bool X509Certificate_GnuTLS::verifyHostName
(const string& hostname, std::vector <std::string>* nonMatchingNames) const
{
if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(m_data->cert, hostname.c_str()) != 0)
return true;
if (nonMatchingNames)
{
const int MAX_CN = 256;
const char* OID_X520_COMMON_NAME = "2.5.4.3";
char dnsName[MAX_CN];
size_t dnsNameLength;
dnsNameLength = sizeof(dnsName);
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(m_data->cert, OID_X520_COMMON_NAME, 0, 0, dnsName, &dnsNameLength) >= 0)
nonMatchingNames->push_back(dnsName);
for (int i = 0, ret = 0 ; ret >= 0 ; ++i)
{
dnsNameLength = sizeof(dnsName);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject_alt_name(m_data->cert, i, dnsName, &dnsNameLength, NULL);
if (ret == GNUTLS_SAN_DNSNAME)
nonMatchingNames->push_back(dnsName);
}
}
return false;
}
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate chain, and
* also check if the hostname matches, and the activation, expiration dates.
*/
void
verify_certificate_chain (gnutls_session_t session,
const char *hostname,
const gnutls_datum_t * cert_chain,
int cert_chain_length)
{
int i;
gnutls_x509_crt_t *cert;
cert = malloc (sizeof (*cert) * cert_chain_length);
/* Import all the certificates in the chain to
* native certificate format.
*/
for (i = 0; i < cert_chain_length; i++)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert[i]);
gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert[i], &cert_chain[i], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
}
/* If the last certificate in the chain is self signed ignore it.
* That is because we want to check against our trusted certificate
* list.
*/
if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer (cert[cert_chain_length - 1],
cert[cert_chain_length - 1]) > 0
&& cert_chain_length > 0)
{
cert_chain_length--;
}
/* Now verify the certificates against their issuers
* in the chain.
*/
for (i = 1; i < cert_chain_length; i++)
{
verify_cert2 (cert[i - 1], cert[i], crl_list, crl_list_size);
}
/* Here we must verify the last certificate in the chain against
* our trusted CA list.
*/
verify_last_cert (cert[cert_chain_length - 1],
ca_list, ca_list_size, crl_list, crl_list_size);
/* Check if the name in the first certificate matches our destination!
*/
if (!gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (cert[0], hostname))
{
printf ("The certificate's owner does not match hostname '%s'\n",
hostname);
}
for (i = 0; i < cert_chain_length; i++)
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert[i]);
return;
}
static int verify_certificate_callback( gnutls_session_t session )
{
unsigned int status;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int cert_list_size;
int gnutlsret;
int verifyret = 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
const char *hostname;
hostname = gnutls_session_get_ptr( session );
gnutlsret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2( session, &status );
if( gnutlsret < 0 )
return VERIFY_CERT_ERROR;
if( status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID )
verifyret |= VERIFY_CERT_INVALID;
if( status & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED )
verifyret |= VERIFY_CERT_REVOKED;
if( status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND )
verifyret |= VERIFY_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
if( status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA )
verifyret |= VERIFY_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA;
if( status & GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM )
verifyret |= VERIFY_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM;
#ifdef GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED
/* Amusingly, the GnuTLS function used above didn't check for expiry
until GnuTLS 2.8 or so. (See CVE-2009-1417) */
if( status & GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED )
verifyret |= VERIFY_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED;
if( status & GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED )
verifyret |= VERIFY_CERT_EXPIRED;
#endif
if( gnutls_certificate_type_get( session ) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509 || gnutls_x509_crt_init( &cert ) < 0 )
return VERIFY_CERT_ERROR;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers( session, &cert_list_size );
if( cert_list == NULL || gnutls_x509_crt_import( cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER ) < 0 )
return VERIFY_CERT_ERROR;
if( !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname( cert, hostname ) )
{
verifyret |= VERIFY_CERT_INVALID;
verifyret |= VERIFY_CERT_WRONG_HOSTNAME;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit( cert );
return verifyret;
}
/* function for replacing old GnuTLS version */
static int
tds_x509_crt_check_hostname(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, const char *hostname)
{
int ret;
ret = tds_check_ip(cert, hostname);
if (ret)
return ret;
return gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert, hostname);
}
/* returns true or false, depending on whether the hostname
* matches to certificate */
static int
verify_x509_hostname (gnutls_session_t session, const char *hostname)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
int ret;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (session, &cert_list_size);
if (cert_list_size == 0)
{
fprintf (stderr, "No certificates found!\n");
return 0;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt);
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &cert_list[0],
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if (ret < 0)
{
fprintf (stderr, "Decoding error: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror (ret));
return 0;
}
/* Check the hostname of the first certificate if it matches
* the name of the host we connected to.
*/
if (hostname != NULL)
{
if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (crt, hostname) == 0)
{
printf
("- The hostname in the certificate does NOT match '%s'\n",
hostname);
ret = 0;
}
else
{
printf ("- The hostname in the certificate matches '%s'.\n",
hostname);
ret = 1;
}
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt);
return ret;
}
static gboolean
x509_check_name (PurpleCertificate *crt, const gchar *name)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt_dat;
g_return_val_if_fail(crt, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail(crt->scheme == &x509_gnutls, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail(name, FALSE);
crt_dat = X509_GET_GNUTLS_DATA(crt);
if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(crt_dat, name)) {
return TRUE;
} else {
return FALSE;
}
}
int TLSSocket::verify(VerifyResult& result) {
const char* hostname = (const char*) gnutls_session_get_ptr (session);
unsigned int status;
int ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (session, &status);
if (ret < 0) {
return -1;
}
result.distrusted = (status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID);
result.unknownIssuer = (status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND);
result.revoked = (status & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED);
result.expired = (status & GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED);
result.inactive = (status & GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED);
result.invalidCert = false;
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (session) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
result.invalidCert = true;
return -1;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
if (gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert) < 0) {
return -1;
}
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int cert_list_size;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (session, &cert_list_size);
if (cert_list == NULL) {
result.invalidCert = true;
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
return -1;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) < 0){
result.invalidCert = true;
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
return -1;
}
result.hostnameMismatch = !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (cert, hostname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
return 0;
}
int /* O - 1 if valid, 0 otherwise */
httpCredentialsAreValidForName(
cups_array_t *credentials, /* I - Credentials */
const char *common_name) /* I - Name to check */
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert; /* Certificate */
int result = 0; /* Result */
cert = http_gnutls_create_credential((http_credential_t *)cupsArrayFirst(credentials));
if (cert)
{
result = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert, common_name) != 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
}
return (result);
}
static int
qcrypto_tls_session_check_certificate(QCryptoTLSSession *session,
Error **errp)
{
int ret;
unsigned int status;
const gnutls_datum_t *certs;
unsigned int nCerts, i;
time_t now;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert = NULL;
now = time(NULL);
if (now == ((time_t)-1)) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Cannot get current time");
return -1;
}
ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session->handle, &status);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Verify failed: %s", gnutls_strerror(ret));
return -1;
}
if (status != 0) {
const char *reason = "Invalid certificate";
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
reason = "The certificate is not trusted";
}
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND) {
reason = "The certificate hasn't got a known issuer";
}
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED) {
reason = "The certificate has been revoked";
}
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM) {
reason = "The certificate uses an insecure algorithm";
}
error_setg(errp, "%s", reason);
return -1;
}
certs = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session->handle, &nCerts);
if (!certs) {
error_setg(errp, "No certificate peers");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < nCerts; i++) {
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Cannot initialize certificate: %s",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
return -1;
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, &certs[i], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Cannot import certificate: %s",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
goto error;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(cert) < now) {
error_setg(errp, "The certificate has expired");
goto error;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(cert) > now) {
error_setg(errp, "The certificate is not yet activated");
goto error;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(cert) > now) {
error_setg(errp, "The certificate is not yet activated");
goto error;
}
if (i == 0) {
size_t dnameSize = 1024;
session->peername = g_malloc(dnameSize);
requery:
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(cert, session->peername, &dnameSize);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER) {
session->peername = g_realloc(session->peername,
dnameSize);
goto requery;
}
error_setg(errp, "Cannot get client distinguished name: %s",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
goto error;
}
if (session->aclname) {
qemu_acl *acl = qemu_acl_find(session->aclname);
int allow;
if (!acl) {
error_setg(errp, "Cannot find ACL %s",
session->aclname);
goto error;
}
allow = qemu_acl_party_is_allowed(acl, session->peername);
if (!allow) {
error_setg(errp, "TLS x509 ACL check for %s is denied",
session->peername);
goto error;
}
}
if (session->hostname) {
if (!gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert, session->hostname)) {
error_setg(errp,
"Certificate does not match the hostname %s",
session->hostname);
goto error;
}
}
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
}
return 0;
error:
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
return -1;
}
/**
* epc_tls_get_server_credentials:
* @hostname: the server's host name
* @crtfile: location for storing the certificate's filename in GLib filename encoding
* @keyfile: location for storing the private key's filename in GLib filename encoding
* @error: return location for a #GError, or %NULL
*
* Searches or creates X.509 certificate and key for the server identified
* by @hostname. This function uses epc_tls_get_certificate_filename() and
* epc_tls_get_private_key_filename() to locate existing certificates and
* keys. New certificates and keys are generated, when the files cannot
* be found, or the existing files contain invalid or expired information.
*
* If the call was successful, it returns %TRUE. If the call was not
* successful, it returns %FALSE and sets @error. The error domain is
* #EPC_TLS_ERROR. Error codes are taken from the <citetitle>GNU
* TLS</citetitle> library.
