution for Exercice 35
* with further enhancement */
MPI u = NULL, v = NULL;
MPI u1 = NULL, u2 = NULL, u3 = NULL;
MPI v1 = NULL, v2 = NULL, v3 = NULL;
MPI t1 = NULL, t2 = NULL, t3 = NULL;
unsigned k;
int sign;
int odd = 0;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
if (mpi_copy(&u, a) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_copy(&v, n) < 0)
goto cleanup;
for (k = 0; !mpi_test_bit(u, 0) && !mpi_test_bit(v, 0); k++) {
if (mpi_rshift(u, u, 1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_rshift(v, v, 1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
odd = mpi_test_bit(v, 0);
u1 = mpi_alloc_set_ui(1);
if (!u1)
goto cleanup;
if (!odd) {
u2 = mpi_alloc_set_ui(0);
if (!u2)
goto cleanup;
}
if (mpi_copy(&u3, u) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_copy(&v1, v) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!odd) {
v2 = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(u));
if (!v2)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_sub(v2, u1, u) < 0)
goto cleanup; /* U is used as const 1 */
}
if (mpi_copy(&v3, v) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_test_bit(u, 0)) { /* u is odd */
t1 = mpi_alloc_set_ui(0);
if (!t1)
goto cleanup;
if (!odd) {
t2 = mpi_alloc_set_ui(1);
if (!t2)
goto cleanup;
t2->sign = 1;
}
if (mpi_copy(&t3, v) < 0)
goto cleanup;
t3->sign = !t3->sign;
goto Y4;
} else {
t1 = mpi_alloc_set_ui(1);
if (!t1)
goto cleanup;
if (!odd) {
t2 = mpi_alloc_set_ui(0);
if (!t2)
goto cleanup;
}
if (mpi_copy(&t3, u) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
do {
do {
if (!odd) {
if (mpi_test_bit(t1, 0) || mpi_test_bit(t2, 0)) { /* one is odd */
if (mpi_add(t1, t1, v) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_sub(t2, t2, u) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
if (mpi_rshift(t1, t1, 1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_rshift(t2, t2, 1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_rshift(t3, t3, 1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
if (mpi_test_bit(t1, 0))
if (mpi_add(t1, t1, v) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_rshift(t1, t1, 1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_rshift(t3, t3, 1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
Y4:
;
} while (!mpi_test_bit(t3, 0)); /* while t3 is even */
if (!t3->sign) {
if (mpi_set(u1, t1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!odd)
if (mpi_set(u2, t2) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_set(u3, t3) < 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
if (mpi_sub(v1, v, t1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
sign = u->sign;
u->sign = !u->sign;
if (!odd)
if (mpi_sub(v2, u, t2) < 0)
goto cleanup;
u->sign = sign;
sign = t3->sign;
t3->sign = !t3->sign;
if (mpi_set(v3, t3) < 0)
goto cleanup;
t3->sign = sign;
}
if (mpi_sub(t1, u1, v1) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!odd)
if (mpi_sub(t2, u2, v2) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (mpi_sub(t3, u3, v3) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (t1->sign) {
if (mpi_add(t1, t1, v) < 0)
goto cleanup;
if (!odd)
if (mpi_sub(t2, t2, u) < 0)
goto cleanup;
}
} while (mpi_cmp_ui(t3, 0)); /* while t3 != 0 */
/* mpi_lshift( u3, k ); */
rc = mpi_set(x, u1);
cleanup:
mpi_free(u1);
mpi_free(v1);
mpi_free(t1);
if (!odd) {
mpi_free(u2);
mpi_free(v2);
mpi_free(t2);
}
mpi_free(u3);
mpi_free(v3);
mpi_free(t3);
mpi_free(u);
mpi_free(v);
return rc;
}
/****************
* We do not need to use the strongest RNG because we gain no extra
* security from it - The prime number is public and we could also
* offer the factors for those who are willing to check that it is
* indeed a strong prime. With ALL_FACTORS set to true all afcors of
* prime-1 are returned in FACTORS.
