/* No padding or other stuff needed. We can call PKCS11 from here */ static int pkcs11_ecdsa_sign(const unsigned char *msg, unsigned int msg_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, PKCS11_KEY *key) { int rv; PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key); PKCS11_CTX *ctx = KEY2CTX(key); PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key); PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot); CK_MECHANISM mechanism; CK_ULONG ck_sigsize; ck_sigsize = *siglen; memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism)); mechanism.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock); rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_SignInit(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object)); if (!rv) rv = pkcs11_authenticate(key); if (!rv) rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_Sign(spriv->session, (CK_BYTE *)msg, msg_len, sigret, &ck_sigsize)); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock); if (rv) { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_SIGN, pkcs11_map_err(rv)); return -1; } *siglen = ck_sigsize; return ck_sigsize; }
/* RSA private key decryption */ int pkcs11_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, PKCS11_KEY *key, int padding) { PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key); PKCS11_CTX *ctx = KEY2CTX(key); PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key); PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot); CK_MECHANISM mechanism; CK_ULONG size = flen; CK_RV rv; if (pkcs11_mechanism(&mechanism, padding) < 0) return -1; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock); rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DecryptInit(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object)); if (rv == CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN) rv = pkcs11_authenticate(key); if (!rv) rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_Decrypt(spriv->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, size, (CK_BYTE_PTR)to, &size)); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock); if (rv) { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_RSA_DECRYPT, pkcs11_map_err(rv)); return -1; } return size; }
/* OpenSSL assumes that the output buffer is always big enough */ int pkcs11_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, PKCS11_KEY *key, int padding) { PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key); PKCS11_CTX *ctx = KEY2CTX(key); PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key); PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot); CK_MECHANISM mechanism; CK_ULONG size; int rv; size = pkcs11_get_key_size(key); if (pkcs11_mechanism(&mechanism, padding) < 0) return -1; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock); /* Try signing first, as applications are more likely to use it */ rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_SignInit(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object)); if (rv == CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN) rv = pkcs11_authenticate(key); if (!rv) rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_Sign(spriv->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &size)); if (rv == CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED) { /* OpenSSL may use it for encryption rather than signing */ rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_EncryptInit(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object)); if (rv == CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN) rv = pkcs11_authenticate(key); if (!rv) rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_Encrypt(spriv->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &size)); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->rwlock); if (rv) { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_RSA_ENCRYPT, pkcs11_map_err(rv)); return -1; } return size; }
int PKCS11_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, PKCS11_KEY * key, int padding) { CK_RV rv; PKCS11_KEY_private *priv; PKCS11_SLOT *slot; PKCS11_CTX *ctx; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_MECHANISM mechanism; CK_ULONG size = flen; if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { printf("pkcs11 engine: only RSA_PKCS1_PADDING allowed so far\n"); return -1; } if (key == NULL) return -1; /* PKCS11 calls go here */ ctx = KEY2CTX(key); priv = PRIVKEY(key); slot = TOKEN2SLOT(priv->parent); CHECK_KEY_FORK(key); session = PRIVSLOT(slot)->session; memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism)); mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; pkcs11_w_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid); rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DecryptInit(session, &mechanism, priv->object)) || CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_Decrypt(session, (CK_BYTE *) from, (CK_ULONG)flen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)to, &size)); pkcs11_w_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid); if (rv) { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_RSA_DECRYPT, pkcs11_map_err(rv)); } return rv ? 0 : size; }
int PKCS11_ecdsa_sign(const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, PKCS11_KEY * key) { /* signature size is the issue, will assume caller has a big buffer ! */ /* No padding or other stuff needed, we can cal PKCS11 from here */ int rv; PKCS11_KEY_private *priv; PKCS11_SLOT *slot; PKCS11_CTX *ctx; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_MECHANISM mechanism; CK_ULONG ck_sigsize; ctx = KEY2CTX(key); priv = PRIVKEY(key); slot = TOKEN2SLOT(priv->parent); CHECK_KEY_FORK(key); session = PRIVSLOT(slot)->session; ck_sigsize = *siglen; memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism)); mechanism.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA; pkcs11_w_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid); rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_SignInit(session, &mechanism, priv->object)) || CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_Sign(session, (CK_BYTE *) m, m_len, sigret, &ck_sigsize)); pkcs11_w_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid); if (rv) { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_SIGN, pkcs11_map_err(rv)); return -1; } *siglen = ck_sigsize; return ck_sigsize; }
