Esempio n. 1
0
MyString convert_ipaddr_to_hostname(const condor_sockaddr& addr)
{
	MyString ret;
	MyString default_domain;
	if (!param(default_domain, "DEFAULT_DOMAIN_NAME")) {
		dprintf(D_HOSTNAME,
				"NO_DNS: DEFAULT_DOMAIN_NAME must be defined in your "
				"top-level config file\n");
		return ret;
	}

	ret = addr.to_ip_string();
	for (int i = 0; i < ret.Length(); ++i) {
		if (ret[i] == '.' || ret[i] == ':')
			ret.setChar(i, '-');
	}
	ret += ".";
	ret += default_domain;

	// Hostnames can't begin with -, as per RFC 1123
	// ipv6 zero-compression could cause this, esp. for the loopback addr
	if (ret[0] == '-') {
		ret = "0" + ret;
	}

	return ret;
}
Esempio n. 2
0
std::vector<MyString> get_hostname_with_alias(const condor_sockaddr& addr)
{
	std::vector<MyString> prelim_ret;
	std::vector<MyString> actual_ret;

	MyString hostname = get_hostname(addr);
	if (hostname.IsEmpty())
		return prelim_ret;

	// we now start to construct a list (prelim_ret) of the hostname and all
	// the aliases.  first the name itself.
	prelim_ret.push_back(hostname);

	if (nodns_enabled())
		// don't need to verify this... the string is actually an IP here
		return prelim_ret; // no need to call further DNS functions.

	// now, add the aliases

	hostent* ent;
		//int aftype = addr.get_aftype();
		//ent = gethostbyname2(hostname.Value(), addr.get_aftype());

		// really should call gethostbyname2() however most platforms do not
		// support. (Solaris, HP-UX, IRIX)
		// complete DNS aliases can be only obtained by gethostbyname.
		// however, what happens if we call it in IPv6-only system?
		// can we get DNS aliases for the hostname that only contains
		// IPv6 addresses?
	ent = gethostbyname(hostname.Value());

	if (ent) {
		char** alias = ent->h_aliases;
		for (; *alias; ++alias) {
			prelim_ret.push_back(MyString(*alias));
		}
	}

	// WARNING! there is a reason this is implimented as two separate loops,
	// so please don't try to combine them.
	//
	// calling verify_name_has_ip() will potentially overwrite static data that
	// is referred to by ent->h_aliases (man 3 gethostbyname, see notes).  so
	// first, we push the name and then all aliases into the MyString vector
	// prelim_ret, and then verify them in the following loop.

	for (unsigned int i = 0; i < prelim_ret.size(); i++) {
		if(verify_name_has_ip(prelim_ret[i], addr)) {
			actual_ret.push_back(prelim_ret[i]);
		} else {
			dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "WARNING: forward resolution of %s doesn't match %s!\n",
					prelim_ret[i].Value(), addr.to_ip_string().Value());
		}
	}

	return actual_ret;
}
Esempio n. 3
0
bool verify_name_has_ip(MyString name, condor_sockaddr addr){
	std::vector<condor_sockaddr> addrs;
	bool found = false;

	addrs = resolve_hostname(name);
	dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "IPVERIFY: checking %s against %s\n", name.Value(), addr.to_ip_string().Value());
	for(unsigned int i = 0; i < addrs.size(); i++) {
		// compare MyStrings
		// addr.to_ip_string
		if(addrs[i].to_ip_string() == addr.to_ip_string()) {
			dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "IPVERIFY: matched %s to %s\n", addrs[i].to_ip_string().Value(), addr.to_ip_string().Value());
			found = true;
		} else {
			dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "IPVERIFY: comparing %s to %s\n", addrs[i].to_ip_string().Value(), addr.to_ip_string().Value());
		}
	}
	dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "IPVERIFY: ip found is %i\n", found);

	return found;
}
Esempio n. 4
0
static void replace_higher_scoring_addr(const char * reason, condor_sockaddr & current, int & current_score,
	const condor_sockaddr & potential, int potential_score) {
	const char * result = "skipped for low score";
	if(current_score < potential_score) {
		current = potential;
		current_score = potential_score;
		result = "new winner";
	}

