static int eap_sim_process_notification_auth(struct eap_sim_data *data, struct eap_hdr *req, size_t reqDataLen, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { if (attr->mac == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: no AT_MAC in after_auth " "Notification message"); return -1; } if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, (u8 *) req, reqDataLen, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Notification message " "used invalid AT_MAC"); return -1; } if (data->reauth && eap_sim_process_notification_reauth(data, req, reqDataLen, attr)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Invalid notification " "message after reauth"); return -1; } return 0; }
static int eap_aka_process_notification_auth(struct eap_aka_data *data, const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { if (attr->mac == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: no AT_MAC in after_auth " "Notification message"); return -1; } if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Notification message " "used invalid AT_MAC"); return -1; } if (data->reauth && eap_aka_process_notification_reauth(data, attr)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid notification " "message after reauth"); return -1; } return 0; }
static int eap_aka_verify_mac(struct eap_aka_data *data, const struct wpabuf *req, const u8 *mac, const u8 *extra, size_t extra_len) { if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) return eap_sim_verify_mac_sha256(data->k_aut, req, mac, extra, extra_len); return eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, req, mac, extra, extra_len); }
static void eap_sim_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_sim_data *data, struct wpabuf *respData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { const u8 *identity; size_t identity_len; if (attr->mac == NULL || eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, respData, attr->mac, (u8 *) data->sres, data->num_chal * EAP_SIM_SRES_LEN)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Challenge message " "did not include valid AT_MAC"); eap_sim_state(data, FAILURE); return; } wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Challenge response includes the " "correct AT_MAC"); if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind && attr->result_ind) { data->use_result_ind = 1; data->notification = EAP_SIM_SUCCESS; eap_sim_state(data, NOTIFICATION); } else eap_sim_state(data, SUCCESS); identity = eap_sim_db_get_permanent(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, sm->identity, sm->identity_len, &identity_len); if (identity == NULL) { identity = sm->identity; identity_len = sm->identity_len; } if (data->next_pseudonym) { eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity, identity_len, data->next_pseudonym); data->next_pseudonym = NULL; } if (data->next_reauth_id) { eap_sim_db_add_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity, identity_len, data->next_reauth_id, data->counter + 1, data->mk); data->next_reauth_id = NULL; } }
static u8 * eap_sim_process_reauthentication(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_sim_data *data, struct eap_hdr *req, size_t reqDataLen, size_t *respDataLen, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: subtype Reauthentication"); if (data->reauth_id == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Server is trying " "reauthentication, but no reauth_id available"); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } data->reauth = 1; if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, (u8 *) req, reqDataLen, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Reauthentication " "did not have valid AT_MAC"); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Reauthentication " "message did not include encrypted data"); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, 0)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Failed to parse encrypted " "data from reauthentication message"); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (eattr.nonce_s == NULL || eattr.counter < 0) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) No%s%s in reauth packet", !eattr.nonce_s ? " AT_NONCE_S" : "", eattr.counter < 0 ? " AT_COUNTER" : ""); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (eattr.counter <= data->counter) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) Invalid counter " "(%d <= %d)", eattr.counter, data->counter); data->counter_too_small = eattr.counter; /* Reply using Re-auth w/ AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL. The current * reauth_id must not be used to start a new reauthentication. * However, since it was used in the last EAP-Response-Identity * packet, it has to saved for the following fullauth to be * used in MK derivation. */ free(data->last_eap_identity); data->last_eap_identity = data->reauth_id; data->last_eap_identity_len = data->reauth_id_len; data->reauth_id = NULL; data->reauth_id_len = 0; return eap_sim_response_reauth(sm, data, req, respDataLen, 1); } data->counter = eattr.counter; memcpy(data->nonce_s, eattr.nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN); wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: (encr) AT_NONCE_S", data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN); eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter, data->reauth_id, data->reauth_id_len, data->nonce_s, data->mk, data->msk); eap_sim_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); eap_sim_learn_ids(data, &eattr); if (data->state != FAILURE) data->state = SUCCESS; data->num_id_req = 0; data->num_notification = 0; if (data->counter > EAP_SIM_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) { wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Maximum number of " "fast reauths performed - force fullauth"); eap_sim_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); } return eap_sim_response_reauth(sm, data, req, respDataLen, 0); }
