static OM_uint32
gsskrb5_acceptor_start(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
krb5_context context,
const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t * src_name,
gss_OID * mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
OM_uint32 * time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
{
krb5_error_code kret;
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
krb5_data indata;
krb5_flags ap_options;
krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
int is_cfx = 0;
const gsskrb5_cred acceptor_cred = (gsskrb5_cred)acceptor_cred_handle;
/*
* We may, or may not, have an escapsulation.
*/
ret = _gsskrb5_decapsulate (minor_status,
input_token_buffer,
&indata,
"\x01\x00",
GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
if (ret) {
/* Assume that there is no OID wrapping. */
indata.length = input_token_buffer->length;
indata.data = input_token_buffer->value;
}
/*
* We need to get our keytab
*/
if (acceptor_cred == NULL) {
if (_gsskrb5_keytab != NULL)
keytab = _gsskrb5_keytab;
} else if (acceptor_cred->keytab != NULL) {
keytab = acceptor_cred->keytab;
}
/*
* We need to check the ticket and create the AP-REP packet
*/
{
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx in = NULL;
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx out = NULL;
krb5_principal server = NULL;
if (acceptor_cred)
server = acceptor_cred->principal;
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_alloc(context, &in);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_set_keytab(context, in, keytab);
if (kret) {
if (in)
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
kret = krb5_rd_req_ctx(context,
&ctx->auth_context,
&indata,
server,
in, &out);
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
if (kret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW || kret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV) {
/*
* No reply in non-MUTUAL mode, but we don't know that its
* non-MUTUAL mode yet, thats inside the 8003 checksum, so
* lets only send the error token on clock skew, that
* limit when send error token for non-MUTUAL.
*/
return send_error_token(minor_status, context, kret,
server, &indata, output_token);
} else if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/*
* we need to remember some data on the context_handle.
*/
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_ap_req_options(context, out,
&ap_options);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_ticket(context, out,
&ctx->ticket);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_keyblock(context, out,
&ctx->service_keyblock);
ctx->lifetime = ctx->ticket->ticket.endtime;
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx_free(context, out);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
}
/*
* We need to copy the principal names to the context and the
* calling layer.
*/
kret = krb5_copy_principal(context,
ctx->ticket->client,
&ctx->source);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
}
kret = krb5_copy_principal(context,
ctx->ticket->server,
&ctx->target);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
/*
* We need to setup some compat stuff, this assumes that
* context_handle->target is already set.
*/
ret = _gss_DES3_get_mic_compat(minor_status, ctx, context);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (src_name != NULL) {
kret = krb5_copy_principal (context,
ctx->ticket->client,
(gsskrb5_name*)src_name);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
}
/*
* We need to get the flags out of the 8003 checksum.
*/
{
krb5_authenticator authenticator;
kret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&authenticator);
if(kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
if (authenticator->cksum == NULL) {
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
}
if (authenticator->cksum->cksumtype == CKSUMTYPE_GSSAPI) {
ret = _gsskrb5_verify_8003_checksum(minor_status,
input_chan_bindings,
authenticator->cksum,
&ctx->flags,
&ctx->fwd_data);
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
} else {
krb5_crypto crypto;
kret = krb5_crypto_init(context,
ctx->auth_context->keyblock,
0, &crypto);
if(kret) {
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
/*
* Windows accepts Samba3's use of a kerberos, rather than
* GSSAPI checksum here
*/
kret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
crypto, KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, NULL, 0,
authenticator->cksum);
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if(kret) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
/*
* Samba style get some flags (but not DCE-STYLE), use
* ap_options to guess the mutual flag.
*/
ctx->flags = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
if (ap_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)
ctx->flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
}
}
if(ctx->flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) {
krb5_data outbuf;
int use_subkey = 0;
_gsskrb5i_is_cfx(context, ctx, 1);
is_cfx = (ctx->more_flags & IS_CFX);
if (is_cfx || (ap_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY)) {
use_subkey = 1;
} else {
krb5_keyblock *rkey;
/*
* If there is a initiator subkey, copy that to acceptor
* subkey to match Windows behavior
*/
kret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&rkey);
if (kret == 0) {
kret = krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey(context,
ctx->auth_context,
rkey);
if (kret == 0)
use_subkey = 1;
krb5_free_keyblock(context, rkey);
}
}
if (use_subkey) {
ctx->more_flags |= ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY;
krb5_auth_con_addflags(context, ctx->auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_USE_SUBKEY,
NULL);
}
kret = krb5_mk_rep(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&outbuf);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (IS_DCE_STYLE(ctx)) {
output_token->length = outbuf.length;
output_token->value = outbuf.data;
} else {
ret = _gsskrb5_encapsulate(minor_status,
&outbuf,
output_token,
"\x02\x00",
GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM);
krb5_data_free (&outbuf);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
ctx->flags |= GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
/* Remember the flags */
ctx->lifetime = ctx->ticket->ticket.endtime;
ctx->more_flags |= OPEN;
if (mech_type)
*mech_type = GSS_KRB5_MECHANISM;
if (time_rec) {
ret = _gsskrb5_lifetime_left(minor_status,
context,
ctx->lifetime,
time_rec);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
}
/*
* When GSS_C_DCE_STYLE is in use, we need ask for a AP-REP from
* the client.
*/
if (IS_DCE_STYLE(ctx)) {
/*
* Return flags to caller, but we haven't processed
* delgations yet
*/
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = (ctx->flags & ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG);
ctx->state = ACCEPTOR_WAIT_FOR_DCESTYLE;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
ret = gsskrb5_acceptor_ready(minor_status, ctx, context,
delegated_cred_handle);
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = ctx->flags;
return ret;
}
/*
* Construct a TGS request and return its ASN.1 encoding as well as the
* timestamp, nonce, and subkey used. The pacb_fn callback allows the caller
* to amend the request padata after the nonce and subkey are determined.
*/
krb5_error_code
k5_make_tgs_req(krb5_context context,
struct krb5int_fast_request_state *fast_state,
krb5_creds *tgt, krb5_flags kdcoptions,
krb5_address *const *addrs, krb5_pa_data **in_padata,
krb5_creds *desired, k5_pacb_fn pacb_fn, void *pacb_data,
krb5_data *req_asn1_out, krb5_timestamp *timestamp_out,
krb5_int32 *nonce_out, krb5_keyblock **subkey_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_kdc_req req;
krb5_data *authdata_asn1 = NULL, *req_body_asn1 = NULL;
krb5_data *ap_req_asn1 = NULL, *tgs_req_asn1 = NULL;
krb5_ticket *sec_ticket = NULL;
krb5_ticket *sec_ticket_arr[2];
krb5_timestamp time_now;
krb5_pa_data **padata = NULL, *pa;
krb5_keyblock *subkey = NULL;
krb5_enc_data authdata_enc;
krb5_enctype enctypes[2], *defenctypes = NULL;
size_t count, i;
*req_asn1_out = empty_data();
*timestamp_out = 0;
*nonce_out = 0;
*subkey_out = NULL;
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
memset(&authdata_enc, 0, sizeof(authdata_enc));
/* tgt's client principal must match the desired client principal. */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, tgt->client, desired->client))
return KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH;
/* tgt must be an actual credential, not a template. */
if (!tgt->ticket.length)
return KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED;
req.kdc_options = kdcoptions;
req.server = desired->server;
req.from = desired->times.starttime;
req.till = desired->times.endtime ? desired->times.endtime :
tgt->times.endtime;
req.rtime = desired->times.renew_till;
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &time_now);
if (ret)
return ret;
*nonce_out = req.nonce = (krb5_int32)time_now;
*timestamp_out = time_now;
req.addresses = (krb5_address **)addrs;
/* Generate subkey. */
ret = krb5_generate_subkey(context, &tgt->keyblock, &subkey);
if (ret)
return ret;
TRACE_SEND_TGS_SUBKEY(context, subkey);
ret = krb5int_fast_tgs_armor(context, fast_state, subkey, &tgt->keyblock,
NULL, NULL);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (desired->authdata != NULL) {
ret = encode_krb5_authdata(desired->authdata, &authdata_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_encrypt_helper(context, subkey,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SUBKEY,
authdata_asn1, &authdata_enc);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
req.authorization_data = authdata_enc;
}
if (desired->keyblock.enctype != ENCTYPE_NULL) {
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(desired->keyblock.enctype)) {
ret = KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enctypes[0] = desired->keyblock.enctype;
enctypes[1] = ENCTYPE_NULL;
req.ktype = enctypes;
req.nktypes = 1;
} else {
/* Get the default TGS enctypes. */
ret = krb5_get_tgs_ktypes(context, desired->server, &defenctypes);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
for (count = 0; defenctypes[count]; count++);
req.ktype = defenctypes;
req.nktypes = count;
}
TRACE_SEND_TGS_ETYPES(context, req.ktype);
if (kdcoptions & (KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY | KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT)) {
if (desired->second_ticket.length == 0) {
ret = KRB5_NO_2ND_TKT;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = decode_krb5_ticket(&desired->second_ticket, &sec_ticket);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
sec_ticket_arr[0] = sec_ticket;
sec_ticket_arr[1] = NULL;
req.second_ticket = sec_ticket_arr;
}
/* Encode the request body. */
ret = krb5int_fast_prep_req_body(context, fast_state, &req,
