/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
* <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
* certificate, and <b>nickname</b> set to the nickname to use.
*
* You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it,
* it generates new certificates; all new connections will use
* the new SSL context.
*/
int
tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *rsa = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL;
char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL;
tor_tls_init();
nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
/* Generate short-term RSA key. */
if (!(rsa = crypto_new_pk_env()))
goto error;
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa)<0)
goto error;
/* Create certificate signed by identity key. */
cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2,
key_lifetime);
/* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */
idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2,
IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME);
if (!cert || !idcert) {
log(LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate");
goto error;
}
result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
result->refcnt = 1;
result->my_cert = X509_dup(cert);
result->my_id_cert = X509_dup(idcert);
result->key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
#ifdef EVERYONE_HAS_AES
/* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1 */
if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
goto error;
#else
/* Tell OpenSSL to use SSL3 or TLS1 but not SSL2. */
if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
goto error;
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
#endif
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data.
*/
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
/* Don't actually allow compression; it uses ram and time, but the data
* we transmit is all encrypted anyway. */
if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
#endif
if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
goto error;
X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */
cert=NULL;
if (idcert) {
X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
tor_assert(s);
X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert);
X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */
idcert = NULL;
}
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
tor_assert(rsa);
if (!(pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa,1)))
goto error;
if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
goto error;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
goto error;
{
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = crypto_dh_new();
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, _crypto_dh_env_get_dh(dh));
crypto_dh_free(dh);
}
SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
always_accept_verify_cb);
/* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
/* Free the old context if one exists. */
if (global_tls_context) {
/* This is safe even if there are open connections: OpenSSL does
* reference counting with SSL and SSL_CTX objects. */
tor_tls_context_decref(global_tls_context);
}
global_tls_context = result;
if (rsa)
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa);
tor_free(nickname);
tor_free(nn2);
return 0;
error:
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, "creating TLS context");
tor_free(nickname);
tor_free(nn2);
if (pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (rsa)
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa);
if (result)
tor_tls_context_decref(result);
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
if (idcert)
X509_free(idcert);
return -1;
}
hs_desc_intro_point_t *
hs_helper_build_intro_point(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp, time_t now,
const char *addr, int legacy)
{
int ret;
ed25519_keypair_t auth_kp;
hs_desc_intro_point_t *intro_point = NULL;
hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip = hs_desc_intro_point_new();
/* For a usable intro point we need at least two link specifiers: One legacy
* keyid and one ipv4 */
{
tor_addr_t a;
tor_addr_make_unspec(&a);
link_specifier_t *ls_legacy = link_specifier_new();
link_specifier_t *ls_ip = link_specifier_new();
link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls_legacy, LS_LEGACY_ID);
memset(link_specifier_getarray_un_legacy_id(ls_legacy), 'C',
link_specifier_getlen_un_legacy_id(ls_legacy));
int family = tor_addr_parse(&a, addr);
switch (family) {
case AF_INET:
link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls_ip, LS_IPV4);
link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_addr(ls_ip, tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&a));
link_specifier_set_un_ipv4_port(ls_ip, 9001);
break;
case AF_INET6:
link_specifier_set_ls_type(ls_ip, LS_IPV6);
memcpy(link_specifier_getarray_un_ipv6_addr(ls_ip),
tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(&a),
link_specifier_getlen_un_ipv6_addr(ls_ip));
link_specifier_set_un_ipv6_port(ls_ip, 9001);
break;
default:
/* Stop the test, not supposed to have an error.
* Compare with -1 to show the actual family.
*/
tt_int_op(family, OP_EQ, -1);
}
smartlist_add(ip->link_specifiers, ls_legacy);
smartlist_add(ip->link_specifiers, ls_ip);
}
ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&auth_kp, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0);
ip->auth_key_cert = tor_cert_create(signing_kp, CERT_TYPE_AUTH_HS_IP_KEY,
&auth_kp.pubkey, now,
HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
tt_assert(ip->auth_key_cert);
if (legacy) {
ip->legacy.key = crypto_pk_new();
tt_assert(ip->legacy.key);
ret = crypto_pk_generate_key(ip->legacy.key);
tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0);
ssize_t cert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(
&signing_kp->pubkey, ip->legacy.key,
now + HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
&ip->legacy.cert.encoded);
tt_assert(ip->legacy.cert.encoded);
tt_u64_op(cert_len, OP_GT, 0);
ip->legacy.cert.len = cert_len;
}
/* Encryption key. */
{
int signbit;
curve25519_keypair_t curve25519_kp;
ed25519_keypair_t ed25519_kp;
tor_cert_t *cross_cert;
ret = curve25519_keypair_generate(&curve25519_kp, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, ==, 0);
ed25519_keypair_from_curve25519_keypair(&ed25519_kp, &signbit,
&curve25519_kp);
cross_cert = tor_cert_create(signing_kp, CERT_TYPE_CROSS_HS_IP_KEYS,
&ed25519_kp.pubkey, time(NULL),
HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
tt_assert(cross_cert);
ip->enc_key_cert = cross_cert;
}
intro_point = ip;
done:
if (intro_point == NULL)
tor_free(ip);
return intro_point;
}
