static krb5_error_code
make_seal_token_v1_iov(krb5_context context,
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx,
int conf_req_flag,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_error_code code = 0;
gss_iov_buffer_t header;
gss_iov_buffer_t padding;
gss_iov_buffer_t trailer;
krb5_checksum md5cksum;
krb5_checksum cksum;
size_t k5_headerlen = 0, k5_trailerlen = 0;
size_t data_length = 0, assoc_data_length = 0;
size_t tmsglen = 0, tlen;
unsigned char *ptr;
krb5_keyusage sign_usage = KG_USAGE_SIGN;
assert(toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
md5cksum.length = cksum.length = 0;
md5cksum.contents = cksum.contents = NULL;
header = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER);
if (header == NULL)
return EINVAL;
padding = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_PADDING);
if (padding == NULL && (ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) == 0)
return EINVAL;
trailer = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL)
trailer->buffer.length = 0;
/* Determine confounder length */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG || conf_req_flag)
k5_headerlen = kg_confounder_size(context, ctx->enc);
/* Check padding length */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
size_t k5_padlen = (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4) ? 1 : 8;
size_t gss_padlen;
size_t conf_data_length;
kg_iov_msglen(iov, iov_count, &data_length, &assoc_data_length);
conf_data_length = k5_headerlen + data_length - assoc_data_length;
if (k5_padlen == 1)
gss_padlen = 1; /* one byte to indicate one byte of padding */
else
gss_padlen = k5_padlen - (conf_data_length % k5_padlen);
if (ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) {
/* DCE will pad the actual data itself; padding buffer optional and will be zeroed */
gss_padlen = 0;
if (conf_data_length % k5_padlen)
code = KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
} else if (padding->type & GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE) {
code = kg_allocate_iov(padding, gss_padlen);
} else if (padding->buffer.length < gss_padlen) {
code = KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
}
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Initialize padding buffer to pad itself */
if (padding != NULL) {
padding->buffer.length = gss_padlen;
memset(padding->buffer.value, (int)gss_padlen, gss_padlen);
}
if (ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE)
tmsglen = k5_headerlen; /* confounder length */
else
tmsglen = conf_data_length + padding->buffer.length + assoc_data_length;
}
/* Determine token size */
tlen = g_token_size(ctx->mech_used, 14 + ctx->cksum_size + tmsglen);
k5_headerlen += tlen - tmsglen;
if (header->type & GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE)
code = kg_allocate_iov(header, k5_headerlen);
else if (header->buffer.length < k5_headerlen)
code = KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
header->buffer.length = k5_headerlen;
ptr = (unsigned char *)header->buffer.value;
g_make_token_header(ctx->mech_used, 14 + ctx->cksum_size + tmsglen, &ptr, toktype);
/* 0..1 SIGN_ALG */
store_16_le(ctx->signalg, &ptr[0]);
/* 2..3 SEAL_ALG or Filler */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && conf_req_flag) {
store_16_le(ctx->sealalg, &ptr[2]);
} else {
/* No seal */
ptr[2] = 0xFF;
ptr[3] = 0xFF;
}
/* 4..5 Filler */
ptr[4] = 0xFF;
ptr[5] = 0xFF;
/* pad the plaintext, encrypt if needed, and stick it in the token */
/* initialize the checksum */
switch (ctx->signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR;
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG)
sign_usage = 15;
break;
default:
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC:
abort ();
}
code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, md5cksum.checksum_type, &k5_trailerlen);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
md5cksum.length = k5_trailerlen;
if (k5_headerlen != 0) {
code = kg_make_confounder(context, ctx->enc, ptr + 14 + ctx->cksum_size);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
/* compute the checksum */
code = kg_make_checksum_iov_v1(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
ctx->cksum_size, ctx->seq, ctx->enc,
sign_usage, iov, iov_count, toktype,
&md5cksum);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
switch (ctx->signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_3:
code = kg_encrypt(context, ctx->seq, KG_USAGE_SEAL,
(g_OID_equal(ctx->mech_used, gss_mech_krb5_old) ?
