krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV krb5_decode_authdata_container(krb5_context context, krb5_authdatatype type, const krb5_authdata *container, krb5_authdata ***authdata) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_data data; *authdata = NULL; if ((container->ad_type & AD_TYPE_FIELD_TYPE_MASK) != type) return EINVAL; data.length = container->length; data.data = (char *)container->contents; code = decode_krb5_authdata(&data, authdata); if (code) return code; return 0; }
/*ARGSUSED*/ krb5_error_code process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from, krb5_data **response) { krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0; krb5_kdc_req *request = 0; krb5_db_entry server; krb5_kdc_rep reply; krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart; krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0; int st_idx = 0; krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply; krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited; int newtransited = 0; krb5_error_code retval = 0; int nprincs = 0; krb5_boolean more; krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0; krb5_keyblock session_key; krb5_timestamp until, rtime; krb5_keyblock encrypting_key; krb5_key_data *server_key; char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *tmp = 0; const char *fromstring = 0; krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry; /* krb5_address *noaddrarray[1]; */ krb5_enctype useenctype; int errcode, errcode2; register int i; int firstpass = 1; const char *status = 0; char ktypestr[128]; char rep_etypestr[128]; char fromstringbuf[70]; session_key.contents = 0; retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request); if (retval) return retval; if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE; ktypes2str(ktypestr, sizeof(ktypestr), request->nktypes, request->ktype); /* * setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer. */ if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) { krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request); return retval; } fromstring = inet_ntop(ADDRTYPE2FAMILY(from->address->addrtype), from->address->contents, fromstringbuf, sizeof(fromstringbuf)); if (!fromstring) fromstring = "<unknown>"; if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) { status = "UNPARSING SERVER"; goto cleanup; } limit_string(sname); /* errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &req_authdat); */ errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket, &subkey); if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 && (errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, header_ticket->enc_part2->client, &cname))) { status = "UNPARSING CLIENT"; errcode = errcode2; goto cleanup; } limit_string(cname); if (errcode) { status = "PROCESS_TGS"; goto cleanup; } if (!header_ticket) { errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */ status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket"; goto cleanup; } /* * We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can * use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been * decrypted with the session key. */ authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime; /* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ header? */ nprincs = 1; if ((errcode = get_principal(kdc_context, request->server, &server, &nprincs, &more))) { status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER"; nprincs = 0; goto cleanup; } tgt_again: if (more) { status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE; goto cleanup; } else if (nprincs != 1) { /* * might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we * should do our best to find such a TGS in this db */ if (firstpass && krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) { if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) { krb5_data *server_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1); krb5_data *tgs_1 = krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1); if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) { krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs); find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs); firstpass = 0; goto tgt_again; } } } krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs); status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN; goto cleanup; } if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) { status = "TIME_OF_DAY"; goto cleanup; } if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket, kdc_time, &status))) { if (!status) status = "UNKNOWN_REASON"; errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; goto cleanup; } /* * We pick the session keytype here.... * * Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user * case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server * which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We * know that it at least must be able to support the encryption * type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be * able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference * to anything else. */ useenctype = 0; if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) { krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key; krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno; krb5_enctype etype; /* * Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it. */ if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx], &st_sealing_key, &st_srv_kvno))) { status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER"; goto cleanup; } errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key, request->second_ticket[st_idx]); krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key); if (errcode) { status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT"; goto cleanup; } etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype; if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) { status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; goto cleanup; } for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) { if (request->ktype[i] == etype) { useenctype = etype; break; } } } /* * Select the keytype for the ticket session key. */ if ((useenctype == 0) && (useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server, request->nktypes, request->ktype)) == 0) { /* unsupported ktype */ status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; goto cleanup; } errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key); if (errcode) { /* random key failed */ status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED"; goto cleanup; } ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */ enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0; enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0; /* * Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the * authtime's value. */ if (!