&req_body_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = tgs_construct_ap_req(context, req_body_asn1, tgt, subkey,
&ap_req_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
for (count = 0; in_padata != NULL && in_padata[count] != NULL; count++);
/* Construct a padata array for the request, beginning with the ap-req. */
padata = k5calloc(count + 2, sizeof(krb5_pa_data *), &ret);
if (padata == NULL)
goto cleanup;
padata[0] = k5alloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data), &ret);
if (padata[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
padata[0]->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_AP_REQ;
padata[0]->contents = k5memdup(ap_req_asn1->data, ap_req_asn1->length,
&ret);
if (padata[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
padata[0]->length = ap_req_asn1->length;
/* Append copies of any other supplied padata. */
for (i = 0; in_padata != NULL && in_padata[i] != NULL; i++) {
pa = k5alloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data), &ret);
if (pa == NULL)
goto cleanup;
pa->pa_type = in_padata[i]->pa_type;
pa->length = in_padata[i]->length;
pa->contents = k5memdup(in_padata[i]->contents, in_padata[i]->length,
&ret);
if (pa->contents == NULL)
goto cleanup;
padata[i + 1] = pa;
}
req.padata = padata;
if (pacb_fn != NULL) {
ret = (*pacb_fn)(context, subkey, &req, pacb_data);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/* Encode the TGS-REQ. Discard the krb5_data container. */
ret = krb5int_fast_prep_req(context, fast_state, &req, ap_req_asn1,
encode_krb5_tgs_req, &tgs_req_asn1);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
*req_asn1_out = *tgs_req_asn1;
free(tgs_req_asn1);
tgs_req_asn1 = NULL;
*subkey_out = subkey;
subkey = NULL;
cleanup:
krb5_free_data(context, authdata_asn1);
krb5_free_data(context, req_body_asn1);
krb5_free_data(context, ap_req_asn1);
krb5_free_pa_data(context, req.padata);
krb5_free_ticket(context, sec_ticket);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &authdata_enc.ciphertext);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, subkey);
free(defenctypes);
return ret;
}
/*
* Request:
* NameZ
* ServerPrincipalPresent
* ServerPrincipal OPTIONAL
* Key
*
* Repsonse:
*
*/
static krb5_error_code
kcm_op_get_initial_ticket(krb5_context context,
kcm_client *client,
kcm_operation opcode,
krb5_storage *request,
krb5_storage *response)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
kcm_ccache ccache;
char *name;
int8_t not_tgt = 0;
krb5_principal server = NULL;
krb5_keyblock key;
krb5_keyblock_zero(&key);
ret = krb5_ret_stringz(request, &name);
if (ret)
return ret;
KCM_LOG_REQUEST_NAME(context, client, opcode, name);
ret = krb5_ret_int8(request, ¬_tgt);
if (ret) {
free(name);
return ret;
}
if (not_tgt) {
ret = krb5_ret_principal(request, &server);
if (ret) {
free(name);
return ret;
}
}
ret = krb5_ret_keyblock(request, &key);
if (ret) {
free(name);
if (server != NULL)
krb5_free_principal(context, server);
return ret;
}
ret = kcm_ccache_resolve_client(context, client, opcode,
name, &ccache);
if (ret == 0) {
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&ccache->mutex);
if (ccache->server != NULL) {
krb5_free_principal(context, ccache->server);
ccache->server = NULL;
}
krb5_free_keyblock(context, &ccache->key.keyblock);
ccache->server = server;
ccache->key.keyblock = key;
ccache->flags |= KCM_FLAGS_USE_CACHED_KEY;
ret = kcm_ccache_enqueue_default(context, ccache, NULL);
if (ret) {
ccache->server = NULL;
krb5_keyblock_zero(&ccache->key.keyblock);
ccache->flags &= ~(KCM_FLAGS_USE_CACHED_KEY);
}
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&ccache->mutex);
}
free(name);
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_free_principal(context, server);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, &key);
}
kcm_release_ccache(context, ccache);
return ret;
}
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct afsconf_dir *tdir;
long code;
const char *confdir;
if (argc == 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: usage is '%s <opcode> options, e.g.\n",
argv[0], argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "\t%s add <kvno> <keyfile> <princ>\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "\tOR\n\t%s add <kvno> <key>\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "\t\tEx: %s add 0 \"80b6a7cd7a9dadb6\"\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "\t%s delete <kvno>\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "\t%s list\n", argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
confdir = AFSDIR_SERVER_ETC_DIRPATH;
tdir = afsconf_Open(confdir);
if (!tdir) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: can't initialize conf dir '%s'\n", argv[0],
confdir);
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(argv[1], "add")==0) {
krb5_context context;
krb5_principal principal;
krb5_keyblock *key;
krb5_error_code retval;
int kvno, keymode = 0;
if (argc != 5) {
if (argc == 4)
keymode = 1;
else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s add: usage is '%s add <kvno> <keyfile> "
"<princ>\n", argv[0], argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "\tOR\n\t%s add <kvno> <key>\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "\t\tEx: %s add 0 \"80b6a7cd7a9dadb6\"\n", argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
}
kvno = atoi(argv[2]);
if (keymode) {
char tkey[8];
int i;
char *cp;
if (strlen(argv[3]) != 16) {
printf("key %s is not in right format\n", argv[3]);
printf(" <key> should be an 8byte hex representation \n");
printf(" Ex: setkey add 0 \"80b6a7cd7a9dadb6\"\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(tkey, 0, sizeof(tkey));
for (i = 7, cp = argv[3] + 15; i >= 0; i--, cp -= 2)
tkey[i] = char2hex(*cp) + char2hex(*(cp - 1)) * 16;
code = afsconf_AddKey(tdir, kvno, tkey, 1);
} else {
krb5_init_context(&context);
retval = krb5_parse_name(context, argv[4], &principal);
if (retval != 0) {
afs_com_err(argv[0], retval, "while parsing AFS principal");
exit(1);
}
retval = krb5_kt_read_service_key(context, argv[3], principal, kvno,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC, &key);
if (retval == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND)
retval = krb5_kt_read_service_key(context, argv[3], principal, kvno,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5, &key);
if (retval == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND)
retval = krb5_kt_read_service_key(context, argv[3], principal, kvno,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4, &key);
if (retval == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) {
char * princname = NULL;
krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &princname);
afs_com_err(argv[0], retval,
"for keytab entry with Principal %s, kvno %u, DES-CBC-CRC/MD5/MD4",
princname ? princname : argv[4],
kvno);
exit(1);
} else if (retval != 0) {
afs_com_err(argv[0], retval, "while extracting AFS service key");
exit(1);
}
#ifdef USING_HEIMDAL
#define deref_key_length(key) \
key->keyvalue.length
#define deref_key_contents(key) \
key->keyvalue.data
#else
#define deref_key_length(key) \
key->length
#define deref_key_contents(key) \
key->contents
#endif
if (deref_key_length(key) != 8) {
fprintf(stderr, "Key length should be 8, but is really %u!\n",
(unsigned int)deref_key_length(key));
exit(1);
}
code = afsconf_AddKey(tdir, kvno, (char *) deref_key_contents(key), 1);
}
if (code) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to set key, code %ld.\n", argv[0], code);
exit(1);
}
if (keymode == 0) {
krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
}
}
else if (strcmp(argv[1], "delete")==0) {
long kvno;
if (argc != 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s delete: usage is '%s delete <kvno>\n",
argv[0], argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
kvno = atoi(argv[2]);
code = afsconf_DeleteKey(tdir, kvno);
if (code) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to delete key %ld, (code %ld)\n",
argv[0], kvno, code);
exit(1);
}
}
else if (strcmp(argv[1], "list") == 0) {
struct afsconf_keys tkeys;
int i, j;
code = afsconf_GetKeys(tdir, &tkeys);
if (code) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to get keys, code %ld\n", argv[0], code);
exit(1);
}
for(i=0;i<tkeys.nkeys;i++) {
if (tkeys.key[i].kvno != -1) {
printf("kvno %4d: key is: ", tkeys.key[i].kvno);
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
printf("%02x", (unsigned char) tkeys.key[i].key[j]);
printf("\n");
}
}
printf("All done.\n");
}
else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown operation '%s', type '%s' for "
"assistance\n", argv[0], argv[1], argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
exit(0);
}
static krb5_error_code
process_preauth(krb5_context context, void *plugin_context,
void *request_context, krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
preauth_get_client_data_proc get_data_proc,
struct _krb5_preauth_client_rock *rock, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_data *encoded_request_body,
krb5_data *encoded_previous_request, krb5_pa_data *padata,
krb5_prompter_fct prompter, void *prompter_data,
preauth_get_as_key_proc gak_fct, void *gak_data,
krb5_data *salt, krb5_data *s2kparams, krb5_keyblock *as_key,
krb5_pa_data ***out_padata)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_enctype enctype = 0;
krb5_keyblock *challenge_key = NULL, *armor_key = NULL;
krb5_data *etype_data = NULL;
krb5int_access kaccess;
if (krb5int_accessor(&kaccess, KRB5INT_ACCESS_VERSION) != 0)
return 0;
retval = fast_get_armor_key(context, get_data_proc, rock, &armor_key);
if (retval || armor_key == NULL)
return 0;
retval = get_data_proc(context, rock, krb5plugin_preauth_client_get_etype, &etype_data);
if (retval == 0) {
enctype = *((krb5_enctype *)etype_data->data);
if (as_key->length == 0 ||as_key->enctype != enctype)
retval = gak_fct(context, request->client,
enctype, prompter, prompter_data,
salt, s2kparams,
as_key, gak_data);
}
if (retval == 0 && padata->length) {
krb5_enc_data *enc = NULL;
krb5_data scratch;
scratch.length = padata->length;
scratch.data = (char *) padata->contents;
retval = krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(context,armor_key, "kdcchallengearmor",
as_key, "challengelongterm",
&challenge_key);
if (retval == 0)
retval =kaccess.decode_enc_data(&scratch, &enc);
scratch.data = NULL;
if (retval == 0) {
scratch.data = malloc(enc->ciphertext.length);
scratch.length = enc->ciphertext.length;
if (scratch.data == NULL)
retval = ENOMEM;
}
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_c_decrypt(context, challenge_key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC, NULL,
enc, &scratch);
/*
* Per draft 11 of the preauth framework, the client MAY but is not
* required to actually check the timestamp from the KDC other than to
* confirm it decrypts. This code does not perform that check.
