/*
* This function is responsible for handling all SiP calls from the NS world
*/
uint64_t sip_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
uint64_t x1,
uint64_t x2,
uint64_t x3,
uint64_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
uint64_t flags)
{
switch (smc_fid) {
case SIP_SVC_CALL_COUNT:
/* Return the number of Mediatek SiP Service Calls. */
SMC_RET1(handle,
MTK_COMMON_SIP_NUM_CALLS + MTK_PLAT_SIP_NUM_CALLS);
case SIP_SVC_UID:
/* Return UID to the caller */
SMC_UUID_RET(handle, mtk_sip_svc_uid);
case SIP_SVC_VERSION:
/* Return the version of current implementation */
SMC_RET2(handle, MTK_SIP_SVC_VERSION_MAJOR,
MTK_SIP_SVC_VERSION_MINOR);
default:
return mediatek_sip_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4,
cookie, handle, flags);
}
}
int imx_otp_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
void *handle,
u_register_t x1,
u_register_t x2)
{
int ret;
uint32_t fuse;
switch (smc_fid) {
case IMX_SIP_OTP_READ:
ret = sc_misc_otp_fuse_read(ipc_handle, x1, &fuse);
SMC_RET2(handle, ret, fuse);
break;
case IMX_SIP_OTP_WRITE:
ret = sc_misc_otp_fuse_write(ipc_handle, x1, x2);
SMC_RET1(handle, ret);
break;
default:
ret = SMC_UNK;
SMC_RET1(handle, ret);
break;
}
return ret;
}
/**
* sip_svc_smc_handler() - Top-level SiP Service SMC handler
*
* Handler for all SiP SMC calls. Handles standard SIP requests
* and calls PM SMC handler if the call is for a PM-API function.
*/
uint64_t sip_svc_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
uint64_t x1,
uint64_t x2,
uint64_t x3,
uint64_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
uint64_t flags)
{
/* Let PM SMC handler deal with PM-related requests */
if (is_pm_fid(smc_fid)) {
return pm_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle,
flags);
}
switch (smc_fid) {
case ZYNQMP_SIP_SVC_CALL_COUNT:
/* PM functions + default functions */
SMC_RET1(handle, PM_API_MAX + 2);
case ZYNQMP_SIP_SVC_UID:
SMC_UUID_RET(handle, zynqmp_sip_uuid);
case ZYNQMP_SIP_SVC_VERSION:
SMC_RET2(handle, SIP_SVC_VERSION_MAJOR, SIP_SVC_VERSION_MINOR);
default:
WARN("Unimplemented SiP Service Call: 0x%x\n", smc_fid);
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the TSPD. It
* validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the TSP at
* 'tsp_sel1_intr_entry()' for handling the interrupt.
******************************************************************************/
static uint64_t tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id,
uint32_t flags,
void *handle,
void *cookie)
{
uint32_t linear_id;
tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx;
/* Check the security state when the exception was generated */
assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE);
/* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/* Save the non-secure context before entering the TSP */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/* Get a reference to this cpu's TSP context */
linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/*
* Determine if the TSP was previously preempted. Its last known
* context has to be preserved in this case.
* The TSP should return control to the TSPD after handling this
* S-EL1 interrupt. Preserve essential EL3 context to allow entry into
* the TSP at the S-EL1 interrupt entry point using the 'cpu_context'
* structure. There is no need to save the secure system register
* context since the TSP is supposed to preserve it during S-EL1
* interrupt handling.
*/
if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) {
tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
CTX_SPSR_EL3);
tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
CTX_ELR_EL3);
#if TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT
/*Need to save the previously interrupted secure context */
memcpy(&tsp_ctx->sp_ctx, &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE);
#endif
}
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->sel1_intr_entry,
SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS));
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
/*
* Tell the TSP that it has to handle a S-EL1 interrupt synchronously.