(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime)) header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime; /* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_ticket->enc_part2->caddrs; /* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */ reply_encpart.caddrs = 0; /* optional...don't put it in */ /* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */ /* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */ /* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) { setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED); /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses; reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses; } if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) { setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY); /* include new addresses in ticket & reply */ enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses; reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses; } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) { setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED); setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID); enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from; } else enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time; if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) { /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs to the caller */ ticket_reply = *(header_ticket); enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2); enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL; clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID); } if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) { krb5_deltat old_life; /* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs to the caller */ ticket_reply = *(header_ticket); enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2); enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL; old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime; enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time; enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime = min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till, kdc_time + old_life); } else { /* not a renew request */ enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time; until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till; enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime = min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm, header_ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime))); if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) && (enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) && isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) { setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE); request->rtime = min(request->till, header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till); } } rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime; if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) { /* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */ setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE); enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = min(rtime, min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till, enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + min(server.max_renewable_life, max_renewable_life_for_realm))); } else { enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0; } /* * Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's */ enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime; /* * Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket. */ if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH); if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH)) setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH); /* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present. so we can nuke it if it matches */ if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime) enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0; /* assemble any authorization data */ if (request->authorization_data.ciphertext.data) { krb5_data scratch; scratch.length = request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length; if (!(scratch.data = malloc(request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length))) { status = "AUTH_NOMEM"; errcode = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } if ((errcode = krb5_c_decrypt(kdc_context, header_ticket->enc_part2->session, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SESSKEY, 0, &request->authorization_data, &scratch))) { status = "AUTH_ENCRYPT_FAIL"; free(scratch.data); goto cleanup; } /* scratch now has the authorization data, so we decode it */ errcode = decode_krb5_authdata(&scratch, &(request->unenc_authdata)); free(scratch.data); if (errcode) { status = "AUTH_DECODE"; goto cleanup; } if ((errcode = concat_authorization_data(request->unenc_authdata, header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data, &enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data))) { status = "CONCAT_AUTH"; goto cleanup; } } else enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data; enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key; enc_tkt_reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client; enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */ /* * Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if * it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different * than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already * implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly * listed). */ /* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */ if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) || realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) { /* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */ enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_ticket->enc_part2->transited; } else { /* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */ /* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */ if (header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type != KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) { status = "BAD_TRTYPE"; errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP; goto cleanup; } enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS; enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0; enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0; enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0; enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0; enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited; if ((errcode = add_to_transited(&header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents, &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client, request->server))) { status = "ADD_TR_FAIL"; goto cleanup; } newtransited = 1; } if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) { unsigned int tlen; char *tdots; errcode = krb5_check_transited_list (kdc_context, &enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents, krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_ticket->enc_part2->client), krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server)); tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length; tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : ""; tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen; if (errcode == 0) { setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED); } else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT) krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' " "via '%.*s%s'", cname ? cname : "<unknown client>", sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", tlen, enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data, tdots); else { const char *emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode); krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR, "unexpected error checking transit from " "'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s", cname ? cname : "<unknown client>", sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", tlen, enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data, tdots, emsg); krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg); } } else krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path"); if (reject_bad_transit && !