/*
* System call to cleanup state after a signal
* has been taken. Reset signal mask and
* stack state from context left by rt_sendsig (above).
* Return to previous pc and psl as specified by
* context left by sendsig. Check carefully to
* make sure that the user has not modified the
* psl to gain improper privileges or to cause
* a machine fault.
*/
int
linux_rt_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_rt_sigreturn_args *args)
{
struct l_ucontext uc;
struct l_sigcontext *context;
sigset_t bmask;
l_stack_t *lss;
stack_t ss;
struct trapframe *regs;
int eflags;
ksiginfo_t ksi;
regs = td->td_frame;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (ldebug(rt_sigreturn))
printf(ARGS(rt_sigreturn, "%p"), (void *)args->ucp);
#endif
/*
* The trampoline code hands us the ucontext.
* It is unsafe to keep track of it ourselves, in the event that a
* program jumps out of a signal handler.
*/
if (copyin(args->ucp, &uc, sizeof(uc)) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
context = &uc.uc_mcontext;
/*
* Check for security violations.
*/
#define EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
eflags = context->sc_eflags;
if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags))
return(EINVAL);
/*
* Don't allow users to load a valid privileged %cs. Let the
* hardware check for invalid selectors, excess privilege in
* other selectors, invalid %eip's and invalid %esp's.
*/
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
if (!CS_SECURE(context->sc_cs)) {
ksiginfo_init_trap(&ksi);
ksi.ksi_signo = SIGBUS;
ksi.ksi_code = BUS_OBJERR;
ksi.ksi_trapno = T_PROTFLT;
ksi.ksi_addr = (void *)regs->tf_rip;
trapsignal(td, &ksi);
return(EINVAL);
}
linux_to_bsd_sigset(&uc.uc_sigmask, &bmask);
kern_sigprocmask(td, SIG_SETMASK, &bmask, NULL, 0);
/*
* Restore signal context
*/
regs->tf_gs = context->sc_gs;
regs->tf_fs = context->sc_fs;
regs->tf_es = context->sc_es;
regs->tf_ds = context->sc_ds;
regs->tf_rdi = context->sc_edi;
regs->tf_rsi = context->sc_esi;
regs->tf_rbp = context->sc_ebp;
regs->tf_rbx = context->sc_ebx;
regs->tf_rdx = context->sc_edx;
regs->tf_rcx = context->sc_ecx;
regs->tf_rax = context->sc_eax;
regs->tf_rip = context->sc_eip;
regs->tf_cs = context->sc_cs;
regs->tf_rflags = eflags;
regs->tf_rsp = context->sc_esp_at_signal;
regs->tf_ss = context->sc_ss;
set_pcb_flags(td->td_pcb, PCB_FULL_IRET);
/*
* call sigaltstack & ignore results..
*/
lss = &uc.uc_stack;
ss.ss_sp = PTRIN(lss->ss_sp);
ss.ss_size = lss->ss_size;
ss.ss_flags = linux_to_bsd_sigaltstack(lss->ss_flags);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (ldebug(rt_sigreturn))
printf(LMSG("rt_sigret flags: 0x%x, sp: %p, ss: 0x%lx, mask: 0x%x"),
ss.ss_flags, ss.ss_sp, ss.ss_size, context->sc_mask);
#endif
(void)kern_sigaltstack(td, &ss, NULL);
return (EJUSTRETURN);
}
/*
* System call to cleanup state after a signal
* has been taken. Reset signal mask and
* stack state from context left by rt_sendsig (above).
* Return to previous pc and psl as specified by
* context left by sendsig. Check carefully to
* make sure that the user has not modified the
* psl to gain improper privileges or to cause
* a machine fault.
*/
int
linux_rt_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_rt_sigreturn_args *args)
{
struct l_ucontext uc;
struct l_sigcontext *context;
sigset_t bmask;
l_stack_t *lss;
stack_t ss;
struct trapframe *regs;
int eflags;
ksiginfo_t ksi;
regs = td->td_frame;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (ldebug(rt_sigreturn))
printf(ARGS(rt_sigreturn, "%p"), (void *)args->ucp);
#endif
/*
* The trampoline code hands us the ucontext.
* It is unsafe to keep track of it ourselves, in the event that a
* program jumps out of a signal handler.
*/
if (copyin(args->ucp, &uc, sizeof(uc)) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
context = &uc.uc_mcontext;
/*
* Check for security violations.
*/
#define EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
eflags = context->sc_eflags;
/*
* XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF. The
* cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults. Debuggers should
* sometimes set it there too. tf_eflags is kept in the signal
* context during signal handling and there is no other place
* to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be corrupted by the
* signal handler without us knowing. Corruption of the PSL_RF
* bit at worst causes one more or one less debugger trap, so
* allowing it is fairly harmless.