/* initial code will only support what is needed for pkcs11_ec_ckey * i.e. CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE * and CK_EC_KDF_TYPE supported by token * The secret key object is deleted * * In future CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE with CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS * could also be supported, and the secret key object could be returned. */ static int pkcs11_ecdh_derive(unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned long ecdh_mechanism, const void * ec_params, void *outnewkey, PKCS11_KEY * key) { PKCS11_SLOT *slot = KEY2SLOT(key); PKCS11_CTX *ctx = KEY2CTX(key); PKCS11_TOKEN *token = KEY2TOKEN(key); PKCS11_KEY_private *kpriv = PRIVKEY(key); PKCS11_SLOT_private *spriv = PRIVSLOT(slot); CK_MECHANISM mechanism; int rv; CK_BBOOL true = TRUE; CK_BBOOL false = FALSE; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newkey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; CK_OBJECT_CLASS newkey_class= CKO_SECRET_KEY; CK_KEY_TYPE newkey_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE * tmpnewkey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)outnewkey; CK_ATTRIBUTE newkey_template[] = { {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)}, /* session only object */ {CKA_CLASS, &newkey_class, sizeof(newkey_class)}, {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &newkey_type, sizeof(newkey_type)}, {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}, {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)} }; memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism)); mechanism.mechanism = ecdh_mechanism; mechanism.pParameter = (void*)ec_params; switch (ecdh_mechanism) { case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE: case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE: mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS); break; #if 0 /* TODO */ case CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS: mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS); break; #endif default: PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, pkcs11_map_err(PKCS11_NOT_SUPPORTED)); return -1; } rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DeriveKey(spriv->session, &mechanism, kpriv->object, newkey_template, 5, &newkey)); CRYPTOKI_checkerr(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, rv); /* Return the value of the secret key and/or the object handle of the secret key */ if (out && outlen) { /* pkcs11_ec_ckey only asks for the value */ if (pkcs11_getattr_alloc(token, newkey, CKA_VALUE, out, outlen)) { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, pkcs11_map_err(CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID)); CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DestroyObject(spriv->session, newkey)); return -1; } } if (tmpnewkey) /* For future use (not used by pkcs11_ec_ckey) */ *tmpnewkey = newkey; else /* Destroy the temporary key */ CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DestroyObject(spriv->session, newkey)); return 0; }
/* initial code will only support what is needed for pkcs11_ec_ckey * i.e. CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE * and CK_EC_KDF_TYPE supported by token * The secret key object is deleted * * In future CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE with CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS * could also be supported, and the secret key object could be returned. */ int pkcs11_ecdh_derive_internal(unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, const unsigned long ecdh_mechanism, const void * ec_params, void *outnewkey, PKCS11_KEY * key) { int rv; int ret = -1; unsigned char * buf = NULL; size_t buflen; PKCS11_KEY_private *priv; PKCS11_SLOT *slot; PKCS11_CTX *ctx; PKCS11_TOKEN *token; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_MECHANISM mechanism; CK_BBOOL true = TRUE; CK_BBOOL false = FALSE; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newkey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; CK_OBJECT_CLASS newkey_class= CKO_SECRET_KEY; CK_KEY_TYPE newkey_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE * tmpnewkey = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)outnewkey; CK_ATTRIBUTE newkey_template[] = { {CKA_TOKEN, &false, sizeof(false)}, /* session only object */ {CKA_CLASS, &newkey_class, sizeof(newkey_class)}, {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &newkey_type, sizeof(newkey_type)}, {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}, {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)} }; ctx = KEY2CTX(key); priv = PRIVKEY(key); token = KEY2TOKEN(key); slot = KEY2SLOT(key); CHECK_KEY_FORK(key); session = PRIVSLOT(slot)->session; memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism)); mechanism.mechanism = ecdh_mechanism; mechanism.pParameter = (void*)ec_params; switch (ecdh_mechanism) { case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE: case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE: mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS); break; // case CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS: // mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS); // break; default: PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, PKCS11_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto err; } CRYPTO_w_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid); rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DeriveKey(session, &mechanism, priv->object, newkey_template, 5, &newkey)); if (rv) { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, pkcs11_map_err(rv)); goto err; } /* Return the value of the secret key and/or the object handle of the secret key */ /* pkcs11_ec_ckey only asks for the value */ if (out && outlen) { /* get size of secret key value */ if (!pkcs11_getattr_var(token, newkey, CKA_VALUE, NULL, &buflen) && buflen > 0) { buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buflen); if (buf == NULL) { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, pkcs11_map_err(CKR_HOST_MEMORY)); goto err; } } else { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_EC_KEY_COMPUTE_KEY, pkcs11_map_err(CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID)); goto err; } pkcs11_getattr_var(token, newkey, CKA_VALUE, buf, &buflen); *out = buf; *outlen = buflen; buf = NULL; } /* not used by pkcs11_ec_ckey for future use */ if (tmpnewkey) { *tmpnewkey = newkey; newkey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; } ret = 1; err: if (buf) OPENSSL_free(buf); if (newkey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_DestroyObject(session, newkey)); return ret; }
int PKCS11_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, PKCS11_KEY * key, int padding) { PKCS11_KEY_private *priv; PKCS11_SLOT *slot; PKCS11_CTX *ctx; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_MECHANISM mechanism; int rv; int sigsize; CK_ULONG ck_sigsize; if (key == NULL) return -1; sigsize=PKCS11_get_key_size(key); ck_sigsize=sigsize; memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism)); switch (padding) { case RSA_NO_PADDING: mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RSA_X_509; break; case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: if ((flen + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) > sigsize) { return -1; /* the size is wrong */ } mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; break; default: printf("pkcs11 engine: only RSA_NO_PADDING or RSA_PKCS1_PADDING allowed so far\n"); return -1; } ctx = KEY2CTX(key); priv = PRIVKEY(key); slot = TOKEN2SLOT(priv->parent); CHECK_KEY_FORK(key); session = PRIVSLOT(slot)->session; pkcs11_w_lock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid); /* API is somewhat fishy here. *siglen is 0 on entry (cleared * by OpenSSL). The library assumes that the memory passed * by the caller is always big enough */ rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_SignInit(session, &mechanism, priv->object)) || CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_Sign(session, (CK_BYTE *) from, flen, to, &ck_sigsize)); pkcs11_w_unlock(PRIVSLOT(slot)->lockid); if (rv) { PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_RSA_SIGN, pkcs11_map_err(rv)); return -1; } if ((unsigned)sigsize != ck_sigsize) return -1; return sigsize; }