*
* mode 0: Standard
* 1: Make sure that at least one factor is of size qbits.
*/
static gcry_err_code_t
prime_generate_internal (int mode,
gcry_mpi_t *prime_generated, unsigned int pbits,
unsigned int qbits, gcry_mpi_t g,
gcry_mpi_t **ret_factors,
gcry_random_level_t randomlevel, unsigned int flags,
int all_factors,
gcry_prime_check_func_t cb_func, void *cb_arg)
{
gcry_err_code_t err = 0;
gcry_mpi_t *factors_new = NULL; /* Factors to return to the
caller. */
gcry_mpi_t *factors = NULL; /* Current factors. */
gcry_mpi_t *pool = NULL; /* Pool of primes. */
unsigned char *perms = NULL; /* Permutations of POOL. */
gcry_mpi_t q_factor = NULL; /* Used if QBITS is non-zero. */
unsigned int fbits = 0; /* Length of prime factors. */
unsigned int n = 0; /* Number of factors. */
unsigned int m = 0; /* Number of primes in pool. */
gcry_mpi_t q = NULL; /* First prime factor. */
gcry_mpi_t prime = NULL; /* Prime candidate. */
unsigned int nprime = 0; /* Bits of PRIME. */
unsigned int req_qbits; /* The original QBITS value. */
gcry_mpi_t val_2; /* For check_prime(). */
unsigned int is_secret = (flags & GCRY_PRIME_FLAG_SECRET);
unsigned int count1 = 0, count2 = 0;
unsigned int i = 0, j = 0;
if (pbits < 48)
return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
/* If QBITS is not given, assume a reasonable value. */
if (!qbits)
qbits = pbits / 3;
req_qbits = qbits;
/* Find number of needed prime factors. */
for (n = 1; (pbits - qbits - 1) / n >= qbits; n++)
;
n--;
val_2 = mpi_alloc_set_ui (2);
if ((! n) || ((mode == 1) && (n < 2)))
{
err = GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
goto leave;
}
if (mode == 1)
{
n--;
fbits = (pbits - 2 * req_qbits -1) / n;
qbits = pbits - req_qbits - n * fbits;
}
else
{
fbits = (pbits - req_qbits -1) / n;
qbits = pbits - n * fbits;
}
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("gen prime: pbits=%u qbits=%u fbits=%u/%u n=%d\n",
pbits, req_qbits, qbits, fbits, n);
prime = gcry_mpi_new (pbits);
/* Generate first prime factor. */
q = gen_prime (qbits, is_secret, randomlevel, NULL, NULL);
if (mode == 1)
q_factor = gen_prime (req_qbits, is_secret, randomlevel, NULL, NULL);
/* Allocate an array to hold the factors + 2 for later usage. */
factors = gcry_calloc (n + 2, sizeof (*factors));
if (!factors)
{
err = gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno);
goto leave;
}
/* Make a pool of 3n+5 primes (this is an arbitrary value). */
m = n * 3 + 5;
if (mode == 1) /* Need some more (for e.g. DSA). */
m += 5;
if (m < 25)
m = 25;
pool = gcry_calloc (m , sizeof (*pool));
if (! pool)
{
err = gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno);
goto leave;
}
/* Permutate over the pool of primes. */
do
{
next_try:
if (! perms)
{
/* Allocate new primes. */
for(i = 0; i < m; i++)
{
mpi_free (pool[i]);
pool[i] = NULL;
}
/* Init m_out_of_n(). */
perms = gcry_calloc (1, m);
if (! perms)
{
err = gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno);
goto leave;
}
for(i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
perms[i] = 1;
pool[i] = gen_prime (fbits, is_secret,
randomlevel, NULL, NULL);
factors[i] = pool[i];
}
}
else
{
m_out_of_n ((char*)perms, n, m);
for (i = j = 0; (i < m) && (j < n); i++)
if (perms[i])
{
if(! pool[i])
pool[i] = gen_prime (fbits, 0, 1, NULL, NULL);
factors[j++] = pool[i];
}
if (i == n)
{
gcry_free (perms);
perms = NULL;
progress ('!');
goto next_try; /* Allocate new primes. */
}
}
/* Generate next prime candidate:
p = 2 * q [ * q_factor] * factor_0 * factor_1 * ... * factor_n + 1.
