/* * NSS_CMSSignerInfo_Sign - sign something * */ SECStatus NSS_CMSSignerInfo_Sign(NSSCMSSignerInfo *signerinfo, SECItem *digest, SECItem *contentType) { CERTCertificate *cert; SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey = NULL; SECOidTag digestalgtag; SECOidTag pubkAlgTag; SECItem signature = { 0 }; SECStatus rv; PLArenaPool *poolp, *tmppoolp = NULL; SECAlgorithmID *algID, freeAlgID; CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki; PORT_Assert (digest != NULL); poolp = signerinfo->cmsg->poolp; switch (signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType) { case NSSCMSSignerID_IssuerSN: cert = signerinfo->cert; privkey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, signerinfo->cmsg->pwfn_arg); if (privkey == NULL) goto loser; algID = &cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm; break; case NSSCMSSignerID_SubjectKeyID: privkey = signerinfo->signingKey; signerinfo->signingKey = NULL; spki = SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(signerinfo->pubKey); SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(signerinfo->pubKey); signerinfo->pubKey = NULL; SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(NULL, &freeAlgID, &spki->algorithm); SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spki); algID = &freeAlgID; break; default: goto loser; } digestalgtag = NSS_CMSSignerInfo_GetDigestAlgTag(signerinfo); /* * XXX I think there should be a cert-level interface for this, * so that I do not have to know about subjectPublicKeyInfo... */ pubkAlgTag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algID); if (signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType == NSSCMSSignerID_SubjectKeyID) { SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(&freeAlgID, PR_FALSE); } if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) { SECOidTag signAlgTag; SECItem encoded_attrs; /* find and fill in the message digest attribute. */ rv = NSS_CMSAttributeArray_SetAttr(poolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST, digest, PR_FALSE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (contentType != NULL) { /* if the caller wants us to, find and fill in the content type attribute. */ rv = NSS_CMSAttributeArray_SetAttr(poolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE, contentType, PR_FALSE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } if ((tmppoolp = PORT_NewArena (1024)) == NULL) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); goto loser; } /* * Before encoding, reorder the attributes so that when they * are encoded, they will be conforming DER, which is required * to have a specific order and that is what must be used for * the hash/signature. We do this here, rather than building * it into EncodeAttributes, because we do not want to do * such reordering on incoming messages (which also uses * EncodeAttributes) or our old signatures (and other "broken" * implementations) will not verify. So, we want to guarantee * that we send out good DER encodings of attributes, but not * to expect to receive them. */ if (NSS_CMSAttributeArray_Reorder(signerinfo->authAttr) != SECSuccess) goto loser; encoded_attrs.data = NULL; encoded_attrs.len = 0; if (NSS_CMSAttributeArray_Encode(tmppoolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), &encoded_attrs) == NULL) goto loser; signAlgTag = SEC_GetSignatureAlgorithmOidTag(privkey->keyType, digestalgtag); if (signAlgTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); goto loser; } rv = SEC_SignData(&signature, encoded_attrs.data, encoded_attrs.len, privkey, signAlgTag); PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); /* awkward memory management :-( */ tmppoolp = 0; } else { rv = SGN_Digest(privkey, digestalgtag, &signature, digest); } SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey); privkey = NULL; if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(signerinfo->encDigest), &signature) != SECSuccess) goto loser; SECITEM_FreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE); if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(signerinfo->digestEncAlg), pubkAlgTag, NULL) != SECSuccess) goto loser; return SECSuccess; loser: if (signature.len != 0) SECITEM_FreeItem (&signature, PR_FALSE); if (privkey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey); if (tmppoolp) PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); return SECFailure; }
/* * SecCmsSignerInfoSign - sign something * */ OSStatus SecCmsSignerInfoSign(SecCmsSignerInfoRef signerinfo, CSSM_DATA_PTR digest, CSSM_DATA_PTR contentType) { SecCertificateRef cert; SecPrivateKeyRef privkey = NULL; SECOidTag digestalgtag; SECOidTag pubkAlgTag; CSSM_DATA signature = { 0 }; OSStatus rv; PLArenaPool *poolp, *tmppoolp = NULL; const SECAlgorithmID *algID; SECAlgorithmID freeAlgID; //CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki; PORT_Assert (digest != NULL); poolp = signerinfo->cmsg->poolp; switch (signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType) { case SecCmsSignerIDIssuerSN: privkey = signerinfo->signingKey; signerinfo->signingKey = NULL; cert = signerinfo->cert; if (SecCertificateGetAlgorithmID(cert,&algID)) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); goto loser; } break; case SecCmsSignerIDSubjectKeyID: privkey = signerinfo->signingKey; signerinfo->signingKey = NULL; #if 0 spki = SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(signerinfo->pubKey); SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(signerinfo->pubKey); signerinfo->pubKey = NULL; SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(NULL, &freeAlgID, &spki->algorithm); SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spki); algID = &freeAlgID; #else #if (TARGET_OS_MAC && !