*
* Returns: %TRUE on successful, %FALSE if an error occurred
*/
gboolean
epc_tls_get_server_credentials (const gchar *hostname,
gchar **crtfile,
gchar **keyfile,
GError **error)
{
gboolean success = FALSE;
struct stat keyinfo, crtinfo;
gnutls_x509_privkey_t key = NULL;
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt = NULL;
gchar *_keyfile = NULL;
gchar *_crtfile = NULL;
g_return_val_if_fail (NULL != hostname, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NULL != crtfile, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NULL != keyfile, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NULL == *crtfile, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NULL == *keyfile, FALSE);
_crtfile = epc_tls_get_certificate_filename (hostname);
_keyfile = epc_tls_get_private_key_filename (hostname);
if (NULL == (key = epc_tls_private_key_load (_keyfile, NULL)))
{
if (!(key = epc_tls_private_key_new (error)) ||
!(epc_tls_private_key_save (key, _keyfile, error)))
goto out;
}
if (0 == g_stat (_keyfile, &keyinfo) &&
0 == g_stat (_crtfile, &crtinfo) &&
keyinfo.st_mtime <= crtinfo.st_mtime)
crt = epc_tls_certificate_load (_crtfile, NULL);
if (NULL != crt)
{
time_t now = time (NULL);
gboolean invalid = TRUE;
if (!gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (crt, hostname))
g_warning ("%s: The certificate's owner doesn't match hostname '%s'.", G_STRLOC, hostname);
else if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (crt) > now)
g_warning ("%s: The certificate is not yet activated.", G_STRLOC);
else if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (crt) < now)
g_warning ("%s: The certificate has expired.", G_STRLOC);
else
invalid = FALSE;
if (invalid)
{
g_warning ("%s: Discarding invalid server certificate.", G_STRLOC);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt);
crt = NULL;
}
}
if (NULL == crt)
{
if (!(crt = epc_tls_certificate_new (hostname, 365 * EPC_TLS_SECONDS_PER_DAY, key, error)) ||
!(epc_tls_certificate_save (crt, _crtfile, error)))
goto out;
}
success = TRUE;
out:
if (!success)
{
g_free (_keyfile);
g_free (_crtfile);
_keyfile = NULL;
_crtfile = NULL;
}
if (key)
gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit (key);
if (crt)
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt);
*keyfile = _keyfile;
*crtfile = _crtfile;
return success;
}
int TLSClient::verify_certificate () const
{
if (_trust == TLSClient::allow_all)
return 0;
// This verification function uses the trusted CAs in the credentials
// structure. So you must have installed one or more CA certificates.
unsigned int status = 0;
const char* hostname = _host.c_str();
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030104
if (_trust == TLSClient::ignore_hostname)
hostname = NULL;
int ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers3 (_session, hostname, &status);
if (ret < 0)
{
if (_debug)
std::cout << "c: ERROR Certificate verification peers3 failed. " << gnutls_strerror (ret) << "\n";
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
#else
int ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (_session, &status);
if (ret < 0)
{
if (_debug)
std::cout << "c: ERROR Certificate verification peers2 failed. " << gnutls_strerror (ret) << "\n";
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
if ((status == 0) && (_trust != TLSClient::ignore_hostname))
{
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (_session) == GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
{
const gnutls_datum* cert_list;
unsigned int cert_list_size;
gnutls_x509_crt cert;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (_session, &cert_list_size);
if (cert_list_size == 0)
{
if (_debug)
std::cout << "c: ERROR Certificate get peers failed. " << gnutls_strerror (ret) << "\n";
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert);
if (ret < 0)
{
if (_debug)
std::cout << "c: ERROR x509 init failed. " << gnutls_strerror (ret) << "\n";
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if (ret < 0)
{
if (_debug)
std::cout << "c: ERROR x509 cert import. " << gnutls_strerror (ret) << "\n";
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (cert, hostname) == 0)
{
if (_debug)
std::cout << "c: ERROR x509 cert check hostname. " << gnutls_strerror (ret) << "\n";
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
}
else
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
#endif
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030104
gnutls_certificate_type_t type = gnutls_certificate_type_get (_session);
gnutls_datum_t out;
ret = gnutls_certificate_verification_status_print (status, type, &out, 0);
if (ret < 0)
{
if (_debug)
std::cout << "c: ERROR certificate verification status. " << gnutls_strerror (ret) << "\n";
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
if (_debug)
std::cout << "c: INFO " << out.data << "\n";
gnutls_free (out.data);
#endif
if (status != 0)
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
// Continue handshake.
return 0;
}
static int my_verify_callback(gnutls_session_t ssl)
{
unsigned int status;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int cert_list_size;
int ret;
MYSQL *mysql= (MYSQL *)gnutls_session_get_ptr(ssl);
MARIADB_PVIO *pvio= mysql->net.pvio;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
const char *hostname;
/* read hostname */
hostname = mysql->host;
/* skip verification if no ca_file/path was specified */
if (!mysql->options.ssl_ca)
return 0;
/* This verification function uses the trusted CAs in the credentials
* structure. So you must have installed one or more CA certificates.
*/
ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (ssl, &status);
if (ret < 0)
{
pvio->set_error(mysql, CR_SSL_CONNECTION_ERROR, SQLSTATE_UNKNOWN, "CA verification failed");
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
// mysql->net.vio->status= status;
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)
{
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
/* Up to here the process is the same for X.509 certificates and
* OpenPGP keys. From now on X.509 certificates are assumed. This can
* be easily extended to work with openpgp keys as well.
*/
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (ssl) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
{
pvio->set_error(mysql, CR_SSL_CONNECTION_ERROR, SQLSTATE_UNKNOWN, "Expected X509 certificate");
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert) < 0)
{
pvio->set_error(mysql, CR_SSL_CONNECTION_ERROR, SQLSTATE_UNKNOWN, "Error during certificate initialization");
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (ssl, &cert_list_size);
if (cert_list == NULL)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
pvio->set_error(mysql, CR_SSL_CONNECTION_ERROR, SQLSTATE_UNKNOWN, "No certificate found");
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) < 0)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
pvio->set_error(mysql, CR_SSL_CONNECTION_ERROR, SQLSTATE_UNKNOWN, "Unknown SSL error");
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
if ((mysql->client_flag & CLIENT_SSL_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT) &&
!gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (cert, hostname))
{
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
pvio->set_error(mysql, CR_SSL_CONNECTION_ERROR, SQLSTATE_UNKNOWN, "Hostname in certificate doesn't match");
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
/* notify gnutls to continue handshake normally */
CLEAR_CLIENT_ERROR(mysql);
return 0;
}
static void
inf_gtk_certificate_manager_certificate_func(InfXmppConnection* connection,
gnutls_session_t session,
InfCertificateChain* chain,
gpointer user_data)
{
InfGtkCertificateManager* manager;
InfGtkCertificateManagerPrivate* priv;
InfGtkCertificateDialogFlags flags;
gnutls_x509_crt_t presented_cert;
gnutls_x509_crt_t known_cert;
gchar* hostname;
gboolean match_hostname;
gboolean issuer_known;
gnutls_x509_crt_t root_cert;
int ret;
unsigned int verify;
GHashTable* table;
gboolean cert_equal;
time_t expiration_time;
InfGtkCertificateManagerQuery* query;
gchar* text;
GtkWidget* vbox;
GtkWidget* button;
GtkWidget* image;
GtkWidget* label;
GError* error;
manager = INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER(user_data);
priv = INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER_PRIVATE(manager);
g_object_get(G_OBJECT(connection), "remote-hostname", &hostname, NULL);
presented_cert = inf_certificate_chain_get_own_certificate(chain);
match_hostname = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(presented_cert, hostname);
/* First, validate the certificate */
ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify);
error = NULL;
if(ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
inf_gnutls_set_error(&error, ret);
/* Remove the GNUTLS_CERT_ISSUER_NOT_KNOWN flag from the verification
* result, and if the certificate is still invalid, then set an error. */
if(error == NULL)
{
issuer_known = TRUE;
if(verify & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
{
issuer_known = FALSE;
/* Re-validate the certificate for other failure reasons --
* unfortunately the gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2() call
* does not tell us whether the certificate is otherwise invalid
* if a signer is not found already. */
/* TODO: Here it would be good to use the verify flags from the
* certificate credentials, but GnuTLS does not have API to
* retrieve them. */
root_cert = inf_certificate_chain_get_root_certificate(chain);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_list_verify(
inf_certificate_chain_get_raw(chain),
inf_certificate_chain_get_n_certificates(chain),
&root_cert,
1,
NULL,
0,
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT,
&verify
);
if(ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
inf_gnutls_set_error(&error, ret);
else if(verify & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)
inf_gnutls_certificate_verification_set_error(&error, verify);
}
}
/* Look up the host in our database of pinned certificates if we could not
* fully verify the certificate, i.e. if either the issuer is not known or
* the hostname of the connection does not match the certificate. */
table = NULL;
if(error == NULL)
{
known_cert = NULL;
if(!match_hostname || !issuer_known)
{
/* If we cannot load the known host file, then cancel the connection.