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) { errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; status = "BAD_TRANSIT"; goto cleanup; } ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply; /* * If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure * that the client for the second ticket matches the request * server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of * the second ticket. */ if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) { /* * Make sure the client for the second ticket matches * requested server. */ krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2; krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client; if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) { if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &tmp))) tmp = 0; if (tmp != NULL) limit_string(tmp); krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ %s: 2ND_TKT_MISMATCH: " "authtime %d, %s for %s, 2nd tkt client %s", fromstring, authtime, cname ? cname : "<unknown client>", sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", tmp ? tmp : "<unknown>"); errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH; goto cleanup; } ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = 0; ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype; if ((errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, t2enc->session, &ticket_reply))) { status = "2ND_TKT_ENCRYPT"; goto cleanup; } st_idx++; } else { /* * Find the server key */ if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server, -1, /* ignore keytype */ -1, /* Ignore salttype */ 0, /* Get highest kvno */ &server_key))) { status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY"; goto cleanup; } /* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted * in the database) */ if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, &master_keyblock, server_key, &encrypting_key, NULL))) { status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY"; goto cleanup; } errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key, &ticket_reply); krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key); if (errcode) { status = "TKT_ENCRYPT"; goto cleanup; } ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno; } /* Start assembling the response */ reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP; reply.padata = 0; /* always */ reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client; reply.enc_part.kvno = 0; /* We are using the session key */ reply.ticket = &ticket_reply; reply_encpart.session = &session_key; reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce; /* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location is used for ktime */ reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times; reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime; /* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present. so we can nuke it if it matches */ if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime) enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0; nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE; nolrentry.value = 0; nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry; nolrarray[1] = 0; reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */ reply_encpart.key_exp = 0; /* ditto */ reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags; reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server; /* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key in the AP_REQ */ reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype : header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype; errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart, subkey ? 1 : 0, subkey ? subkey : header_ticket->enc_part2->session, &reply, response); if (errcode) { status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP"; } else { status = "ISSUE"; } memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0, ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length); free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data); /* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */ memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0, reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length); free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data); cleanup: if (status) { const char * emsg = NULL; if (!errcode) rep_etypes2str(rep_etypestr, sizeof(rep_etypestr), &reply); if (errcode) emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode); krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "TGS_REQ (%s) %s: %s: authtime %d, " "%s%s %s for %s%s%s", ktypestr, fromstring, status, authtime, !errcode ? rep_etypestr : "", !errcode ? "," : "", cname ? cname : "<unknown client>", sname ? sname : "<unknown server>", errcode ? ", " : "", errcode ? emsg : ""); if (errcode) krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg); } if (errcode) { int got_err = 0; if (status == 0) { status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode); got_err = 1; } errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128) errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC; retval = prepare_error_tgs(request, header_ticket, errcode, fromstring, response, status); if (got_err) { krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status); status = 0; } } if (header_ticket) krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket); if (request) krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request); if (cname) free(cname); if (sname) free(sname); if (nprincs) krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1); if (session_key.contents) krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key); if (newtransited) free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data); if (subkey) krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey); return retval; }
/* Handle copying TGS-REQ authorization data into reply */ static krb5_error_code handle_request_authdata (krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_data scratch; if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ || request->authorization_data.ciphertext.data == NULL) return 0; assert(enc_tkt_request != NULL); scratch.length = request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length; scratch.data = malloc(scratch.length); if (scratch.data == NULL) return ENOMEM; /* * RFC 4120 requires authdata in the TGS body to be encrypted in * the subkey with usage 5 if a subkey is present, and in the TGS * session key with key usage 4 if it is not. Prior to krb5 1.7, * we got this wrong, always decrypting the authorization data * with the TGS session key and usage 4. For the sake of * conservatism, try the decryption the old way (wrong if * client_key is a subkey) first, and then try again the right way * (in the case where client_key is a subkey) if the first way * fails. */ code = krb5_c_decrypt(context, enc_tkt_request->session, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SESSKEY, 0, &request->authorization_data, &scratch); if (code != 0) code = krb5_c_decrypt(context, client_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SUBKEY, 0, &request->authorization_data, &scratch); if (code != 0) { free(scratch.data); return code; } /* scratch now has the authorization data, so we decode it, and make * it available to subsequent authdata plugins */ code = decode_krb5_authdata(&scratch, &request->unenc_authdata); if (code != 0) { free(scratch.data); return code; } free(scratch.data); if (has_mandatory_for_kdc_authdata(context, request->unenc_authdata)) return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; code = merge_authdata(context, request->unenc_authdata, &enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, TRUE, /* copy */ TRUE); /* ignore_kdc_issued */ return code; }