/* * read packets, try to authenticate the user and * return only if authentication is successful */ static void do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt) { int authenticated = 0; u_int bits; Key *client_host_key; BIGNUM *n; char *client_user, *password; char info[1024]; u_int dlen; u_int ulen; int type = 0; struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.", authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", authctxt->user); /* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */ if (options.password_authentication && #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) && #endif PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) { auth_log(authctxt, 1, "without authentication", ""); return; } /* Indicate that authentication is needed. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); client_user = NULL; for ( ;; ) { /* default to fail */ authenticated = 0; info[0] = '\0'; /* Get a packet from the client. */ authctxt->v1_auth_type = type = packet_read(); authctxt->v1_auth_name = get_authname(type); authctxt->attempt++; /* Process the packet. */ switch (type) { #if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5) case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS: if (!options.kerberos_authentication) { verbose("Kerberos authentication disabled."); } else { char *kdata = packet_get_string(&dlen); packet_check_eom(); if (kdata[0] == 4) { /* KRB_PROT_VERSION */ #ifdef KRB4 KTEXT_ST tkt, reply; tkt.length = dlen; if (tkt.length < MAX_KTXT_LEN) memcpy(tkt.dat, kdata, tkt.length); if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb4(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user, &reply))) { authenticated = 1; snprintf(info, sizeof(info), " tktuser %.100s", client_user); packet_start( SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE); packet_put_string((char *) reply.dat, reply.length); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } #endif /* KRB4 */ } else { #ifdef KRB5 krb5_data tkt, reply; tkt.length = dlen; tkt.data = kdata; if (PRIVSEP(auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user, &reply))) { authenticated = 1; snprintf(info, sizeof(info), " tktuser %.100s", client_user); /* Send response to client */ packet_start( SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE); packet_put_string((char *) reply.data, reply.length); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); if (reply.length) xfree(reply.data); } #endif /* KRB5 */ } xfree(kdata); } break; #endif /* KRB4 || KRB5 */ #if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5) /* XXX - punt on backward compatibility here. */ case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT: packet_send_debug("Kerberos TGT passing disabled before authentication."); break; #ifdef AFS case SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN: packet_send_debug("AFS token passing disabled before authentication."); break; #endif /* AFS */ #endif /* AFS || KRB5 */ case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS: if (!options.rhosts_authentication) { verbose("Rhosts authentication disabled."); break; } /* * Get client user name. Note that we just have to * trust the client; this is one reason why rhosts * authentication is insecure. (Another is * IP-spoofing on a local network.) */ client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen); packet_check_eom(); /* Try to authenticate using /etc/hosts.equiv and .rhosts. */ authenticated = auth_rhosts(pw, client_user); snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user); break; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA: if (!options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) { verbose("Rhosts with RSA authentication disabled."); break; } /* * Get client user name. Note that we just have to * trust the client; root on the client machine can * claim to be any user. */ client_user = packet_get_string(&ulen); /* Get the client host key. */ client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); bits = packet_get_int(); packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e); packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n); if (bits != BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n)) verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: " "actual %d, announced %d", BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits); packet_check_eom(); authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(pw, client_user, client_host_key); key_free(client_host_key); snprintf(info, sizeof info, " ruser %.100s", client_user); break; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA: if (!options.rsa_authentication) { verbose("RSA authentication disabled."); break; } /* RSA authentication requested. */ if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(n); packet_check_eom(); authenticated = auth_rsa(pw, n); BN_clear_free(n); break; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD: authctxt->init_attempt++; if (!options.password_authentication) { verbose("Password authentication disabled."); break; } /* * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is * not visible to an outside observer. */ password = packet_get_string(&dlen); packet_check_eom(); /* Try authentication with the password. */ if (authctxt->init_failures < options.max_init_auth_tries) authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)); memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); xfree(password); break; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS: debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS"); if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) { char *challenge = get_challenge(authctxt); if (challenge != NULL) { debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge); packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE); packet_put_cstring(challenge); xfree(challenge); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); continue; } } break; case SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE: debug("rcvd SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE"); if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) { char *response = packet_get_string(&dlen); debug("got response '%s'", response); packet_check_eom(); authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response); memset(response, 'r', dlen); xfree(response); } break; default: /* * Any unknown messages will be ignored (and failure * returned) during authentication. */ log("Unknown message during authentication: type %d", type); break; } #ifdef BSD_AUTH if (authctxt->as) { auth_close(authctxt->as); authctxt->as = NULL; } #endif if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated) { authenticated = 0; log("Ignoring authenticated invalid user %s", authctxt->user); } #ifdef _UNICOS if (type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD && !authenticated) cray_login_failure(authctxt->user, IA_UDBERR); if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) { authenticated = 0; fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user); } #endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (authenticated && !check_nt_auth(type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, pw)) { packet_disconnect("Authentication rejected for uid %d.", pw == NULL ? -1 : pw->pw_uid); authenticated = 0; } #else /* Special handling for root */ if (!use_privsep && authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(get_authname(type))) authenticated = 0; #endif #ifdef USE_PAM /* XXX PAM and PRIVSEP don't mix */ if (use_privsep && authenticated) fatal("Privsep is not supported"); if (authenticated && type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) authenticated = do_pam_non_initial_userauth(authctxt); else if (authenticated && !AUTHPAM_DONE(authctxt)) authenticated = 0; if (!authenticated) authctxt->pam_retval = AUTHPAM_ERROR(authctxt, PAM_PERM_DENIED); #endif /* USE_PAM */ /* Log before sending the reply */ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, get_authname(type), info); if (client_user != NULL) { xfree(client_user); client_user = NULL; } if (authenticated) return; if (type == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD) authctxt->init_failures++; if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_auth_tries) { #ifdef HAVE_BSM fatal_remove_cleanup(audit_failed_login_cleanup, authctxt); audit_sshd_login_failure(&ah, PAM_MAXTRIES); #endif /* HAVE_BSM */ packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user); } packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } }
static void userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer b; Key *key = NULL; char *pkalg; u_char *pkblob, *sig; u_int alen, blen, slen; int have_sig, pktype; int authenticated = 0; if (!authctxt || !authctxt->method) fatal("%s: missing context", __func__); have_sig = packet_get_char(); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH"); /* no explicit pkalg given */ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */ pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); buffer_free(&b); } else { pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); } pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ log("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); goto done; } key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); if (key == NULL) { error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key " "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } /* Detect and count abandonment */ if (authctxt->method->method_data) { Key *prev_key; unsigned char *prev_pkblob; int prev_blen; /* * Check for earlier test of a key that was allowed but * not followed up with a pubkey req for the same pubkey * and with a signature. */ prev_key = authctxt->method->method_data; if ((prev_blen = key_to_blob(prev_key, &prev_pkblob, NULL))) { if (prev_blen != blen || memcmp(prev_pkblob, pkblob, blen) != 0) { authctxt->method->abandons++; authctxt->method->attempts++; } } key_free(prev_key); authctxt->method->method_data = NULL; } if (have_sig) { sig = packet_get_string(&slen); packet_check_eom(); buffer_init(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); } else { buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); } /* reconstruct packet */ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey"); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); } buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif /* test for correct signature */ if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key) && key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1) { authenticated = 1; } authctxt->method->postponed = 0; buffer_free(&b); xfree(sig); } else { debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable"); packet_check_eom(); /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ /* * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an * issue? -markus */ if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK); packet_put_string(pkalg, alen); packet_put_string(pkblob, blen); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); authctxt->method->postponed = 1; /* * Remember key that was tried so we can * correctly detect abandonment. See above. */ authctxt->method->method_data = (void *) key; key = NULL; } } if (authenticated != 1) auth_clear_options(); done: /* * XXX TODO: add config options for specifying users for whom * this userauth is insufficient and what userauths may * continue. */ #ifdef USE_PAM if (authenticated) { if (!do_pam_non_initial_userauth(authctxt)) authenticated = 0; } #endif /* USE_PAM */ debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg); if (key != NULL) key_free(key); xfree(pkalg); xfree(pkblob); #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_nt_auth(0, authctxt->pw) == 0) return; #endif if (authenticated) authctxt->method->authenticated = 1; }