static u8 * eap_sim_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_sim_data *data, struct eap_hdr *req, size_t reqDataLen, size_t *respDataLen, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { struct wpa_ssid *config = eap_get_config(sm); u8 *identity; size_t identity_len; struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: subtype Challenge"); data->reauth = 0; if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Challenge message " "did not include%s%s", !attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "", !attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : ""); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: %lu challenges", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal); if (attr->num_chal < data->min_num_chal) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Insufficient number of " "challenges (%lu)", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_INSUFFICIENT_NUM_OF_CHAL); } if (attr->num_chal > 3) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Too many challenges " "(%lu)", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } /* Verify that RANDs are different */ if (memcmp(attr->rand, attr->rand + GSM_RAND_LEN, GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0 || (attr->num_chal > 2 && (memcmp(attr->rand, attr->rand + 2 * GSM_RAND_LEN, GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0 || memcmp(attr->rand + GSM_RAND_LEN, attr->rand + 2 * GSM_RAND_LEN, GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0))) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Same RAND used multiple times"); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_RAND_NOT_FRESH); } memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, attr->num_chal * GSM_RAND_LEN); data->num_chal = attr->num_chal; if (eap_sim_gsm_auth(sm, data)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: GSM authentication failed"); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (data->last_eap_identity) { identity = data->last_eap_identity; identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len; } else if (data->pseudonym) { identity = data->pseudonym; identity_len = data->pseudonym_len; } else { identity = config->identity; identity_len = config->identity_len; } wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Selected identity for MK " "derivation", identity, identity_len); eap_sim_derive_mk(data, identity, identity_len); eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk); if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, (u8 *) req, reqDataLen, attr->mac, data->nonce_mt, EAP_SIM_NONCE_MT_LEN)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Challenge message " "used invalid AT_MAC"); return eap_sim_client_error(sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } /* Old reauthentication and pseudonym identities must not be used * anymore. In other words, if no new identities are received, full * authentication will be used on next reauthentication. */ eap_sim_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_PSEUDONYM | CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); if (attr->encr_data) { if (eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, 0)) { return eap_sim_client_error( sm, data, req, respDataLen, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } eap_sim_learn_ids(data, &eattr); } if (data->state != FAILURE) data->state = SUCCESS; data->num_id_req = 0; data->num_notification = 0; /* draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-13.txt specifies that counter * is initialized to one after fullauth, but initializing it to * zero makes it easier to implement reauth verification. */ data->counter = 0; return eap_sim_response_challenge(sm, data, req, respDataLen); }
static struct wpabuf * eap_sim_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_sim_data *data, u8 id, const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { const u8 *identity; size_t identity_len; struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: subtype Challenge"); data->reauth = 0; if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Challenge message " "did not include%s%s", !attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "", !attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : ""); return eap_sim_client_error(data, id, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: %lu challenges", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal); if (attr->num_chal < data->min_num_chal) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Insufficient number of " "challenges (%lu)", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal); return eap_sim_client_error(data, id, EAP_SIM_INSUFFICIENT_NUM_OF_CHAL); } if (attr->num_chal > 3) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Too many challenges " "(%lu)", (unsigned long) attr->num_chal); return eap_sim_client_error(data, id, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } /* Verify that RANDs are different */ if (os_memcmp(attr->rand, attr->rand + GSM_RAND_LEN, GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0 || (attr->num_chal > 2 && (os_memcmp(attr->rand, attr->rand + 2 * GSM_RAND_LEN, GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0 || os_memcmp(attr->rand + GSM_RAND_LEN, attr->rand + 2 * GSM_RAND_LEN, GSM_RAND_LEN) == 0))) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Same RAND used multiple times"); return eap_sim_client_error(data, id, EAP_SIM_RAND_NOT_FRESH); } os_memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, attr->num_chal * GSM_RAND_LEN); data->num_chal = attr->num_chal; if (eap_sim_gsm_auth(sm, data)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: GSM authentication failed"); return eap_sim_client_error(data, id, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (data->last_eap_identity) { identity = data->last_eap_identity; identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len; } else if (data->pseudonym) { identity = data->pseudonym; identity_len = data->pseudonym_len; } else identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len); wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Selected identity for MK " "derivation", identity, identity_len); eap_sim_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->nonce_mt, data->selected_version, data->ver_list, data->ver_list_len, data->num_chal, (const u8 *) data->kc, data->mk); eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk, data->emsk); if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, data->nonce_mt, EAP_SIM_NONCE_MT_LEN)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Challenge message " "used invalid