* Also the instruction in normal world where the interrupt was
* generated is passed for debugging purposes. It is safe to retrieve
* this address from ELR_EL3 as the secure context will not take effect
* until el3_exit().
*/
SMC_RET2(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, TSP_HANDLE_SEL1_INTR_AND_RETURN, read_elr_el3());
}
/*
* Top-level OEM Service SMC handler. This handler will in turn dispatch
* calls to related SMC handler
*/
uintptr_t oem_svc_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
u_register_t x1,
u_register_t x2,
u_register_t x3,
u_register_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
u_register_t flags)
{
/*
* Dispatch OEM calls to OEM Common handler and return its return value
*/
if (is_oem_fid(smc_fid)) {
return oem_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
handle, flags);
}
switch (smc_fid) {
case OEM_SVC_CALL_COUNT:
/*
* Return the number of OEM Service Calls.
*/
SMC_RET1(handle, OEM_SVC_NUM_CALLS);
case OEM_SVC_UID:
/* Return UID to the caller */
SMC_UUID_RET(handle, oem_svc_uid);
case OEM_SVC_VERSION:
/* Return the version of current implementation */
SMC_RET2(handle, OEM_VERSION_MAJOR, OEM_VERSION_MINOR);
default:
WARN("Unimplemented OEM Service Call: 0x%x\n", smc_fid);
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
* range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention
* Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload
* to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it
* will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the
* work assigned to it.
******************************************************************************/
uint64_t tlkd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
uint64_t x1,
uint64_t x2,
uint64_t x3,
uint64_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
uint64_t flags)
{
cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
gp_regs_t *gp_regs;
uint32_t ns;
uint64_t par;
/* Passing a NULL context is a critical programming error */
assert(handle);
/* These SMCs are only supported by CPU0 */
if ((read_mpidr() & MPIDR_CPU_MASK) != 0)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
switch (smc_fid) {
/*
* This function ID is used by SP to indicate that it was
* preempted by a non-secure world IRQ.
*/
case TLK_PREEMPTED:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/*
* Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
* secure system register context since the SP was supposed
* to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1);
/*
* Request from non secure world to resume the preempted
* Standard SMC call.
*/
case TLK_RESUME_FID:
/* RESUME should be invoked only by normal world */
if (!ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* This is a resume request from the non-secure client.
* save the non-secure state and send the request to
* the secure payload.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/* Check if we are already preempted before resume */
if (!get_std_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state))
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* secure payload to do the work now.
*/
/* We just need to return to the preempted point in
* SP and the execution will resume as normal.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
SMC_RET0(handle);
/*
* This is a request from the non-secure context to:
*
* a. register shared memory with the SP for storing it's
* activity logs.
* b. register shared memory with the SP for passing args
* required for maintaining sessions with the Trusted
* Applications.
* c. open/close sessions
* d. issue commands to the Trusted Apps
*/
case TLK_REGISTER_LOGBUF:
case TLK_REGISTER_REQBUF:
case TLK_OPEN_TA_SESSION:
case TLK_CLOSE_TA_SESSION:
case TLK_TA_LAUNCH_OP:
case TLK_TA_SEND_EVENT:
if (!ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* This is a fresh request from the non-secure client.
* The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which
* registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure
* state and send the request to the secure payload.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/* Check if we are already preempted */
if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state))
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/*
* Verify if there is a valid context to use.
*/
assert(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/*
* Mark the SP state as active.
*/
set_std_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state);
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* secure payload to do the work now.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
/*
* TLK is a 32-bit Trusted OS and so expects the SMC
* arguments via r0-r7. TLK expects the monitor frame
* registers to be 64-bits long. Hence, we pass x0 in
* r0-r1, x1 in r2-r3, x3 in r4-r5 and x4 in r6-r7.
*
* As smc_fid is a uint32 value, r1 contains 0.