	dprintf(D_HOSTNAME, "%s: %s (score %d) %s\n",
		reason,
		potential.to_ip_string().Value(),
		potential_score,
		result);
}
Esempio n. 5
0
void reset_local_hostname() {
	if( ! init_local_hostname_impl() ) {
		dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "Something went wrong identifying my hostname and IP address.\n" );
		hostname_initialized = false;
	} else {
		dprintf( D_HOSTNAME, "I am: hostname: %s, fully qualified doman name: %s, IP: %s, IPv4: %s, IPv6: %s\n", local_hostname.Value(), local_fqdn.Value(), local_ipaddr.to_ip_string().Value(), local_ipv4addr.to_ip_string().Value(), local_ipv6addr.to_ip_string().Value() );
		hostname_initialized = true;
	}
}
Esempio n. 6
0
void init_local_hostname()
{
		// [m.]
		// initializing local hostname, ip address, fqdn was
		// super complex.
		//
		// implementation was scattered over condor_netdb and
		// my_hostname, get_full_hostname.
		//
		// above them has duplicated code in many ways.
		// so I aggregated all of them into here.

	bool ipaddr_inited = false;
	char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
	int ret;

		// [TODO:IPV6] condor_gethostname is not IPv6 safe.
		// reimplement it.
	ret = condor_gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname));
	if (ret) {
		dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "condor_gethostname() failed. Cannot initialize "
				"local hostname, ip address, FQDN.\n");
		return;
	}

	dprintf(D_HOSTNAME, "condor_gethostname() claims we are %s\n", hostname);

	// Fallback case.
	local_hostname = hostname;

		// if NETWORK_INTERFACE is defined, we use that as a local ip addr.
	MyString network_interface;
	if (param(network_interface, "NETWORK_INTERFACE", "*")) {
		if (local_ipaddr.from_ip_string(network_interface))
			ipaddr_inited = true;
	}

		// Dig around for an IP address in the interfaces
		// TODO WARNING: Will only return IPv4 addresses!
	if( ! ipaddr_inited ) {
		std::string ip;
		if( ! network_interface_to_ip("NETWORK_INTERFACE", network_interface.Value(), ip, NULL)) {
			dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "Unable to identify IP address from interfaces.  None matches NETWORK_INTERFACE=%s. Problems are likely.\n", network_interface.Value());
			return;
		}
		if ( ! local_ipaddr.from_ip_string(ip))
		{
			// Should not happen; means network_interface_to_ip returned
			// invalid IP address.
			ASSERT(FALSE);
		}
		ipaddr_inited = true;
	}

		// now initialize hostname and fqdn
	if (nodns_enabled()) { // if nodns is enabled, we can cut some slack.
			// condor_gethostname() returns a hostname with
			// DEFAULT_DOMAIN_NAME. Thus, it is always fqdn
		local_fqdn = hostname;
		if (!ipaddr_inited) {
			local_ipaddr = convert_hostname_to_ipaddr(local_hostname);
		}
		return;
	}

	addrinfo_iterator ai;
	ret = ipv6_getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, ai);
	if (ret) {
			// write some error message
		dprintf(D_HOSTNAME, "hostname %s cannot be resolved by getaddrinfo\n",
				hostname);
		return;
	}
	
	int local_hostname_desireability = 0;
	while (addrinfo* info = ai.next()) {
		const char* name = info->ai_canonname;
		if (!name)
			continue;
		condor_sockaddr addr(info->ai_addr);

		int desireability = 0;
		if (addr.is_loopback())            { desireability = 1; }
		else if(addr.is_private_network()) { desireability = 2; }
		else                               { desireability = 3; }
		dprintf(D_HOSTNAME, "Considering %s (Ranked at %d) as possible local hostname versus %s/%s (%d)\n", name, desireability, local_hostname.Value(), local_fqdn.Value(), local_hostname_desireability);
		if(desireability < local_hostname_desireability) { continue; }
		local_hostname_desireability = desireability;

		if (!ipaddr_inited)
			local_ipaddr = addr;

		const char* dotpos = strchr(name, '.');
		if (dotpos) { // consider it as a FQDN
			local_fqdn = name;
			local_hostname = local_fqdn.Substr(0, dotpos-name-1);
		} else {
			local_hostname = name;
			local_fqdn = local_hostname;
			MyString default_domain;
			if (param(default_domain, "DEFAULT_DOMAIN_NAME")) {
				if (default_domain[0] != '.')
					local_fqdn += ".";
				local_fqdn += default_domain;
			}
		}
	}

	dprintf(D_HOSTNAME, "Identifying myself as: Short:: %s, Long: %s, IP: %s\n", local_hostname.Value(), local_fqdn.Value(), local_ipaddr.to_ip_string().Value());
	hostname_initialized = true;
}
Esempio n. 7
0
int
IpVerify::Verify( DCpermission perm, const condor_sockaddr& addr, const char * user, MyString *allow_reason, MyString *deny_reason )
{
	perm_mask_t mask;
	in6_addr sin6_addr;
	const char *thehost;
    const char * who = user;
	MyString peer_description; // we build this up as we go along (DNS etc.)