AT_MAC"); return eap_sim_client_error(data, id, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } /* Old reauthentication identity must not be used anymore. In * other words, if no new reauth identity is received, full * authentication will be used on next reauthentication (using * pseudonym identity or permanent identity). */ eap_sim_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); if (attr->encr_data) { u8 *decrypted; decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, 0); if (decrypted == NULL) { return eap_sim_client_error( data, id, EAP_SIM_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } eap_sim_learn_ids(sm, data, &eattr); os_free(decrypted); } if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind) data->use_result_ind = 1; if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) { eap_sim_state(data, data->use_result_ind ? RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS); } data->num_id_req = 0; data->num_notification = 0; /* RFC 4186 specifies that counter is initialized to one after * fullauth, but initializing it to zero makes it easier to implement * reauth verification. */ data->counter = 0; return eap_sim_response_challenge(data, id); }
static void eap_sim_process_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_sim_data *data, struct wpabuf *respData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; u8 *decrypted = NULL; const u8 *identity, *id2; size_t identity_len, id2_len; if (attr->mac == NULL || eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, respData, attr->mac, data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication message " "did not include valid AT_MAC"); goto fail; } if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Reauthentication " "message did not include encrypted data"); goto fail; } decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, 0); if (decrypted == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Failed to parse encrypted " "data from reauthentication message"); goto fail; } if (eattr.counter != data->counter) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication message " "used incorrect counter %u, expected %u", eattr.counter, data->counter); goto fail; } os_free(decrypted); decrypted = NULL; wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication response includes " "the correct AT_MAC"); if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind && attr->result_ind) { data->use_result_ind = 1; data->notification = EAP_SIM_SUCCESS; eap_sim_state(data, NOTIFICATION); } else eap_sim_state(data, SUCCESS); if (data->reauth) { identity = data->reauth->identity; identity_len = data->reauth->identity_len; } else { identity = sm->identity; identity_len = sm->identity_len; } id2 = eap_sim_db_get_permanent(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity, identity_len, &id2_len); if (id2) { identity = id2; identity_len = id2_len; } if (data->next_pseudonym) { eap_sim_db_add_pseudonym(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity, identity_len, data->next_pseudonym); data->next_pseudonym = NULL; } if (data->next_reauth_id) { eap_sim_db_add_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, identity, identity_len, data->next_reauth_id, data->counter + 1, data->mk); data->next_reauth_id = NULL; } else { eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth); data->reauth = NULL; } return; fail: eap_sim_state(data, FAILURE); eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth); data->reauth = NULL; os_free(decrypted); }
static u8 * eap_aka_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, const struct eap_hdr *req, size_t reqDataLen, size_t *respDataLen, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { const u8 *identity; size_t identity_len; int res; struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Challenge"); data->reauth = 0; if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand || !attr->autn) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message " "did not include%s%s%s", !attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "", !attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : "", !attr->autn ? " AT_AUTN" : ""); return eap_aka_client_error(data, req, respDataLen, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } os_memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN); os_memcpy(data->autn, attr->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN); res = eap_aka_umts_auth(sm, data); if (res == -1) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication " "failed (AUTN)"); return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, req, respDataLen); } else if (res == -2) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication " "failed (AUTN seq# -> AUTS)"); return eap_aka_synchronization_failure(data, req, respDataLen); } else if (res) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication failed"); return eap_aka_client_error(data, req, respDataLen, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (data->last_eap_identity) { identity = data->last_eap_identity; identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len; } else if (data->pseudonym) { identity = data->pseudonym; identity_len = data->pseudonym_len; } else identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len); wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Selected identity for MK " "derivation", identity, identity_len); eap_aka_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->ik, data->ck, data->mk); eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk, data->emsk); if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, (const u8 *) req, reqDataLen, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message " "used invalid AT_MAC"); return eap_aka_client_error(data, req, respDataLen, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } /* Old reauthentication and pseudonym identities must not be used * anymore. In other words, if no new identities are received, full * authentication will be used on next reauthentication. */ eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_PSEUDONYM | CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); if (attr->encr_data) { u8 *decrypted; decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, 0); if (decrypted == NULL) { return eap_aka_client_error( data, req, respDataLen, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } eap_aka_learn_ids(data, &eattr); os_free(decrypted); } if (data->state != FAILURE) data->state = SUCCESS; data->num_id_req = 0; data->num_notification = 0; /* RFC 4187 specifies that counter is initialized to one after * fullauth, but initializing it to zero makes it easier to implement * reauth verification. */ data->counter = 0; return eap_aka_response_challenge(data, req, respDataLen); }