(TARGET_OS_EMBEDDED || TARGET_OS_IPHONE || TARGET_IPHONE_SIMULATOR)) if (SecKeyGetAlgorithmID(signerinfo->pubKey,&algID)) { #else /* TBD: Unify this code. Currently, iOS has an incompatible * SecKeyGetAlgorithmID implementation. */ if (true) { #endif PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); goto loser; } CFRelease(signerinfo->pubKey); signerinfo->pubKey = NULL; #endif break; default: PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto loser; } digestalgtag = SecCmsSignerInfoGetDigestAlgTag(signerinfo); /* * XXX I think there should be a cert-level interface for this, * so that I do not have to know about subjectPublicKeyInfo... */ pubkAlgTag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algID); if (signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType == SecCmsSignerIDSubjectKeyID) { SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(&freeAlgID, PR_FALSE); } #if 0 // @@@ Not yet /* Fortezza MISSI have weird signature formats. * Map them to standard DSA formats */ pubkAlgTag = PK11_FortezzaMapSig(pubkAlgTag); #endif if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) { CSSM_DATA encoded_attrs; /* find and fill in the message digest attribute. */ rv = SecCmsAttributeArraySetAttr(poolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST, digest, PR_FALSE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (contentType != NULL) { /* if the caller wants us to, find and fill in the content type attribute. */ rv = SecCmsAttributeArraySetAttr(poolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE, contentType, PR_FALSE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } if ((tmppoolp = PORT_NewArena (1024)) == NULL) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); goto loser; } /* * Before encoding, reorder the attributes so that when they * are encoded, they will be conforming DER, which is required * to have a specific order and that is what must be used for * the hash/signature. We do this here, rather than building * it into EncodeAttributes, because we do not want to do * such reordering on incoming messages (which also uses * EncodeAttributes) or our old signatures (and other "broken" * implementations) will not verify. So, we want to guarantee * that we send out good DER encodings of attributes, but not * to expect to receive them. */ if (SecCmsAttributeArrayReorder(signerinfo->authAttr) != SECSuccess) goto loser; encoded_attrs.Data = NULL; encoded_attrs.Length = 0; if (SecCmsAttributeArrayEncode(tmppoolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), &encoded_attrs) == NULL) goto loser; rv = SEC_SignData(&signature, encoded_attrs.Data, (int)encoded_attrs.Length, privkey, digestalgtag, pubkAlgTag); PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); /* awkward memory management :-( */ tmppoolp = 0; } else { rv = SGN_Digest(privkey, digestalgtag, pubkAlgTag, &signature, digest); } SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey); privkey = NULL; if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(signerinfo->encDigest), &signature) != SECSuccess) goto loser; SECITEM_FreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE); if(pubkAlgTag == SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) { /* * RFC 3278 section section 2.1.1 states that the signatureAlgorithm * field contains the full ecdsa-with-SHA1 OID, not plain old ecPublicKey * as would appear in other forms of signed datas. However Microsoft doesn't * do this, it puts ecPublicKey there, and if we put ecdsa-with-SHA1 there, * MS can't verify - presumably because it takes the digest of the digest * before feeding it to ECDSA. * We handle this with a preference; default if it's not there is * "Microsoft compatibility mode". */ if(!SecCmsMsEcdsaCompatMode()) { pubkAlgTag = SEC_OID_ECDSA_WithSHA1; } /* else violating the spec for compatibility */ } if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(signerinfo->digestEncAlg), pubkAlgTag, NULL) != SECSuccess) goto loser; return SECSuccess; loser: if (signature.Length != 0) SECITEM_FreeItem (&signature, PR_FALSE); if (privkey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey); if (tmppoolp) PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); return SECFailure; } OSStatus SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate(SecCmsSignerInfoRef signerinfo, SecKeychainRef keychainOrArray, CFTypeRef policies, SecTrustRef *trustRef) { SecCertificateRef cert; CFAbsoluteTime stime; OSStatus rv; CSSM_DATA_PTR *otherCerts; if ((cert = SecCmsSignerInfoGetSigningCertificate(signerinfo, keychainOrArray)) == NULL) { dprintf("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate: no signing cert\n"); signerinfo->verificationStatus = SecCmsVSSigningCertNotFound; return SECFailure; } /* * Get and convert the signing time; if available, it will be used * both on the cert verification and for importing the sender * email profile. */ CFTypeRef timeStampPolicies=SecPolicyCreateAppleTimeStampingAndRevocationPolicies(policies); if (SecCmsSignerInfoGetTimestampTimeWithPolicy(signerinfo, timeStampPolicies, &stime) != SECSuccess) if (SecCmsSignerInfoGetSigningTime(signerinfo, &stime) != SECSuccess) stime = CFAbsoluteTimeGetCurrent(); CFReleaseSafe(timeStampPolicies); rv = SecCmsSignedDataRawCerts(signerinfo->sigd, &otherCerts); if(rv) { return rv; } rv = CERT_VerifyCert(keychainOrArray, cert, otherCerts, policies, stime, trustRef); dprintfRC("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate after vfy: certp %p cert.rc %d\n", cert, (int)CFGetRetainCount(cert)); if (rv || !trustRef) { if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT) { /* Signature or digest level verificationStatus errors should supercede certificate level errors, so only change the verificationStatus if the status was GoodSignature. */ if (signerinfo->verificationStatus == SecCmsVSGoodSignature) signerinfo->verificationStatus = SecCmsVSSigningCertNotTrusted; } } /* FIXME isn't this leaking the cert? */ dprintf("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate: CertVerify rtn %d\n", (int)rv); return rv; }