* Otherwise it might happen that someone shows us a certificate that we
* tell the user we don't know, if though actually for that host we expect
* a different certificate. */
table = inf_gtk_certificate_manager_ref_known_hosts(manager, &error);
if(table != NULL)
known_cert = g_hash_table_lookup(table, hostname);
}
}
/* Next, configure the flags for the dialog to be shown based on the
* verification result, and on whether the pinned certificate matches
* the one presented by the host or not. */
flags = 0;
if(error == NULL)
{
if(known_cert != NULL)
{
cert_equal = inf_gtk_certificate_manager_compare_fingerprint(
known_cert,
presented_cert,
&error
);
if(error == NULL && cert_equal == FALSE)
{
if(!match_hostname)
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH;
if(!issuer_known)
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_ISSUER_NOT_KNOWN;
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_UNEXPECTED;
expiration_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(known_cert);
if(expiration_time != (time_t)(-1))
{
expiration_time -= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_MANAGER_EXPIRATION_TOLERANCE;
if(time(NULL) > expiration_time)
{
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_OLD_EXPIRED;
}
}
}
}
else
{
if(!match_hostname)
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH;
if(!issuer_known)
flags |= INF_GTK_CERTIFICATE_DIALOG_CERT_ISSUER_NOT_KNOWN;
}
}
/* Now proceed either by accepting the connection, rejecting it, or
* bothering the user with an annoying dialog. */
if(error == NULL)
{
if(flags == 0)
{
if(match_hostname && issuer_known)
{
/* Remove the pinned entry if we now have a valid certificate for
* this host. */
if(table != NULL && g_hash_table_remove(table, hostname) == TRUE)
{
inf_gtk_certificate_manager_write_known_hosts_with_warning(
manager,
table
);
}
}
inf_xmpp_connection_certificate_verify_continue(connection);
}
else
{
query = g_slice_new(InfGtkCertificateManagerQuery);
query->manager = manager;
query->known_hosts = table;
query->connection = connection;
query->dialog = inf_gtk_certificate_dialog_new(
priv->parent_window,
0,
flags,
hostname,
chain
);
query->certificate_chain = chain;
table = NULL;
g_object_ref(query->connection);
inf_certificate_chain_ref(chain);
g_signal_connect(
G_OBJECT(connection),
"notify::status",
G_CALLBACK(inf_gtk_certificate_manager_notify_status_cb),
query
);
g_signal_connect(
G_OBJECT(query->dialog),
"response",
G_CALLBACK(inf_gtk_certificate_manager_response_cb),
query
);
image = gtk_image_new_from_stock(GTK_STOCK_CANCEL, GTK_ICON_SIZE_BUTTON);
gtk_widget_show(image);
button = gtk_dialog_add_button(
GTK_DIALOG(query->dialog),
_("_Cancel connection"),
GTK_RESPONSE_REJECT
);
gtk_button_set_image(GTK_BUTTON(button), image);
image = gtk_image_new_from_stock(GTK_STOCK_CONNECT, GTK_ICON_SIZE_BUTTON);
gtk_widget_show(image);
button = gtk_dialog_add_button(
GTK_DIALOG(query->dialog),
_("C_ontinue connection"),
GTK_RESPONSE_ACCEPT
);
gtk_button_set_image(GTK_BUTTON(button), image);
text = g_strdup_printf(
_("Do you want to continue the connection to host \"%s\"? If you "
"choose to continue, this certificate will be trusted in the "
"future when connecting to this host."),
hostname
);
label = gtk_label_new(text);
gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL(label), TRUE);
gtk_label_set_line_wrap_mode(GTK_LABEL(label), PANGO_WRAP_WORD_CHAR);
gtk_label_set_width_chars(GTK_LABEL(label), 60);
gtk_misc_set_alignment(GTK_MISC(label), 0.0, 0.0);
gtk_widget_show(label);
g_free(text);
vbox = gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(query->dialog));
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(vbox), label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
priv->queries = g_slist_prepend(priv->queries, query);
gtk_window_present(GTK_WINDOW(query->dialog));
}
}
else
{
inf_xmpp_connection_certificate_verify_cancel(connection, error);
g_error_free(error);
}
if(table != NULL) g_hash_table_unref(table);
g_free(hostname);
}
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate chain, and
* also check if the hostname matches.
*/
void
verify_certificate_chain(const char *hostname,
const gnutls_datum_t * cert_chain,
int cert_chain_length)
{
int i;
gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tlist;
gnutls_x509_crt_t *cert;
unsigned int output;
/* Initialize the trusted certificate list. This should be done
* once on initialization. gnutls_x509_crt_list_import2() and
* gnutls_x509_crl_list_import2() can be used to load them.
*/
gnutls_x509_trust_list_init(&tlist, 0);
gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_cas(tlist, ca_list, ca_list_size, 0);
gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_crls(tlist, crl_list, crl_list_size,
GNUTLS_TL_VERIFY_CRL, 0);
cert = malloc(sizeof(*cert) * cert_chain_length);
/* Import all the certificates in the chain to
* native certificate format.
*/
for (i = 0; i < cert_chain_length; i++) {
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert[i]);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert[i], &cert_chain[i],
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
}
gnutls_x509_trust_list_verify_named_crt(tlist, cert[0], hostname,
strlen(hostname),
GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CRL_CHECKS,
&output,
print_details_func);
/* if this certificate is not explicitly trusted verify against CAs
*/
if (output != 0) {
gnutls_x509_trust_list_verify_crt(tlist, cert,
cert_chain_length, 0,
&output,
print_details_func);
}
if (output & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
fprintf(stderr, "Not trusted");
if (output & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
fprintf(stderr, ": no issuer was found");
if (output & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA)
fprintf(stderr, ": issuer is not a CA");
if (output & GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED)
fprintf(stderr, ": not yet activated\n");
if (output & GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED)
fprintf(stderr, ": expired\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Trusted\n");
/* Check if the name in the first certificate matches our destination!
*/
if (!gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert[0], hostname)) {
printf
("The certificate's owner does not match hostname '%s'\n",
hostname);
}
gnutls_x509_trust_list_deinit(tlist, 1);
return;
}
/*
* This function is called after the TCP connect has completed. Setup the TLS
* layer and do all necessary magic.
*/
CURLcode
Curl_gtls_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
const int cert_type_priority[] = { GNUTLS_CRT_X509, 0 };
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
gnutls_session session;
int rc;
unsigned int cert_list_size;
const gnutls_datum *chainp;
unsigned int verify_status;
gnutls_x509_crt x509_cert;
char certbuf[256]; /* big enough? */
size_t size;
unsigned int algo;
unsigned int bits;
time_t clock;
const char *ptr;
void *ssl_sessionid;
size_t ssl_idsize;
/* GnuTLS only supports TLSv1 (and SSLv3?) */
if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2) {
failf(data, "GnuTLS does not support SSLv2");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* allocate a cred struct */
rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&conn->ssl[sockindex].cred);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "gnutls_cert_all_cred() failed: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
if(data->set.ssl.CAfile) {
/* set the trusted CA cert bundle file */
gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(conn->ssl[sockindex].cred,
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT);
rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(conn->ssl[sockindex].cred,
data->set.ssl.CAfile,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if(rc < 0) {
infof(data, "error reading ca cert file %s (%s)\n",
data->set.ssl.CAfile, gnutls_strerror(rc));
if (data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
else
infof(data, "found %d certificates in %s\n",
rc, data->set.ssl.CAfile);
}
/* Initialize TLS session as a client */
rc = gnutls_init(&conn->ssl[sockindex].session, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
if(rc) {
failf(data, "gnutls_init() failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* convenient assign */
session = conn->ssl[sockindex].session;
/* Use default priorities */
rc = gnutls_set_default_priority(session);
if(rc < 0)
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
/* Sets the priority on the certificate types supported by gnutls. Priority
is higher for types specified before others. After specifying the types
you want, you must append a 0. */
rc = gnutls_certificate_type_set_priority(session, cert_type_priority);
if(rc < 0)
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
if(data->set.cert) {
if( gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(
conn->ssl[sockindex].cred, data->set.cert,
data->set.key != 0 ? data->set.key : data->set.cert,
do_file_type(data->set.cert_type) ) ) {
failf(data, "error reading X.509 key or certificate file");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
/* put the credentials to the current session */
rc = gnutls_credentials_set(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE,
conn->ssl[sockindex].cred);
/* set the connection handle (file descriptor for the socket) */
gnutls_transport_set_ptr(session,
(gnutls_transport_ptr)conn->sock[sockindex]);
/* register callback functions to send and receive data. */
gnutls_transport_set_push_function(session, Curl_gtls_push);
gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(session, Curl_gtls_pull);
/* lowat must be set to zero when using custom push and pull functions. */
gnutls_transport_set_lowat(session, 0);
/* This might be a reconnect, so we check for a session ID in the cache
to speed up things */
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize)) {
/* we got a session id, use it! */
gnutls_session_set_data(session, ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize);
/* Informational message */
infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
}
rc = handshake(conn, session, sockindex, TRUE);
if(rc)
/* handshake() sets its own error message with failf() */
return rc;
/* This function will return the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by
the peer. These certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for
X.509). In case of a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The
first certificate in the list is the peer's certificate, following the
issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. */
chainp = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if(!chainp) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
failf(data, "failed to get server cert");
return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
}
infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
}
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its
status (trusted, invalid etc.). The value of status should be one or more
of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements bitwise or'd. To
avoid denial of service attacks some default upper limits regarding the
certificate key size and chain size are set. To override them use
gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). */
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify_status);
if (rc < 0) {
failf(data, "server cert verify failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* verify_status is a bitmask of gnutls_certificate_status bits */
if(verify_status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
if (data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate verification failed. CAfile: %s",
data->set.ssl.CAfile?data->set.ssl.CAfile:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification OK\n");
/* initialize an X.509 certificate structure. */
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_cert);
/* convert the given DER or PEM encoded Certificate to the native
gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
size=sizeof(certbuf);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(x509_cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME,
0, /* the first and only one */
FALSE,
certbuf,
&size);
if(rc) {
infof(data, "error fetching CN from cert:%s\n",
gnutls_strerror(rc));
}
/* This function will check if the given certificate's subject matches the
given hostname. This is a basic implementation of the matching described
in RFC2818 (HTTPS), which takes into account wildcards, and the subject
alternative name PKIX extension. Returns non zero on success, and zero on
failure. */
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509_cert, conn->host.name);
if(!rc) {
if (data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name (%s) does not match "
"target host name '%s'", certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", certbuf);
/* Show:
- ciphers used
- subject
- start date
- expire date
- common name
- issuer
*/
/* public key algorithm's parameters */
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(x509_cert, &bits);
infof(data, "\t certificate public key: %s\n",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name(algo));
/* version of the X.509 certificate. */
infof(data, "\t certificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(x509_cert));
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", certbuf);
clock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "start date", clock);
clock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "expire date", clock);