*/
gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx);
write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X4, (uint32_t)x2);
write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X5, (uint32_t)(x2 >> 32));
write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X6, (uint32_t)x3);
write_ctx_reg(gp_regs, CTX_GPREG_X7, (uint32_t)(x3 >> 32));
SMC_RET4(&tlk_ctx.cpu_ctx, smc_fid, 0, (uint32_t)x1,
(uint32_t)(x1 >> 32));
/*
* Translate NS/EL1-S virtual addresses.
*
* x1 = virtual address
* x3 = type (NS/S)
*
* Returns PA:lo in r0, PA:hi in r1.
*/
case TLK_VA_TRANSLATE:
/* Should be invoked only by secure world */
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/* NS virtual addresses are 64-bit long */
if (x3 & TLK_TRANSLATE_NS_VADDR)
x1 = (uint32_t)x1 | (x2 << 32);
if (!x1)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* TODO: Sanity check x1. This would require platform
* support.
*/
/* virtual address and type: ns/s */
par = tlkd_va_translate(x1, x3);
/* return physical address in r0-r1 */
SMC_RET4(handle, (uint32_t)par, (uint32_t)(par >> 32), 0, 0);
/*
* This is a request from the SP to mark completion of
* a standard function ID.
*/
case TLK_REQUEST_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* Mark the SP state as inactive.
*/
clr_std_smc_active_flag(tlk_ctx.state);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/*
* This is a request completion SMC and we must switch to
* the non-secure world to pass the result.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/*
* We are done stashing the secure context. Switch to the
* non-secure context and return the result.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1);
/*
* This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished initialising itself after a cold boot
*/
case TLK_ENTRY_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* SP has been successfully initialized. Register power
* managemnt hooks with PSCI
*/
psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tlkd_pm_ops);
/*
* TLK reports completion. The SPD must have initiated
* the original request through a synchronous entry
* into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime
* context.
*/
tlkd_synchronous_sp_exit(&tlk_ctx, x1);
/*
* Return the number of service function IDs implemented to
* provide service to non-secure
*/
case TOS_CALL_COUNT:
SMC_RET1(handle, TLK_NUM_FID);
/*
* Return TLK's UID to the caller
*/
case TOS_UID:
SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tlk_uuid);
/*
* Return the version of current implementation
*/
case TOS_CALL_VERSION:
SMC_RET2(handle, TLK_VERSION_MAJOR, TLK_VERSION_MINOR);
default:
break;
}
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
/*
* Handle SMC from a lower exception level to switch its execution state
* (either from AArch64 to AArch32, or vice versa).
*
* smc_fid:
* SMC function ID - either ARM_SIP_SVC_STATE_SWITCH_64 or
* ARM_SIP_SVC_STATE_SWITCH_32.
* pc_hi, pc_lo:
* PC upon re-entry to the calling exception level; width dependent on the
* calling exception level.
* cookie_hi, cookie_lo:
* Opaque pointer pairs received from the caller to pass it back, upon
* re-entry.
* handle:
* Handle to saved context.
*/
int arm_execution_state_switch(unsigned int smc_fid,
uint32_t pc_hi,
uint32_t pc_lo,
uint32_t cookie_hi,
uint32_t cookie_lo,
void *handle)
{
/* Execution state can be switched only if EL3 is AArch64 */
#ifdef AARCH64
int caller_64, from_el2, el, endianness, thumb = 0;
u_register_t spsr, pc, scr, sctlr;
entry_point_info_t ep;
cpu_context_t *ctx = (cpu_context_t *) handle;
el3_state_t *el3_ctx = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
/* That the SMC originated from NS is already validated by the caller */
/*
* Disallow state switch if any of the secondaries have been brought up.
*/
if (psci_secondaries_brought_up())
goto exec_denied;
spsr = read_ctx_reg(el3_ctx, CTX_SPSR_EL3);
caller_64 = (GET_RW(spsr) == MODE_RW_64);
if (caller_64) {
/*
* If the call originated from AArch64, expect 32-bit pointers when
* switching to AArch32.
