static CERTSignedCrl *
CreateNewCrl(PLArenaPool *arena, CERTCertDBHandle *certHandle,
CERTCertificate *cert)
{
CERTSignedCrl *signCrl = NULL;
void *dummy = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
void *mark = NULL;
/* if the CERTSignedCrl structure changes, this function will need to be
updated as well */
if (!cert || !arena) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
SECU_PrintError(progName, "invalid args for function "
"CreateNewCrl\n");
return NULL;
}
mark = PORT_ArenaMark(arena);
signCrl = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, CERTSignedCrl);
if (signCrl == NULL) {
SECU_PrintError(progName, "fail to allocate memory\n");
return NULL;
}
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &signCrl->crl.version,
SEC_CRL_VERSION_2);
/* set crl->version */
if (!dummy) {
SECU_PrintError(progName, "fail to create crl version data "
"container\n");
goto loser;
}
/* copy SECItem name from cert */
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &signCrl->crl.derName, &cert->derSubject);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
SECU_PrintError(progName, "fail to duplicate der name from "
"certificate.\n");
goto loser;
}
/* copy CERTName name structure from cert issuer */
rv = CERT_CopyName(arena, &signCrl->crl.name, &cert->subject);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
SECU_PrintError(progName, "fail to duplicate RD name from "
"certificate.\n");
goto loser;
}
rv = DER_EncodeTimeChoice(arena, &signCrl->crl.lastUpdate, PR_Now());
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
SECU_PrintError(progName, "fail to encode current time\n");
goto loser;
}
/* set fields */
signCrl->arena = arena;
signCrl->dbhandle = certHandle;
signCrl->crl.arena = arena;
return signCrl;
loser:
PORT_ArenaRelease(arena, mark);
return NULL;
}
SECStatus
ConfigSecureServerWithNamedCert(PRFileDesc *fd, const char *certName,
/*optional*/ ScopedCERTCertificate *certOut,
/*optional*/ SSLKEAType *keaOut)
{
ScopedCERTCertificate cert(PK11_FindCertFromNickname(certName, nullptr));
if (!cert) {
PrintPRError("PK11_FindCertFromNickname failed");
return SECFailure;
}
// If an intermediate certificate issued the server certificate (rather than
// directly by a trust anchor), we want to send it along in the handshake so
// we don't encounter unknown issuer errors when that's not what we're
// testing.
ScopedCERTCertificateList certList;
ScopedCERTCertificate issuerCert(
CERT_FindCertByName(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &cert->derIssuer));
// If we can't find the issuer cert, continue without it.
if (issuerCert) {
// Sadly, CERTCertificateList does not have a CERT_NewCertificateList
// utility function, so we must create it ourselves. This consists
// of creating an arena, allocating space for the CERTCertificateList,
// and then transferring ownership of the arena to that list.
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
PrintPRError("PORT_NewArena failed");
return SECFailure;
}
certList = reinterpret_cast<CERTCertificateList*>(
PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, sizeof(CERTCertificateList)));
if (!certList) {
PrintPRError("PORT_ArenaAlloc failed");
return SECFailure;
}
certList->arena = arena.forget();
// We also have to manually copy the certificates we care about to the
// list, because there aren't any utility functions for that either.
certList->certs = reinterpret_cast<SECItem*>(
PORT_ArenaAlloc(certList->arena, 2 * sizeof(SECItem)));
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(certList->arena, certList->certs, &cert->derCert)
!= SECSuccess) {
PrintPRError("SECITEM_CopyItem failed");
return SECFailure;
}
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(certList->arena, certList->certs + 1,
&issuerCert->derCert) != SECSuccess) {
PrintPRError("SECITEM_CopyItem failed");
return SECFailure;
}
certList->len = 2;
}
ScopedSECKEYPrivateKey key(PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, nullptr));
if (!key) {
PrintPRError("PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert failed");
return SECFailure;
}
SSLKEAType certKEA = NSS_FindCertKEAType(cert);
if (SSL_ConfigSecureServerWithCertChain(fd, cert, certList, key, certKEA)
!= SECSuccess) {
PrintPRError("SSL_ConfigSecureServer failed");
return SECFailure;
}
if (certOut) {
*certOut = cert.forget();
}
if (keaOut) {
*keaOut = certKEA;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* MUST BE THREAD-SAFE */
PK11SymKey *calc_dh_shared(const chunk_t g, /* converted to SECItem */
/*const*/ SECKEYPrivateKey *privk, /* NSS doesn't do const */
const struct oakley_group_desc *group,
const SECKEYPublicKey *local_pubk, const char **story)
{
SECStatus status;
DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
DBG_log("Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS:"));
PRArenaPool *arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
passert(arena != NULL);
SECKEYPublicKey *remote_pubk = (SECKEYPublicKey *)
PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPublicKey));
remote_pubk->arena = arena;
remote_pubk->keyType = dhKey;
remote_pubk->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
remote_pubk->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
SECItem nss_g = {
.data = g.ptr,
.len = (unsigned int)g.len,
.type = siBuffer
};
status = SECITEM_CopyItem(remote_pubk->arena, &remote_pubk->u.dh.prime,
&local_pubk->u.dh.prime);
passert(status == SECSuccess);
status = SECITEM_CopyItem(remote_pubk->arena, &remote_pubk->u.dh.base,
&local_pubk->u.dh.base);
passert(status == SECSuccess);
status = SECITEM_CopyItem(remote_pubk->arena,
&remote_pubk->u.dh.publicValue, &nss_g);
passert(status == SECSuccess);
PK11SymKey *dhshared = PK11_PubDerive(privk, remote_pubk, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL,
CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE,
CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE,
CKA_DERIVE, group->bytes,
lsw_return_nss_password_file_info());
if (dhshared != NULL) {
unsigned int shortfall = group->bytes - PK11_GetKeyLength(dhshared);
if (shortfall > 0) {
/*
* We've got to pad the result with [shortfall] 0x00 bytes.
* The chance of shortfall being n should be 1 in 256^n.
* So really zauto ought to be big enough for the zeros.
* If it isn't, we allocate space on the heap
* (this will likely never be executed).
*/
DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
DBG_log("restoring %u DHshared leading zeros", shortfall));
unsigned char zauto[10];
unsigned char *z =
shortfall <= sizeof(zauto) ?
zauto : alloc_bytes(shortfall, "DH shortfall");
memset(z, 0x00, shortfall);
CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA string_params = {
.pData = z,
.ulLen = shortfall
};
SECItem params = {
.data = (unsigned char *)&string_params,
.len = sizeof(string_params)
};
PK11SymKey *newdhshared =
PK11_Derive(dhshared,
CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE,
¶ms,
CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE,
CKA_DERIVE, 0);
passert(newdhshared != NULL);
if (z != zauto)
pfree(z);
free_any_symkey("dhshared", &dhshared);
dhshared = newdhshared;
}
}
*story = enum_name(&oakley_group_names, group->group);
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(remote_pubk);
return dhshared;
}
SECStatus
SEC_StringToOID(PLArenaPool *pool, SECItem *to, const char *from, PRUint32 len)
{
PRUint32 result_len = 0;
PRUint32 decimal_numbers = 0;
PRUint32 result_bytes = 0;
SECStatus rv;
PRUint8 result[1024];
static const PRUint32 max_decimal = (0xffffffff / 10);
static const char OIDstring[] = {"OID."};
if (!from || !to) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!len) {
len = PL_strlen(from);
}
if (len >= 4 && !PL_strncasecmp(from, OIDstring, 4)) {
from += 4; /* skip leading "OID." if present */
len -= 4;
}
if (!len) {
bad_data:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
return SECFailure;
}
do {
PRUint32 decimal = 0;
while (len > 0 && isdigit(*from)) {
PRUint32 addend = (*from++ - '0');
--len;
if (decimal > max_decimal) /* overflow */
goto bad_data;
decimal = (decimal * 10) + addend;
if (decimal < addend) /* overflow */
goto bad_data;
}
if (len != 0 && *from != '.') {
goto bad_data;
}
if (decimal_numbers == 0) {
if (decimal > 2)
goto bad_data;
result[0] = decimal * 40;
result_bytes = 1;
} else if (decimal_numbers == 1) {
if (decimal > 40)
goto bad_data;
result[0] += decimal;
} else {
/* encode the decimal number, */
PRUint8 * rp;
PRUint32 num_bytes = 0;
PRUint32 tmp = decimal;
while (tmp) {
num_bytes++;
tmp >>= 7;
}
if (!num_bytes )
++num_bytes; /* use one byte for a zero value */
if (num_bytes + result_bytes > sizeof result)
goto bad_data;
tmp = num_bytes;
rp = result + result_bytes - 1;
rp[tmp] = (PRUint8)(decimal & 0x7f);
decimal >>= 7;
while (--tmp > 0) {
rp[tmp] = (PRUint8)(decimal | 0x80);
decimal >>= 7;
}
result_bytes += num_bytes;
}
++decimal_numbers;
if (len > 0) { /* skip trailing '.' */
++from;
--len;
}
} while (len > 0);
/* now result contains result_bytes of data */
if (to->data && to->len >= result_bytes) {
PORT_Memcpy(to->data, result, to->len = result_bytes);
rv = SECSuccess;
} else {
SECItem result_item = {siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
result_item.data = result;
result_item.len = result_bytes;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(pool, to, &result_item);
}
return rv;
}
nsresult
CryptoKey::PublicKeyToSpki(SECKEYPublicKey* aPubKey,
CryptoBuffer& aRetVal,
const nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock& /*proofOfLock*/)
{
UniqueCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki;
// NSS doesn't support exporting DH public keys.