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
/* compression algorithm (if any) */
ptr = gnutls_compression_get_name(gnutls_compression_get(session));
/* the *_get_name() says "NULL" if GNUTLS_COMP_NULL is returned */
infof(data, "\t compression: %s\n", ptr);
/* the name of the cipher used. ie 3DES. */
ptr = gnutls_cipher_get_name(gnutls_cipher_get(session));
infof(data, "\t cipher: %s\n", ptr);
/* the MAC algorithms name. ie SHA1 */
ptr = gnutls_mac_get_name(gnutls_mac_get(session));
infof(data, "\t MAC: %s\n", ptr);
if(!ssl_sessionid) {
/* this session was not previously in the cache, add it now */
/* get the session ID data size */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &ssl_idsize);
ssl_sessionid = malloc(ssl_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */
if(ssl_sessionid) {
/* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize);
/* store this session id */
return Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize);
}
}
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode
gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
unsigned int cert_list_size;
const gnutls_datum *chainp;
unsigned int verify_status;
gnutls_x509_crt x509_cert,x509_issuer;
gnutls_datum issuerp;
char certbuf[256]; /* big enough? */
size_t size;
unsigned int algo;
unsigned int bits;
time_t certclock;
const char *ptr;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
gnutls_session session = conn->ssl[sockindex].session;
int rc;
int incache;
void *ssl_sessionid;
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
/* This function will return the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by
the peer. These certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for
X.509). In case of a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The
first certificate in the list is the peer's certificate, following the
issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. */
chainp = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if(!chainp) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer ||
data->set.ssl.verifyhost ||
data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
&& data->set.ssl.username != NULL
&& !data->set.ssl.verifypeer
&& gnutls_cipher_get(session)) {
/* no peer cert, but auth is ok if we have SRP user and cipher and no
peer verify */
}
else {
#endif
failf(data, "failed to get server cert");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
}
#endif
}
infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
}
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its
status (trusted, invalid etc.). The value of status should be one or
more of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements bitwise
or'd. To avoid denial of service attacks some default upper limits
regarding the certificate key size and chain size are set. To override
them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). */
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify_status);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "server cert verify failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* verify_status is a bitmask of gnutls_certificate_status bits */
if(verify_status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate verification failed. CAfile: %s "
"CRLfile: %s", data->set.ssl.CAfile?data->set.ssl.CAfile:"none",
data->set.ssl.CRLfile?data->set.ssl.CRLfile:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification OK\n");
}
else {
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification SKIPPED\n");
goto after_server_cert_verification;
}
/* initialize an X.509 certificate structure. */
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_cert);
/* convert the given DER or PEM encoded Certificate to the native
gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if(data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_issuer);
issuerp = load_file(data->set.ssl.issuercert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_issuer, &issuerp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(x509_cert,x509_issuer);
unload_file(issuerp);
if(rc <= 0) {
failf(data, "server certificate issuer check failed (IssuerCert: %s)",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
infof(data,"\t server certificate issuer check OK (Issuer Cert: %s)\n",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
}
size=sizeof(certbuf);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(x509_cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME,
0, /* the first and only one */
FALSE,
certbuf,
&size);
if(rc) {
infof(data, "error fetching CN from cert:%s\n",
gnutls_strerror(rc));
}
/* This function will check if the given certificate's subject matches the
given hostname. This is a basic implementation of the matching described
in RFC2818 (HTTPS), which takes into account wildcards, and the subject
alternative name PKIX extension. Returns non zero on success, and zero on
failure. */
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509_cert, conn->host.name);
if(!rc) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name (%s) does not match "
"target host name '%s'", certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", certbuf);
/* Check for time-based validity */
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
failf(data, "server cert expiration date verify failed");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
if(certclock < time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate expiration date has passed.");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date OK\n");
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
failf(data, "server cert activation date verify failed");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
if(certclock > time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate not activated yet.");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date OK\n");
/* Show:
- ciphers used
- subject
- start date
- expire date
- common name
- issuer
*/
/* public key algorithm's parameters */
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(x509_cert, &bits);
infof(data, "\t certificate public key: %s\n",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name(algo));
/* version of the X.509 certificate. */
infof(data, "\t certificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(x509_cert));
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", certbuf);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "start date", certclock);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "expire date", certclock);
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
after_server_cert_verification:
/* compression algorithm (if any) */
ptr = gnutls_compression_get_name(gnutls_compression_get(session));
/* the *_get_name() says "NULL" if GNUTLS_COMP_NULL is returned */
infof(data, "\t compression: %s\n", ptr);
/* the name of the cipher used. ie 3DES. */
ptr = gnutls_cipher_get_name(gnutls_cipher_get(session));
infof(data, "\t cipher: %s\n", ptr);
/* the MAC algorithms name. ie SHA1 */
ptr = gnutls_mac_get_name(gnutls_mac_get(session));
infof(data, "\t MAC: %s\n", ptr);
conn->ssl[sockindex].state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = gtls_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = gtls_send;
{
/* we always unconditionally get the session id here, as even if we
already got it from the cache and asked to use it in the connection, it
might've been rejected and then a new one is in use now and we need to
detect that. */
void *connect_sessionid;
size_t connect_idsize;
/* get the session ID data size */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &connect_idsize);
connect_sessionid = malloc(connect_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */
if(connect_sessionid) {
/* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize);
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL));
if(incache) {
/* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the
previous one was rejected, we just kill that and store the new */
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid);
}
/* store this session id */
result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, connect_sessionid, connect_idsize);
if(result) {
free(connect_sessionid);
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
else
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return result;
}
static int tls_check_preauth (const gnutls_datum_t *certdata,
gnutls_certificate_status certstat,
const char *hostname, int chainidx, int* certerr,
int* savedcert)
{
gnutls_x509_crt cert;
*certerr = CERTERR_VALID;
*savedcert = 0;
if (gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert) < 0)
{
mutt_error (_("Error initialising gnutls certificate data"));
mutt_sleep (2);
return -1;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, certdata, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) < 0)
{
mutt_error (_("Error processing certificate data"));
mutt_sleep (2);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
return -1;
}
if (option (OPTSSLVERIFYDATES) != M_NO)
{
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert) < time(NULL))
*certerr |= CERTERR_EXPIRED;
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (cert) > time(NULL))
*certerr |= CERTERR_NOTYETVALID;
}
if (chainidx == 0 && option (OPTSSLVERIFYHOST) != M_NO
&& !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (cert, hostname)
&& !tls_check_stored_hostname (certdata, hostname))
*certerr |= CERTERR_HOSTNAME;
/* see whether certificate is in our cache (certificates file) */
if (tls_compare_certificates (certdata))
{
*savedcert = 1;
if (chainidx == 0 && (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID))
{
/* doesn't matter - have decided is valid because server
certificate is in our trusted cache */
certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
}
if (chainidx == 0 && (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND))
{
/* doesn't matter that we haven't found the signer, since
certificate is in our trusted cache */
certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (chainidx <= 1 && (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA))
{
/* Hmm. Not really sure how to handle this, but let's say
that we don't care if the CA certificate hasn't got the
correct X.509 basic constraints if server or first signer
certificate is in our cache. */
certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA;
}
if (chainidx == 0 && (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM))
{
/* doesn't matter that it was signed using an insecure
algorithm, since certificate is in our trusted cache */
certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM;
}
}
if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)
{
*certerr |= CERTERR_REVOKED;
certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED;
}
if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)
{
*certerr |= CERTERR_NOTTRUSTED;
certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
}
if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
{
/* NB: already cleared if cert in cache */
*certerr |= CERTERR_NOTTRUSTED;
certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA)
{
/* NB: already cleared if cert in cache */
*certerr |= CERTERR_SIGNERNOTCA;
certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA;
}
if (certstat & GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM)
{
/* NB: already cleared if cert in cache */
*certerr |= CERTERR_INSECUREALG;
certstat ^= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
/* we've been zeroing the interesting bits in certstat -
don't return OK if there are any unhandled bits we don't
understand */
if (*certerr == CERTERR_VALID && certstat == 0)
return 0;
return -1;
}
static void
print_x509_info (gnutls_session_t session, const char *hostname, int insecure)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int cert_list_size = 0, j;
int hostname_ok = 0;
int ret;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (session, &cert_list_size);
if (cert_list_size == 0)
{
fprintf (stderr, "No certificates found!\n");
return;
}
printf (" - Got a certificate list of %d certificates.\n", cert_list_size);
for (j = 0; j < cert_list_size; j++)
{
gnutls_datum_t cinfo;
gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &cert_list[j], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if (ret < 0)
{
fprintf (stderr, "Decoding error: %s\n", gnutls_strerror (ret));
return;
}
printf (" - Certificate[%d] info:\n - ", j);
if (verbose)
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_print (crt, GNUTLS_CRT_PRINT_FULL, &cinfo);
else
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_print (crt, GNUTLS_CRT_PRINT_ONELINE, &cinfo);
if (ret == 0)
{
printf ("%s\n", cinfo.data);
gnutls_free (cinfo.data);
}
if (print_cert)
{
size_t size = 0;
char *p = NULL;
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_export (crt, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, p, &size);
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
{
p = malloc (size);
if (!p)
{
fprintf (stderr, "gnutls_malloc\n");
exit (1);
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_export (crt, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
p, &size);
}
if (ret < 0)
{
fprintf (stderr, "Encoding error: %s\n", gnutls_strerror (ret));
return;
}
fputs ("\n", stdout);
fputs (p, stdout);
fputs ("\n", stdout);
gnutls_free (p);
}
if (j == 0 && hostname != NULL)
{
/* Check the hostname of the first certificate if it matches
* the name of the host we connected to.