*/
if (scratch.data)
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &scratch);
if (retval == 0)
fast_set_kdc_verified(context, get_data_proc, rock);
if (enc)
kaccess.free_enc_data(context, enc);
} else if (retval == 0) { /*No padata; we send*/
krb5_enc_data enc;
krb5_pa_data *pa = NULL;
krb5_pa_data **pa_array = NULL;
krb5_data *encoded_ts = NULL;
krb5_pa_enc_ts ts;
enc.ciphertext.data = NULL;
retval = krb5_us_timeofday(context, &ts.patimestamp, &ts.pausec);
if (retval == 0)
retval = kaccess.encode_enc_ts(&ts, &encoded_ts);
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(context,
armor_key, "clientchallengearmor",
as_key, "challengelongterm",
&challenge_key);
if (retval == 0)
retval = kaccess.encrypt_helper(context, challenge_key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
encoded_ts, &enc);
if (encoded_ts)
krb5_free_data(context, encoded_ts);
encoded_ts = NULL;
if (retval == 0) {
retval = kaccess.encode_enc_data(&enc, &encoded_ts);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &enc.ciphertext);
}
if (retval == 0) {
pa = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (pa == NULL)
retval = ENOMEM;
}
if (retval == 0) {
pa_array = calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_pa_data *));
if (pa_array == NULL)
retval = ENOMEM;
}
if (retval == 0) {
pa->length = encoded_ts->length;
pa->contents = (unsigned char *) encoded_ts->data;
pa->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE;
free(encoded_ts);
encoded_ts = NULL;
pa_array[0] = pa;
pa = NULL;
*out_padata = pa_array;
pa_array = NULL;
}
if (pa)
free(pa);
if (encoded_ts)
krb5_free_data(context, encoded_ts);
if (pa_array)
free(pa_array);
}
if (challenge_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(context, challenge_key);
if (armor_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(context, armor_key);
if (etype_data != NULL)
get_data_proc(context, rock, krb5plugin_preauth_client_free_etype,
&etype_data);
return retval;
}
static krb5_error_code
make_seal_token_v1_iov(krb5_context context,
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx,
int conf_req_flag,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_error_code code = 0;
gss_iov_buffer_t header;
gss_iov_buffer_t padding;
gss_iov_buffer_t trailer;
krb5_checksum md5cksum;
krb5_checksum cksum;
size_t k5_headerlen = 0, k5_trailerlen = 0;
size_t data_length = 0, assoc_data_length = 0;
size_t tmsglen = 0, tlen;
unsigned char *ptr;
krb5_keyusage sign_usage = KG_USAGE_SIGN;
assert(toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG);
md5cksum.length = cksum.length = 0;
md5cksum.contents = cksum.contents = NULL;
header = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER);
if (header == NULL)
return EINVAL;
padding = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_PADDING);
if (padding == NULL && (ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) == 0)
return EINVAL;
trailer = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL)
trailer->buffer.length = 0;
/* Determine confounder length */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG || conf_req_flag)
k5_headerlen = kg_confounder_size(context, ctx->enc);
/* Check padding length */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
size_t k5_padlen = (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4) ? 1 : 8;
size_t gss_padlen;
size_t conf_data_length;
kg_iov_msglen(iov, iov_count, &data_length, &assoc_data_length);
conf_data_length = k5_headerlen + data_length - assoc_data_length;
if (k5_padlen == 1)
gss_padlen = 1; /* one byte to indicate one byte of padding */
else
gss_padlen = k5_padlen - (conf_data_length % k5_padlen);
if (ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) {
/* DCE will pad the actual data itself; padding buffer optional and will be zeroed */
gss_padlen = 0;
if (conf_data_length % k5_padlen)
code = KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
} else if (padding->type & GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE) {
code = kg_allocate_iov(padding, gss_padlen);
} else if (padding->buffer.length < gss_padlen) {
code = KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
}
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Initialize padding buffer to pad itself */
if (padding != NULL) {
padding->buffer.length = gss_padlen;
memset(padding->buffer.value, (int)gss_padlen, gss_padlen);
}
if (ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE)
tmsglen = k5_headerlen; /* confounder length */
else
tmsglen = conf_data_length + padding->buffer.length + assoc_data_length;
}
/* Determine token size */
tlen = g_token_size(ctx->mech_used, 14 + ctx->cksum_size + tmsglen);
k5_headerlen += tlen - tmsglen;
if (header->type & GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE)
code = kg_allocate_iov(header, k5_headerlen);
else if (header->buffer.length < k5_headerlen)
code = KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
header->buffer.length = k5_headerlen;
ptr = (unsigned char *)header->buffer.value;
g_make_token_header(ctx->mech_used, 14 + ctx->cksum_size + tmsglen, &ptr, toktype);
/* 0..1 SIGN_ALG */
store_16_le(ctx->signalg, &ptr[0]);
/* 2..3 SEAL_ALG or Filler */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && conf_req_flag) {
store_16_le(ctx->sealalg, &ptr[2]);
} else {
/* No seal */
ptr[2] = 0xFF;
ptr[3] = 0xFF;
}
/* 4..5 Filler */
ptr[4] = 0xFF;
ptr[5] = 0xFF;
/* pad the plaintext, encrypt if needed, and stick it in the token */
/* initialize the checksum */
switch (ctx->signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR;
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG)
sign_usage = 15;
break;
default:
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC:
abort ();
}
code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, md5cksum.checksum_type, &k5_trailerlen);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
md5cksum.length = k5_trailerlen;
if (k5_headerlen != 0) {
code = kg_make_confounder(context, ctx->enc, ptr + 14 + ctx->cksum_size);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
/* compute the checksum */
code = kg_make_checksum_iov_v1(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
ctx->cksum_size, ctx->seq, ctx->enc,
sign_usage, iov, iov_count, toktype,
&md5cksum);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
switch (ctx->signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_3:
code = kg_encrypt(context, ctx->seq, KG_USAGE_SEAL,
(g_OID_equal(ctx->mech_used, gss_mech_krb5_old) ?
ctx->seq->contents : NULL),
md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.contents, 16);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
cksum.length = ctx->cksum_size;
cksum.contents = md5cksum.contents + 16 - cksum.length;
memcpy(ptr + 14, cksum.contents, cksum.length);
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
assert(md5cksum.length == ctx->cksum_size);
memcpy(ptr + 14, md5cksum.contents, md5cksum.length);
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
memcpy(ptr + 14, md5cksum.contents, ctx->cksum_size);
break;
}
/* create the seq_num */
code = kg_make_seq_num(context, ctx->seq, ctx->initiate ? 0 : 0xFF,
(OM_uint32)ctx->seq_send, ptr + 14, ptr + 6);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (conf_req_flag) {
if (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4) {
unsigned char bigend_seqnum[4];
krb5_keyblock *enc_key;
size_t i;
store_32_be(ctx->seq_send, bigend_seqnum);
code = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, ctx->enc, &enc_key);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
assert(enc_key->length == 16);
for (i = 0; i < enc_key->length; i++)
((char *)enc_key->contents)[i] ^= 0xF0;
code = kg_arcfour_docrypt_iov(context, enc_key, 0,
bigend_seqnum, 4,
iov, iov_count);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, enc_key);
} else {
code = kg_encrypt_iov(context, ctx->proto,
((ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) != 0),
0 /*EC*/, 0 /*RRC*/,
ctx->enc, KG_USAGE_SEAL, NULL,
iov, iov_count);
}
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
ctx->seq_send++;
ctx->seq_send &= 0xFFFFFFFFL;
code = 0;
if (conf_state != NULL)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
cleanup:
if (code != 0)
kg_release_iov(iov, iov_count);
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &md5cksum);
return code;
}
krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION
krb5_verify_ap_req2(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
krb5_ap_req *ap_req,
krb5_const_principal server,
krb5_keyblock *keyblock,
krb5_flags flags,
krb5_flags *ap_req_options,
krb5_ticket **ticket,
krb5_key_usage usage)
{
krb5_ticket *t;
krb5_auth_context ac;
krb5_error_code ret;
EtypeList etypes;
if (ticket)
*ticket = NULL;
if (auth_context && *auth_context) {
ac = *auth_context;
} else {
ret = krb5_auth_con_init (context, &ac);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
t = calloc(1, sizeof(*t));
if (t == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_clear_error_string (context);
goto out;
}
if (ap_req->ap_options.use_session_key && ac->keyblock){
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, &ap_req->ticket,
ac->keyblock,
&t->ticket,
flags);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, ac->keyblock);
ac->keyblock = NULL;
}else
ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, &ap_req->ticket,
keyblock,
&t->ticket,
flags);
if(ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&t->server,
ap_req->ticket.sname,
ap_req->ticket.realm);
if (ret) goto out;
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&t->client,
t->ticket.cname,
t->ticket.crealm);
if (ret) goto out;
/* save key */
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &t->ticket.key, &ac->keyblock);
if (ret) goto out;
ret = decrypt_authenticator (context,
&t->ticket.key,
&ap_req->authenticator,
ac->authenticator,
usage);
if (ret)
goto out;
{
krb5_principal p1, p2;
krb5_boolean res;
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&p1,
ac->authenticator->cname,
ac->authenticator->crealm);
_krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
&p2,
t->ticket.cname,
t->ticket.crealm);
res = krb5_principal_compare (context, p1, p2);
krb5_free_principal (context, p1);
krb5_free_principal (context, p2);
if (!res) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH;
krb5_clear_error_string (context);
goto out;
}
}
/* check addresses */
if (t->ticket.caddr
&& ac->remote_address
&& !krb5_address_search (context,
ac->remote_address,
t->ticket.caddr)) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
krb5_clear_error_string (context);
goto out;
}
/* check timestamp in authenticator */
{
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_timeofday (context, &now);
if (abs(ac->authenticator->ctime - now) > context->max_skew) {
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
krb5_clear_error_string (context);
goto out;
}
}
if (ac->authenticator->seq_number)
krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(context, ac,
*ac->authenticator->seq_number);
/* XXX - Xor sequence numbers */
if (ac->authenticator->subkey) {
ret = krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey(context, ac,
ac->authenticator->subkey);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = find_etypelist(context, ac, &etypes);
if (ret)
goto out;
ac->keytype = ETYPE_NULL;
if (etypes.val) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < etypes.len; i++) {
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes.val[i]) == 0) {
ac->keytype = etypes.val[i];
break;
}
}
}
if (ap_req_options) {
*ap_req_options = 0;
if (ac->keytype != ETYPE_NULL)
*ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY;
if (ap_req->ap_options.use_session_key)
*ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY;
if (ap_req->ap_options.mutual_required)
*ap_req_options |= AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED;
}
if(ticket)
*ticket = t;
else
krb5_free_ticket (context, t);
if (auth_context) {
if (*auth_context == NULL)
*auth_context = ac;
} else
krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac);
free_EtypeList(&etypes);
return 0;
out:
if (t)
krb5_free_ticket (context, t);
if (auth_context == NULL || *auth_context == NULL)
krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac);
return ret;
}
static OM_uint32 inquire_sec_context_get_subkey
(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gsskrb5_ctx context_handle,
krb5_context context,
enum keytype keytype,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_keyblock *key = NULL;
krb5_storage *sp = NULL;
krb5_data data;
OM_uint32 maj_stat = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data_zero(&data);
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
if (sp == NULL) {
_gsskrb5_clear_status();
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
switch(keytype) {
case ACCEPTOR_KEY:
ret = _gsskrb5i_get_acceptor_subkey(context_handle, context, &key);
break;
case INITIATOR_KEY:
ret = _gsskrb5i_get_initiator_subkey(context_handle, context, &key);
break;
case TOKEN_KEY:
ret = _gsskrb5i_get_token_key(context_handle, context, &key);
break;
default:
_gsskrb5_set_status(EINVAL, "%d is not a valid subkey type", keytype);
ret = EINVAL;
break;
}
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (key == NULL) {
_gsskrb5_set_status(EINVAL, "have no subkey of type %d", keytype);
ret = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_store_keyblock(sp, *key);