*/
mpi_set (prime, q);
mpi_mul_ui (prime, prime, 2);
if (mode == 1)
mpi_mul (prime, prime, q_factor);
for(i = 0; i < n; i++)
mpi_mul (prime, prime, factors[i]);
mpi_add_ui (prime, prime, 1);
nprime = mpi_get_nbits (prime);
if (nprime < pbits)
{
if (++count1 > 20)
{
count1 = 0;
qbits++;
progress('>');
mpi_free (q);
q = gen_prime (qbits, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
goto next_try;
}
}
else
count1 = 0;
if (nprime > pbits)
{
if (++count2 > 20)
{
count2 = 0;
qbits--;
progress('<');
mpi_free (q);
q = gen_prime (qbits, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
goto next_try;
}
}
else
count2 = 0;
}
while (! ((nprime == pbits) && check_prime (prime, val_2, cb_func, cb_arg)));
if (DBG_CIPHER)
{
progress ('\n');
log_mpidump ("prime : ", prime);
log_mpidump ("factor q: ", q);
if (mode == 1)
log_mpidump ("factor q0: ", q_factor);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
log_mpidump ("factor pi: ", factors[i]);
log_debug ("bit sizes: prime=%u, q=%u",
mpi_get_nbits (prime), mpi_get_nbits (q));
if (mode == 1)
log_debug (", q0=%u", mpi_get_nbits (q_factor));
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
log_debug (", p%d=%u", i, mpi_get_nbits (factors[i]));
progress('\n');
}
if (ret_factors)
{
/* Caller wants the factors. */
factors_new = gcry_calloc (n + 4, sizeof (*factors_new));
if (! factors_new)
{
err = gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno);
goto leave;
}
if (all_factors)
{
i = 0;
factors_new[i++] = gcry_mpi_set_ui (NULL, 2);
factors_new[i++] = mpi_copy (q);
if (mode == 1)
factors_new[i++] = mpi_copy (q_factor);
for(j=0; j < n; j++)
factors_new[i++] = mpi_copy (factors[j]);
}
else
{
i = 0;
if (mode == 1)
{
factors_new[i++] = mpi_copy (q_factor);
for (; i <= n; i++)
factors_new[i] = mpi_copy (factors[i]);
}
else
for (; i < n; i++ )
factors_new[i] = mpi_copy (factors[i]);
}
}
if (g)
{
/* Create a generator (start with 3). */
gcry_mpi_t tmp = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (prime));
gcry_mpi_t b = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (prime));
gcry_mpi_t pmin1 = mpi_alloc (mpi_get_nlimbs (prime));
if (mode == 1)
err = GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
else
{
factors[n] = q;
factors[n + 1] = mpi_alloc_set_ui (2);
mpi_sub_ui (pmin1, prime, 1);
mpi_set_ui (g, 2);
do
{
mpi_add_ui (g, g, 1);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
{
log_debug ("checking g:");
gcry_mpi_dump (g);
log_printf ("\n");
}
else
progress('^');
for (i = 0; i < n + 2; i++)
{
mpi_fdiv_q (tmp, pmin1, factors[i]);
/* No mpi_pow(), but it is okay to use this with mod