if (aPubKey->keyType == dhKey) {
// Mimic the behavior of SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo() and create
// a new arena for the SPKI object.
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
spki.reset(PORT_ArenaZNew(arena.get(), CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo));
if (!spki) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Assign |arena| to |spki| and null the variable afterwards so that the
// arena created above that holds the SPKI object is free'd when |spki|
// goes out of scope, not when |arena| does.
spki->arena = arena.release();
nsresult rv = PublicDhKeyToSpki(aPubKey, spki.get());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
} else {
spki.reset(SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(aPubKey));
if (!spki) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
}
// Per WebCrypto spec we must export ECDH SPKIs with the algorithm OID
// id-ecDH (1.3.132.112) and DH SPKIs with OID dhKeyAgreement
// (1.2.840.113549.1.3.1). NSS doesn't know about these OIDs and there is
// no way to specify the algorithm to use when exporting a public key.
if (aPubKey->keyType == ecKey || aPubKey->keyType == dhKey) {
const SECItem* oidData = nullptr;
if (aPubKey->keyType == ecKey) {
oidData = &SEC_OID_DATA_EC_DH;
} else if (aPubKey->keyType == dhKey) {
oidData = &SEC_OID_DATA_DH_KEY_AGREEMENT;
} else {
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
}
SECStatus rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(spki->arena, &spki->algorithm.algorithm,
oidData);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
}
const SEC_ASN1Template* tpl = SEC_ASN1_GET(CERT_SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate);
UniqueSECItem spkiItem(SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(nullptr, nullptr, spki.get(), tpl));
if (!aRetVal.Assign(spkiItem.get())) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
CERTCertificateList *
CERT_CertChainFromCert(CERTCertificate *cert, SECCertUsage usage,
PRBool includeRoot)
{
CERTCertificateList *chain = NULL;
NSSCertificate **stanChain;
NSSCertificate *stanCert;
PLArenaPool *arena;
NSSUsage nssUsage;
int i, len;
NSSTrustDomain *td = STAN_GetDefaultTrustDomain();
NSSCryptoContext *cc = STAN_GetDefaultCryptoContext();
stanCert = STAN_GetNSSCertificate(cert);
if (!stanCert) {
/* error code is set */
return NULL;
}
nssUsage.anyUsage = PR_FALSE;
nssUsage.nss3usage = usage;
nssUsage.nss3lookingForCA = PR_FALSE;
stanChain = NSSCertificate_BuildChain(stanCert, NULL, &nssUsage, NULL, NULL,
CERT_MAX_CERT_CHAIN, NULL, NULL, td, cc);
if (!stanChain) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
return NULL;
}
len = 0;
stanCert = stanChain[0];
while (stanCert) {
stanCert = stanChain[++len];
}
arena = PORT_NewArena(4096);
if (arena == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
chain = (CERTCertificateList *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,
sizeof(CERTCertificateList));
if (!chain)
goto loser;
chain->certs = (SECItem *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, len * sizeof(SECItem));
if (!chain->certs)
goto loser;
i = 0;
stanCert = stanChain[i];
while (stanCert) {
SECItem derCert;
CERTCertificate *cCert = STAN_GetCERTCertificate(stanCert);
if (!cCert) {
goto loser;
}
derCert.len = (unsigned int)stanCert->encoding.size;
derCert.data = (unsigned char *)stanCert->encoding.data;
derCert.type = siBuffer;
SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &chain->certs[i], &derCert);
stanCert = stanChain[++i];
if (!stanCert && !cCert->isRoot) {
/* reached the end of the chain, but the final cert is
* not a root. Don't discard it.
*/
includeRoot = PR_TRUE;
}
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cCert);
}
if (!includeRoot && len > 1) {
chain->len = len - 1;
} else {
chain->len = len;
}
chain->arena = arena;
nss_ZFreeIf(stanChain);
return chain;
loser:
i = 0;
stanCert = stanChain[i];
while (stanCert) {
CERTCertificate *cCert = STAN_GetCERTCertificate(stanCert);
if (cCert) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cCert);
}
stanCert = stanChain[++i];
}
nss_ZFreeIf(stanChain);
if (arena) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
}
return NULL;
}
SECStatus
crmf_copy_encryptedvalue(PRArenaPool *poolp,
CRMFEncryptedValue *srcValue,
CRMFEncryptedValue *destValue)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (srcValue->intendedAlg != NULL) {
rv = crmf_copy_encryptedvalue_secalg(poolp,
srcValue->intendedAlg,
&destValue->intendedAlg);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
if (srcValue->symmAlg != NULL) {
rv = crmf_copy_encryptedvalue_secalg(poolp,
srcValue->symmAlg,
&destValue->symmAlg);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
if (srcValue->encSymmKey.data != NULL) {
rv = crmf_make_bitstring_copy(poolp,
&destValue->encSymmKey,
&srcValue->encSymmKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
if (srcValue->keyAlg != NULL) {
rv = crmf_copy_encryptedvalue_secalg(poolp,
srcValue->keyAlg,
&destValue->keyAlg);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
if (srcValue->valueHint.data != NULL) {
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp,
&destValue->valueHint,
&srcValue->valueHint);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
if (srcValue->encValue.data != NULL) {
rv = crmf_make_bitstring_copy(poolp,
&destValue->encValue,
&srcValue->encValue);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
return SECSuccess;
loser:
if (poolp == NULL && destValue != NULL) {
crmf_destroy_encrypted_value(destValue, PR_FALSE);
}
return SECFailure;
}
/*
* SecCmsSignerInfoSign - sign something
*
*/
OSStatus
SecCmsSignerInfoSign(SecCmsSignerInfoRef signerinfo, CSSM_DATA_PTR digest, CSSM_DATA_PTR contentType)
{
SecCertificateRef cert;
SecPrivateKeyRef privkey = NULL;
SECOidTag digestalgtag;
SECOidTag pubkAlgTag;
CSSM_DATA signature = { 0 };
OSStatus rv;
PLArenaPool *poolp, *tmppoolp = NULL;
const SECAlgorithmID *algID;
SECAlgorithmID freeAlgID;
//CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki;
PORT_Assert (digest != NULL);
poolp = signerinfo->cmsg->poolp;
switch (signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType) {
case SecCmsSignerIDIssuerSN:
privkey = signerinfo->signingKey;
signerinfo->signingKey = NULL;
cert = signerinfo->cert;
if (SecCertificateGetAlgorithmID(cert,&algID)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
goto loser;
}
break;
case SecCmsSignerIDSubjectKeyID:
privkey = signerinfo->signingKey;
signerinfo->signingKey = NULL;
#if 0
spki = SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(signerinfo->pubKey);
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(signerinfo->pubKey);
signerinfo->pubKey = NULL;
SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(NULL, &freeAlgID, &spki->algorithm);
SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spki);
algID = &freeAlgID;
#else
#if (TARGET_OS_MAC && !(TARGET_OS_EMBEDDED || TARGET_OS_IPHONE || TARGET_IPHONE_SIMULATOR))
if (SecKeyGetAlgorithmID(signerinfo->pubKey,&algID)) {
#else
/* TBD: Unify this code. Currently, iOS has an incompatible
* SecKeyGetAlgorithmID implementation. */
if (true) {
#endif
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
goto loser;
}
CFRelease(signerinfo->pubKey);
signerinfo->pubKey = NULL;
#endif
break;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto loser;
}
digestalgtag = SecCmsSignerInfoGetDigestAlgTag(signerinfo);
/*
* XXX I think there should be a cert-level interface for this,
* so that I do not have to know about subjectPublicKeyInfo...