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_reauthentication( struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id, const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; u8 *decrypted; wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Reauthentication"); if (attr->checkcode && eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode, attr->checkcode_len)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the " "message"); return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (data->reauth_id == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Server is trying " "reauthentication, but no reauth_id available"); return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } data->reauth = 1; if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication " "did not have valid AT_MAC"); return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication " "message did not include encrypted data"); return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, 0); if (decrypted == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted " "data from reauthentication message"); return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (eattr.nonce_s == NULL || eattr.counter < 0) { wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No%s%s in reauth packet", !eattr.nonce_s ? " AT_NONCE_S" : "", eattr.counter < 0 ? " AT_COUNTER" : ""); os_free(decrypted); return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); } if (eattr.counter < 0 || (size_t) eattr.counter <= data->counter) { struct wpabuf *res; wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) Invalid counter " "(%d <= %d)", eattr.counter, data->counter); data->counter_too_small = eattr.counter; eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(eattr.counter, data->reauth_id, data->reauth_id_len, eattr.nonce_s, data->mk, NULL, NULL); /* Reply using Re-auth w/ AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL. The current * reauth_id must not be used to start a new reauthentication. * However, since it was used in the last EAP-Response-Identity * packet, it has to saved for the following fullauth to be * used in MK derivation. */ os_free(data->last_eap_identity); data->last_eap_identity = data->reauth_id; data->last_eap_identity_len = data->reauth_id_len; data->reauth_id = NULL; data->reauth_id_len = 0; res = eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 1, eattr.nonce_s); os_free(decrypted); return res; } data->counter = eattr.counter; os_memcpy(data->nonce_s, eattr.nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN); wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NONCE_S", data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN); eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter, data->reauth_id, data->reauth_id_len, data->nonce_s, data->mk, data->msk, data->emsk); eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); eap_aka_learn_ids(data, &eattr); if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind) data->use_result_ind = 1; if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) { eap_aka_state(data, data->use_result_ind ? RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS); } data->num_id_req = 0; data->num_notification = 0; if (data->counter > EAP_AKA_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) { wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Maximum number of " "fast reauths performed - force fullauth"); eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); } os_free(decrypted); return eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 0, data->nonce_s); }
static void eap_sim_process_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_sim_data *data, struct wpabuf *respData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) { struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; u8 *decrypted = NULL; if (attr->mac == NULL || eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, respData, attr->mac, data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN)) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication message " "did not include valid AT_MAC"); goto fail; } if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Reauthentication " "message did not include encrypted data"); goto fail; } decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, 0); if (decrypted == NULL) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Failed to parse encrypted " "data from reauthentication message"); goto fail; } if (eattr.counter != data->counter) { wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication message " "used incorrect counter %u, expected %u", eattr.counter, data->counter); goto fail; } os_free(decrypted); decrypted = NULL; wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Re-authentication response includes " "the correct AT_MAC"); if (eattr.counter_too_small) { wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Re-authentication response " "included AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL - starting full " "authentication"); data->start_round = -1; eap_sim_state(data, START); return; } if (sm->eap_sim_aka_result_ind && attr->result_ind) { data->use_result_ind = 1; data->notification = EAP_SIM_SUCCESS; eap_sim_state(data, NOTIFICATION); } else eap_sim_state(data, SUCCESS); if (data->next_reauth_id) { eap_sim_db_add_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->permanent, data->next_reauth_id, data->counter + 1, data->mk); data->next_reauth_id = NULL; } else { eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth); data->reauth = NULL; } return; fail: data->notification = EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH; eap_sim_state(data, NOTIFICATION); eap_sim_db_remove_reauth(sm->eap_sim_db_priv, data->reauth); data->reauth = NULL; os_free(decrypted); }