*/
if ((pc_hi != 0) || (cookie_hi != 0))
goto invalid_param;
pc = pc_lo;
/* Instruction state when entering AArch32 */
thumb = pc & 1;
} else {
/* Construct AArch64 PC */
pc = (((u_register_t) pc_hi) << 32) | pc_lo;
}
/* Make sure PC is 4-byte aligned, except for Thumb */
if ((pc & 0x3) && !thumb)
goto invalid_param;
/*
* EL3 controls register width of the immediate lower EL only. Expect
* this request from EL2/Hyp unless:
*
* - EL2 is not implemented;
* - EL2 is implemented, but was disabled. This can be inferred from
* SCR_EL3.HCE.
*/
from_el2 = caller_64 ? (GET_EL(spsr) == MODE_EL2) :
(GET_M32(spsr) == MODE32_hyp);
scr = read_ctx_reg(el3_ctx, CTX_SCR_EL3);
if (!from_el2) {
/* The call is from NS privilege level other than HYP */
/*
* Disallow switching state if there's a Hypervisor in place;
* this request must be taken up with the Hypervisor instead.
*/
if (scr & SCR_HCE_BIT)
goto exec_denied;
}
/*
* Return to the caller using the same endianness. Extract
* endianness bit from the respective system control register
* directly.
*/
sctlr = from_el2 ? read_sctlr_el2() : read_sctlr_el1();
endianness = !!(sctlr & SCTLR_EE_BIT);
/* Construct SPSR for the exception state we're about to switch to */
if (caller_64) {
int impl;
/*
* Switching from AArch64 to AArch32. Ensure this CPU implements
* the target EL in AArch32.
*/
impl = from_el2 ? EL_IMPLEMENTED(2) : EL_IMPLEMENTED(1);
if (impl != EL_IMPL_A64_A32)
goto exec_denied;
/* Return to the equivalent AArch32 privilege level */
el = from_el2 ? MODE32_hyp : MODE32_svc;
spsr = SPSR_MODE32(el, thumb ? SPSR_T_THUMB : SPSR_T_ARM,
endianness, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
} else {
/*
* Switching from AArch32 to AArch64. Since it's not possible to
* implement an EL as AArch32-only (from which this call was
* raised), it's safe to assume AArch64 is also implemented.
*/
el = from_el2 ? MODE_EL2 : MODE_EL1;
spsr = SPSR_64(el, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
}
/*
* Use the context management library to re-initialize the existing
* context with the execution state flipped. Since the library takes
* entry_point_info_t pointer as the argument, construct a dummy one
* with PC, state width, endianness, security etc. appropriately set.
* Other entries in the entry point structure are irrelevant for
* purpose.
*/
zeromem(&ep, sizeof(ep));
ep.pc = pc;
ep.spsr = spsr;
SET_PARAM_HEAD(&ep, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1,
((endianness ? EP_EE_BIG : EP_EE_LITTLE) | NON_SECURE |
EP_ST_DISABLE));
/*
* Re-initialize the system register context, and exit EL3 as if for the
* first time. State switch is effectively a soft reset of the
* calling EL.
*/
cm_init_my_context(&ep);
cm_prepare_el3_exit(NON_SECURE);
/*
* State switch success. The caller of SMC wouldn't see the SMC
* returning. Instead, execution starts at the supplied entry point,
* with context pointers populated in registers 0 and 1.
*/
SMC_RET2(handle, cookie_hi, cookie_lo);
invalid_param:
SMC_RET1(handle, STATE_SW_E_PARAM);
exec_denied:
#endif
/* State switch denied */
SMC_RET1(handle, STATE_SW_E_DENIED);
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
* range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention
* Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload
* to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it
* will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the
* work assigned to it.
******************************************************************************/
uint64_t tspd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
uint64_t x1,
uint64_t x2,
uint64_t x3,
uint64_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
uint64_t flags)
{
cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(), ns;
tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
uint64_t rc;
#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC
entry_point_info_t *next_image_info;
#endif
/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
switch (smc_fid) {
/*
* This function ID is used by TSP to indicate that it was
* preempted by a normal world IRQ.