prime. */
gcry_mpi_powm (b, g, tmp, prime);
if (! mpi_cmp_ui (b, 1))
break;
}
if (DBG_CIPHER)
progress('\n');
}
while (i < n + 2);
mpi_free (factors[n+1]);
mpi_free (tmp);
mpi_free (b);
mpi_free (pmin1);
}
}
if (! DBG_CIPHER)
progress ('\n');
leave:
if (pool)
{
for(i = 0; i < m; i++)
mpi_free (pool[i]);
gcry_free (pool);
}
if (factors)
gcry_free (factors); /* Factors are shallow copies. */
if (perms)
gcry_free (perms);
mpi_free (val_2);
mpi_free (q);
mpi_free (q_factor);
if (! err)
{
*prime_generated = prime;
if (ret_factors)
*ret_factors = factors_new;
}
else
{
if (factors_new)
{
for (i = 0; factors_new[i]; i++)
mpi_free (factors_new[i]);
gcry_free (factors_new);
}
mpi_free (prime);
}
return err;
}
/*
* Return true if n is probably a prime
*/
static int
is_prime (gcry_mpi_t n, int steps, unsigned int *count)
{
gcry_mpi_t x = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
gcry_mpi_t y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
gcry_mpi_t z = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
gcry_mpi_t nminus1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
gcry_mpi_t a2 = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 2 );
gcry_mpi_t q;
unsigned i, j, k;
int rc = 0;
unsigned nbits = mpi_get_nbits( n );
mpi_sub_ui( nminus1, n, 1 );
/* Find q and k, so that n = 1 + 2^k * q . */
q = mpi_copy ( nminus1 );
k = mpi_trailing_zeros ( q );
mpi_tdiv_q_2exp (q, q, k);
for (i=0 ; i < steps; i++ )
{
++*count;
if( !i )
{
mpi_set_ui( x, 2 );
}
else
{
gcry_mpi_randomize( x, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM );
/* Make sure that the number is smaller than the prime and
keep the randomness of the high bit. */
if ( mpi_test_bit ( x, nbits-2) )
{
mpi_set_highbit ( x, nbits-2); /* Clear all higher bits. */
}
else
{
mpi_set_highbit( x, nbits-2 );
mpi_clear_bit( x, nbits-2 );
}
assert ( mpi_cmp( x, nminus1 ) < 0 && mpi_cmp_ui( x, 1 ) > 0 );
}
gcry_mpi_powm ( y, x, q, n);
if ( mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) && mpi_cmp( y, nminus1 ) )
{
for ( j=1; j < k && mpi_cmp( y, nminus1 ); j++ )
{
gcry_mpi_powm(y, y, a2, n);
if( !mpi_cmp_ui( y, 1 ) )
goto leave; /* Not a prime. */
}
if (mpi_cmp( y, nminus1 ) )
goto leave; /* Not a prime. */
}
progress('+');
}
rc = 1; /* May be a prime. */
leave:
mpi_free( x );
mpi_free( y );
mpi_free( z );
mpi_free( nminus1 );
mpi_free( q );
mpi_free( a2 );
return rc;
}
/****************
* Generate a random secret exponent k from prime p, so that k is
* relatively prime to p-1. With SMALL_K set, k will be selected for
* better encryption performance - this must never be used signing!