krb5_free_keyblock (context, key);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data);
if (ret)
goto out;
{
gss_buffer_desc value;
value.length = data.length;
value.value = data.data;
maj_stat = gss_add_buffer_set_member(minor_status,
&value,
data_set);
}
out:
krb5_data_free(&data);
if (sp)
krb5_storage_free(sp);
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
maj_stat = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
return maj_stat;
}
static OM_uint32
export_lucid_sec_context_v1(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gsskrb5_ctx context_handle,
krb5_context context,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_storage *sp = NULL;
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_keyblock *key = NULL;
int32_t number;
int is_cfx;
krb5_data data;
*minor_status = 0;
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
_gsskrb5i_is_cfx(context_handle, &is_cfx);
sp = krb5_storage_emem();
if (sp == NULL) {
_gsskrb5_clear_status();
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, 1);
if (ret) goto out;
ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL) ? 1 : 0);
if (ret) goto out;
ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, context_handle->lifetime);
if (ret) goto out;
krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber (context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&number);
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, (uint32_t)0); /* store top half as zero */
if (ret) goto out;
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, (uint32_t)number);
if (ret) goto out;
krb5_auth_getremoteseqnumber (context,
context_handle->auth_context,
&number);
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, (uint32_t)0); /* store top half as zero */
if (ret) goto out;
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, (uint32_t)number);
if (ret) goto out;
ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, (is_cfx) ? 1 : 0);
if (ret) goto out;
ret = _gsskrb5i_get_token_key(context_handle, context, &key);
if (ret) goto out;
if (is_cfx == 0) {
int sign_alg, seal_alg;
switch (key->keytype) {
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
sign_alg = 0;
seal_alg = 0;
break;
case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5:
case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
sign_alg = 4;
seal_alg = 2;
break;
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
sign_alg = 17;
seal_alg = 16;
break;
default:
sign_alg = -1;
seal_alg = -1;
break;
}
ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, sign_alg);
if (ret) goto out;
ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, seal_alg);
if (ret) goto out;
/* ctx_key */
ret = krb5_store_keyblock(sp, *key);
if (ret) goto out;
} else {
int subkey_p = (context_handle->more_flags & ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) ? 1 : 0;
/* have_acceptor_subkey */
ret = krb5_store_int32(sp, subkey_p);
if (ret) goto out;
/* ctx_key */
ret = krb5_store_keyblock(sp, *key);
if (ret) goto out;
/* acceptor_subkey */
if (subkey_p) {
ret = krb5_store_keyblock(sp, *key);
if (ret) goto out;
}
}
ret = krb5_storage_to_data(sp, &data);
if (ret) goto out;
{
gss_buffer_desc ad_data;
ad_data.value = data.data;
ad_data.length = data.length;
ret = gss_add_buffer_set_member(minor_status, &ad_data, data_set);
krb5_data_free(&data);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
out:
if (key)
krb5_free_keyblock (context, key);
if (sp)
krb5_storage_free(sp);
if (ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&context_handle->ctx_id_mutex);
return major_status;
}
static OM_uint32
gsskrb5_extract_key(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID oid,
krb5_keyblock **keyblock)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
gss_buffer_set_t data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
OM_uint32 major_status;
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_storage *sp = NULL;
if (context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
ret = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ret = krb5_init_context(&context);
if(ret) {
*minor_status = ret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
major_status =
gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (minor_status,
context_handle,
oid,
&data_set);
if (major_status)
return major_status;
if (data_set == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET || data_set->count != 1) {
gss_release_buffer_set(minor_status, &data_set);
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(data_set->elements[0].value,
data_set->elements[0].length);
if (sp == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
*keyblock = calloc(1, sizeof(**keyblock));
if (keyblock == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_ret_keyblock(sp, *keyblock);
out:
gss_release_buffer_set(minor_status, &data_set);
if (sp)
krb5_storage_free(sp);
if (ret && keyblock) {
krb5_free_keyblock(context, *keyblock);
*keyblock = NULL;
}
if (context)
krb5_free_context(context);
*minor_status = ret;
if (ret)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
int
main ()
{
krb5_context context = 0;
krb5_data in, in2, out, out2, check, check2, state, signdata;
krb5_crypto_iov iov[5];
int i, j, pos;
unsigned int dummy;
size_t len;
krb5_enc_data enc_out, enc_out2;
krb5_keyblock *keyblock;
krb5_key key;
memset(iov, 0, sizeof(iov));
in.data = "This is a test.\n";
in.length = strlen (in.data);
in2.data = "This is another test.\n";
in2.length = strlen (in2.data);
test ("Seeding random number generator",
krb5_c_random_seed (context, &in));
/* Set up output buffers. */
out.data = malloc(2048);
out2.data = malloc(2048);
check.data = malloc(2048);
check2.data = malloc(2048);
if (out.data == NULL || out2.data == NULL
|| check.data == NULL || check2.data == NULL)
abort();
out.magic = KV5M_DATA;
out.length = 2048;
out2.magic = KV5M_DATA;
out2.length = 2048;
check.length = 2048;
check2.length = 2048;
for (i = 0; interesting_enctypes[i]; i++) {
krb5_enctype enctype = interesting_enctypes [i];
printf ("Testing enctype %d\n", enctype);
test ("Initializing a keyblock",
krb5_init_keyblock (context, enctype, 0, &keyblock));
test ("Generating random keyblock",
krb5_c_make_random_key (context, enctype, keyblock));
test ("Creating opaque key from keyblock",
krb5_k_create_key (context, keyblock, &key));
enc_out.ciphertext = out;
enc_out2.ciphertext = out2;
/* We use an intermediate `len' because size_t may be different size
than `int' */
krb5_c_encrypt_length (context, keyblock->enctype, in.length, &len);
enc_out.ciphertext.length = len;
/* Encrypt, decrypt, and see if we got the plaintext back again. */
test ("Encrypting (c)",
krb5_c_encrypt (context, keyblock, 7, 0, &in, &enc_out));
display ("Enc output", &enc_out.ciphertext);
test ("Decrypting",
krb5_c_decrypt (context, keyblock, 7, 0, &enc_out, &check));
test ("Comparing", compare_results (&in, &check));
/* Try again with the opaque-key-using variants. */
memset(out.data, 0, out.length);
test ("Encrypting (k)",
krb5_k_encrypt (context, key, 7, 0, &in, &enc_out));
display ("Enc output", &enc_out.ciphertext);
test ("Decrypting",
krb5_k_decrypt (context, key, 7, 0, &enc_out, &check));
test ("Comparing", compare_results (&in, &check));
/* Check if this enctype supports IOV encryption. */
if ( krb5_c_crypto_length(context, keyblock->enctype,
KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER, &dummy) == 0 ){
/* Set up iovecs for stream decryption. */
memcpy(out2.data, enc_out.ciphertext.data, enc_out.ciphertext.length);
iov[0].flags= KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_STREAM;
iov[0].data.data = out2.data;
iov[0].data.length = enc_out.ciphertext.length;
iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
/* Decrypt the encrypted data from above and check it. */
test("IOV stream decrypting (c)",
krb5_c_decrypt_iov( context, keyblock, 7, 0, iov, 2));
test("Comparing results",
compare_results(&in, &iov[1].data));
/* Try again with the opaque-key-using variant. */
memcpy(out2.data, enc_out.ciphertext.data, enc_out.ciphertext.length);
test("IOV stream decrypting (k)",
krb5_k_decrypt_iov( context, key, 7, 0, iov, 2));
test("Comparing results",
compare_results(&in, &iov[1].data));
/* Set up iovecs for AEAD encryption. */
signdata.magic = KV5M_DATA;
signdata.data = (char *) "This should be signed";
signdata.length = strlen(signdata.data);
iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER;
iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
iov[1].data = in; /*We'll need to copy memory before encrypt*/
iov[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY;
iov[2].data = signdata;
iov[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING;
iov[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER;
/* "Allocate" data for the iovec buffers from the "out" buffer. */
test("Setting up iov lengths",
krb5_c_crypto_length_iov(context, keyblock->enctype, iov, 5));
for (j=0,pos=0; j <= 4; j++ ){
if (iov[j].flags == KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY)
continue;
iov[j].data.data = &out.data[pos];
pos += iov[j].data.length;
}
assert (iov[1].data.length == in.length);
memcpy(iov[1].data.data, in.data, in.length);
/* Encrypt and decrypt in place, and check the result. */
test("iov encrypting (c)",
krb5_c_encrypt_iov(context, keyblock, 7, 0, iov, 5));
assert(iov[1].data.length == in.length);
display("Header", &iov[0].data);
display("Data", &iov[1].data);
display("Padding", &iov[3].data);
display("Trailer", &iov[4].data);
test("iov decrypting",
krb5_c_decrypt_iov(context, keyblock, 7, 0, iov, 5));
test("Comparing results",
compare_results(&in, &iov[1].data));
/* Try again with opaque-key-using variants. */
test("iov encrypting (k)",
krb5_k_encrypt_iov(context, key, 7, 0, iov, 5));
assert(iov[1].data.length == in.length);
display("Header", &iov[0].data);
display("Data", &iov[1].data);
display("Padding", &iov[3].data);
display("Trailer", &iov[4].data);
test("iov decrypting",
krb5_k_decrypt_iov(context, key, 7, 0, iov, 5));
test("Comparing results",
compare_results(&in, &iov[1].data));
}
enc_out.ciphertext.length = out.length;
check.length = 2048;
test ("init_state",
krb5_c_init_state (context, keyblock, 7, &state));
test ("Encrypting with state",
krb5_c_encrypt (context, keyblock, 7, &state, &in, &enc_out));
display ("Enc output", &enc_out.ciphertext);
test ("Encrypting again with state",
krb5_c_encrypt (context, keyblock, 7, &state, &in2, &enc_out2));
display ("Enc output", &enc_out2.ciphertext);
test ("free_state",
krb5_c_free_state (context, keyblock, &state));
test ("init_state",
krb5_c_init_state (context, keyblock, 7, &state));
test ("Decrypting with state",
krb5_c_decrypt (context, keyblock, 7, &state, &enc_out, &check));
test ("Decrypting again with state",
krb5_c_decrypt (context, keyblock, 7, &state, &enc_out2, &check2));
test ("free_state",
krb5_c_free_state (context, keyblock, &state));
test ("Comparing",
compare_results (&in, &check));
test ("Comparing",
compare_results (&in2, &check2));
krb5_free_keyblock (context, keyblock);
krb5_k_free_key (context, key);
}
/* Test the RC4 decrypt fallback from key usage 9 to 8. */
test ("Initializing an RC4 keyblock",
krb5_init_keyblock (context, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, 0, &keyblock));
test ("Generating random RC4 key",
krb5_c_make_random_key (context, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC, keyblock));
enc_out.ciphertext = out;
krb5_c_encrypt_length (context, keyblock->enctype, in.length, &len);
enc_out.ciphertext.length = len;
check.length = 2048;
test ("Encrypting with RC4 key usage 8",
krb5_c_encrypt (context, keyblock, 8, 0, &in, &enc_out));
display ("Enc output", &enc_out.ciphertext);
test ("Decrypting with RC4 key usage 9",
krb5_c_decrypt (context, keyblock, 9, 0, &enc_out, &check));
test ("Comparing", compare_results (&in, &check));
krb5_free_keyblock (context, keyblock);
free(out.data);
free(out2.data);
free(check.data);
free(check2.data);
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code
init_tgs_req (krb5_context context,
krb5_ccache ccache,
krb5_addresses *addresses,
krb5_kdc_flags flags,
Ticket *second_ticket,
krb5_creds *in_creds,
krb5_creds *krbtgt,
unsigned nonce,
krb5_keyblock **subkey,
TGS_REQ *t,
krb5_key_usage usage)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
memset(t, 0, sizeof(*t));
t->pvno = 5;
t->msg_type = krb_tgs_req;
if (in_creds->session.keytype) {
ALLOC_SEQ(&t->req_body.etype, 1);
if(t->req_body.etype.val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
goto fail;
}
t->req_body.etype.val[0] = in_creds->session.keytype;
} else {
ret = krb5_init_etype(context,
&t->req_body.etype.len,
&t->req_body.etype.val,
NULL);
}
if (ret)
goto fail;
t->req_body.addresses = addresses;
t->req_body.kdc_options = flags.b;
ret = copy_Realm(&in_creds->server->realm, &t->req_body.realm);
if (ret)
goto fail;
ALLOC(t->req_body.sname, 1);
if (t->req_body.sname == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
goto fail;
}
/* some versions of some code might require that the client be
present in TGS-REQs, but this is clearly against the spec */
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&in_creds->server->name, t->req_body.sname);
if (ret)
goto fail;
/* req_body.till should be NULL if there is no endtime specified,
but old MIT code (like DCE secd) doesn't like that */
ALLOC(t->req_body.till, 1);