*/
pubkAlgTag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algID);
if (signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType == SecCmsSignerIDSubjectKeyID) {
SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(&freeAlgID, PR_FALSE);
}
#if 0
// @@@ Not yet
/* Fortezza MISSI have weird signature formats.
* Map them to standard DSA formats
*/
pubkAlgTag = PK11_FortezzaMapSig(pubkAlgTag);
#endif
if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) {
CSSM_DATA encoded_attrs;
/* find and fill in the message digest attribute. */
rv = SecCmsAttributeArraySetAttr(poolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr),
SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST, digest, PR_FALSE);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (contentType != NULL) {
/* if the caller wants us to, find and fill in the content type attribute. */
rv = SecCmsAttributeArraySetAttr(poolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr),
SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE, contentType, PR_FALSE);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
}
if ((tmppoolp = PORT_NewArena (1024)) == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
goto loser;
}
/*
* Before encoding, reorder the attributes so that when they
* are encoded, they will be conforming DER, which is required
* to have a specific order and that is what must be used for
* the hash/signature. We do this here, rather than building
* it into EncodeAttributes, because we do not want to do
* such reordering on incoming messages (which also uses
* EncodeAttributes) or our old signatures (and other "broken"
* implementations) will not verify. So, we want to guarantee
* that we send out good DER encodings of attributes, but not
* to expect to receive them.
*/
if (SecCmsAttributeArrayReorder(signerinfo->authAttr) != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
encoded_attrs.Data = NULL;
encoded_attrs.Length = 0;
if (SecCmsAttributeArrayEncode(tmppoolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr),
&encoded_attrs) == NULL)
goto loser;
rv = SEC_SignData(&signature, encoded_attrs.Data, (int)encoded_attrs.Length,
privkey, digestalgtag, pubkAlgTag);
PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); /* awkward memory management :-( */
tmppoolp = 0;
} else {
rv = SGN_Digest(privkey, digestalgtag, pubkAlgTag, &signature, digest);
}
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey);
privkey = NULL;
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(signerinfo->encDigest), &signature)
!= SECSuccess)
goto loser;
SECITEM_FreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE);
if(pubkAlgTag == SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) {
/*
* RFC 3278 section section 2.1.1 states that the signatureAlgorithm
* field contains the full ecdsa-with-SHA1 OID, not plain old ecPublicKey
* as would appear in other forms of signed datas. However Microsoft doesn't
* do this, it puts ecPublicKey there, and if we put ecdsa-with-SHA1 there,
* MS can't verify - presumably because it takes the digest of the digest
* before feeding it to ECDSA.
* We handle this with a preference; default if it's not there is
* "Microsoft compatibility mode".
*/
if(!SecCmsMsEcdsaCompatMode()) {
pubkAlgTag = SEC_OID_ECDSA_WithSHA1;
}
/* else violating the spec for compatibility */
}
if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(signerinfo->digestEncAlg), pubkAlgTag,
NULL) != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
return SECSuccess;
loser:
if (signature.Length != 0)
SECITEM_FreeItem (&signature, PR_FALSE);
if (privkey)
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey);
if (tmppoolp)
PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE);
return SECFailure;
}
OSStatus
SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate(SecCmsSignerInfoRef signerinfo, SecKeychainRef keychainOrArray,
CFTypeRef policies, SecTrustRef *trustRef)
{
SecCertificateRef cert;
CFAbsoluteTime stime;
OSStatus rv;
CSSM_DATA_PTR *otherCerts;
if ((cert = SecCmsSignerInfoGetSigningCertificate(signerinfo, keychainOrArray)) == NULL) {
dprintf("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate: no signing cert\n");
signerinfo->verificationStatus = SecCmsVSSigningCertNotFound;
return SECFailure;
}
/*
* Get and convert the signing time; if available, it will be used
* both on the cert verification and for importing the sender
* email profile.
*/
CFTypeRef timeStampPolicies=SecPolicyCreateAppleTimeStampingAndRevocationPolicies(policies);
if (SecCmsSignerInfoGetTimestampTimeWithPolicy(signerinfo, timeStampPolicies, &stime) != SECSuccess)
if (SecCmsSignerInfoGetSigningTime(signerinfo, &stime) != SECSuccess)
stime = CFAbsoluteTimeGetCurrent();
CFReleaseSafe(timeStampPolicies);
rv = SecCmsSignedDataRawCerts(signerinfo->sigd, &otherCerts);
if(rv) {
return rv;
}
rv = CERT_VerifyCert(keychainOrArray, cert, otherCerts, policies, stime, trustRef);
dprintfRC("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate after vfy: certp %p cert.rc %d\n",
cert, (int)CFGetRetainCount(cert));
if (rv || !trustRef)
{
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT)
{
/* Signature or digest level verificationStatus errors should supercede certificate level errors, so only change the verificationStatus if the status was GoodSignature. */
if (signerinfo->verificationStatus == SecCmsVSGoodSignature)
signerinfo->verificationStatus = SecCmsVSSigningCertNotTrusted;
}
}
/* FIXME isn't this leaking the cert? */
dprintf("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate: CertVerify rtn %d\n", (int)rv);
return rv;
}
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *
nsslowkey_ConvertToPublicKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privk)
{
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubk;
PLArenaPool *arena;
arena = PORT_NewArena (DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (arena == NULL) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return NULL;
}
switch(privk->keyType) {
case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
case NSSLOWKEYNullKey:
pubk = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey));
if (pubk != NULL) {
SECStatus rv;
pubk->arena = arena;
pubk->keyType = privk->keyType;
if (privk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYNullKey) return pubk;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.rsa.modulus,
&privk->u.rsa.modulus);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem (arena, &pubk->u.rsa.publicExponent,
&privk->u.rsa.publicExponent);
if (rv == SECSuccess)
return pubk;
}
} else {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
}
break;
case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
pubk = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey));
if (pubk != NULL) {
SECStatus rv;
pubk->arena = arena;
pubk->keyType = privk->keyType;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.dsa.publicValue,
&privk->u.dsa.publicValue);
if (rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.dsa.params.prime,
&privk->u.dsa.params.prime);
if (rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.dsa.params.subPrime,
&privk->u.dsa.params.subPrime);
if (rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.dsa.params.base,
&privk->u.dsa.params.base);
if (rv == SECSuccess) return pubk;
}
break;
case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
pubk = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey));
if (pubk != NULL) {
SECStatus rv;
pubk->arena = arena;
pubk->keyType = privk->keyType;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.dh.publicValue,
&privk->u.dh.publicValue);
if (rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.dh.prime,
&privk->u.dh.prime);
if (rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.dh.base,
&privk->u.dh.base);
if (rv == SECSuccess) return pubk;
}
break;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
pubk = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey));
if (pubk != NULL) {
SECStatus rv;
pubk->arena = arena;
pubk->keyType = privk->keyType;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.ec.publicValue,
&privk->u.ec.publicValue);
if (rv != SECSuccess) break;
pubk->u.ec.ecParams.arena = arena;
/* Copy the rest of the params */
rv = EC_CopyParams(arena, &(pubk->u.ec.ecParams),
&(privk->u.ec.ecParams));
if (rv == SECSuccess) return pubk;
}
break;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
/* No Fortezza in Low Key implementations (Fortezza keys aren't
* stored in our data base */
default:
break;
}
PORT_FreeArena (arena, PR_FALSE);
return NULL;
}
static CERTCertificatePolicies *
secu_DecodeCertificatePoliciesExtension(SECItem *extnValue)
{
PRArenaPool *arena = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
CERTCertificatePolicies *policies;
CERTPolicyInfo **policyInfos, *policyInfo;
CERTPolicyQualifier **policyQualifiers, *policyQualifier;
SECItem newExtnValue;
/* make a new arena */
arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if ( !arena ) {
goto loser;
}
/* allocate the certifiate policies structure */
policies = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, CERTCertificatePolicies);
if ( policies == NULL ) {
goto loser;
}
policies->arena = arena;
/* copy the DER into the arena, since Quick DER returns data that points
into the DER input, which may get freed by the caller */
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &newExtnValue, extnValue);
if ( rv != SECSuccess ) {
goto loser;
}
/* decode the policy info */
rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, policies,
secu_CertificatePoliciesTemplate,
&newExtnValue);
if ( rv != SECSuccess ) {
goto loser;
}
/* initialize the oid tags */
policyInfos = policies->policyInfos;
while (policyInfos != NULL && *policyInfos != NULL ) {
policyInfo = *policyInfos;
policyInfo->oid = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&policyInfo->policyID);