*/
if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (crt, hostname) == 0)
hostname_ok = 1;
else
hostname_ok = 2;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt);
}
if (hostname_ok == 1)
{
printf ("- The hostname in the certificate does NOT match '%s'\n",
hostname);
if (!insecure)
exit (1);
}
else if (hostname_ok == 2)
{
printf ("- The hostname in the certificate matches '%s'.\n", hostname);
}
}
static int
tds_verify_certificate(gnutls_session_t session)
{
unsigned int status;
int ret;
TDSSOCKET *tds = (TDSSOCKET *) gnutls_transport_get_ptr(session);
#ifdef ENABLE_DEVELOPING
unsigned int list_size;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
#endif
if (!tds->login)
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &status);
if (ret < 0) {
tdsdump_log(TDS_DBG_ERROR, "Error verifying certificate: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret));
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_DEVELOPING
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &list_size);
if (cert_list) {
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
gnutls_datum_t cinfo;
char buf[8192];
size_t size;
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
/* This is the preferred way of printing short information about
* a certificate. */
size = sizeof(buf);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_export(cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, buf, &size);
if (ret == 0) {
FILE *f = fopen("cert.dat", "wb");
if (f) {
fwrite(buf, size, 1, f);
fclose(f);
}
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_print(cert, GNUTLS_CRT_PRINT_ONELINE, &cinfo);
if (ret == 0) {
tdsdump_log(TDS_DBG_INFO1, "Certificate info: %s\n", cinfo.data);
gnutls_free(cinfo.data);
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
}
#endif
/* Certificate is not trusted */
if (status != 0) {
tdsdump_log(TDS_DBG_ERROR, "Certificate status: %u\n", status);
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
/* check hostname */
if (tds->login->check_ssl_hostname) {
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int list_size;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &list_size);
if (!cert_list) {
tdsdump_log(TDS_DBG_ERROR, "Error getting TLS session peers\n");
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert, tds_dstr_cstr(&tds->login->server_host_name));
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
if (!ret) {
tdsdump_log(TDS_DBG_ERROR, "Certificate hostname does not match\n");
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
}
}
/* notify gnutls to continue handshake normally */
return 0;
}
static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags)
{
TLSContext *c = h->priv_data;
int ret;
int port;
const char *p;
char buf[200], host[200], opts[50] = "";
int numerichost = 0;
struct addrinfo hints = { 0 }, *ai = NULL;
const char *proxy_path;
int use_proxy;
if ((ret = ff_tls_init()) < 0)
return ret;
if (c->listen)
snprintf(opts, sizeof(opts), "?listen=1");
av_url_split(NULL, 0, NULL, 0, host, sizeof(host), &port, NULL, 0, uri);
p = strchr(uri, '?');
if (!p) {
p = opts;
} else {
if (av_find_info_tag(opts, sizeof(opts), "listen", p))
c->listen = 1;
}
ff_url_join(buf, sizeof(buf), "tcp", NULL, host, port, "%s", p);
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
if (!getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai)) {
numerichost = 1;
freeaddrinfo(ai);
}
proxy_path = getenv("http_proxy");
use_proxy = !ff_http_match_no_proxy(getenv("no_proxy"), host) &&
proxy_path && av_strstart(proxy_path, "http://", NULL);
if (use_proxy) {
char proxy_host[200], proxy_auth[200], dest[200];
int proxy_port;
av_url_split(NULL, 0, proxy_auth, sizeof(proxy_auth),
proxy_host, sizeof(proxy_host), &proxy_port, NULL, 0,
proxy_path);
ff_url_join(dest, sizeof(dest), NULL, NULL, host, port, NULL);
ff_url_join(buf, sizeof(buf), "httpproxy", proxy_auth, proxy_host,
proxy_port, "/%s", dest);
}
ret = ffurl_open(&c->tcp, buf, AVIO_FLAG_READ_WRITE,
&h->interrupt_callback, NULL);
if (ret)
goto fail;
c->fd = ffurl_get_file_handle(c->tcp);
#if CONFIG_GNUTLS
gnutls_init(&c->session, c->listen ? GNUTLS_SERVER : GNUTLS_CLIENT);
if (!c->listen && !numerichost)
gnutls_server_name_set(c->session, GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, host, strlen(host));
gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&c->cred);
set_options(h, uri);
if (c->ca_file) {
ret = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(c->cred, c->ca_file, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret));
}
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
else
gnutls_certificate_set_x509_system_trust(c->cred);
#endif
gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(c->cred, c->verify ?
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT : 0);
if (c->cert_file && c->key_file) {
ret = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(c->cred,
c->cert_file, c->key_file,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to set cert/key files %s and %s: %s\n",
c->cert_file, c->key_file, gnutls_strerror(ret));
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
} else if (c->cert_file || c->key_file)
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cert and key required\n");
gnutls_credentials_set(c->session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, c->cred);
gnutls_transport_set_ptr(c->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)
(intptr_t) c->fd);
gnutls_priority_set_direct(c->session, "NORMAL", NULL);
while (1) {
ret = gnutls_handshake(c->session);
if (ret == 0)
break;
if ((ret = do_tls_poll(h, ret)) < 0)
goto fail;
}
if (c->verify) {
unsigned int status, cert_list_size;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
if ((ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(c->session, &status)) < 0) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to verify peer certificate: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Peer certificate failed verification\n");
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get(c->session) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unsupported certificate type\n");
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert);
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(c->session, &cert_list_size);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, cert_list, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert, host);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
if (!ret) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"The certificate's owner does not match hostname %s\n", host);
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
}
#elif CONFIG_OPENSSL
c->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(c->listen ? TLSv1_server_method() : TLSv1_client_method());
if (!c->ctx) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
set_options(h, uri);
if (c->ca_file) {
if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(c->ctx, c->ca_file, NULL))
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations %s\n", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
}
if (c->cert_file && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(c->ctx, c->cert_file)) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to load cert file %s: %s\n",
c->cert_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
if (c->key_file && !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(c->ctx, c->key_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to load key file %s: %s\n",
c->key_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
// Note, this doesn't check that the peer certificate actually matches
// the requested hostname.
if (c->verify)
SSL_CTX_set_verify(c->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, NULL);
c->ssl = SSL_new(c->ctx);
if (!c->ssl) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%s\n", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
SSL_set_fd(c->ssl, c->fd);
if (!c->listen && !numerichost)
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(c->ssl, host);
while (1) {
ret = c->listen ? SSL_accept(c->ssl) : SSL_connect(c->ssl);
if (ret > 0)
break;
if (ret == 0) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to negotiate TLS/SSL session\n");
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
if ((ret = do_tls_poll(h, ret)) < 0)
goto fail;
}
#endif
return 0;
fail:
TLS_free(c);
if (c->tcp)
ffurl_close(c->tcp);
ff_tls_deinit();
return ret;
}
static int
verify_certificates(struct socket *socket)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
gnutls_session_t session = *(ssl_t *)socket->ssl;
struct connection *conn = socket->conn;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned char *hostname;
int ret;
unsigned int cert_list_size, status;
ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &status);
if (ret) return ret;
if (status) return status;
/* If the certificate is of a type for which verification has
* not yet been implemented, then reject it. This way, a fake
* server cannot avoid verification by using a strange type of
* certificate.