*/
if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF))
return(EINVAL);
/*
* Don't allow users to load a valid privileged %cs. Let the
* hardware check for invalid selectors, excess privilege in
* other selectors, invalid %eip's and invalid %esp's.
*/
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
if (!CS_SECURE(context->sc_cs)) {
ksiginfo_init_trap(&ksi);
ksi.ksi_signo = SIGBUS;
ksi.ksi_code = BUS_OBJERR;
ksi.ksi_trapno = T_PROTFLT;
ksi.ksi_addr = (void *)regs->tf_eip;
trapsignal(td, &ksi);
return(EINVAL);
}
linux_to_bsd_sigset(&uc.uc_sigmask, &bmask);
kern_sigprocmask(td, SIG_SETMASK, &bmask, NULL, 0);
/*
* Restore signal context
*/
/* %gs was restored by the trampoline. */
regs->tf_fs = context->sc_fs;
regs->tf_es = context->sc_es;
regs->tf_ds = context->sc_ds;
regs->tf_edi = context->sc_edi;
regs->tf_esi = context->sc_esi;
regs->tf_ebp = context->sc_ebp;
regs->tf_ebx = context->sc_ebx;
regs->tf_edx = context->sc_edx;
regs->tf_ecx = context->sc_ecx;
regs->tf_eax = context->sc_eax;
regs->tf_eip = context->sc_eip;
regs->tf_cs = context->sc_cs;
regs->tf_eflags = eflags;
regs->tf_esp = context->sc_esp_at_signal;
regs->tf_ss = context->sc_ss;
/*
* call sigaltstack & ignore results..
*/
lss = &uc.uc_stack;
ss.ss_sp = lss->ss_sp;
ss.ss_size = lss->ss_size;
ss.ss_flags = linux_to_bsd_sigaltstack(lss->ss_flags);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (ldebug(rt_sigreturn))
printf(LMSG("rt_sigret flags: 0x%x, sp: %p, ss: 0x%x, mask: 0x%x"),
ss.ss_flags, ss.ss_sp, ss.ss_size, context->sc_mask);
#endif
(void)kern_sigaltstack(td, &ss, NULL);
return (EJUSTRETURN);
}
/*
* System call to cleanup state after a signal
* has been taken. Reset signal mask and
* stack state from context left by sendsig (above).
* Return to previous pc and psl as specified by
* context left by sendsig. Check carefully to
* make sure that the user has not modified the
* psl to gain improper privileges or to cause
* a machine fault.
*/
int
linux_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_sigreturn_args *args)
{
struct l_sigframe frame;
struct trapframe *regs;
sigset_t bmask;
l_sigset_t lmask;
int eflags, i;
ksiginfo_t ksi;
regs = td->td_frame;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (ldebug(sigreturn))
printf(ARGS(sigreturn, "%p"), (void *)args->sfp);
#endif
/*
* The trampoline code hands us the sigframe.
* It is unsafe to keep track of it ourselves, in the event that a
* program jumps out of a signal handler.
*/
if (copyin(args->sfp, &frame, sizeof(frame)) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
/*
* Check for security violations.
*/
#define EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
eflags = frame.sf_sc.sc_eflags;
if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags, regs->tf_rflags))
return(EINVAL);
/*
* Don't allow users to load a valid privileged %cs. Let the
* hardware check for invalid selectors, excess privilege in
* other selectors, invalid %eip's and invalid %esp's.
*/
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
if (!CS_SECURE(frame.sf_sc.sc_cs)) {
ksiginfo_init_trap(&ksi);
ksi.ksi_signo = SIGBUS;
ksi.ksi_code = BUS_OBJERR;
ksi.ksi_trapno = T_PROTFLT;
ksi.ksi_addr = (void *)regs->tf_rip;
trapsignal(td, &ksi);
return(EINVAL);
}
lmask.__bits[0] = frame.sf_sc.sc_mask;
for (i = 0; i < (LINUX_NSIG_WORDS-1); i++)
lmask.__bits[i+1] = frame.sf_extramask[i];
linux_to_bsd_sigset(&lmask, &bmask);
kern_sigprocmask(td, SIG_SETMASK, &bmask, NULL, 0);
/*
* Restore signal context.
