Esempio n. 1
0
int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
	      unsigned int mode)
{
	/*
                                 
                             
                                  
                                                                       
                                           
                                             
  */

	struct aa_profile *tracer_p;
	/*                     */
	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
	int error = 0;
	tracer_p = aa_cred_profile(cred);

	if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
		/*                      */
		const struct cred *lcred = get_task_cred(tracee);
		struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_cred_profile(lcred);

		error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
		error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);

		put_cred(lcred);
	}
	put_cred(cred);

	return error;
}
Esempio n. 2
0
/**
 * aa_ptrace - do ptrace permission check and auditing
 * @tracer: task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
 * @tracee: task being traced (NOT NULL)
 * @mode: ptrace mode either PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
 *
 * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
 */
int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
              unsigned int mode)
{
    /*
     * tracer can ptrace tracee when
     * - tracer is unconfined ||
     *   - tracer is in complain mode
     *   - tracer has rules allowing it to trace tracee currently this is:
     *       - confined by the same profile ||
     *       - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
     */

    struct aa_profile *tracer_p;
    /* cred released below */
    const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
    int error = 0;
    tracer_p = aa_cred_profile(cred);

    if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
        /* lcred released below */
        const struct cred *lcred = get_task_cred(tracee);
        struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_cred_profile(lcred);

        error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
        error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);

        put_cred(lcred);
    }
    put_cred(cred);

    return error;
}
Esempio n. 3
0
/**
 * aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
 * @profile: the profile to print profile info about  (NOT NULL)
 * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
 *
 * Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure
 *
 * Requires: profile != NULL
 *
 * Creates a string containing the namespace_name://profile_name for
 * @profile.
 *
 * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
 */
int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string)
{
	char *str;
	int len = 0, mode_len = 0, ns_len = 0, name_len;
	const char *mode_str = aa_profile_mode_names[profile->mode];
	const char *ns_name = NULL;
	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
	struct aa_namespace *current_ns = __aa_current_profile()->ns;
	char *s;

	if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns))
		return -EACCES;

	ns_name = aa_ns_name(current_ns, ns);
	ns_len = strlen(ns_name);

	/* if the visible ns_name is > 0 increase size for : :// seperator */
	if (ns_len)
		ns_len += 4;

	/* unconfined profiles don't have a mode string appended */
	if (!unconfined(profile))
		mode_len = strlen(mode_str) + 3;	/* + 3 for _() */

	name_len = strlen(profile->base.hname);
	len = mode_len + ns_len + name_len + 1;	    /* + 1 for \n */
	s = str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);	    /* + 1 \0 */
	if (!str)
		return -ENOMEM;

	if (ns_len) {
		/* skip over prefix current_ns->base.hname and separating // */
		sprintf(s, ":%s://", ns_name);
		s += ns_len;
	}
	if (unconfined(profile))
		/* mode string not being appended */
		sprintf(s, "%s\n", profile->base.hname);
	else
		sprintf(s, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname, mode_str);
	*string = str;

	/* NOTE: len does not include \0 of string, not saved as part of file */
	return len;
}
Esempio n. 4
0
File: ipc.c Progetto: Anjali05/linux
static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
			       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
{
	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
		return 0;

	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
}
Esempio n. 5
0
/**
 * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
 * @tracer_task: task who will do the tracing  (NOT NULL)
 * @tracer: profile of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
 * @tracee: task to be traced
 * @mode: whether PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
 *
 * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
 */
int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
                  struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode)
{
    /* TODO: currently only based on capability, not extended ptrace
     *       rules,
     *       Test mode for PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
     */

    if (unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
        return 0;
    /* log this capability request */
    return aa_capable(tracer_task, tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
}
Esempio n. 6
0
int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
		  struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode)
{
	/*                                                              
                
                                                              
  */

	if (unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
		return 0;
	/*                             */
	return aa_capable(tracer_task, tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
}
Esempio n. 7
0
File: net.c Progetto: SelfImp/m75
static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, int op, u32 request,
			    struct sock *sk)
{
	struct aa_profile *profile;

	AA_BUG(!label);
	AA_BUG(!sk);

	if (unconfined(label))
		return 0;

	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, op, sk->sk_family,
					   sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol,
					   sk));

}
Esempio n. 8
0
/**
 * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
 * @op: operation being checked
 * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
 *
 * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
 */
int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
{
	struct aa_profile *profile;
	int error = 0;

	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
	 */
	if (in_interrupt())
		return 0;

	profile = __aa_current_profile();
	if (!unconfined(profile))
		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);

	return error;
}
Esempio n. 9
0
static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
			    struct sock *sk)
{
	int error = 0;

	AA_BUG(!label);
	AA_BUG(!sk);

	if (!unconfined(label)) {
		struct aa_profile *profile;
		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);

		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
			    aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
	}

	return error;
}
Esempio n. 10
0
File: audit.c Progetto: 020gzh/linux
/**
 * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem
 * @type: audit type for the message
 * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL)
 * @gfp: allocation flags to use
 * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL)
 * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
 *
 * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags
 *
 * Returns: error on failure
 */
int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
	     struct common_audit_data *sa,
	     void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
{
	BUG_ON(!profile);

	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
		if (likely(!sa->aad->error)) {
			if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
				return 0;
			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
		} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
		else
			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
	}
	if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
	    (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
		return sa->aad->error;

	if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;

	if (!unconfined(profile))
		sa->aad->profile = profile;

	aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);

	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
				    sa->u.tsk ?  sa->u.tsk : current);

	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
		return complain_error(sa->aad->error);

	return sa->aad->error;
}
Esempio n. 11
0
/**
 * aa_audit_base - core AppArmor function.
 * @type: type of audit message (see include/linux/apparmor.h)
 * @profile: active profile for event (MAY BE NULL)
 * @sa: audit structure containing data to audit
 * @audit_cxt: audit_cxt that event is under
 * @cb: audit cb for this event
 *
 * Record an audit message for data is @sa, and handle deal with kill and
 * complain messages switches.
 *
 * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, else error
 */
static int aa_audit_base(int type, struct aa_profile *profile,
			 struct aa_audit *sa, struct audit_context *audit_cxt,
			 void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, struct aa_audit *))
{
	struct audit_buffer *ab = NULL;
	struct task_struct *task = sa->task ? sa->task : current;

	if (profile && DO_KILL(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;

	/* ab freed below in audit_log_end */
	ab = audit_log_start(audit_cxt, sa->gfp_mask, type);

	if (!ab) {
		AA_ERROR("(%d) Unable to log event of type (%d)\n",
			 -ENOMEM, type);
		sa->error = -ENOMEM;
		goto out;
	}

	if (aa_g_audit_header) {
		audit_log_format(ab, " type=");
		audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[type - AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT]);
	}

	if (sa->operation) {
		audit_log_format(ab, " operation=");
		audit_log_string(ab, sa->operation);
	}

	if (sa->info) {
		audit_log_format(ab, " info=");
		audit_log_string(ab, sa->info);
		if (sa->error)
			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->error);
	}

	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d", task->pid);

	if (profile && !unconfined(profile)) {
		pid_t pid;
		rcu_read_lock();
		pid = task->real_parent->pid;
		rcu_read_unlock();
		audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", pid);
		audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname);

		if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
			audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.hname);
		}
	}

	if (cb)
		cb(ab, sa);

	audit_log_end(ab);

out:
	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, task);

	return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : sa->error;
}