*
*/
case TSP_PREEMPTED:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
return tspd_handle_sp_preemption(handle);
/*
* This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it has
* finished handling a S-EL1 FIQ interrupt. Execution should resume
* in the normal world.
*/
case TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_FIQ:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/*
* Restore the relevant EL3 state which saved to service
* this SMC.
*/
if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) {
SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
CTX_SPSR_EL3,
tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3);
SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
CTX_ELR_EL3,
tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3);
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Need to restore the previously interrupted
* secure context.
*/
memcpy(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, &tsp_ctx->sp_ctx,
TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE);
#endif
}
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/*
* Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
* secure system register context since the TSP was supposed
* to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context);
/*
* This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it was
* interrupted due to a EL3 FIQ interrupt. Execution should resume
* in the normal world.
*/
case TSP_EL3_FIQ:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/* Assert that standard SMC execution has been preempted */
assert(get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state));
/* Save the secure system register state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/* Restore non-secure state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, TSP_EL3_FIQ);
/*
* This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished initialising itself after a cold boot
*/
case TSP_ENTRY_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* Stash the SP entry points information. This is done
* only once on the primary cpu
*/
assert(tsp_vectors == NULL);
tsp_vectors = (tsp_vectors_t *) x1;
if (tsp_vectors) {
set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON);
/*
* TSP has been successfully initialized. Register power
* managemnt hooks with PSCI
*/
psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tspd_pm);
/*
* Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts
* when generated during code executing in the
* non-secure state.
*/
flags = 0;
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler,
flags);
if (rc)
panic();
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Register an interrupt handler for NS interrupts when
* generated during code executing in secure state are
* routed to EL3.
*/
flags = 0;
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_NS,
tspd_ns_interrupt_handler,
flags);
if (rc)
panic();
/*
* Disable the interrupt NS locally since it will be enabled globally
* within cm_init_my_context.
*/
disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);
#endif
}
#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC
/* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */
assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Program EL3 registers to enable entry into the next EL */
next_image_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(NON_SECURE);
assert(next_image_info);
assert(NON_SECURE ==
GET_SECURITY_STATE(next_image_info->h.attr));
cm_init_my_context(next_image_info);
cm_prepare_el3_exit(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET0(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
#else
/*
* SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated
* the original request through a synchronous entry
* into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime
* context.
*/
tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
#endif
/*
* These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished:
* 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci
* cpu_on request
* 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
*/
case TSP_ON_DONE:
case TSP_RESUME_DONE:
/*
* These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished:
* 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
* 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci
* cpu_off request.
*/
case TSP_OFF_DONE:
case TSP_SUSPEND_DONE:
case TSP_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE:
case TSP_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated the
* original request through a synchronous entry into the SP.
* Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as
* return value to the caller
*/
tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
/*
* Request from non-secure client to perform an
* arithmetic operation or response from secure
* payload to an earlier request.
*/
case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_ADD):
case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_SUB):
case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_MUL):
case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_DIV):
case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_ADD):
case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_SUB):
case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_MUL):
case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_DIV):
if (ns) {
/*
* This is a fresh request from the non-secure client.
* The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which
* registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure
* state and send the request to the secure payload.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/* Check if we are already preempted */
if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state))
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/* Save x1 and x2 for use by TSP_GET_ARGS call below */
store_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2);
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* secure payload to do the work now.
*/
/*
* Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the
* operation type and parameters to the secure context
* and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure
* payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit
* from this function.
*/
assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/* Set appropriate entry for SMC.
* We expect the TSP to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F
* flags as appropriate.
*/
if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) {
cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
&tsp_vectors->fast_smc_entry);
} else {
set_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state);
cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
&tsp_vectors->std_smc_entry);
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Enable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3
* during STD SMC processing on this core.