*/
regs->tf_rdi = frame.sf_sc.sc_edi;
regs->tf_rsi = frame.sf_sc.sc_esi;
regs->tf_rbp = frame.sf_sc.sc_ebp;
regs->tf_rbx = frame.sf_sc.sc_ebx;
regs->tf_rdx = frame.sf_sc.sc_edx;
regs->tf_rcx = frame.sf_sc.sc_ecx;
regs->tf_rax = frame.sf_sc.sc_eax;
regs->tf_rip = frame.sf_sc.sc_eip;
regs->tf_cs = frame.sf_sc.sc_cs;
regs->tf_ds = frame.sf_sc.sc_ds;
regs->tf_es = frame.sf_sc.sc_es;
regs->tf_fs = frame.sf_sc.sc_fs;
regs->tf_gs = frame.sf_sc.sc_gs;
regs->tf_rflags = eflags;
regs->tf_rsp = frame.sf_sc.sc_esp_at_signal;
regs->tf_ss = frame.sf_sc.sc_ss;
set_pcb_flags(td->td_pcb, PCB_FULL_IRET);
return (EJUSTRETURN);
}
/*
* System call to cleanup state after a signal
* has been taken. Reset signal mask and
* stack state from context left by sendsig (above).
* Return to previous pc and psl as specified by
* context left by sendsig. Check carefully to
* make sure that the user has not modified the
* psl to gain improper privileges or to cause
* a machine fault.
*/
int
linux_sigreturn(struct thread *td, struct linux_sigreturn_args *args)
{
struct l_sigframe frame;
struct trapframe *regs;
l_sigset_t lmask;
sigset_t bmask;
int eflags, i;
ksiginfo_t ksi;
regs = td->td_frame;
#ifdef DEBUG
if (ldebug(sigreturn))
printf(ARGS(sigreturn, "%p"), (void *)args->sfp);
#endif
/*
* The trampoline code hands us the sigframe.
* It is unsafe to keep track of it ourselves, in the event that a
* program jumps out of a signal handler.
*/
if (copyin(args->sfp, &frame, sizeof(frame)) != 0)
return (EFAULT);
/*
* Check for security violations.
*/
#define EFLAGS_SECURE(ef, oef) ((((ef) ^ (oef)) & ~PSL_USERCHANGE) == 0)
eflags = frame.sf_sc.sc_eflags;
/*
* XXX do allow users to change the privileged flag PSL_RF. The
* cpu sets PSL_RF in tf_eflags for faults. Debuggers should
* sometimes set it there too. tf_eflags is kept in the signal
* context during signal handling and there is no other place
* to remember it, so the PSL_RF bit may be corrupted by the
* signal handler without us knowing. Corruption of the PSL_RF
* bit at worst causes one more or one less debugger trap, so
* allowing it is fairly harmless.
*/
if (!EFLAGS_SECURE(eflags & ~PSL_RF, regs->tf_eflags & ~PSL_RF))
return(EINVAL);
/*
* Don't allow users to load a valid privileged %cs. Let the
* hardware check for invalid selectors, excess privilege in
* other selectors, invalid %eip's and invalid %esp's.
*/
#define CS_SECURE(cs) (ISPL(cs) == SEL_UPL)
if (!CS_SECURE(frame.sf_sc.sc_cs)) {
ksiginfo_init_trap(&ksi);
ksi.ksi_signo = SIGBUS;
ksi.ksi_code = BUS_OBJERR;
ksi.ksi_trapno = T_PROTFLT;
ksi.ksi_addr = (void *)regs->tf_eip;
trapsignal(td, &ksi);
return(EINVAL);
}
lmask.__bits[0] = frame.sf_sc.sc_mask;
for (i = 0; i < (LINUX_NSIG_WORDS-1); i++)
lmask.__bits[i+1] = frame.sf_extramask[i];
linux_to_bsd_sigset(&lmask, &bmask);
kern_sigprocmask(td, SIG_SETMASK, &bmask, NULL, 0);
/*
* Restore signal context.
*/
/* %gs was restored by the trampoline. */
regs->tf_fs = frame.sf_sc.sc_fs;
regs->tf_es = frame.sf_sc.sc_es;
regs->tf_ds = frame.sf_sc.sc_ds;
regs->tf_edi = frame.sf_sc.sc_edi;
regs->tf_esi = frame.sf_sc.sc_esi;
regs->tf_ebp = frame.sf_sc.sc_ebp;
regs->tf_ebx = frame.sf_sc.sc_ebx;
regs->tf_edx = frame.sf_sc.sc_edx;
regs->tf_ecx = frame.sf_sc.sc_ecx;
regs->tf_eax = frame.sf_sc.sc_eax;
regs->tf_eip = frame.sf_sc.sc_eip;
regs->tf_cs = frame.sf_sc.sc_cs;
regs->tf_eflags = eflags;
regs->tf_esp = frame.sf_sc.sc_esp_at_signal;
regs->tf_ss = frame.sf_sc.sc_ss;
return (EJUSTRETURN);
}