policyQualifiers = policyInfo->policyQualifiers;
while ( policyQualifiers && *policyQualifiers != NULL ) {
policyQualifier = *policyQualifiers;
policyQualifier->oid =
SECOID_FindOIDTag(&policyQualifier->qualifierID);
policyQualifiers++;
}
policyInfos++;
}
return(policies);
loser:
if ( arena != NULL ) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
}
return(NULL);
}
SecCmsSignerInfoRef
nss_cmssignerinfo_create(SecCmsMessageRef cmsg, SecCmsSignerIDSelector type, SecCertificateRef cert, CSSM_DATA_PTR subjKeyID, SecPublicKeyRef pubKey, SecPrivateKeyRef signingKey, SECOidTag digestalgtag)
{
void *mark;
SecCmsSignerInfoRef signerinfo;
int version;
PLArenaPool *poolp;
poolp = cmsg->poolp;
mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp);
signerinfo = (SecCmsSignerInfoRef)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(SecCmsSignerInfo));
if (signerinfo == NULL) {
PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark);
return NULL;
}
signerinfo->cmsg = cmsg;
switch(type) {
case SecCmsSignerIDIssuerSN:
signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType = SecCmsSignerIDIssuerSN;
if ((signerinfo->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert)) == NULL)
goto loser;
if ((signerinfo->signerIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert)) == NULL)
goto loser;
dprintfRC("nss_cmssignerinfo_create: SecCmsSignerIDIssuerSN: cert.rc %d\n",
(int)CFGetRetainCount(signerinfo->cert));
break;
case SecCmsSignerIDSubjectKeyID:
signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType = SecCmsSignerIDSubjectKeyID;
PORT_Assert(subjKeyID);
if (!subjKeyID)
goto loser;
signerinfo->signerIdentifier.id.subjectKeyID = PORT_ArenaNew(poolp, CSSM_DATA);
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, signerinfo->signerIdentifier.id.subjectKeyID,
subjKeyID)) {
goto loser;
}
signerinfo->pubKey = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(pubKey);
if (!signerinfo->pubKey)
goto loser;
break;
default:
goto loser;
}
if (!signingKey)
goto loser;
signerinfo->signingKey = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(signingKey);
if (!signerinfo->signingKey)
goto loser;
/* set version right now */
version = SEC_CMS_SIGNER_INFO_VERSION_ISSUERSN;
/* RFC2630 5.3 "version is the syntax version number. If the .... " */
if (signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType == SecCmsSignerIDSubjectKeyID)
version = SEC_CMS_SIGNER_INFO_VERSION_SUBJKEY;
(void)SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(signerinfo->version), (long)version);
if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &signerinfo->digestAlg, digestalgtag, NULL) != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
PORT_ArenaUnmark(poolp, mark);
return signerinfo;
loser:
PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark);
return NULL;
}
/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a supplied
* value and the public key is the result of performing a scalar
* point multiplication of that value with the curve's base point.
*/
SECStatus
ec_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey,
const unsigned char *privKeyBytes, int privKeyLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
PRArenaPool *arena;
ECPrivateKey *key;
mp_int k;
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
int len;
#if EC_DEBUG
printf("ec_NewKey called\n");
#endif
MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
if (!ecParams || !privKey || !privKeyBytes || (privKeyLen < 0)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Initialize an arena for the EC key. */
if (!(arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE)))
return SECFailure;
key = (ECPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(ECPrivateKey));
if (!key) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Set the version number (SEC 1 section C.4 says it should be 1) */
SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->version, 1);
key->version.data[0] = 1;
/* Copy all of the fields from the ECParams argument to the
* ECParams structure within the private key.
*/
key->ecParams.arena = arena;
key->ecParams.type = ecParams->type;
key->ecParams.fieldID.size = ecParams->fieldID.size;
key->ecParams.fieldID.type = ecParams->fieldID.type;
if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_GFp) {
CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.fieldID.u.prime,
&ecParams->fieldID.u.prime));
} else {
CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.fieldID.u.poly,
&ecParams->fieldID.u.poly));
}
key->ecParams.fieldID.k1 = ecParams->fieldID.k1;
key->ecParams.fieldID.k2 = ecParams->fieldID.k2;
key->ecParams.fieldID.k3 = ecParams->fieldID.k3;
CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.a,
&ecParams->curve.a));
CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.b,
&ecParams->curve.b));
CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.seed,
&ecParams->curve.seed));
CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.base,
&ecParams->base));
CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.order,
&ecParams->order));
key->ecParams.cofactor = ecParams->cofactor;
CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.DEREncoding,
&ecParams->DEREncoding));
key->ecParams.name = ecParams->name;
CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curveOID,
&ecParams->curveOID));
len = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->publicValue, 2*len + 1);
len = ecParams->order.len;
SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->privateValue, len);
/* Copy private key */
if (privKeyLen >= len) {
memcpy(key->privateValue.data, privKeyBytes, len);
} else {
memset(key->privateValue.data, 0, (len - privKeyLen));
memcpy(key->privateValue.data + (len - privKeyLen), privKeyBytes, privKeyLen);
}
/* Compute corresponding public key */
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&k) );
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, key->privateValue.data,
(mp_size) len) );
rv = ec_points_mul(ecParams, &k, NULL, NULL, &(key->publicValue));
if (rv != SECSuccess) goto cleanup;
*privKey = key;
cleanup:
mp_clear(&k);
if (rv)
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
#if EC_DEBUG
printf("ec_NewKey returning %s\n",
(rv == SECSuccess) ? "success" : "failure");
#endif
#else
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
dsa_NewKeyExtended(const PQGParams *params, const SECItem * seed,
DSAPrivateKey **privKey)
{
mp_int p, g;
mp_int x, y;
mp_err err;
PRArenaPool *arena;
DSAPrivateKey *key;
/* Check args. */
if (!params || !privKey || !seed || !seed->data) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Initialize an arena for the DSA key. */
arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DSA_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (!arena) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return SECFailure;
}
key = (DSAPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(DSAPrivateKey));
if (!key) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
key->params.arena = arena;
/* Initialize MPI integers. */
MP_DIGITS(&p) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&g) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&x) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&p) );
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&g) );
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&x) );
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&y) );
/* Copy over the PQG params */
CHECK_MPI_OK( SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->params.prime,
¶ms->prime) );
CHECK_MPI_OK( SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->params.subPrime,
¶ms->subPrime) );
CHECK_MPI_OK( SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->params.base, ¶ms->base) );
/* Convert stored p, g, and received x into MPI integers. */
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(params->prime, &p);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(params->base, &g);
OCTETS_TO_MPINT(seed->data, &x, seed->len);
/* Store x in private key */
SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->privateValue, seed->len);
PORT_Memcpy(key->privateValue.data, seed->data, seed->len);
/* Compute public key y = g**x mod p */
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_exptmod(&g, &x, &p, &y) );
/* Store y in public key */
MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&y, &key->publicValue, arena);
*privKey = key;
key = NULL;
cleanup:
mp_clear(&p);
mp_clear(&g);
mp_clear(&x);
mp_clear(&y);
if (key)
PORT_FreeArena(key->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
if (err) {
translate_mpi_error(err);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
NSSCMSRecipientInfo *
nss_cmsrecipientinfo_create(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg,
NSSCMSRecipientIDSelector type,
CERTCertificate *cert,
SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
SECItem *subjKeyID,
void* pwfn_arg,
SECItem* DERinput)
{
NSSCMSRecipientInfo *ri;
void *mark;
SECOidTag certalgtag;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
NSSCMSRecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
NSSCMSOriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oiok;
unsigned long version;
SECItem *dummy;
PLArenaPool *poolp;
CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, *freeSpki = NULL;
NSSCMSRecipientIdentifier *rid;
extern const SEC_ASN1Template NSSCMSRecipientInfoTemplate[];
if (!cmsg) {
/* a CMSMessage wasn't supplied, create a fake one to hold the pwfunc
* and a private arena pool */
cmsg = NSS_CMSMessage_Create(NULL);
cmsg->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg;
/* mark it as a special cms message */
cmsg->contentInfo.contentTypeTag = (SECOidData *)&fakeContent;
}
poolp = cmsg->poolp;
mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp);