if(t->req_body.till == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
goto fail;
}
*t->req_body.till = in_creds->times.endtime;
t->req_body.nonce = nonce;
if(second_ticket){
ALLOC(t->req_body.additional_tickets, 1);
if (t->req_body.additional_tickets == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
goto fail;
}
ALLOC_SEQ(t->req_body.additional_tickets, 1);
if (t->req_body.additional_tickets->val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
goto fail;
}
ret = copy_Ticket(second_ticket, t->req_body.additional_tickets->val);
if (ret)
goto fail;
}
ALLOC(t->padata, 1);
if (t->padata == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
goto fail;
}
ALLOC_SEQ(t->padata, 1);
if (t->padata->val == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
krb5_set_error_string(context, "malloc: out of memory");
goto fail;
}
{
krb5_auth_context ac;
krb5_keyblock *key = NULL;
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &ac);
if(ret)
goto fail;
if (krb5_config_get_bool_default(context, NULL, FALSE,
"realms",
krbtgt->server->realm,
"tgs_require_subkey",
NULL))
{
ret = krb5_generate_subkey (context, &krbtgt->session, &key);
if (ret) {
krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac);
goto fail;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey(context, ac, key);
if (ret) {
if (key)
krb5_free_keyblock (context, key);
krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac);
goto fail;
}
}
ret = set_auth_data (context, &t->req_body, &in_creds->authdata,
key ? key : &krbtgt->session);
if (ret) {
if (key)
krb5_free_keyblock (context, key);
krb5_auth_con_free (context, ac);
goto fail;
}
ret = make_pa_tgs_req(context,
ac,
&t->req_body,
t->padata->val,
krbtgt,
usage);
if(ret) {
if (key)
krb5_free_keyblock (context, key);
krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
goto fail;
}
*subkey = key;
krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
}
fail:
if (ret) {
t->req_body.addresses = NULL;
free_TGS_REQ (t);
}
return ret;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
krb5_error_code
process_tgs_req(krb5_data *pkt, const krb5_fulladdr *from,
krb5_data **response)
{
krb5_keyblock * subkey = 0;
krb5_kdc_req *request = 0;
krb5_db_entry server;
krb5_kdc_rep reply;
krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part reply_encpart;
krb5_ticket ticket_reply, *header_ticket = 0;
int st_idx = 0;
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_tkt_reply;
krb5_transited enc_tkt_transited;
int newtransited = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
int nprincs = 0;
krb5_boolean more;
krb5_timestamp kdc_time, authtime=0;
krb5_keyblock session_key;
krb5_timestamp until, rtime;
krb5_keyblock encrypting_key;
krb5_key_data *server_key;
char *cname = 0, *sname = 0, *tmp = 0;
const char *fromstring = 0;
krb5_last_req_entry *nolrarray[2], nolrentry;
/* krb5_address *noaddrarray[1]; */
krb5_enctype useenctype;
int errcode, errcode2;
register int i;
int firstpass = 1;
const char *status = 0;
char ktypestr[128];
char rep_etypestr[128];
char fromstringbuf[70];
session_key.contents = 0;
retval = decode_krb5_tgs_req(pkt, &request);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ)
return KRB5_BADMSGTYPE;
ktypes2str(ktypestr, sizeof(ktypestr),
request->nktypes, request->ktype);
/*
* setup_server_realm() sets up the global realm-specific data pointer.
*/
if ((retval = setup_server_realm(request->server))) {
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
return retval;
}
fromstring = inet_ntop(ADDRTYPE2FAMILY(from->address->addrtype),
from->address->contents,
fromstringbuf, sizeof(fromstringbuf));
if (!fromstring)
fromstring = "<unknown>";
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, request->server, &sname))) {
status = "UNPARSING SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(sname);
/* errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &req_authdat); */
errcode = kdc_process_tgs_req(request, from, pkt, &header_ticket, &subkey);
if (header_ticket && header_ticket->enc_part2 &&
(errcode2 = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->client,
&cname))) {
status = "UNPARSING CLIENT";
errcode = errcode2;
goto cleanup;
}
limit_string(cname);
if (errcode) {
status = "PROCESS_TGS";
goto cleanup;
}
if (!header_ticket) {
errcode = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED; /* XXX? */
status="UNEXPECTED NULL in header_ticket";
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* We've already dealt with the AP_REQ authentication, so we can
* use header_ticket freely. The encrypted part (if any) has been
* decrypted with the session key.
*/
authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* XXX make sure server here has the proper realm...taken from AP_REQ
header? */
nprincs = 1;
if ((errcode = get_principal(kdc_context, request->server, &server,
&nprincs, &more))) {
status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
nprincs = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
tgt_again:
if (more) {
status = "NON_UNIQUE_PRINCIPAL";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE;
goto cleanup;
} else if (nprincs != 1) {
/*
* might be a request for a TGT for some other realm; we
* should do our best to find such a TGS in this db
*/
if (firstpass && krb5_is_tgs_principal(request->server) == TRUE) {
if (krb5_princ_size(kdc_context, request->server) == 2) {
krb5_data *server_1 =
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, request->server, 1);
krb5_data *tgs_1 =
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, tgs_server, 1);
if (!tgs_1 || !data_eq(*server_1, *tgs_1)) {
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
find_alternate_tgs(request, &server, &more, &nprincs);
firstpass = 0;
goto tgt_again;
}
}
}
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, nprincs);
status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_timeofday(kdc_context, &kdc_time))) {
status = "TIME_OF_DAY";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((retval = validate_tgs_request(request, server, header_ticket,
kdc_time, &status))) {
if (!status)
status = "UNKNOWN_REASON";
errcode = retval + ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* We pick the session keytype here....
*
* Some special care needs to be taken in the user-to-user
* case, since we don't know what keytypes the application server
* which is doing user-to-user authentication can support. We
* know that it at least must be able to support the encryption
* type of the session key in the TGT, since otherwise it won't be
* able to decrypt the U2U ticket! So we use that in preference
* to anything else.
*/
useenctype = 0;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
krb5_keyblock * st_sealing_key;
krb5_kvno st_srv_kvno;
krb5_enctype etype;
/*
* Get the key for the second ticket, and decrypt it.
*/
if ((errcode = kdc_get_server_key(request->second_ticket[st_idx],
&st_sealing_key,
&st_srv_kvno))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_SERVER";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, st_sealing_key,
request->second_ticket[st_idx]);
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, st_sealing_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "2ND_TKT_DECRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
etype = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
if (request->ktype[i] == etype) {
useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Select the keytype for the ticket session key.
*/
if ((useenctype == 0) &&
(useenctype = select_session_keytype(kdc_context, &server,
request->nktypes,
request->ktype)) == 0) {
/* unsupported ktype */
status = "BAD_ENCRYPTION_TYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, useenctype, &session_key);
if (errcode) {
/* random key failed */
status = "RANDOM_KEY_FAILED";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.server = request->server; /* XXX careful for realm... */
enc_tkt_reply.flags = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
/*
* Fix header_ticket's starttime; if it's zero, fill in the
* authtime's value.
*/
if (!(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime))
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime =
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* don't use new addresses unless forwarded, see below */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = header_ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
/* noaddrarray[0] = 0; */
reply_encpart.caddrs = 0; /* optional...don't put it in */
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_FORWARDED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDED);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_PROXY)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PROXY);
/* include new addresses in ticket & reply */
enc_tkt_reply.caddrs = request->addresses;
reply_encpart.caddrs = request->addresses;
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE);
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_POSTDATED)) {
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_POSTDATED);
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = request->from;
} else
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_VALIDATE)) {
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
clear(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_INVALID);
}
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEW)) {
krb5_deltat old_life;
/* BEWARE of allocation hanging off of ticket & enc_part2, it belongs
to the caller */
ticket_reply = *(header_ticket);
enc_tkt_reply = *(header_ticket->enc_part2);
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data = NULL;
old_life = enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime - enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime;
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
kdc_time + old_life);
} else {
/* not a renew request */
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = kdc_time;
until = (request->till == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->till;
enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime =
min(until, min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + server.max_life,
min(enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime + max_life_for_realm,
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime)));
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK) &&
(enc_tkt_reply.times.endtime < request->till) &&
isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags,
TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE)) {
setflag(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE);
request->rtime =
min(request->till,
header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till);
}
}
rtime = (request->rtime == 0) ? kdc_infinity : request->rtime;
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE)) {
/* already checked above in policy check to reject request for a
renewable ticket using a non-renewable ticket */
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE);
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till =
min(rtime,
min(header_ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till,
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime +
min(server.max_renewable_life,
max_renewable_life_for_realm)));
} else {
enc_tkt_reply.times.renew_till = 0;
}
/*
* Set authtime to be the same as header_ticket's
*/
enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/*
* Propagate the preauthentication flags through to the returned ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH);
if (isflagset(header_ticket->enc_part2->flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH))
setflag(enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH);
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
/* assemble any authorization data */
if (request->authorization_data.ciphertext.data) {
krb5_data scratch;
scratch.length = request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length;
if (!(scratch.data =
malloc(request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length))) {
status = "AUTH_NOMEM";
errcode = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode = krb5_c_decrypt(kdc_context,
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SESSKEY,
0, &request->authorization_data,
&scratch))) {
status = "AUTH_ENCRYPT_FAIL";
free(scratch.data);
goto cleanup;
}
/* scratch now has the authorization data, so we decode it */
errcode = decode_krb5_authdata(&scratch, &(request->unenc_authdata));
free(scratch.data);
if (errcode) {
status = "AUTH_DECODE";
goto cleanup;
}
if ((errcode =
concat_authorization_data(request->unenc_authdata,
header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data,
&enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data))) {
status = "CONCAT_AUTH";
goto cleanup;
}
} else
enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data =
header_ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data;
enc_tkt_reply.session = &session_key;
enc_tkt_reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents = empty_string; /* equivalent of "" */
/*
* Only add the realm of the presented tgt to the transited list if
* it is different than the local realm (cross-realm) and it is different
* than the realm of the client (since the realm of the client is already
* implicitly part of the transited list and should not be explicitly
* listed).