	if( !did_init ) {
		Init();
	}
	/*
	 * Be Warned:  careful about parameter "sin" being NULL.  It could be, in
	 * which case we should return FALSE (unless perm is ALLOW)
	 *
	 */

	switch ( perm ) {

	case ALLOW:
		return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
		break;

	default:
		break;
	}

	sin6_addr = addr.to_ipv6_address();
	mask = 0;	// must initialize to zero because we logical-or bits into this

    if (who == NULL || *who == '\0') {
        who = TotallyWild;
    }

	if ( perm >= LAST_PERM || !PermTypeArray[perm] ) {
		EXCEPT("IpVerify::Verify: called with unknown permission %d\n",perm);
	}


		// see if a authorization hole has been dyamically punched (via
		// PunchHole) for this perm / user / IP
		// Note that the permission hierarchy is dealt with in
		// PunchHole(), by punching a hole for all implied levels.
		// Therefore, if there is a hole or an implied hole, we will
		// always find it here before we get into the subsequent code
		// which recursively calls Verify() to traverse the hierarchy.
		// This is important, because we do not want holes to find
		// there way into the authorization cache.
		//
	if ( PunchedHoleArray[perm] != NULL ) {
		HolePunchTable_t* hpt = PunchedHoleArray[perm];
		MyString ip_str_buf = addr.to_ip_string();
		const char* ip_str = ip_str_buf.Value();
		MyString id_with_ip;
		MyString id;
		int count;
		if ( who != TotallyWild ) {
			id_with_ip.sprintf("%s/%s", who, ip_str);
			id = who;
			if ( hpt->lookup(id, count) != -1 )	{
				if( allow_reason ) {
					allow_reason->sprintf(
						"%s authorization has been made automatic for %s",
						PermString(perm), id.Value() );
				}
				return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
			}
			if ( hpt->lookup(id_with_ip, count) != -1 ) {
				if( allow_reason ) {
					allow_reason->sprintf(
						"%s authorization has been made automatic for %s",
						PermString(perm), id_with_ip.Value() );
				}
				return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
			}
		}
		id = ip_str;
		if ( hpt->lookup(id, count) != -1 ) {
			if( allow_reason ) {
				allow_reason->sprintf(
					"%s authorization has been made automatic for %s",
					PermString(perm), id.Value() );
			}
			return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
		}
	}

	if ( PermTypeArray[perm]->behavior == USERVERIFY_ALLOW ) {
			// allow if no HOSTALLOW_* or HOSTDENY_* restrictions 
			// specified.
		if( allow_reason ) {
			allow_reason->sprintf(
				"%s authorization policy allows access by anyone",
				PermString(perm));
		}
		return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
	}
		
	if ( PermTypeArray[perm]->behavior == USERVERIFY_DENY ) {
			// deny
		if( deny_reason ) {
			deny_reason->sprintf(
				"%s authorization policy denies all access",
				PermString(perm));
		}
		return USER_AUTH_FAILURE;
	}
		
	if( LookupCachedVerifyResult(perm,sin6_addr,who,mask) ) {
		if( deny_reason && (mask&deny_mask(perm)) ) {
			deny_reason->sprintf(
				"cached result for %s; see first case for the full reason",
				PermString(perm));
		}
		else if( allow_reason && (mask&allow_mask(perm)) ) {
			allow_reason->sprintf(
				"cached result for %s; see first case for the full reason",
				PermString(perm));
		}
	}
	else {
		mask = 0;

			// if the deny bit is already set, skip further DENY analysis
		perm_mask_t const deny_resolved = deny_mask(perm);
			// if the allow or deny bit is already set,
			// skip further ALLOW analysis
		perm_mask_t const allow_resolved = allow_mask(perm)|deny_mask(perm);

			// check for matching subnets in ip/mask style
		char ipstr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN] = { 0, };
   		addr.to_ip_string(ipstr, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN);

		peer_description = addr.to_ip_string();

		if ( !(mask&deny_resolved) && lookup_user_ip_deny(perm,who,ipstr)) {
			mask |= deny_mask(perm);
			if( deny_reason ) {
				deny_reason->sprintf(
					"%s authorization policy denies IP address %s",
					PermString(perm), addr.to_ip_string().Value() );
			}
		}

		if ( !(mask&allow_resolved) && lookup_user_ip_allow(perm,who,ipstr)) {
			mask |= allow_mask(perm);
			if( allow_reason ) {
				allow_reason->sprintf(
					"%s authorization policy allows IP address %s",
					PermString(perm), addr.to_ip_string().Value() );
			}
		}