ri = (NSSCMSRecipientInfo *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(NSSCMSRecipientInfo));
if (ri == NULL)
goto loser;
ri->cmsg = cmsg;
if (DERinput) {
/* decode everything from DER */
SECItem newinput;
SECStatus rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &newinput, DERinput);
if (SECSuccess != rv)
goto loser;
rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(poolp, ri, NSSCMSRecipientInfoTemplate, &newinput);
if (SECSuccess != rv)
goto loser;
}
switch (type) {
case NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN:
{
ri->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
if (NULL == ri->cert)
goto loser;
spki = &(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo);
break;
}
case NSSCMSRecipientID_SubjectKeyID:
{
PORT_Assert(pubKey);
spki = freeSpki = SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(pubKey);
break;
}
case NSSCMSRecipientID_BrandNew:
goto done;
break;
default:
/* unkown type */
goto loser;
break;
}
certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(spki->algorithm));
rid = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier;
switch (certalgtag) {
case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
ri->recipientInfoType = NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyTrans;
rid->identifierType = type;
if (type == NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN) {
rid->id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert);
if (rid->id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
break;
}
} else if (type == NSSCMSRecipientID_SubjectKeyID){
NSSCMSKeyTransRecipientInfoEx *riExtra;
rid->id.subjectKeyID = PORT_ArenaNew(poolp, SECItem);
if (rid->id.subjectKeyID == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
break;
}
SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, rid->id.subjectKeyID, subjKeyID);
if (rid->id.subjectKeyID->data == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
break;
}
riExtra = &ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfoEx;
riExtra->version = 0;
riExtra->pubKey = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(pubKey);
if (riExtra->pubKey == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
break;
}
} else {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
rv = SECFailure;
}
break;
case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: /* dh-public-number */
PORT_Assert(type == NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN);
if (type != NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN) {
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
/* a key agreement op */
ri->recipientInfoType = NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyAgree;
if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
/* we do not support the case where multiple recipients
* share the same KeyAgreeRecipientInfo and have multiple RecipientEncryptedKeys
* in this case, we would need to walk all the recipientInfos, take the
* ones that do KeyAgreement algorithms and join them, algorithm by algorithm
* Then, we'd generate ONE ukm and OriginatorIdentifierOrKey */
/* only epheremal-static Diffie-Hellman is supported for now
* this is the only form of key agreement that provides potential anonymity
* of the sender, plus we do not have to include certs in the message */
/* force single recipientEncryptedKey for now */
if ((rek = NSS_CMSRecipientEncryptedKey_Create(poolp)) == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
/* hardcoded IssuerSN choice for now */
rek->recipientIdentifier.identifierType = NSSCMSKeyAgreeRecipientID_IssuerSN;
if ((rek->recipientIdentifier.id.issuerAndSN = CERT_GetCertIssuerAndSN(poolp, cert)) == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
oiok = &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.originatorIdentifierOrKey);
/* see RFC2630 12.3.1.1 */
oiok->identifierType = NSSCMSOriginatorIDOrKey_OriginatorPublicKey;
rv = NSS_CMSArray_Add(poolp, (void ***)&ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.recipientEncryptedKeys,
(void *)rek);
break;
default:
/* other algorithms not supported yet */
/* NOTE that we do not support any KEK algorithm */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
if (rv == SECFailure)
goto loser;
/* set version */
switch (ri->recipientInfoType) {
case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyTrans:
if (ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.recipientIdentifier.identifierType == NSSCMSRecipientID_IssuerSN)
version = NSS_CMS_KEYTRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION_ISSUERSN;
else
version = NSS_CMS_KEYTRANS_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION_SUBJKEY;
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyTransRecipientInfo.version), version);
if (dummy == NULL)
goto loser;
break;
case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KeyAgree:
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(ri->ri.keyAgreeRecipientInfo.version),
NSS_CMS_KEYAGREE_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION);
if (dummy == NULL)
goto loser;
break;
case NSSCMSRecipientInfoID_KEK:
/* NOTE: this cannot happen as long as we do not support any KEK algorithm */
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &(ri->ri.kekRecipientInfo.version),
NSS_CMS_KEK_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION);
if (dummy == NULL)
goto loser;
break;
}
done:
PORT_ArenaUnmark (poolp, mark);
if (freeSpki)
SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki);
return ri;
loser:
if (ri && ri->cert) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ri->cert);
}
if (freeSpki) {
SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(freeSpki);
}
PORT_ArenaRelease (poolp, mark);
if (cmsg->contentInfo.contentTypeTag == &fakeContent) {
NSS_CMSMessage_Destroy(cmsg);
}
return NULL;
}
OSStatus
SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyMISSI(PLArenaPool *poolp, SecCertificateRef cert, SecSymmetricKeyRef bulkkey,
SECOidTag symalgtag, SecAsn1Item * encKey, SecAsn1Item * *pparams, void *pwfn_arg)
{
SECOidTag certalgtag; /* the certificate's encryption algorithm */
SECOidTag encalgtag; /* the algorithm used for key exchange/agreement */
OSStatus rv = SECFailure;
SecAsn1Item * params = NULL;
OSStatus err;
SecSymmetricKeyRef tek;
SecCertificateRef ourCert;
SecPublicKeyRef ourPubKey, *publickey = NULL;
SecPrivateKeyRef ourPrivKey = NULL;
SecCmsKEATemplateSelector whichKEA = SecCmsKEAInvalid;
SecCmsSMIMEKEAParameters keaParams;
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
const SECAlgorithmID *algid;
/* Clear keaParams, since cleanup code checks the lengths */
(void) memset(&keaParams, 0, sizeof(keaParams));
#if USE_CDSA_CRYPTO
SecCertificateGetAlgorithmID(cert,&algid);
#endif
certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid);
PORT_Assert(certalgtag == SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS_OLD ||
certalgtag == SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS ||
certalgtag == SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA);
#define SMIME_FORTEZZA_RA_LENGTH 128
#define SMIME_FORTEZZA_IV_LENGTH 24
#define SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE 256
/* We really want to show our KEA tag as the key exchange algorithm tag. */
encalgtag = SEC_OID_NETSCAPE_SMIME_KEA;
/* Get the public key of the recipient. */
publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
if (publickey == NULL) goto loser;
/* Find our own cert, and extract its keys. */
ourCert = PK11_FindBestKEAMatch(cert, pwfn_arg);
if (ourCert == NULL) goto loser;
arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
if (arena == NULL)
goto loser;
ourPubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ourCert);
if (ourPubKey == NULL) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ourCert);
goto loser;
}
/* While we're here, copy the public key into the outgoing
* KEA parameters. */
SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &(keaParams.originatorKEAKey), &(ourPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey));
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ourPubKey);
ourPubKey = NULL;
/* Extract our private key in order to derive the KEA key. */
ourPrivKey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(ourCert, pwfn_arg);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ourCert); /* we're done with this */
if (!ourPrivKey)
goto loser;
/* Prepare raItem with 128 bytes (filled with zeros). */
keaParams.originatorRA.Data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,SMIME_FORTEZZA_RA_LENGTH);
keaParams.originatorRA.Length = SMIME_FORTEZZA_RA_LENGTH;
/* Generate the TEK (token exchange key) which we use
* to wrap the bulk encryption key. (keaparams.originatorRA) will be
* filled with a random seed which we need to send to
* the recipient. (user keying material in RFC2630/DSA speak) */
tek = PK11_PubDerive(ourPrivKey, publickey, PR_TRUE,
&keaParams.originatorRA, NULL,
CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
CKA_WRAP, 0, pwfn_arg);
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
publickey = NULL;
ourPrivKey = NULL;
if (!tek)
goto loser;
/* allocate space for the wrapped key data */
encKey->Data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
encKey->Length = SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE;
if (encKey->Data == NULL) {
CFRelease(tek);
goto loser;
}
/* Wrap the bulk key. What we do with the resulting data
depends on whether we're using Skipjack to wrap the key. */
switch (PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(symalgtag)) {
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8:
/* SKIPJACK, we use the wrap mechanism because we can do it on the hardware */
err = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, tek, bulkkey, encKey);
whichKEA = SecCmsKEAUsesSkipjack;
break;
default:
/* Not SKIPJACK, we encrypt the raw key data */
keaParams.nonSkipjackIV.Data =
(unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, SMIME_FORTEZZA_IV_LENGTH);
keaParams.nonSkipjackIV.Length = SMIME_FORTEZZA_IV_LENGTH;
err = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, &keaParams.nonSkipjackIV, tek, bulkkey, encKey);
if (err != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (encKey->Length != PK11_GetKeyLength(bulkkey)) {
/* The size of the encrypted key is not the same as
that of the original bulk key, presumably due to
padding. Encode and store the real size of the
bulk key. */
if (SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &keaParams.bulkKeySize, PK11_GetKeyLength(bulkkey)) == NULL)
err = (OSStatus)PORT_GetError();
else
/* use full template for encoding */
whichKEA = SecCmsKEAUsesNonSkipjackWithPaddedEncKey;
}
else
/* enc key length == bulk key length */
whichKEA = SecCmsKEAUsesNonSkipjack;
break;
}
CFRelease(tek);
if (err != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
PORT_Assert(whichKEA != SecCmsKEAInvalid);
/* Encode the KEA parameters into the recipient info. */
params = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(poolp, NULL, &keaParams, nss_cms_get_kea_template(whichKEA));
if (params == NULL)
goto loser;
/* pass back the algorithm params */
*pparams = params;
rv = SECSuccess;
loser:
if (arena)
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
if (publickey)
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
if (ourPrivKey)
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
return rv;
}
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *
nsslowkey_CopyPrivateKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
{
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *returnKey = NULL;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PLArenaPool *poolp;
if(!privKey) {
return NULL;
}
poolp = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if(!poolp) {
return NULL;
}
returnKey = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(poolp, sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
if(!returnKey) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
returnKey->keyType = privKey->keyType;
returnKey->arena = poolp;
switch(privKey->keyType) {
case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.rsa.modulus),
&(privKey->u.rsa.modulus));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.rsa.version),
&(privKey->u.rsa.version));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.rsa.publicExponent),
&(privKey->u.rsa.publicExponent));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.rsa.privateExponent),
&(privKey->u.rsa.privateExponent));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.rsa.prime1),
&(privKey->u.rsa.prime1));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.rsa.prime2),
&(privKey->u.rsa.prime2));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.rsa.exponent1),
&(privKey->u.rsa.exponent1));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.rsa.exponent2),
&(privKey->u.rsa.exponent2));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.rsa.coefficient),
&(privKey->u.rsa.coefficient));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
break;
case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.dsa.publicValue),
&(privKey->u.dsa.publicValue));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.dsa.privateValue),
&(privKey->u.dsa.privateValue));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
returnKey->u.dsa.params.arena = poolp;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.dsa.params.prime),
&(privKey->u.dsa.params.prime));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime),
&(privKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.dsa.params.base),
&(privKey->u.dsa.params.base));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
break;
case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.dh.publicValue),
&(privKey->u.dh.publicValue));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.dh.privateValue),
&(privKey->u.dh.privateValue));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
returnKey->u.dsa.params.arena = poolp;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.dh.prime),
&(privKey->u.dh.prime));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.dh.base),
&(privKey->u.dh.base));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
break;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.ec.version),
&(privKey->u.ec.version));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.ec.publicValue),
&(privKey->u.ec.publicValue));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(returnKey->u.ec.privateValue),
&(privKey->u.ec.privateValue));
if(rv != SECSuccess) break;
returnKey->u.ec.ecParams.arena = poolp;
/* Copy the rest of the params */
rv = EC_CopyParams(poolp, &(returnKey->u.ec.ecParams),
&(privKey->u.ec.ecParams));
if (rv != SECSuccess) break;
break;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
default:
rv = SECFailure;
}
loser:
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_FreeArena(poolp, PR_TRUE);
returnKey = NULL;
}
return returnKey;
}
OSStatus
SecCmsUtilEncryptSymKeyESDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, SecCertificateRef cert, SecSymmetricKeyRef key,
SecAsn1Item * encKey, SecAsn1Item * *ukm, SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg,
SecAsn1Item * pubKey)
{
#if 0 /* not yet done */
SECOidTag certalgtag; /* the certificate's encryption algorithm */
SECOidTag encalgtag; /* the algorithm used for key exchange/agreement */
OSStatus rv;
SecAsn1Item * params = NULL;
int data_len;
OSStatus err;
SecSymmetricKeyRef tek;
SecCertificateRef ourCert;
SecPublicKeyRef ourPubKey;
SecCmsKEATemplateSelector whichKEA = SecCmsKEAInvalid;
certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm));
PORT_Assert(certalgtag == SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY);
/* We really want to show our KEA tag as the key exchange algorithm tag. */
encalgtag = SEC_OID_CMS_EPHEMERAL_STATIC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
/* Get the public key of the recipient. */
publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
if (publickey == NULL) goto loser;
/* XXXX generate a DH key pair on a PKCS11 module (XXX which parameters?) */
/* XXXX */ourCert = PK11_FindBestKEAMatch(cert, wincx);
if (ourCert == NULL) goto loser;
arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
if (arena == NULL) goto loser;
/* While we're here, extract the key pair's public key data and copy it into */
/* the outgoing parameters. */
/* XXXX */ourPubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ourCert);
if (ourPubKey == NULL)
{
goto loser;
}
SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, pubKey, /* XXX */&(ourPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey));
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ourPubKey); /* we only need the private key from now on */
ourPubKey = NULL;
/* Extract our private key in order to derive the KEA key. */
ourPrivKey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(ourCert,wincx);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ourCert); /* we're done with this */
if (!ourPrivKey) goto loser;
/* If ukm desired, prepare it - allocate enough space (filled with zeros). */
if (ukm) {
ukm->Data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,/* XXXX */);
ukm->Length = /* XXXX */;
}
/* Generate the KEK (key exchange key) according to RFC2631 which we use
* to wrap the bulk encryption key. */
kek = PK11_PubDerive(ourPrivKey, publickey, PR_TRUE,
ukm, NULL,
/* XXXX */CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, /* XXXX */CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
CKA_WRAP, 0, wincx);
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
publickey = NULL;
ourPrivKey = NULL;
if (!kek)
goto loser;
/* allocate space for the encrypted CEK (bulk key) */
encKey->Data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
encKey->Length = SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE;
if (encKey->Data == NULL)
{
CFRelease(kek);
goto loser;
}
/* Wrap the bulk key using CMSRC2WRAP or CMS3DESWRAP, depending on the */
/* bulk encryption algorithm */
switch (/* XXXX */PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(enccinfo->encalg))
{
case /* XXXX */CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8:
err = PK11_WrapSymKey(/* XXXX */CKM_CMS3DES_WRAP, NULL, kek, bulkkey, encKey);
whichKEA = SecCmsKEAUsesSkipjack;
break;
case /* XXXX */CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8:
err = PK11_WrapSymKey(/* XXXX */CKM_CMSRC2_WRAP, NULL, kek, bulkkey, encKey);
whichKEA = SecCmsKEAUsesSkipjack;
break;
default:
/* XXXX what do we do here? Neither RC2 nor 3DES... */
err = SECFailure;
/* set error */
break;
}
CFRelease(kek); /* we do not need the KEK anymore */
if (err != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
PORT_Assert(whichKEA != SecCmsKEAInvalid);
/* see RFC2630 12.3.1.1 "keyEncryptionAlgorithm must be ..." */
/* params is the DER encoded key wrap algorithm (with parameters!) (XXX) */
params = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, NULL, &keaParams, sec_pkcs7_get_kea_template(whichKEA));
if (params == NULL)
goto loser;
/* now set keyEncAlg */
rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, keyEncAlg, SEC_OID_CMS_EPHEMERAL_STATIC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, params);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* XXXXXXX this is not right yet */
loser:
if (arena) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
}
if (publickey) {
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
}
if (ourPrivKey) {
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
}
#endif
return SECFailure;
}
/**
* Check a canonical sig+rrset and signature against a dnskey
* @param buf: buffer with data to verify, the first rrsig part and the
* canonicalized rrset.