*/
enable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);
#endif
}
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
SMC_RET3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2);
} else {
/*
* This is the result from the secure client of an
* earlier request. The results are in x1-x3. Copy it
* into the non-secure context, save the secure state
* and return to the non-secure state.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/* Restore non-secure state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_STD) {
clr_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state);
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Disable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3
* after STD SMC processing is finished on this
* core.
*/
disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);
#endif
}
SMC_RET3(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3);
}
break;
/*
* Request from non secure world to resume the preempted
* Standard SMC call.
*/
case TSP_FID_RESUME:
/* RESUME should be invoked only by normal world */
if (!ns) {
assert(0);
break;
}
/*
* This is a resume request from the non-secure client.
* save the non-secure state and send the request to
* the secure payload.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/* Check if we are already preempted before resume */
if (!get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state))
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* secure payload to do the work now.
*/
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Enable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3 during resumption
* of STD SMC call on this core.
*/
enable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);
#endif
/* We just need to return to the preempted point in
* TSP and the execution will resume as normal.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
SMC_RET0(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
/*
* This is a request from the secure payload for more arguments
* for an ongoing arithmetic operation requested by the
* non-secure world. Simply return the arguments from the non-
* secure client in the original call.
*/
case TSP_GET_ARGS:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
get_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2);
SMC_RET2(handle, x1, x2);
case TOS_CALL_COUNT:
/*
* Return the number of service function IDs implemented to
* provide service to non-secure
*/
SMC_RET1(handle, TSP_NUM_FID);
case TOS_UID:
/* Return TSP UID to the caller */
SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tsp_uuid);
case TOS_CALL_VERSION:
/* Return the version of current implementation */
SMC_RET2(handle, TSP_VERSION_MAJOR, TSP_VERSION_MINOR);
default:
break;
}
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
/*
* Top-level Standard Service SMC handler. This handler will in turn dispatch
* calls to PSCI SMC handler
*/
static uintptr_t std_svc_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
u_register_t x1,
u_register_t x2,
u_register_t x3,
u_register_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
u_register_t flags)
{
/*
* Dispatch PSCI calls to PSCI SMC handler and return its return
* value
*/
if (is_psci_fid(smc_fid)) {
uint64_t ret;
#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
/*
* Flush cache line so that even if CPU power down happens
* the timestamp update is reflected in memory.
*/
PMF_WRITE_TIMESTAMP(rt_instr_svc,
RT_INSTR_ENTER_PSCI,
PMF_CACHE_MAINT,
get_cpu_data(cpu_data_pmf_ts[CPU_DATA_PMF_TS0_IDX]));
#endif
ret = psci_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4,
cookie, handle, flags);
#if ENABLE_RUNTIME_INSTRUMENTATION
PMF_CAPTURE_TIMESTAMP(rt_instr_svc,
RT_INSTR_EXIT_PSCI,
PMF_NO_CACHE_MAINT);
#endif
SMC_RET1(handle, ret);
}
#if ENABLE_SPM && SPM_DEPRECATED
/*
* Dispatch SPM calls to SPM SMC handler and return its return
* value
*/
if (is_spm_fid(smc_fid)) {
return spm_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
handle, flags);
}
#endif
#if SDEI_SUPPORT
if (is_sdei_fid(smc_fid)) {
return sdei_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie, handle,
flags);
}
#endif
switch (smc_fid) {
case ARM_STD_SVC_CALL_COUNT:
/*
* Return the number of Standard Service Calls. PSCI is the only
* standard service implemented; so return number of PSCI calls
*/
SMC_RET1(handle, PSCI_NUM_CALLS);
case ARM_STD_SVC_UID:
/* Return UID to the caller */
SMC_UUID_RET(handle, arm_svc_uid);
case ARM_STD_SVC_VERSION:
/* Return the version of current implementation */
SMC_RET2(handle, STD_SVC_VERSION_MAJOR, STD_SVC_VERSION_MINOR);
default:
WARN("Unimplemented Standard Service Call: 0x%x \n", smc_fid);
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the FIQD. It
* validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the TSP at
* 'tsp_fiq_entry()' for handling the interrupt.