*/
/* realm compare is like strcmp, but knows how to deal with these args */
if (realm_compare(header_ticket->server, tgs_server) ||
realm_compare(header_ticket->server, enc_tkt_reply.client)) {
/* tgt issued by local realm or issued by realm of client */
enc_tkt_reply.transited = header_ticket->enc_part2->transited;
} else {
/* tgt issued by some other realm and not the realm of the client */
/* assemble new transited field into allocated storage */
if (header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type !=
KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS) {
status = "BAD_TRTYPE";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
enc_tkt_transited.tr_type = KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
enc_tkt_transited.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.magic = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.data = 0;
enc_tkt_transited.tr_contents.length = 0;
enc_tkt_reply.transited = enc_tkt_transited;
if ((errcode =
add_to_transited(&header_ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
header_ticket->server,
enc_tkt_reply.client,
request->server))) {
status = "ADD_TR_FAIL";
goto cleanup;
}
newtransited = 1;
}
if (!isflagset (request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK)) {
unsigned int tlen;
char *tdots;
errcode = krb5_check_transited_list (kdc_context,
&enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents,
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, header_ticket->enc_part2->client),
krb5_princ_realm (kdc_context, request->server));
tlen = enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.length;
tdots = tlen > 125 ? "..." : "";
tlen = tlen > 125 ? 125 : tlen;
if (errcode == 0) {
setflag (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED);
} else if (errcode == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT)
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO,
"bad realm transit path from '%s' to '%s' "
"via '%.*s%s'",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots);
else {
const char *emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_ERR,
"unexpected error checking transit from "
"'%s' to '%s' via '%.*s%s': %s",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tlen,
enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data,
tdots, emsg);
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
}
} else
krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "not checking transit path");
if (reject_bad_transit
&& !isflagset (enc_tkt_reply.flags, TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED)) {
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
status = "BAD_TRANSIT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* If we are doing user-to-user authentication, then make sure
* that the client for the second ticket matches the request
* server, and then encrypt the ticket using the session key of
* the second ticket.
*/
if (isflagset(request->kdc_options, KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
/*
* Make sure the client for the second ticket matches
* requested server.
*/
krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc = request->second_ticket[st_idx]->enc_part2;
krb5_principal client2 = t2enc->client;
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context, request->server, client2)) {
if ((errcode = krb5_unparse_name(kdc_context, client2, &tmp)))
tmp = 0;
if (tmp != NULL)
limit_string(tmp);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ %s: 2ND_TKT_MISMATCH: "
"authtime %d, %s for %s, 2nd tkt client %s",
fromstring, authtime,
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
tmp ? tmp : "<unknown>");
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = 0;
ticket_reply.enc_part.enctype = t2enc->session->enctype;
if ((errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, t2enc->session,
&ticket_reply))) {
status = "2ND_TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
st_idx++;
} else {
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, &server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
/* convert server.key into a real key (it may be encrypted
* in the database) */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbekd_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context,
&master_keyblock,
server_key, &encrypting_key,
NULL))) {
status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto cleanup;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &encrypting_key,
&ticket_reply);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
status = "TKT_ENCRYPT";
goto cleanup;
}
ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
}
/* Start assembling the response */
reply.msg_type = KRB5_TGS_REP;
reply.padata = 0; /* always */
reply.client = header_ticket->enc_part2->client;
reply.enc_part.kvno = 0; /* We are using the session key */
reply.ticket = &ticket_reply;
reply_encpart.session = &session_key;
reply_encpart.nonce = request->nonce;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; its location
is used for ktime */
reply_encpart.times = enc_tkt_reply.times;
reply_encpart.times.authtime = header_ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
/* starttime is optional, and treated as authtime if not present.
so we can nuke it if it matches */
if (enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime == enc_tkt_reply.times.authtime)
enc_tkt_reply.times.starttime = 0;
nolrentry.lr_type = KRB5_LRQ_NONE;
nolrentry.value = 0;
nolrarray[0] = &nolrentry;
nolrarray[1] = 0;
reply_encpart.last_req = nolrarray; /* not available for TGS reqs */
reply_encpart.key_exp = 0; /* ditto */
reply_encpart.flags = enc_tkt_reply.flags;
reply_encpart.server = ticket_reply.server;
/* use the session key in the ticket, unless there's a subsession key
in the AP_REQ */
reply.enc_part.enctype = subkey ? subkey->enctype :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session->enctype;
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_TGS_REP, &reply_encpart,
subkey ? 1 : 0,
subkey ? subkey :
header_ticket->enc_part2->session,
&reply, response);
if (errcode) {
status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
} else {
status = "ISSUE";
}
memset(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
cleanup:
if (status) {
const char * emsg = NULL;
if (!errcode)
rep_etypes2str(rep_etypestr, sizeof(rep_etypestr), &reply);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
"TGS_REQ (%s) %s: %s: authtime %d, "
"%s%s %s for %s%s%s",
ktypestr,
fromstring, status, authtime,
!errcode ? rep_etypestr : "",
!errcode ? "," : "",
cname ? cname : "<unknown client>",
sname ? sname : "<unknown server>",
errcode ? ", " : "",
errcode ? emsg : "");
if (errcode)
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, emsg);
}
if (errcode) {
int got_err = 0;
if (status == 0) {
status = krb5_get_error_message (kdc_context, errcode);
got_err = 1;
}
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
retval = prepare_error_tgs(request, header_ticket, errcode,
fromstring, response, status);
if (got_err) {
krb5_free_error_message (kdc_context, status);
status = 0;
}
}
if (header_ticket)
krb5_free_ticket(kdc_context, header_ticket);
if (request)
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, request);
if (cname)
free(cname);
if (sname)
free(sname);
if (nprincs)
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, &server, 1);
if (session_key.contents)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &session_key);
if (newtransited)
free(enc_tkt_reply.transited.tr_contents.data);
if (subkey)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, subkey);
return retval;
}
/* returns 0 for failure, 1 for success */
static int k5support_verify_tgt(krb5_context context,
krb5_ccache ccache)
{
krb5_principal server;
krb5_data packet;
krb5_keyblock *keyblock = NULL;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_error_code k5_retcode;
krb5_keytab kt = NULL;
char thishost[BUFSIZ];
int result = 0;
memset(&packet, 0, sizeof(packet));
if ((k5_retcode = krb5_sname_to_principal(context, NULL, verify_principal,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server))) {
k5support_log_err(context, k5_retcode, "krb5_sname_to_principal()");
return 0;
}
if (keytabname) {
if ((k5_retcode = krb5_kt_resolve(context, keytabname, &kt))) {
k5support_log_err(context, k5_retcode, "krb5_kt_resolve()");
goto fini;
}
}
if ((k5_retcode = krb5_kt_read_service_key(context, kt, server, 0,
0, &keyblock))) {
k5support_log_err(context, k5_retcode, "krb5_kt_read_service_key()");
goto fini;
}
if (keyblock) {
krb5_free_keyblock(context, keyblock);
}
/* this duplicates work done in krb5_sname_to_principal
* oh well.
*/
if (gethostname(thishost, BUFSIZ) < 0) {
goto fini;
}
thishost[BUFSIZ-1] = '\0';
if ((k5_retcode = krb5_mk_req(context, &auth_context, 0, verify_principal,
thishost, NULL, ccache, &packet))) {
k5support_log_err(context, k5_retcode, "krb5_mk_req()");
}
if (auth_context) {
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
auth_context = NULL;
}
if (k5_retcode) {
goto fini;
}
if ((k5_retcode = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &packet,
server, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
k5support_log_err(context, k5_retcode, "krb5_rd_req()");
goto fini;
}
if (auth_context) {
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
auth_context = NULL;
}
/* all is good now */
result = 1;
fini:
if (!k5_retcode) {
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &packet);
}
krb5_free_principal(context, server);
return result;
}
NTSTATUS ads_verify_ticket(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *realm,
time_t time_offset,
const DATA_BLOB *ticket,
char **principal,
struct PAC_DATA **pac_data,
DATA_BLOB *ap_rep,
DATA_BLOB *session_key,
bool use_replay_cache)
{
NTSTATUS sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
NTSTATUS pac_ret;
DATA_BLOB auth_data;
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_data packet;
krb5_ticket *tkt = NULL;
krb5_rcache rcache = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *keyblock = NULL;
time_t authtime;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
int flags = 0;
krb5_principal host_princ = NULL;
krb5_const_principal client_principal = NULL;
char *host_princ_s = NULL;
bool auth_ok = False;
bool got_auth_data = False;
struct named_mutex *mutex = NULL;
ZERO_STRUCT(packet);
ZERO_STRUCT(auth_data);
*principal = NULL;
*pac_data = NULL;
*ap_rep = data_blob_null;
*session_key = data_blob_null;
initialize_krb5_error_table();
ret = krb5_init_context(&context);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_init_context failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
if (time_offset != 0) {
krb5_set_real_time(context, time(NULL) + time_offset, 0);
}
ret = krb5_set_default_realm(context, realm);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_set_default_realm failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
/* This whole process is far more complex than I would
like. We have to go through all this to allow us to store
the secret internally, instead of using /etc/krb5.keytab */
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_init failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
krb5_auth_con_getflags( context, auth_context, &flags );
if ( !use_replay_cache ) {
/* Disable default use of a replay cache */
flags &= ~KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME;
krb5_auth_con_setflags( context, auth_context, flags );
}
if (asprintf(&host_princ_s, "%s$", global_myname()) == -1) {
goto out;
}
strlower_m(host_princ_s);
ret = smb_krb5_parse_name(context, host_princ_s, &host_princ);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: smb_krb5_parse_name(%s) failed (%s)\n",
host_princ_s, error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
if ( use_replay_cache ) {
/* Lock a mutex surrounding the replay as there is no
locking in the MIT krb5 code surrounding the replay
cache... */
mutex = grab_named_mutex(talloc_tos(), "replay cache mutex",
10);
if (mutex == NULL) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: unable to protect "
"replay cache with mutex.\n"));
ret = KRB5_CC_IO;
goto out;
}
/* JRA. We must set the rcache here. This will prevent
replay attacks. */
ret = krb5_get_server_rcache(context,
krb5_princ_component(context, host_princ, 0),
&rcache);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_get_server_rcache "
"failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, auth_context, rcache);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_auth_con_setrcache "
"failed (%s)\n", error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
}
/* Try secrets.tdb first and fallback to the krb5.keytab if
necessary */
auth_ok = ads_secrets_verify_ticket(context, auth_context, host_princ,
ticket, &tkt, &keyblock, &ret);
if (!auth_ok &&
(ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV ||
ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED ||
ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW)) {
goto auth_failed;
}
if (!auth_ok && lp_use_kerberos_keytab()) {
auth_ok = ads_keytab_verify_ticket(context, auth_context,
ticket, &tkt, &keyblock, &ret);
}
if ( use_replay_cache ) {
TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
#if 0
/* Heimdal leaks here, if we fix the leak, MIT crashes */
if (rcache) {
krb5_rc_close(context, rcache);
}
#endif
}
auth_failed:
if (!auth_ok) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: krb5_rd_req with auth failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
/* Try map the error return in case it's something like
* a clock skew error.