* @param algo: DNSKEY algorithm.
* @param sigblock: signature rdata field from RRSIG
* @param sigblock_len: length of sigblock data.
* @param key: public key data from DNSKEY RR.
* @param keylen: length of keydata.
* @param reason: bogus reason in more detail.
* @return secure if verification succeeded, bogus on crypto failure,
* unchecked on format errors and alloc failures.
*/
enum sec_status
verify_canonrrset(sldns_buffer* buf, int algo, unsigned char* sigblock,
unsigned int sigblock_len, unsigned char* key, unsigned int keylen,
char** reason)
{
/* uses libNSS */
/* large enough for the different hashes */
unsigned char hash[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
unsigned char hash2[HASH_LENGTH_MAX*2];
HASH_HashType htype = 0;
SECKEYPublicKey* pubkey = NULL;
SECItem secsig = {siBuffer, sigblock, sigblock_len};
SECItem sechash = {siBuffer, hash, 0};
SECStatus res;
unsigned char* prefix = NULL; /* prefix for hash, RFC3110, RFC5702 */
size_t prefixlen = 0;
int err;
if(!nss_setup_key_digest(algo, &pubkey, &htype, key, keylen,
&prefix, &prefixlen)) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: failed to setup key");
*reason = "use of key for crypto failed";
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
return sec_status_bogus;
}
/* need to convert DSA, ECDSA signatures? */
if((algo == LDNS_DSA || algo == LDNS_DSA_NSEC3)) {
if(sigblock_len == 1+2*SHA1_LENGTH) {
secsig.data ++;
secsig.len --;
} else {
SECItem* p = DSAU_DecodeDerSig(&secsig);
if(!p) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: failed DER decode");
*reason = "signature DER decode failed";
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
return sec_status_bogus;
}
if(SECITEM_CopyItem(pubkey->arena, &secsig, p)) {
log_err("alloc failure in DER decode");
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
SECITEM_FreeItem(p, PR_TRUE);
return sec_status_unchecked;
}
SECITEM_FreeItem(p, PR_TRUE);
}
}
/* do the signature cryptography work */
/* hash the data */
sechash.len = HASH_ResultLen(htype);
if(sechash.len > sizeof(hash)) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: hash too large for buffer");
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
return sec_status_unchecked;
}
if(HASH_HashBuf(htype, hash, (unsigned char*)sldns_buffer_begin(buf),
(unsigned int)sldns_buffer_limit(buf)) != SECSuccess) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: HASH_HashBuf failed");
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
return sec_status_unchecked;
}
if(prefix) {
int hashlen = sechash.len;
if(prefixlen+hashlen > sizeof(hash2)) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: hashprefix too large");
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
return sec_status_unchecked;
}
sechash.data = hash2;
sechash.len = prefixlen+hashlen;
memcpy(sechash.data, prefix, prefixlen);
memmove(sechash.data+prefixlen, hash, hashlen);
}
/* verify the signature */
res = PK11_Verify(pubkey, &secsig, &sechash, NULL /*wincx*/);
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubkey);
if(res == SECSuccess) {
return sec_status_secure;
}
err = PORT_GetError();
if(err != SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE) {
/* failed to verify */
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: PK11_Verify failed: %s",
PORT_ErrorToString(err));
/* if it is not supported, like ECC is removed, we get,
* SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE */
if(err == SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE)
return sec_status_unchecked;
/* but other errors are commonly returned
* for a bad signature from NSS. Thus we return bogus,
* not unchecked */
*reason = "signature crypto failed";
return sec_status_bogus;
}
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "verify: signature mismatch: %s",
PORT_ErrorToString(err));
*reason = "signature crypto failed";
return sec_status_bogus;
}
/*
* FUNCTION: pkix_pl_GeneralName_Create
* DESCRIPTION:
*
* Creates new GeneralName which represents the CERTGeneralName pointed to by
* "nssAltName" and stores it at "pGenName".
*
* PARAMETERS:
* "nssAltName"
* Address of CERTGeneralName. Must be non-NULL.
* "pGenName"
* Address where object pointer will be stored. Must be non-NULL.
* "plContext" - Platform-specific context pointer.
* THREAD SAFETY:
* Thread Safe (see Thread Safety Definitions in Programmer's Guide)
* RETURNS:
* Returns NULL if the function succeeds.
* Returns a GeneralName Error if the function fails in a non-fatal way.
* Returns a Fatal Error if the function fails in an unrecoverable way.
*/
PKIX_Error *
pkix_pl_GeneralName_Create(
CERTGeneralName *nssAltName,
PKIX_PL_GeneralName **pGenName,
void *plContext)
{
PKIX_PL_GeneralName *genName = NULL;
PKIX_PL_X500Name *pkixDN = NULL;
PKIX_PL_OID *pkixOID = NULL;
OtherName *otherName = NULL;
CERTGeneralNameList *nssGenNameList = NULL;
CERTGeneralNameType nameType;
SECItem *secItem = NULL;
char *asciiName = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
PKIX_ENTER(GENERALNAME, "pkix_pl_GeneralName_Create");
PKIX_NULLCHECK_TWO(nssAltName, pGenName);
/* create a PKIX_PL_GeneralName object */
PKIX_CHECK(PKIX_PL_Object_Alloc
(PKIX_GENERALNAME_TYPE,
sizeof (PKIX_PL_GeneralName),
(PKIX_PL_Object **)&genName,
plContext),
PKIX_COULDNOTCREATEOBJECT);
nameType = nssAltName->type;
/*
* We use CERT_CreateGeneralNameList to create just one CERTGeneralName
* item for memory allocation reason. If we want to just create one
* item, we have to use the calling path CERT_NewGeneralName, then
* CERT_CopyOneGeneralName. With this calling path, if we pass
* the arena argument as NULL, in CERT_CopyOneGeneralName's subsequent
* call to CERT_CopyName, it assumes arena should be valid, hence
* segmentation error (not sure this is a NSS bug, certainly it is
* not consistent). But on the other hand, we don't want to keep an
* arena record here explicitely for every PKIX_PL_GeneralName.
* So I concluded it is better to use CERT_CreateGeneralNameList,
* which keeps an arena pointer in its data structure and also masks
* out details calls from this libpkix level.
*/
PKIX_GENERALNAME_DEBUG("\t\tCalling CERT_CreateGeneralNameList).\n");
nssGenNameList = CERT_CreateGeneralNameList(nssAltName);
if (nssGenNameList == NULL) {
PKIX_ERROR(PKIX_CERTCREATEGENERALNAMELISTFAILED);
}
genName->nssGeneralNameList = nssGenNameList;
/* initialize fields */
genName->type = nameType;
genName->directoryName = NULL;
genName->OthName = NULL;
genName->other = NULL;
genName->oid = NULL;
switch (nameType){
case certOtherName:
PKIX_CHECK(pkix_pl_OtherName_Create
(nssAltName, &otherName, plContext),
PKIX_OTHERNAMECREATEFAILED);
genName->OthName = otherName;
break;
case certDirectoryName:
PKIX_CHECK(pkix_pl_DirectoryName_Create
(nssAltName, &pkixDN, plContext),
PKIX_DIRECTORYNAMECREATEFAILED);
genName->directoryName = pkixDN;
break;
case certRegisterID:
PKIX_CHECK(pkix_pl_oidBytes2Ascii
(&nssAltName->name.other, &asciiName, plContext),
PKIX_OIDBYTES2ASCIIFAILED);
PKIX_CHECK(PKIX_PL_OID_Create(asciiName, &pkixOID, plContext),
PKIX_OIDCREATEFAILED);
genName->oid = pkixOID;
break;
case certDNSName:
case certEDIPartyName:
case certIPAddress:
case certRFC822Name:
case certX400Address:
case certURI:
PKIX_GENERALNAME_DEBUG("\t\tCalling SECITEM_AllocItem).\n");
secItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, 0);
if (secItem == NULL){
PKIX_ERROR(PKIX_OUTOFMEMORY);
}
PKIX_GENERALNAME_DEBUG("\t\tCalling SECITEM_CopyItem).\n");
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, secItem, &nssAltName->name.other);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PKIX_ERROR(PKIX_OUTOFMEMORY);
}
genName->other = secItem;
break;
default:
PKIX_ERROR(PKIX_NAMETYPENOTSUPPORTED);
}
*pGenName = genName;
cleanup:
PKIX_FREE(asciiName);
if (PKIX_ERROR_RECEIVED){
PKIX_DECREF(genName);
if (secItem){
PKIX_GENERALNAME_DEBUG
("\t\tCalling SECITEM_FreeItem).\n");
SECITEM_FreeItem(secItem, PR_TRUE);
secItem = NULL;
}
}
PKIX_RETURN(GENERALNAME);