*
* OpenPGP certificates shouldn't even get this far anyway,
* because init_ssl_connection() tells GnuTLS to disable
* OpenPGP, and ELinks never calls
* gnutls_certificate_set_openpgp_keyring_file, so status
* should have been GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND. */
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get(session) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
return -7;
if (gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert) < 0) {
return -1;
}
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if (!cert_list) {
return -2;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, &cert_list[0],
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) < 0) {
return -3;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(cert) < time(NULL)) {
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
return -4;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(cert) > time(NULL)) {
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
return -5;
}
/* Because RFC 5280 defines dNSName as an IA5String, it can
* only contain ASCII characters. Internationalized domain
* names must thus be in Punycode form. Because GnuTLS 2.8.6
* does not itself support IDN, ELinks must convert. */
hostname = get_uri_string(conn->uri, URI_HOST | URI_IDN);
if (!hostname) return -6;
ret = !gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert, hostname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
mem_free(hostname);
return ret;
}
void doit(void)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t x509;
#ifdef ENABLE_OPENPGP
gnutls_openpgp_crt_t pgp;
#endif
gnutls_datum_t data;
int ret;
ret = global_init();
if (ret < 0)
fail("global_init: %d\n", ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509);
if (ret < 0)
fail("gnutls_x509_crt_init: %d\n", ret);
#ifdef ENABLE_OPENPGP
ret = gnutls_openpgp_crt_init(&pgp);
if (ret < 0)
fail("gnutls_openpgp_crt_init: %d\n", ret);
#endif
if (debug)
success("Testing wildcards...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) wildcards;
data.size = strlen(wildcards);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "example.com");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "example.org");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example.net");
if (ret==0)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
if (debug)
success("Testing pem1...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem1;
data.size = strlen(pem1);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foo");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
if (debug)
success("Testing pem2...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem2;
data.size = strlen(pem2);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foo");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example.org");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "*.example.org");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
if (debug)
success("Testing pem3...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem3;
data.size = strlen(pem3);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foo");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example.org");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "*.example.org");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
if (debug)
success("Testing pem4...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem4;
data.size = strlen(pem4);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foo");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example.org");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname2(x509, "www.example.org", GNUTLS_VERIFY_DO_NOT_ALLOW_WILDCARDS);
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foo.example.org");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foo.example.com");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
#ifdef SUPPORT_COMPLEX_WILDCARDS
if (debug)
success("Testing pem6...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem6;
data.size = strlen(pem6);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foo.example.org");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "bar.foo.example.org");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
if (debug)
success("Testing pem7...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem7;
data.size = strlen(pem7);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foo.bar.example.org");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foobar.bar.example.org");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foobar.example.org");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foobazbar.example.org");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
#endif
if (debug)
success("Testing pem8...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem8;
data.size = strlen(pem8);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
/* this was passing in old gnutls versions, but that was not a
* good idea. See http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel/7380
* for a discussion. */
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example.org");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example.");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
/* this was passing in old gnutls versions, but that was not a
* good idea. See http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel/7380
* for a discussion. */
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example.com");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example.foo.com");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
if (debug)
success("Testing pem9...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem9;
data.size = strlen(pem9);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "foo.example.org");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "bar.example.org");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
if (debug)
success("Testing pem10...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem10;
data.size = strlen(pem10);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "localhost");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
if (debug)
success("Testing pem_too_many...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem_too_many;
data.size = strlen(pem_too_many);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509,
"localhost.gnutls.gnutls.org");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname verification should have failed (too many wildcards)\n", __LINE__);
if (debug)
success("Testing pem-ips...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem_ips;
data.size = strlen(pem_ips);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "127.0.0.2");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "example.com");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "127.0.0.1");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "192.168.5.1");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "::1");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "fe80::3e97:eff:fe18:359a");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
if (debug)
success("Testing multi-cns...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) multi_cns;
data.size = strlen(multi_cns);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &data, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_x509_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "example.com");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example.com");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example2.com");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509, "www.example3.com");
if (ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly matches (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
#ifdef ENABLE_OPENPGP
if (debug)
success("Testing pem11...\n");
data.data = (unsigned char *) pem11;
data.size = strlen(pem11);
ret =
gnutls_openpgp_crt_import(pgp, &data,
GNUTLS_OPENPGP_FMT_BASE64);
if (ret < 0)
fail("%d: gnutls_openpgp_crt_import: %d\n", __LINE__, ret);
ret = gnutls_openpgp_crt_check_hostname(pgp, "test.gnutls.org");
if (!ret)
fail("%d: Hostname incorrectly does not match (%d)\n", __LINE__, ret);
gnutls_openpgp_crt_deinit(pgp);
#endif
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509);
gnutls_global_deinit();
}
void
doit (void)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
int ret;
ret = gnutls_global_init ();
if (ret < 0)
{
fail ("gnutls_global_init");
exit (1);
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_init (&crt);
if (ret != 0)
{
fail ("gnutls_x509_crt_init");
exit (1);
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &badguy_nul_cn, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
{
fail ("gnutls_x509_crt_import");
exit (1);
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (crt, "www.bank.com");
if (ret == 0)
{
if (debug)
success ("gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname OK (NUL-IN-CN)");
}
else
{
fail ("gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname BROKEN (NUL-IN-CN)");
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import (crt, &badguy_nul_san, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
{
fail ("gnutls_x509_crt_import");
exit (1);
}
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (crt, "www.bank.com");
if (ret == 0)
{
if (debug)
success ("gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname OK (NUL-IN-SAN)");
}
else
{
fail ("gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname BROKEN (NUL-IN-SAN)");
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (crt);
gnutls_global_deinit ();
}
static CURLcode
gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
unsigned int cert_list_size;
const gnutls_datum_t *chainp;
unsigned int verify_status = 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_t x509_cert, x509_issuer;
gnutls_datum_t issuerp;
char certbuf[256] = ""; /* big enough? */
size_t size;
unsigned int algo;
unsigned int bits;
time_t certclock;
const char *ptr;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
gnutls_session_t session = conn->ssl[sockindex].session;
int rc;
bool incache;
void *ssl_sessionid;
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
gnutls_datum_t proto;
#endif
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
gnutls_protocol_t version = gnutls_protocol_get_version(session);
/* the name of the cipher suite used, e.g. ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. */
ptr = gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(gnutls_kx_get(session),
gnutls_cipher_get(session),
gnutls_mac_get(session));
infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n",
gnutls_protocol_get_name(version), ptr);
/* This function will return the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by
the peer. These certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for
X.509). In case of a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The
first certificate in the list is the peer's certificate, following the
issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. */
chainp = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if(!chainp) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer ||
data->set.ssl.verifyhost ||
data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
&& data->set.ssl.username != NULL
&& !data->set.ssl.verifypeer
&& gnutls_cipher_get(session)) {
/* no peer cert, but auth is ok if we have SRP user and cipher and no
peer verify */
}
else {
#endif
failf(data, "failed to get server cert");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
}
#endif
}
infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
}
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo && chainp) {
unsigned int i;
result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, cert_list_size);
if(result)
return result;
for(i = 0; i < cert_list_size; i++) {
const char *beg = (const char *) chainp[i].data;
const char *end = beg + chainp[i].size;
result = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, i, beg, end);
if(result)
return result;
}
}
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its
status (trusted, invalid etc.). The value of status should be one or
more of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements bitwise
or'd. To avoid denial of service attacks some default upper limits
regarding the certificate key size and chain size are set. To override
them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). */
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify_status);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "server cert verify failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* verify_status is a bitmask of gnutls_certificate_status bits */
if(verify_status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate verification failed. CAfile: %s "
"CRLfile: %s", data->set.ssl.CAfile?data->set.ssl.CAfile:"none",
data->set.ssl.CRLfile?data->set.ssl.CRLfile:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification OK\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification SKIPPED\n");
#ifdef HAS_OCSP
if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
if(gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(session, 0) == 0) {
gnutls_datum_t status_request;
gnutls_ocsp_resp_t ocsp_resp;
gnutls_ocsp_cert_status_t status;
gnutls_x509_crl_reason_t reason;
rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(session, &status_request);
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification FAILED\n");
if(rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
failf(data, "No OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&ocsp_resp);
rc = gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(ocsp_resp, &status_request);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
rc = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_single(ocsp_resp, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&status, NULL, NULL, NULL, &reason);
switch(status) {
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_GOOD:
break;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_REVOKED: {
const char *crl_reason;
switch(reason) {
default:
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_UNSPECIFIED:
crl_reason = "unspecified reason";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_KEYCOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "private key compromised";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CACOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "CA compromised";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_AFFILIATIONCHANGED:
crl_reason = "affiliation has changed";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_SUPERSEDED:
crl_reason = "certificate superseded";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CESSATIONOFOPERATION:
crl_reason = "operation has ceased";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CERTIFICATEHOLD:
crl_reason = "certificate is on hold";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_REMOVEFROMCRL:
crl_reason = "will be removed from delta CRL";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_PRIVILEGEWITHDRAWN:
crl_reason = "privilege withdrawn";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_AACOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "AA compromised";
break;
}
failf(data, "Server certificate was revoked: %s", crl_reason);
break;
}
default:
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
failf(data, "Server certificate status is unknown");
break;
}
gnutls_ocsp_resp_deinit(ocsp_resp);
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification OK\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification SKIPPED\n");
#endif
/* initialize an X.509 certificate structure. */
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_cert);
if(chainp)
/* convert the given DER or PEM encoded Certificate to the native
gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if(data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_issuer);
issuerp = load_file(data->set.ssl.issuercert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_issuer, &issuerp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(x509_cert, x509_issuer);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_issuer);
unload_file(issuerp);
if(rc <= 0) {
failf(data, "server certificate issuer check failed (IssuerCert: %s)",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
infof(data, "\t server certificate issuer check OK (Issuer Cert: %s)\n",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
}
size=sizeof(certbuf);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(x509_cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME,
0, /* the first and only one */
FALSE,
certbuf,
&size);
if(rc) {
infof(data, "error fetching CN from cert:%s\n",
gnutls_strerror(rc));
}
/* This function will check if the given certificate's subject matches the
given hostname. This is a basic implementation of the matching described
in RFC2818 (HTTPS), which takes into account wildcards, and the subject
alternative name PKIX extension. Returns non zero on success, and zero on
failure. */
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509_cert, conn->host.name);
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x030306
/* Before 3.3.6, gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname() didn't check IP
addresses. */
if(!rc) {
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
#define use_addr in6_addr
#else
#define use_addr in_addr
#endif
unsigned char addrbuf[sizeof(struct use_addr)];
unsigned char certaddr[sizeof(struct use_addr)];
size_t addrlen = 0, certaddrlen;
int i;
int ret = 0;
if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, addrbuf) > 0)
addrlen = 4;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, addrbuf) > 0)
addrlen = 16;
#endif
if(addrlen) {
for(i=0; ; i++) {
certaddrlen = sizeof(certaddr);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject_alt_name(x509_cert, i, certaddr,
&certaddrlen, NULL);
/* If this happens, it wasn't an IP address. */
if(ret == GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
continue;
if(ret < 0)
break;
if(ret != GNUTLS_SAN_IPADDRESS)
continue;
if(certaddrlen == addrlen && !memcmp(addrbuf, certaddr, addrlen)) {
rc = 1;
break;
}
}
}
}
#endif
if(!rc) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name (%s) does not match "
"target host name '%s'", certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", certbuf);
/* Check for time-based validity */
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server cert expiration date verify failed");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date verify FAILED\n");
}
else {
if(certclock < time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate expiration date has passed.");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date OK\n");
}
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server cert activation date verify failed");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date verify FAILED\n");
}
else {
if(certclock > time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate not activated yet.");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date OK\n");
}
ptr = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
if(ptr) {
result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, x509_cert, ptr);
if(result != CURLE_OK) {
failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return result;
}
}
/* Show:
- subject
- start date
- expire date
- common name
- issuer
*/
/* public key algorithm's parameters */
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(x509_cert, &bits);
infof(data, "\t certificate public key: %s\n",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name(algo));
/* version of the X.509 certificate. */
infof(data, "\t certificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(x509_cert));
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", certbuf);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "start date", certclock);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "expire date", certclock);
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
/* compression algorithm (if any) */
ptr = gnutls_compression_get_name(gnutls_compression_get(session));
/* the *_get_name() says "NULL" if GNUTLS_COMP_NULL is returned */
infof(data, "\t compression: %s\n", ptr);
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
if(data->set.ssl_enable_alpn) {
rc = gnutls_alpn_get_selected_protocol(session, &proto);
if(rc == 0) {
infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", proto.size,
proto.data);
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(proto.size == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
!memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, proto.data,
NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
}
else
#endif
if(proto.size == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
!memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, proto.data, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
}
}
else
infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
}
#endif
conn->ssl[sockindex].state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = gtls_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = gtls_send;
{
/* we always unconditionally get the session id here, as even if we
already got it from the cache and asked to use it in the connection, it
might've been rejected and then a new one is in use now and we need to
detect that. */
void *connect_sessionid;
size_t connect_idsize = 0;
/* get the session ID data size */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &connect_idsize);
connect_sessionid = malloc(connect_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */
if(connect_sessionid) {
/* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize);
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL));
if(incache) {
/* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the
previous one was rejected, we just kill that and store the new */
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid);
}
/* store this session id */
result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, connect_sessionid, connect_idsize);
if(result) {
free(connect_sessionid);
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
else
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return result;
}
static void
perform_verification (EmpathyTLSVerifier *self,
GcrCertificateChain *chain)
{
gboolean ret = FALSE;
EmpTLSCertificateRejectReason reason =
EMP_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REJECT_REASON_UNKNOWN;
gnutls_x509_crt_t *list, *anchors;
guint n_list, n_anchors;
guint verify_output;
gint res;
gint i;
gboolean matched = FALSE;
EmpathyTLSVerifierPriv *priv = GET_PRIV (self);
DEBUG ("Performing verification");
debug_certificate_chain (chain);
list = anchors = NULL;
n_list = n_anchors = 0;
/*
* If the first certificate is an pinned certificate then we completely
* ignore the rest of the verification process.
*/
if (gcr_certificate_chain_get_status (chain) == GCR_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_PINNED)
{
DEBUG ("Found pinned certificate for %s", priv->hostname);
complete_verification (self);
goto out;
}
build_certificate_list_for_gnutls (chain, &list, &n_list,
&anchors, &n_anchors);
if (list == NULL || n_list == 0) {
g_warn_if_reached ();
abort_verification (self, EMP_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REJECT_REASON_UNKNOWN);
goto out;
}
verify_output = 0;
res = gnutls_x509_crt_list_verify (list, n_list, anchors, n_anchors,
NULL, 0, 0, &verify_output);
ret = verification_output_to_reason (res, verify_output, &reason);
DEBUG ("Certificate verification gave result %d with reason %u", ret,
reason);
if (!ret) {
abort_verification (self, reason);
goto out;
}
/* now check if the certificate matches one of the reference identities. */
if (priv->reference_identities != NULL)
{
for (i = 0, matched = FALSE; priv->reference_identities[i] != NULL; ++i)
{
if (gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (list[0],
priv->reference_identities[i]) == 1)
{
matched = TRUE;
break;
}
}
}
if (!matched)
{
gchar *certified_hostname;
certified_hostname = empathy_get_x509_certificate_hostname (list[0]);
tp_asv_set_string (priv->details,
"expected-hostname", priv->hostname);
tp_asv_set_string (priv->details,
"certificate-hostname", certified_hostname);
DEBUG ("Hostname mismatch: got %s but expected %s",
certified_hostname, priv->hostname);
g_free (certified_hostname);
abort_verification (self,
EMP_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REJECT_REASON_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH);
goto out;
}
DEBUG ("Hostname matched");
complete_verification (self);
out:
free_certificate_list_for_gnutls (list, n_list);
free_certificate_list_for_gnutls (anchors, n_anchors);
}
static gboolean
ssl_verify_certificate (LmSSL *ssl, const gchar *server)
{
LmSSLBase *base;
unsigned int status;
int rc;
base = LM_SSL_BASE (ssl);
/* This verification function uses the trusted CAs in the credentials
* structure. So you must have installed one or more CA certificates.
*/
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (ssl->gnutls_session, &status);
if (rc == GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND) {
if (base->func (ssl,
LM_SSL_STATUS_NO_CERT_FOUND,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
if (rc != 0) {
if (base->func (ssl,
LM_SSL_STATUS_GENERIC_ERROR,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
if (rc == GNUTLS_E_NO_CERTIFICATE_FOUND) {
if (base->func (ssl,
LM_SSL_STATUS_NO_CERT_FOUND,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID
|| status & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED) {
if (base->func (ssl, LM_SSL_STATUS_UNTRUSTED_CERT,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
if (gnutls_certificate_expiration_time_peers (ssl->gnutls_session) < time (0)) {
if (base->func (ssl, LM_SSL_STATUS_CERT_EXPIRED,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
if (gnutls_certificate_activation_time_peers (ssl->gnutls_session) > time (0)) {
if (base->func (ssl, LM_SSL_STATUS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (ssl->gnutls_session) == GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
const gnutls_datum_t* cert_list;
guint cert_list_size;
gnutls_digest_algorithm_t digest = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256;
guchar digest_bin[LM_FINGERPRINT_LENGTH];
size_t digest_size;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (ssl->gnutls_session, &cert_list_size);
if (cert_list == NULL) {
if (base->func (ssl, LM_SSL_STATUS_NO_CERT_FOUND,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert);
if (gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, &cert_list[0],
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) != 0) {
if (base->func (ssl, LM_SSL_STATUS_NO_CERT_FOUND,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
if (!gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname (cert, server)) {
if (base->func (ssl, LM_SSL_STATUS_CERT_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
digest_size = gnutls_hash_get_len(digest);
g_assert(digest_size < sizeof(digest_bin));
if (gnutls_fingerprint (digest,
&cert_list[0],
digest_bin,
&digest_size) >= 0) {
_lm_ssl_base_set_fingerprint(base, digest_bin, digest_size);
if (_lm_ssl_base_check_fingerprint(base) != 0 &&
base->func (ssl,
LM_SSL_STATUS_CERT_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
else if (base->func (ssl, LM_SSL_STATUS_GENERIC_ERROR,
base->func_data) != LM_SSL_RESPONSE_CONTINUE) {
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
static void real_start_verification(HevImpathyTLSVerifier *self)
{
HevImpathyTLSVerifierPrivate *priv =
HEV_IMPATHY_TLS_VERIFIER_GET_PRIVATE(self);
gnutls_x509_crt_t first_cert = 0, last_cert = 0;
gint idx = 0;
gboolean res = FALSE;
gint num_certs = 0;
TpTLSCertificateRejectReason reason =
TP_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REJECT_REASON_UNKNOWN;
g_debug("%s:%d[%s]", __FILE__, __LINE__, __FUNCTION__);
/* check if the certificate matches the hostname first. */
first_cert = g_ptr_array_index(priv->cert_chain, 0);
if(0 == gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(first_cert, priv->hostname))
{
gchar *certified_hostname = NULL;
reason = TP_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REJECT_REASON_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH;
certified_hostname =
(gchar *)hev_impathy_get_x509_certificate_hostname(first_cert);
tp_asv_set_string(priv->details,
"expected-hostname", priv->hostname);
tp_asv_set_string(priv->details,
"certificate-hostname", certified_hostname);
g_free(certified_hostname);
goto out;
}
num_certs = priv->cert_chain->len;
if(0 < priv->trusted_ca_list->len)
{
/* if the last certificate is self-signed, and we have a list of
* trusted CAs, ignore it, as we want to check the chain against our
* trusted CAs list first.
* if we have only one certificate in the chain, don't ignore it though,
* as it's the CA certificate itself.