*/
sret = krb5_to_nt_status(ret);
if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret) || NT_STATUS_EQUAL(sret,NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL)) {
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
}
DEBUG(10,("ads_verify_ticket: returning error %s\n",
nt_errstr(sret) ));
goto out;
}
authtime = get_authtime_from_tkt(tkt);
client_principal = get_principal_from_tkt(tkt);
ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &packet);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: Failed to generate mutual authentication reply (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
goto out;
}
*ap_rep = data_blob(packet.data, packet.length);
if (packet.data) {
kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &packet);
ZERO_STRUCT(packet);
}
get_krb5_smb_session_key(context, auth_context, session_key, True);
dump_data_pw("SMB session key (from ticket)\n", session_key->data, session_key->length);
#if 0
file_save("/tmp/ticket.dat", ticket->data, ticket->length);
#endif
/* continue when no PAC is retrieved or we couldn't decode the PAC
(like accounts that have the UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED flag set, or
Kerberos tickets encrypted using a DES key) - Guenther */
got_auth_data = get_auth_data_from_tkt(mem_ctx, &auth_data, tkt);
if (!got_auth_data) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: did not retrieve auth data. continuing without PAC\n"));
}
if (got_auth_data) {
pac_ret = decode_pac_data(mem_ctx, &auth_data, context, keyblock, client_principal, authtime, pac_data);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(pac_ret)) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: failed to decode PAC_DATA: %s\n", nt_errstr(pac_ret)));
*pac_data = NULL;
}
data_blob_free(&auth_data);
}
#if 0
#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_TKT_ENC_PART2)
/* MIT */
if (tkt->enc_part2) {
file_save("/tmp/authdata.dat",
tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->contents,
tkt->enc_part2->authorization_data[0]->length);
}
#else
/* Heimdal */
if (tkt->ticket.authorization_data) {
file_save("/tmp/authdata.dat",
tkt->ticket.authorization_data->val->ad_data.data,
tkt->ticket.authorization_data->val->ad_data.length);
}
#endif
#endif
if ((ret = smb_krb5_unparse_name(context, client_principal, principal))) {
DEBUG(3,("ads_verify_ticket: smb_krb5_unparse_name failed (%s)\n",
error_message(ret)));
sret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
sret = NT_STATUS_OK;
out:
TALLOC_FREE(mutex);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) {
data_blob_free(&auth_data);
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(sret)) {
data_blob_free(ap_rep);
}
if (host_princ) {
krb5_free_principal(context, host_princ);
}
if (keyblock) {
krb5_free_keyblock(context, keyblock);
}
if (tkt != NULL) {
krb5_free_ticket(context, tkt);
}
SAFE_FREE(host_princ_s);
if (auth_context) {
krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context);
}
if (context) {
krb5_free_context(context);
}
return sret;
}
/* Create the response for a client. */
static krb5_error_code
server_return(krb5_context kcontext,
krb5_pa_data *padata,
struct _krb5_db_entry_new *client,
krb5_data *req_pkt,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_kdc_rep *reply,
struct _krb5_key_data *client_key,
krb5_keyblock *encrypting_key,
krb5_pa_data **send_pa,
preauth_get_entry_data_proc server_get_entry_data,
void *pa_module_context,
void **pa_request_context)
{
/* This module does a couple of dumb things. It tags its reply with
* the same type as the initial challenge (expecting the client to sort
* out whether there's anything useful in there). Oh, and it replaces
* the AS reply key with one which is sent in the clear. */
krb5_keyblock *kb;
krb5_int32 enctype;
int i;
*send_pa = NULL;
/* We'll want a key with the first supported enctype. */
for (i = 0; i < request->nktypes; i++) {
kb = NULL;
if (krb5_init_keyblock(kcontext, request->ktype[i], 0, &kb) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (i >= request->nktypes) {
/* No matching cipher type found. */
return 0;
}
/* Randomize a key and save it for the client. */
if (krb5_c_make_random_key(kcontext, request->ktype[i], kb) != 0) {
krb5_free_keyblock(kcontext, kb);
return 0;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Generated random key, type=%d, length=%d.\n",
kb->enctype, kb->length);
#endif
*send_pa = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (*send_pa == NULL) {
krb5_free_keyblock(kcontext, kb);
return ENOMEM;
}
(*send_pa)->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_WPSE_REQ;
(*send_pa)->length = 4 + kb->length;
(*send_pa)->contents = malloc(4 + kb->length);
if ((*send_pa)->contents == NULL) {
free(*send_pa);
*send_pa = NULL;
krb5_free_keyblock(kcontext, kb);
return ENOMEM;
}
/* Store the preauth data. */
enctype = htonl(kb->enctype);
memcpy((*send_pa)->contents, &enctype, 4);
memcpy((*send_pa)->contents + 4, kb->contents, kb->length);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kcontext, encrypting_key);
krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(kcontext, kb, encrypting_key);
/* Clean up. */
krb5_free_keyblock(kcontext, kb);
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
_krb5_mk_req_internal(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
const krb5_flags ap_req_options,
krb5_data *in_data,
krb5_creds *in_creds,
krb5_data *outbuf,
krb5_key_usage checksum_usage,
krb5_key_usage encrypt_usage)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data authenticator;
Checksum c;
Checksum *c_opt;
krb5_auth_context ac;
if(auth_context) {
if(*auth_context == NULL)
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, auth_context);
else
ret = 0;
ac = *auth_context;
} else
ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &ac);
if(ret)
return ret;
if(ac->local_subkey == NULL && (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY)) {
ret = krb5_auth_con_generatelocalsubkey(context,
ac,
&in_creds->session);
if(ret)
goto out;
}
krb5_free_keyblock(context, ac->keyblock);
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &in_creds->session, &ac->keyblock);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* it's unclear what type of checksum we can use. try the best one, except:
* a) if it's configured differently for the current realm, or
* b) if the session key is des-cbc-crc
*/
if (in_data) {
if(ac->keyblock->keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC) {
/* this is to make DCE secd (and older MIT kdcs?) happy */
ret = krb5_create_checksum(context,
NULL,
0,
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4,
in_data->data,
in_data->length,
&c);
} else if(ac->keyblock->keytype == ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5 ||
ac->keyblock->keytype == ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56 ||
ac->keyblock->keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 ||
ac->keyblock->keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5) {
/* this is to make MS kdc happy */
ret = krb5_create_checksum(context,
NULL,
0,
CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5,
in_data->data,
in_data->length,
&c);
} else {
krb5_crypto crypto;
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, ac->keyblock, 0, &crypto);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_create_checksum(context,
crypto,
checksum_usage,
0,
in_data->data,
in_data->length,
&c);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
}
c_opt = &c;
} else {
c_opt = NULL;
}
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = _krb5_build_authenticator(context,
ac,
ac->keyblock->keytype,
in_creds,
c_opt,
&authenticator,
encrypt_usage);
if (c_opt)
free_Checksum (c_opt);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_build_ap_req (context, ac->keyblock->keytype,
in_creds, ap_req_options, authenticator, outbuf);
out:
if(auth_context == NULL)
krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
client_process(krb5_context kcontext,
void *plugin_context,
void *request_context,
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
preauth_get_client_data_proc client_get_data_proc,
struct _krb5_preauth_client_rock *rock,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_data *encoded_request_body,
krb5_data *encoded_previous_request,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_prompter_fct prompter,
void *prompter_data,
preauth_get_as_key_proc gak_fct,
void *gak_data,
krb5_data *salt, krb5_data *s2kparams,
krb5_keyblock *as_key,
krb5_pa_data **out_pa_data)
{
krb5_pa_data *send_pa;
krb5_int32 nnonce, enctype;
krb5_keyblock *kb;
krb5_error_code status;
int *pctx;
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "%d bytes of preauthentication data (type %d)\n",
pa_data->length, pa_data->pa_type);
#endif
pctx = plugin_context;
if (pctx) {
(*pctx)++;
}
if (pa_data->length == 0) {
/* Create preauth data. */
send_pa = malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (send_pa == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
send_pa->pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_WPSE_REQ;
send_pa->length = 4;
send_pa->contents = malloc(4);
if (send_pa->contents == NULL) {
free(send_pa);
return ENOMEM;
}
/* Store the preauth data. */
nnonce = htonl(request->nonce);
memcpy(send_pa->contents, &nnonce, 4);
*out_pa_data = send_pa;
} else {
/* A reply from the KDC. Conventionally this would be
* indicated by a different preauthentication type, but this
* mechanism/implementation doesn't do that. */
if (pa_data->length > 4) {
memcpy(&enctype, pa_data->contents, 4);
kb = NULL;
status = krb5_init_keyblock(kcontext, ntohl(enctype),
pa_data->length - 4, &kb);
if (status != 0)
return status;
memcpy(kb->contents, pa_data->contents + 4, pa_data->length - 4);
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Recovered key type=%d, length=%d.\n",
kb->enctype, kb->length);
#endif
status = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(kcontext, kb, as_key);
krb5_free_keyblock(kcontext, kb);
return status;
}
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
return 0;
}
KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
krb5_string_to_key_derived(krb5_context context,
const void *str,
size_t len,
krb5_enctype etype,
krb5_keyblock *key)
{
struct _krb5_encryption_type *et = _krb5_find_enctype(etype);
krb5_error_code ret;
struct _krb5_key_data kd;
size_t keylen;
u_char *tmp;
if(et == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message (context, KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP,
N_("encryption type %d not supported", ""),
etype);
return KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
}
keylen = et->keytype->bits / 8;
ALLOC(kd.key, 1);
if(kd.key == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message (context, ENOMEM,
N_("malloc: out of memory", ""));
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = krb5_data_alloc(&kd.key->keyvalue, et->keytype->size);
if(ret) {
free(kd.key);
return ret;
}
kd.key->keytype = etype;
tmp = malloc (keylen);
if(tmp == NULL) {
krb5_free_keyblock(context, kd.key);
krb5_set_error_message (context, ENOMEM, N_("malloc: out of memory", ""));
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = _krb5_n_fold(str, len, tmp, keylen);
if (ret) {
free(tmp);
krb5_set_error_message (context, ENOMEM, N_("malloc: out of memory", ""));
return ret;
}
kd.schedule = NULL;
_krb5_DES3_random_to_key(context, kd.key, tmp, keylen);
memset(tmp, 0, keylen);
free(tmp);
ret = _krb5_derive_key(context,
et,
&kd,
"kerberos", /* XXX well known constant */
strlen("kerberos"));
if (ret) {
_krb5_free_key_data(context, &kd, et);
return ret;
}
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, kd.key, key);
_krb5_free_key_data(context, &kd, et);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code
digest_request(krb5_context context,
krb5_realm realm,
krb5_ccache ccache,
krb5_key_usage usage,
const DigestReqInner *ireq,
DigestRepInner *irep)
{
DigestREQ req;
DigestREP rep;
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_data data, data2;
size_t size = 0;
krb5_crypto crypto = NULL;
krb5_auth_context ac = NULL;
krb5_principal principal = NULL;
krb5_ccache id = NULL;
krb5_realm r = NULL;
krb5_data_zero(&data);
krb5_data_zero(&data2);
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
if (ccache == NULL) {
ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &id);
if (ret)
goto out;
} else
id = ccache;
if (realm == NULL) {
ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &r);
if (ret)
goto out;
} else
r = realm;
/*
*
*/
ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &principal,
r, KRB5_DIGEST_NAME, r, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(DigestReqInner, data.data, data.length,