}
/*
** Generate and return a new RSA public and private key.
** Both keys are encoded in a single RSAPrivateKey structure.
** "cx" is the random number generator context
** "keySizeInBits" is the size of the key to be generated, in bits.
** 512, 1024, etc.
** "publicExponent" when not NULL is a pointer to some data that
** represents the public exponent to use. The data is a byte
** encoded integer, in "big endian" order.
*/
RSAPrivateKey *
RSA_NewKey(int keySizeInBits, SECItem *publicExponent)
{
unsigned int primeLen;
mp_int p, q, e;
int kiter;
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
int prerr = 0;
RSAPrivateKey *key = NULL;
PRArenaPool *arena = NULL;
/* Require key size to be a multiple of 16 bits. */
if (!publicExponent || keySizeInBits % 16 != 0 ||
BAD_RSA_KEY_SIZE(keySizeInBits/8, publicExponent->len)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
/* 1. Allocate arena & key */
arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (!arena) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return NULL;
}
key = (RSAPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(RSAPrivateKey));
if (!key) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
return NULL;
}
key->arena = arena;
/* length of primes p and q (in bytes) */
primeLen = keySizeInBits / (2 * BITS_PER_BYTE);
MP_DIGITS(&p) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&e) = 0;
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&p) );
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&q) );
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&e) );
/* 2. Set the version number (PKCS1 v1.5 says it should be zero) */
SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->version, 1);
key->version.data[0] = 0;
/* 3. Set the public exponent */
SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->publicExponent, publicExponent);
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*publicExponent, &e);
kiter = 0;
do {
prerr = 0;
PORT_SetError(0);
CHECK_SEC_OK( generate_prime(&p, primeLen) );
CHECK_SEC_OK( generate_prime(&q, primeLen) );
/* Assure q < p */
if (mp_cmp(&p, &q) < 0)
mp_exch(&p, &q);
/* Attempt to use these primes to generate a key */
rv = rsa_keygen_from_primes(&p, &q, &e, key, keySizeInBits);
if (rv == SECSuccess)
break; /* generated two good primes */
prerr = PORT_GetError();
kiter++;
/* loop until have primes */
} while (prerr == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM && kiter < MAX_KEY_GEN_ATTEMPTS);
if (prerr)
goto cleanup;
MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&p, &key->prime1, arena);
MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&q, &key->prime2, arena);
cleanup:
mp_clear(&p);
mp_clear(&q);
mp_clear(&e);
if (err) {
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
rv = SECFailure;
}
if (rv && arena) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
key = NULL;
}
return key;
}
static int
cmmf_create_witness_and_challenge(PRArenaPool *poolp,
CMMFChallenge *challenge,
long inRandom,
SECItem *senderDER,
SECKEYPublicKey *inPubKey,
void *passwdArg)
{
SECItem *encodedRandNum;
SECItem encodedRandStr = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
SECItem *dummy;
unsigned char *randHash, *senderHash, *encChal=NULL;
unsigned modulusLen = 0;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
CMMFRand randStr= { {siBuffer, NULL, 0}, {siBuffer, NULL, 0}};
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id;
CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki = NULL;
encodedRandNum = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(poolp, &challenge->randomNumber,
inRandom);
encodedRandNum = &challenge->randomNumber;
randHash = PORT_ArenaNewArray(poolp, unsigned char, SHA1_LENGTH);
senderHash = PORT_ArenaNewArray(poolp, unsigned char, SHA1_LENGTH);
if (randHash == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, randHash, encodedRandNum->data,
(PRUint32)encodedRandNum->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, senderHash, senderDER->data,
(PRUint32)senderDER->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
challenge->witness.data = randHash;
challenge->witness.len = SHA1_LENGTH;
randStr.integer = *encodedRandNum;
randStr.senderHash.data = senderHash;
randStr.senderHash.len = SHA1_LENGTH;
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, &encodedRandStr, &randStr,
CMMFRandTemplate);
if (dummy != &encodedRandStr) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
/* XXXX Now I have to encrypt encodedRandStr and stash it away. */
modulusLen = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(inPubKey);
encChal = PORT_ArenaNewArray(poolp, unsigned char, modulusLen);
if (encChal == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
slot =PK11_GetBestSlotWithAttributes(CKM_RSA_PKCS, CKF_WRAP, 0, passwdArg);
if (slot == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
id = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, inPubKey, PR_FALSE);
/* In order to properly encrypt the data, we import as a symmetric
* key, and then wrap that key. That in essence encrypts the data.
* This is the method recommended in the PK11 world in order
* to prevent threading issues as well as breaking any other semantics
* the PK11 libraries depend on.
*/
symKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, PK11_OriginGenerated,
CKA_VALUE, &encodedRandStr, passwdArg);
if (symKey == NULL) {
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
challenge->challenge.data = encChal;
challenge->challenge.len = modulusLen;
rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, inPubKey, symKey,
&challenge->challenge);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &challenge->senderDER, senderDER);
crmf_get_public_value(inPubKey, &challenge->key);
/* Fall through */
loser:
if (spki != NULL) {
SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spki);
}
if (encodedRandStr.data != NULL) {
PORT_Free(encodedRandStr.data);
}
if (encodedRandNum != NULL) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(encodedRandNum, PR_TRUE);
}
if (symKey != NULL) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
}
return rv;
}
/* set the content of the content info. For data content infos,
* the data is set. For encrytped content infos, the plainContent
* is set, and is expected to be encrypted later.
*
* cinfo is the content info where the data will be set
*
* buf is a buffer of the data to set
*
* len is the length of the data being set.
*
* in the event of an error, SECFailure is returned. SECSuccess
* indicates the content was successfully set.
*/
SECStatus
SEC_PKCS7SetContent(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
const char *buf,
unsigned long len)
{
SECOidTag cinfo_type;
SECStatus rv;
SECItem content;
SECOidData *contentTypeTag = NULL;
content.type = siBuffer;
content.data = (unsigned char *)buf;
content.len = len;
cinfo_type = SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo);
/* set inner content */
switch(cinfo_type)
{
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
if(content.len > 0) {
/* we "leak" the old content here, but as it's all in the pool */
/* it does not really matter */
/* create content item if necessary */
if (cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data == NULL)
cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data = SECITEM_AllocItem(cinfo->poolp, NULL, 0);
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(cinfo->poolp,
cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data,
&content);
} else {
cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data->data = NULL;
cinfo->content.signedData->contentInfo.content.data->len = 0;
rv = SECSuccess;
}
if(rv == SECFailure)
goto loser;
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
/* XXX this forces the inner content type to be "data" */
/* do we really want to override without asking or reason? */
contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA);
if(contentTypeTag == NULL)
goto loser;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(cinfo->poolp,
&(cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.contentType),
&(contentTypeTag->oid));
if(rv == SECFailure)
goto loser;
if(content.len > 0) {
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(cinfo->poolp,
&(cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.plainContent),
&content);
} else {
cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.plainContent.data = NULL;
cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent.data = NULL;
cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.plainContent.len = 0;
cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent.len = 0;
rv = SECSuccess;
}
if(rv == SECFailure)
goto loser;
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
cinfo->content.data = (SECItem *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(cinfo->poolp,
sizeof(SECItem));
if(cinfo->content.data == NULL)
goto loser;
if(content.len > 0) {
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(cinfo->poolp,
cinfo->content.data, &content);
} else {
/* handle case with NULL content */
rv = SECSuccess;
}
if(rv == SECFailure)
goto loser;
break;
default:
goto loser;
}
return SECSuccess;
loser:
return SECFailure;
}