******************************************************************************/
static uint64_t fiqd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id,
uint32_t flags,
void *handle,
void *cookie)
{
unsigned int iar;
/* Check the security state when the exception was generated */
assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE);
#if IMF_READ_INTERRUPT_ID
/* Check the security status of the interrupt */
assert(plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(id) == INTR_TYPE_S_EL1);
#endif
/* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/* Save the non-secure context before entering the TSP */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
iar = get_ack_info();
ack_sgi(iar);
if(id == WDT_IRQ_BIT_ID)
{
/* FIX-ME : change 0xFE to the kernel online CPU mask */
fiq_smp_call_function(0xFE, aee_wdt_dump, 0, 0);
aee_wdt_dump();
}
if(id == FIQ_SMP_CALL_SGI)
{
fiq_icc_isr();
}
SMC_RET0(handle);
#if 0
/* Get a reference to this cpu's TSP context */
linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr);
tsp_ctx = &fiqd_sp_context[linear_id];
assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/*
* Determine if the TSP was previously preempted. Its last known
* context has to be preserved in this case.
* The TSP should return control to the FIQD after handling this
* FIQ. Preserve essential EL3 context to allow entry into the
* TSP at the FIQ entry point using the 'cpu_context' structure.
* There is no need to save the secure system register context
* since the TSP is supposed to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt
* handling.
*/
if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) {
tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
CTX_SPSR_EL3);
tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
CTX_ELR_EL3);
}
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->fiq_entry,
SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS));
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
/*
* Tell the TSP that it has to handle an FIQ synchronously. Also the
* instruction in normal world where the interrupt was generated is
* passed for debugging purposes. It is safe to retrieve this address
* from ELR_EL3 as the secure context will not take effect until
* el3_exit().
*/
SMC_RET2(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, TSP_HANDLE_FIQ_AND_RETURN, read_elr_el3());
#endif
}
/*
* This function handles ARM defined SiP Calls
*/
static uintptr_t arm_sip_handler(unsigned int smc_fid,
u_register_t x1,
u_register_t x2,
u_register_t x3,
u_register_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
u_register_t flags)
{
int call_count = 0;
/*
* Dispatch PMF calls to PMF SMC handler and return its return
* value
*/
if (is_pmf_fid(smc_fid)) {
return pmf_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
handle, flags);
}
switch (smc_fid) {
case ARM_SIP_SVC_EXE_STATE_SWITCH: {
u_register_t pc;
/* Allow calls from non-secure only */
if (!is_caller_non_secure(flags))
SMC_RET1(handle, STATE_SW_E_DENIED);
/* Validate supplied entry point */
pc = (u_register_t) ((x1 << 32) | (uint32_t) x2);
if (arm_validate_ns_entrypoint(pc) != 0)
SMC_RET1(handle, STATE_SW_E_PARAM);
/*
* Pointers used in execution state switch are all 32 bits wide
*/
return (uintptr_t) arm_execution_state_switch(smc_fid,
(uint32_t) x1, (uint32_t) x2, (uint32_t) x3,
(uint32_t) x4, handle);
}
case ARM_SIP_SVC_CALL_COUNT:
/* PMF calls */
call_count += PMF_NUM_SMC_CALLS;
/* State switch call */
call_count += 1;
SMC_RET1(handle, call_count);
case ARM_SIP_SVC_UID:
/* Return UID to the caller */
SMC_UUID_RET(handle, arm_sip_svc_uid);
case ARM_SIP_SVC_VERSION:
/* Return the version of current implementation */
SMC_RET2(handle, ARM_SIP_SVC_VERSION_MAJOR, ARM_SIP_SVC_VERSION_MINOR);
default:
WARN("Unimplemented ARM SiP Service Call: 0x%x \n", smc_fid);
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
}