		std::vector<MyString> hostnames;
		// now scan through hostname strings
		if( !(mask&allow_resolved) || !(mask&deny_resolved) ) {
			hostnames = get_hostname_with_alias(addr);
		}

		for (unsigned int i = 0; i < hostnames.size(); ++i) {
			thehost = hostnames[i].Value();
			peer_description.append_to_list(thehost);

			if ( !(mask&deny_resolved) && lookup_user_host_deny(perm,who,thehost) ) {
				mask |= deny_mask(perm);
				if( deny_reason ) {
					deny_reason->sprintf(
						"%s authorization policy denies hostname %s",
						PermString(perm), thehost );
				}
			}

			if ( !(mask&allow_resolved) && lookup_user_host_allow(perm,who,thehost) ) {
				mask |= allow_mask(perm);
				if( allow_reason ) {
					allow_reason->sprintf(
						"%s authorization policy allows hostname %s",
						PermString(perm), thehost );
				}
			}
		}
			// if we found something via our hostname or subnet mactching, we now have 
			// a mask, and we should add it into our table so we need not
			// do a gethostbyaddr() next time.  if we still do not have a mask
			// (perhaps because this host doesn't appear in any list), create one
			// and then add to the table.
			// But first, check our parent permission levels in the
			// authorization heirarchy.
			// DAEMON and ADMINISTRATOR imply WRITE.
			// WRITE, NEGOTIATOR, and CONFIG_PERM imply READ.
		bool determined_by_parent = false;
		if ( mask == 0 ) {
			if ( PermTypeArray[perm]->behavior == USERVERIFY_ONLY_DENIES ) {
				dprintf(D_SECURITY,"IPVERIFY: %s at %s not matched to deny list, so allowing.\n",who, addr.to_sinful().Value());
				if( allow_reason ) {
					allow_reason->sprintf(
						"%s authorization policy does not deny, so allowing",
						PermString(perm));
				}

				mask |= allow_mask(perm);
			} else {
				DCpermissionHierarchy hierarchy( perm );
				DCpermission const *parent_perms =
					hierarchy.getPermsIAmDirectlyImpliedBy();
				bool parent_allowed = false;
				for( ; *parent_perms != LAST_PERM; parent_perms++ ) {
					if( Verify( *parent_perms, addr, user, allow_reason, NULL ) == USER_AUTH_SUCCESS ) {
						determined_by_parent = true;
						parent_allowed = true;
						dprintf(D_SECURITY,"IPVERIFY: allowing %s at %s for %s because %s is allowed\n",who, addr.to_sinful().Value(),PermString(perm),PermString(*parent_perms));
						if( allow_reason ) {
							MyString tmp = *allow_reason;
							allow_reason->sprintf(
								"%s is implied by %s; %s",
								PermString(perm),
								PermString(*parent_perms),
								tmp.Value());
						}
						break;
					}
				}
				if( parent_allowed ) {
					mask |= allow_mask(perm);
				}
				else {
					mask |= deny_mask(perm);

					if( !determined_by_parent && deny_reason ) {
							// We don't just allow anyone, and this request
							// did not match any of the entries we do allow.
							// In case the reason we didn't match is
							// because of a typo or a DNS problem, record
							// all the hostnames we searched for.
						deny_reason->sprintf(
							"%s authorization policy contains no matching "
							"ALLOW entry for this request"
							"; identifiers used for this host: %s, hostname size = %lu, "
							"original ip address = %s",
							PermString(perm),
							peer_description.Value(),
							(unsigned long)hostnames.size(),
							ipstr);
					}
				}
			}
		}

		if( !determined_by_parent && (mask&allow_mask(perm)) ) {
			// In case we are allowing because of not matching a DENY
			// entry that the user expected us to match (e.g. because
			// of typo or DNS problem), record all the hostnames we
			// searched for.
			if( allow_reason && !peer_description.IsEmpty() ) {
				allow_reason->sprintf_cat(
					"; identifiers used for this remote host: %s",
					peer_description.Value());
			}
		}

			// finally, add the mask we computed into the table with this IP addr
			add_hash_entry(sin6_addr, who, mask);			
	}  // end of if find_match is FALSE

		// decode the mask and return True or False to the user.
	if ( mask & deny_mask(perm) ) {
		return USER_AUTH_FAILURE;
	}

	if ( mask & allow_mask(perm) ) {
		return USER_AUTH_SUCCESS;
	}

	return USER_AUTH_FAILURE;
}