*/
static gcry_mpi_t
gen_k( gcry_mpi_t p, int small_k )
{
gcry_mpi_t k = mpi_alloc_secure( 0 );
gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
gcry_mpi_t p_1 = mpi_copy(p);
unsigned int orig_nbits = mpi_get_nbits(p);
unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
char *rndbuf = NULL;
if (small_k)
{
/* Using a k much lesser than p is sufficient for encryption and
* it greatly improves the encryption performance. We use
* Wiener's table and add a large safety margin. */
nbits = wiener_map( orig_nbits ) * 3 / 2;
if( nbits >= orig_nbits )
BUG();
}
else
nbits = orig_nbits;
nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
if( DBG_CIPHER )
log_debug("choosing a random k ");
mpi_sub_ui( p_1, p, 1);
for(;;)
{
if( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 )
{
gcry_free(rndbuf);
rndbuf = gcry_random_bytes_secure( nbytes, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM );
}
else
{
/* Change only some of the higher bits. We could improve
this by directly requesting more memory at the first call
to get_random_bytes() and use this the here maybe it is
easier to do this directly in random.c Anyway, it is
highly inlikely that we will ever reach this code. */
char *pp = gcry_random_bytes_secure( 4, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM );
memcpy( rndbuf, pp, 4 );
gcry_free(pp);
}
_gcry_mpi_set_buffer( k, rndbuf, nbytes, 0 );
for(;;)
{
if( !(mpi_cmp( k, p_1 ) < 0) ) /* check: k < (p-1) */
{
if( DBG_CIPHER )
progress('+');
break; /* no */
}
if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( k, 0 ) > 0) ) /* check: k > 0 */
{
if( DBG_CIPHER )
progress('-');
break; /* no */
}
if (gcry_mpi_gcd( temp, k, p_1 ))
goto found; /* okay, k is relative prime to (p-1) */
mpi_add_ui( k, k, 1 );
if( DBG_CIPHER )
progress('.');
}
}
found:
gcry_free(rndbuf);
if( DBG_CIPHER )
progress('\n');
mpi_free(p_1);
mpi_free(temp);
return k;
}
/****************
* RES = (BASE[0] ^ EXP[0]) * (BASE[1] ^ EXP[1]) * ... * mod M
*/
int
mpi_mulpowm( MPI res, MPI *basearray, MPI *exparray, MPI m)
{
int rc = -ENOMEM;
int k; /* number of elements */
int t; /* bit size of largest exponent */
int i, j, idx;
MPI *G = NULL; /* table with precomputed values of size 2^k */
MPI tmp = NULL;
for(k=0; basearray[k]; k++ )
;
if (!k) { printk("mpi_mulpowm: assert(k) failed\n"); BUG(); }
for(t=0, i=0; (tmp=exparray[i]); i++ ) {
j = mpi_get_nbits(tmp);
if( j > t )
t = j;
}
if (i!=k) { printk("mpi_mulpowm: assert(i==k) failed\n"); BUG(); }
if (!t) { printk("mpi_mulpowm: assert(t) failed\n"); BUG(); }
if (k>=10) { printk("mpi_mulpowm: assert(k<10) failed\n"); BUG(); }
//daveti: hack
//G = kzalloc( (1<<k) * sizeof *G, GFP_KERNEL );
G = kzalloc( (1<<k) * sizeof *G, GFP_ATOMIC );
if (!G) goto nomem;
/* and calculate */
tmp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(m)+1 ); if (!tmp) goto nomem;
if (mpi_set_ui( res, 1 ) < 0) goto nomem;
for(i = 1; i <= t; i++ ) {
if (mpi_mulm(tmp, res, res, m ) < 0) goto nomem;
idx = build_index( exparray, k, i, t );
if (!(idx >= 0 && idx < (1<<k))) {
printk("mpi_mulpowm: assert(idx >= 0 && idx < (1<<k)) failed\n");
BUG();
}
if( !G[idx] ) {
if( !idx ) {
G[0] = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 1 );
if (!G[0]) goto nomem;
}
else {
for(j=0; j < k; j++ ) {
if( (idx & (1<<j) ) ) {
if( !G[idx] ) {
if (mpi_copy( &G[idx], basearray[j] ) < 0)
goto nomem;
}
else {
if (mpi_mulm(G[idx],G[idx],basearray[j],m) < 0)
goto nomem;
}
}
}
if( !G[idx] ) {
G[idx] = mpi_alloc(0);
if (!G[idx]) goto nomem;
}
}
}
if (mpi_mulm(res, tmp, G[idx], m ) < 0) goto nomem;
}
rc = 0;
nomem:
/* cleanup */
mpi_free(tmp);
for(i=0; i < (1<<k); i++ )
mpi_free(G[i]);
kfree(G);
return rc;
}