ctx->seq->contents : NULL),
md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.contents, 16);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
cksum.length = ctx->cksum_size;
cksum.contents = md5cksum.contents + 16 - cksum.length;
memcpy(ptr + 14, cksum.contents, cksum.length);
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
assert(md5cksum.length == ctx->cksum_size);
memcpy(ptr + 14, md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.length);
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
memcpy(ptr + 14, md5cksum.contents, ctx->cksum_size);
break;
}
/* create the seq_num */
code = kg_make_seq_num(context, ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xFF,
(OM_uint32)ctx->seq_send, ptr + 14, ptr + 6);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (conf_req_flag) {
if (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4) {
unsigned char bigend_seqnum[4];
krb5_keyblock *enc_key;
size_t i;
store_32_be(ctx->seq_send, bigend_seqnum);
code = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, ctx->enc, &enc_key);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
assert(enc_key->length == 16);
for (i = 0; i < enc_key->length; i++)
((char *)enc_key->contents)[i] ^= 0xF0;
code = kg_arcfour_docrypt_iov(context, enc_key, 0,
bigend_seqnum, 4,
iov, iov_count);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, enc_key);
} else {
code = kg_encrypt_iov(context, ctx->proto,
((ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) != 0),
0 /*EC*/, 0 /*RRC*/,
ctx->enc, KG_USAGE_SEAL, NULL,
iov, iov_count);
}
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
ctx->seq_send++;
ctx->seq_send &= 0xFFFFFFFFL;
code = 0;
if (conf_state != NULL)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
cleanup:
if (code != 0)
kg_release_iov(iov, iov_count);
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &md5cksum);
return code;
}
static OM_uint32
kg_unseal_v1_iov(krb5_context context,
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
size_t token_wrapper_len,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
int toktype)
{
OM_uint32 code;
gss_iov_buffer_t header;
gss_iov_buffer_t trailer;
unsigned char *ptr;
int sealalg;
int signalg;
krb5_checksum cksum;
krb5_checksum md5cksum;
size_t cksum_len = 0;
size_t conflen = 0;
int direction;
krb5_ui_4 seqnum;
OM_uint32 retval;
size_t sumlen;
krb5_keyusage sign_usage = KG_USAGE_SIGN;
md5cksum.length = cksum.length = 0;
md5cksum.contents = cksum.contents = NULL;
header = kg_locate_header_iov(iov, iov_count, toktype);
assert(header != NULL);
trailer = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL && trailer->buffer.length != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (header->buffer.length < token_wrapper_len + 14) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ptr = (unsigned char *)header->buffer.value + token_wrapper_len;
signalg = ptr[0];
signalg |= ptr[1] << 8;
sealalg = ptr[2];
sealalg |= ptr[3] << 8;
if (ptr[4] != 0xFF || ptr[5] != 0xFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
!(sealalg == 0xFFFF || sealalg == ctx->sealalg)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if ((ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD)||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4 &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
cksum_len = 8;
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG)
sign_usage = 15;
break;
case SGN_ALG_3:
cksum_len = 16;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
cksum_len = 20;
break;
default:
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
/* get the token parameters */
code = kg_get_seq_num(context, ctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
&seqnum);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
/* decode the message, if SEAL */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
if (sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
if (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4) {
unsigned char bigend_seqnum[4];
krb5_keyblock *enc_key;
size_t i;
store_32_be(seqnum, bigend_seqnum);
code = krb5_k_key_keyblock(context, ctx->enc, &enc_key);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
assert(enc_key->length == 16);
for (i = 0; i < enc_key->length; i++)
((char *)enc_key->contents)[i] ^= 0xF0;
code = kg_arcfour_docrypt_iov(context, enc_key, 0,
&bigend_seqnum[0], 4,
iov, iov_count);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, enc_key);
} else {
code = kg_decrypt_iov(context, 0,
((ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) != 0),
0 /*EC*/, 0 /*RRC*/,
ctx->enc, KG_USAGE_SEAL, NULL,
iov, iov_count);
}
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
}
conflen = kg_confounder_size(context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
}
if (header->buffer.length != token_wrapper_len + 14 + cksum_len + conflen) {
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
/* compute the checksum of the message */
/* initialize the checksum */
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC:
case SGN_ALG_3:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3;
break;
default:
abort();
}
code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, md5cksum.checksum_type, &sumlen);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
md5cksum.length = sumlen;
/* compute the checksum of the message */
code = kg_make_checksum_iov_v1(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
cksum_len, ctx->seq, ctx->enc,
sign_usage, iov, iov_count, toktype,
&md5cksum);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_3:
code = kg_encrypt_inplace(context, ctx->seq, KG_USAGE_SEAL,
(g_OID_equal(ctx->mech_used,
gss_mech_krb5_old) ?
ctx->seq->keyblock.contents : NULL),
md5cksum.contents, 16);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
cksum.length = cksum_len;
cksum.contents = md5cksum.contents + 16 - cksum.length;
code = k5_bcmp(cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum.length);
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
break;
default:
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* For GSS_C_DCE_STYLE, the caller manages the padding, because the
* pad length is in the RPC PDU. The value of the padding may be
* uninitialized. For normal GSS, the last bytes of the decrypted
* data contain the pad length. kg_fixup_padding_iov() will find
* this and fixup the last data IOV appropriately.
*/
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
(ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) == 0) {
retval = kg_fixup_padding_iov(&code, iov, iov_count);
if (retval != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
}
if (conf_state != NULL)
*conf_state = (sealalg != 0xFFFF);
if (qop_state != NULL)
*qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
(!ctx->initiate && direction != 0)) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_DIRECTION;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
code = 0;
retval = g_order_check(&ctx->seqstate, (gssint_uint64)seqnum);
cleanup:
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &md5cksum);
*minor_status = code;
return retval;
}