*/
last_cert = g_ptr_array_index(priv->cert_chain, num_certs - 1);
if((0<gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(last_cert, last_cert)) &&
(1<num_certs))
num_certs --;
}
for (idx = 1; idx < num_certs; idx++)
{
res = verify_certificate(self,
g_ptr_array_index(priv->cert_chain, idx-1),
g_ptr_array_index(priv->cert_chain, idx), &reason);
if(!res)
{
abort_verification(self, reason);
return;
}
}
res = verify_last_certificate(self,
g_ptr_array_index(priv->cert_chain,
num_certs - 1), &reason);
out:
if(!res)
{
abort_verification(self, reason);
return;
}
complete_verification(self);
}
static int tls_open(URLContext *h, const char *uri, int flags, AVDictionary **options)
{
TLSContext *p = h->priv_data;
TLSShared *c = &p->tls_shared;
int ret;
ff_gnutls_init();
if ((ret = ff_tls_open_underlying(c, h, uri, options)) < 0)
goto fail;
gnutls_init(&p->session, c->listen ? GNUTLS_SERVER : GNUTLS_CLIENT);
if (!c->listen && !c->numerichost)
gnutls_server_name_set(p->session, GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, c->host, strlen(c->host));
gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&p->cred);
if (c->ca_file) {
ret = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(p->cred, c->ca_file, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0)
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "%s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret));
}
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
else
gnutls_certificate_set_x509_system_trust(p->cred);
#endif
gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(p->cred, c->verify ?
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT : 0);
if (c->cert_file && c->key_file) {
ret = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(p->cred,
c->cert_file, c->key_file,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Unable to set cert/key files %s and %s: %s\n",
c->cert_file, c->key_file, gnutls_strerror(ret));
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
} else if (c->cert_file || c->key_file)
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cert and key required\n");
gnutls_credentials_set(p->session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, p->cred);
gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(p->session, gnutls_url_pull);
gnutls_transport_set_push_function(p->session, gnutls_url_push);
gnutls_transport_set_ptr(p->session, c->tcp);
gnutls_priority_set_direct(p->session, "NORMAL", NULL);
ret = gnutls_handshake(p->session);
if (ret) {
ret = print_tls_error(h, ret);
goto fail;
}
p->need_shutdown = 1;
if (c->verify) {
unsigned int status, cert_list_size;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
if ((ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(p->session, &status)) < 0) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to verify peer certificate: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret));
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Peer certificate failed verification\n");
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get(p->session) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unsupported certificate type\n");
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert);
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(p->session, &cert_list_size);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, cert_list, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert, c->host);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
if (!ret) {
av_log(h, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"The certificate's owner does not match hostname %s\n", c->host);
ret = AVERROR(EIO);
goto fail;
}
}
return 0;
fail:
tls_close(h);
return ret;
}
static Ecore_Con_Ssl_Error
_ecore_con_ssl_server_init_gnutls(Ecore_Con_Server *svr)
{
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int iter, cert_list_size;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert = NULL;
const char *priority = "NONE:%VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+DHE-DSS:+ANON-DH:+COMP-DEFLATE:+COMP-NULL:+CTYPE-X509:+SHA1:+SHA256:+SHA384:+SHA512:+AES-256-CBC:+AES-128-CBC:+3DES-CBC:+VERS-TLS1.2:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.0:+VERS-SSL3.0";
int ret = 0;
switch (svr->ssl_state)
{
case ECORE_CON_SSL_STATE_DONE:
return ECORE_CON_SSL_ERROR_NONE;
case ECORE_CON_SSL_STATE_INIT:
if (svr->type & ECORE_CON_USE_SSL2) /* not supported because of security issues */
return ECORE_CON_SSL_ERROR_SSL2_NOT_SUPPORTED;
switch (svr->type & ECORE_CON_SSL)
{
case ECORE_CON_USE_SSL3:
case ECORE_CON_USE_SSL3 | ECORE_CON_LOAD_CERT:
priority = "NONE:%VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+DHE-DSS:+ANON-DH:+COMP-DEFLATE:+COMP-NULL:+CTYPE-X509:+SHA1:+SHA256:+SHA384:+SHA512:+AES-256-CBC:+AES-128-CBC:+3DES-CBC:!VERS-TLS1.0:!VERS-TLS1.1";
break;
case ECORE_CON_USE_TLS:
case ECORE_CON_USE_TLS | ECORE_CON_LOAD_CERT:
priority = "NONE:%VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT:+RSA:+DHE-RSA:+DHE-DSS:+ANON-DH:+COMP-DEFLATE:+COMP-NULL:+CTYPE-X509:+SHA1:+SHA256:+SHA384:+SHA512:+AES-256-CBC:+AES-128-CBC:+3DES-CBC:!VERS-SSL3.0";
break;
case ECORE_CON_USE_MIXED:
case ECORE_CON_USE_MIXED | ECORE_CON_LOAD_CERT:
break;
default:
return ECORE_CON_SSL_ERROR_NONE;
}
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(ret = gnutls_init(&svr->session, GNUTLS_CLIENT));
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(ret = gnutls_session_ticket_enable_client(svr->session));
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(ret = gnutls_server_name_set(svr->session, GNUTLS_NAME_DNS, svr->name, strlen(svr->name)));
INF("Applying priority string: %s", priority);
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(ret = gnutls_priority_set_direct(svr->session, priority, NULL));
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(ret = gnutls_credentials_set(svr->session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, svr->cert));
// SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(ret = gnutls_credentials_set(svr->session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK, svr->pskcred_c));
if (!svr->use_cert)
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(ret = gnutls_credentials_set(svr->session, GNUTLS_CRD_ANON, svr->anoncred_c));
gnutls_dh_set_prime_bits(svr->session, 512);
gnutls_transport_set_ptr(svr->session, (gnutls_transport_ptr_t)((intptr_t)svr->fd));
svr->ssl_state = ECORE_CON_SSL_STATE_HANDSHAKING;
case ECORE_CON_SSL_STATE_HANDSHAKING:
if (!svr->session)
{
DBG("Server was previously lost, going to error condition");
goto error;
}
ret = gnutls_handshake(svr->session);
DBG("calling gnutls_handshake(): returned with '%s'", gnutls_strerror_name(ret));
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(gnutls_error_is_fatal(ret));
if (!ret)
{
svr->handshaking = EINA_FALSE;
svr->ssl_state = ECORE_CON_SSL_STATE_DONE;
}
else
{
if (gnutls_record_get_direction(svr->session))
ecore_main_fd_handler_active_set(svr->fd_handler, ECORE_FD_WRITE);
else
ecore_main_fd_handler_active_set(svr->fd_handler, ECORE_FD_READ);
return ECORE_CON_SSL_ERROR_NONE;
}
default:
break;
}
if (!svr->verify)
/* not verifying certificates, so we're done! */
return ECORE_CON_SSL_ERROR_NONE;
ret = 0;
/* use CRL/CA lists to verify */
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(svr->session, &iter));
if (iter & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID)
ERR("The certificate is not trusted.");
else if (iter & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
ERR("The certificate hasn't got a known issuer.");
else if (iter & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)
ERR("The certificate has been revoked.");
else if (iter & GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED)
ERR("The certificate has expired");
else if (iter & GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED)
ERR("The certificate is not yet activated");
if (iter)
goto error;
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get(svr->session) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
{
ERR("Warning: PGP certificates are not yet supported!");
goto error;
}
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(!(cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(svr->session, &cert_list_size)));
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(!cert_list_size);
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert));
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER));
SSL_ERROR_CHECK_GOTO_ERROR(!gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert, svr->name));
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
DBG("SSL certificate verification succeeded!");
return ECORE_CON_SSL_ERROR_NONE;
error:
_gnutls_print_errors(ret);
if ((ret == GNUTLS_E_WARNING_ALERT_RECEIVED) || (ret == GNUTLS_E_FATAL_ALERT_RECEIVED))
ERR("Also received alert: %s", gnutls_alert_get_name(gnutls_alert_get(svr->session)));
if (svr->session && (svr->ssl_state != ECORE_CON_SSL_STATE_DONE))
{
ERR("last out: %s", SSL_GNUTLS_PRINT_HANDSHAKE_STATUS(gnutls_handshake_get_last_out(svr->session)));
ERR("last in: %s", SSL_GNUTLS_PRINT_HANDSHAKE_STATUS(gnutls_handshake_get_last_in(svr->session)));
}
if (cert)
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
_ecore_con_ssl_server_shutdown_gnutls(svr);
return ECORE_CON_SSL_ERROR_SERVER_INIT_FAILED;
}
/* This function will verify the peer's certificate, and check
* if the hostname matches, as well as the activation, expiration dates.
*/
static int verify_certificate_callback(gnutls_session_t session)
{
unsigned int status;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int cert_list_size;
int ret;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
const char *hostname;
/* read hostname */
hostname = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session);
/* This verification function uses the trusted CAs in the credentials
* structure. So you must have installed one or more CA certificates.
*/
ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &status);
if (ret < 0) {
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed verifying certificate peers.");
goto error;
}
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND)
logit(LOG_WARNING, "The certificate does not have a known issuer.");
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED)
logit(LOG_WARNING, "The certificate has been revoked.");
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_EXPIRED)
logit(LOG_WARNING, "The certificate has expired.");
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_NOT_ACTIVATED)
logit(LOG_WARNING, "The certificate is not yet activated.");
if (status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
logit(LOG_ERR, "The certificate is not trusted.");
goto error;
}
/* Up to here the process is the same for X.509 certificates and
* OpenPGP keys. From now on X.509 certificates are assumed. This can
* be easily extended to work with openpgp keys as well.
*/
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get(session) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509) {
logit(LOG_ERR, "Not a valid X.509 certificate");
goto error;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert) < 0) {
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed init of X.509 cert engine");
goto error;
}
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if (cert_list == NULL) {
logit(LOG_ERR, "No certificate was found!");
goto error;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) < 0) {
logit(LOG_ERR, "Error while parsing certificate.");
goto error;
}
if (!gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(cert, hostname)) {
logit(LOG_ERR, "The certificate's owner does not match the hostname '%s'", hostname);
goto error;
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
/* notify gnutls to continue handshake normally */
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Certificate OK");
return 0;
error:
if (secure_ssl)
return GNUTLS_E_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