ireq, &size, ret);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed to encode digest inner request", ""));
goto out;
}
if (size != data.length)
krb5_abortx(context, "ASN.1 internal encoder error");
ret = krb5_mk_req_exact(context, &ac,
AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY|AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED,
principal, NULL, id, &req.apReq);
if (ret)
goto out;
{
krb5_keyblock *key;
ret = krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey(context, ac, &key);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (key == NULL) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Digest failed to get local subkey", ""));
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto);
krb5_free_keyblock (context, key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, crypto, usage,
data.data, data.length, 0,
&req.innerReq);
if (ret)
goto out;
krb5_data_free(&data);
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(DigestREQ, data.data, data.length,
&req, &size, ret);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed to encode DigestREQest", ""));
goto out;
}
if (size != data.length)
krb5_abortx(context, "ASN.1 internal encoder error");
ret = krb5_sendto_kdc(context, &data, &r, &data2);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = decode_DigestREP(data2.data, data2.length, &rep, NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed to parse digest response", ""));
goto out;
}
{
krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *repl;
ret = krb5_rd_rep(context, ac, &rep.apRep, &repl);
if (ret)
goto out;
krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
}
{
krb5_keyblock *key;
ret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context, ac, &key);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (key == NULL) {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Digest reply have no remote subkey", ""));
goto out;
}
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto);
krb5_free_keyblock (context, key);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
krb5_data_free(&data);
ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(context, crypto, usage,
&rep.innerRep, &data);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = decode_DigestRepInner(data.data, data.length, irep, NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed to decode digest inner reply", ""));
goto out;
}
out:
if (ccache == NULL && id)
krb5_cc_close(context, id);
if (realm == NULL && r)
free(r);
if (crypto)
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if (ac)
krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
if (principal)
krb5_free_principal(context, principal);
krb5_data_free(&data);
krb5_data_free(&data2);
free_DigestREQ(&req);
free_DigestREP(&rep);
return ret;
}
void KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx_free(krb5_context context, krb5_rd_req_out_ctx ctx)
{
krb5_free_keyblock(context, ctx->keyblock);
free(ctx);
}
static void
ec_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply, krb5_pa_data *data,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb, krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond, void *arg)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_enc_data *enc = NULL;
krb5_data scratch, plain;
krb5_keyblock *armor_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock);
krb5_pa_enc_ts *ts = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *client_keys = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *challenge_key = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *kdc_challenge_key;
krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq = NULL;
int i = 0;
plain.data = NULL;
if (armor_key == NULL) {
retval = ENOENT;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOENT,
_("Encrypted Challenge used outside of FAST "
"tunnel"));
}
scratch.data = (char *) data->contents;
scratch.length = data->length;
if (retval == 0)
retval = decode_krb5_enc_data(&scratch, &enc);
if (retval == 0) {
plain.data = malloc(enc->ciphertext.length);
plain.length = enc->ciphertext.length;
if (plain.data == NULL)
retval = ENOMEM;
}
if (retval == 0)
retval = cb->client_keys(context, rock, &client_keys);
if (retval == 0) {
for (i = 0; client_keys[i].enctype&& (retval == 0); i++ ) {
retval = krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(context,
armor_key, "clientchallengearmor",
&client_keys[i], "challengelongterm",
&challenge_key);
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_c_decrypt(context, challenge_key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
NULL, enc, &plain);
if (challenge_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(context, challenge_key);
challenge_key = NULL;
if (retval == 0)
break;
/*We failed to decrypt. Try next key*/
retval = 0;
}
if (client_keys[i].enctype == 0) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Incorrect password in encrypted "
"challenge"));
}
}
if (retval == 0)
retval = decode_krb5_pa_enc_ts(&plain, &ts);
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_timeofday(context, &now);
if (retval == 0) {
if (labs(now-ts->patimestamp) < context->clockskew) {
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
/*
* If this fails, we won't generate a reply to the client. That
* may cause the client to fail, but at this point the KDC has
* considered this a success, so the return value is ignored.
*/
if (krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(context, armor_key, "kdcchallengearmor",
&client_keys[i], "challengelongterm",
&kdc_challenge_key) == 0)
modreq = (krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq)kdc_challenge_key;
} else { /*skew*/
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
}
}
cb->free_keys(context, rock, client_keys);
if (plain.data)
free(plain.data);
if (enc)
krb5_free_enc_data(context, enc);
if (ts)
krb5_free_pa_enc_ts(context, ts);
(*respond)(arg, retval, modreq, NULL, NULL);
}
static krb5_error_code
kdc_verify_preauth(krb5_context context, struct _krb5_db_entry_new *client,
krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply, krb5_pa_data *data,
preauth_get_entry_data_proc get_entry_proc,
void *pa_module_context, void **pa_request_context,
krb5_data **e_data, krb5_authdata ***authz_data)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_enc_data *enc = NULL;
krb5_data scratch, plain;
krb5_keyblock *armor_key = NULL;
krb5_pa_enc_ts *ts = NULL;
krb5int_access kaccess;
krb5_keyblock *client_keys = NULL;
krb5_data *client_data = NULL;
krb5_keyblock *challenge_key = NULL;
int i = 0;
plain.data = NULL;
if (krb5int_accessor(&kaccess, KRB5INT_ACCESS_VERSION) != 0)
return 0;
retval = fast_kdc_get_armor_key(context, get_entry_proc, request, client, &armor_key);
if (retval == 0 &&armor_key == NULL) {
retval = ENOENT;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOENT, "Encrypted Challenge used outside of FAST tunnel");
}
scratch.data = (char *) data->contents;
scratch.length = data->length;
if (retval == 0)
retval = kaccess.decode_enc_data(&scratch, &enc);
if (retval == 0) {
plain.data = malloc(enc->ciphertext.length);
plain.length = enc->ciphertext.length;
if (plain.data == NULL)
retval = ENOMEM;
}
if (retval == 0)
retval = get_entry_proc(context, request, client,
krb5plugin_preauth_keys, &client_data);
if (retval == 0) {
client_keys = (krb5_keyblock *) client_data->data;
for (i = 0; client_keys[i].enctype&& (retval == 0); i++ ) {
retval = krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(context,
armor_key, "clientchallengearmor",
&client_keys[i], "challengelongterm",
&challenge_key);
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_c_decrypt(context, challenge_key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT,
NULL, enc, &plain);
if (challenge_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(context, challenge_key);
challenge_key = NULL;
if (retval == 0)
break;
/*We failed to decrypt. Try next key*/
retval = 0;
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &client_keys[i]);
}
if (client_keys[i].enctype == 0) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "Incorrect password in encrypted challenge");
} else { /*not run out of keys*/
int j;
assert (retval == 0);
for (j = i+1; client_keys[j].enctype; j++)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &client_keys[j]);
}
}
if (retval == 0)
retval = kaccess.decode_enc_ts(&plain, &ts);
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_timeofday(context, &now);
if (retval == 0) {
if (labs(now-ts->patimestamp) < context->clockskew) {
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
/*
* If this fails, we won't generate a reply to the client. That
* may cause the client to fail, but at this point the KDC has
* considered this a success, so the return value is ignored.
*/
fast_kdc_replace_reply_key(context, get_entry_proc, request);
krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(context, armor_key, "kdcchallengearmor",
&client_keys[i], "challengelongterm",
(krb5_keyblock **) pa_request_context);
} else { /*skew*/
retval = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
}
}
if (client_keys) {
if (client_keys[i].enctype)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &client_keys[i]);
krb5_free_data(context, client_data);
}
if (armor_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(context, armor_key);
if (plain.data)
free(plain.data);
if (enc)
kaccess.free_enc_data(context, enc);
if (ts)
kaccess.free_enc_ts(context, ts);
return retval;
}
krb5_error_code
kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(struct kdc_request_state *state,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_kdc_rep *rep, krb5_enctype enctype)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_fast_finished finish;
krb5_fast_response fast_response;
krb5_data *encoded_ticket = NULL;
krb5_data *encrypted_reply = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa = NULL, **pa_array = NULL;
krb5_cksumtype cksumtype = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
krb5_pa_data *empty_padata[] = {NULL};
krb5_keyblock *strengthen_key = NULL;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->realm_data;
if (!state->armor_key)
return 0;
memset(&finish, 0, sizeof(finish));
retval = krb5_init_keyblock(kdc_context, enctype, 0, &strengthen_key);
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_c_make_random_key(kdc_context, enctype, strengthen_key);
if (retval == 0) {
state->strengthen_key = strengthen_key;
strengthen_key = NULL;
}
fast_response.padata = rep->padata;
if (fast_response.padata == NULL)
fast_response.padata = &empty_padata[0];
fast_response.strengthen_key = state->strengthen_key;
fast_response.nonce = request->nonce;
fast_response.finished = &finish;
finish.client = rep->client;
pa_array = calloc(3, sizeof(*pa_array));
if (pa_array == NULL)
retval = ENOMEM;
pa = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (retval == 0 && pa == NULL)
retval = ENOMEM;
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_us_timeofday(kdc_context, &finish.timestamp, &finish.usec);
if (retval == 0)
retval = encode_krb5_ticket(rep->ticket, &encoded_ticket);
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(kdc_context,
state->armor_key->enctype,
&cksumtype);
if (retval == 0)
retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(kdc_context, cksumtype,
state->armor_key,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_FAST_FINISHED,
encoded_ticket, &finish.ticket_checksum);
if (retval == 0)
retval = encrypt_fast_reply(state, &fast_response, &encrypted_reply);
if (retval == 0) {
pa[0].pa_type = KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST;
pa[0].length = encrypted_reply->length;
pa[0].contents = (unsigned char *) encrypted_reply->data;
pa_array[0] = &pa[0];
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, rep->padata);
rep->padata = pa_array;
pa_array = NULL;
free(encrypted_reply);
encrypted_reply = NULL;
pa = NULL;
}
if (pa)
free(pa);
if (pa_array)
free(pa_array);
if (encrypted_reply)
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, encrypted_reply);
if (encoded_ticket)
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, encoded_ticket);
if (strengthen_key != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, strengthen_key);
if (finish.ticket_checksum.contents)
krb5_free_checksum_contents(kdc_context, &finish.ticket_checksum);
return retval;
}
static OM_uint32
gsskrb5_acceptor_start(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
gsskrb5_ctx ctx,
krb5_context context,
const gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
const gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
const gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_name_t * src_name,
gss_OID * mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 * ret_flags,
OM_uint32 * time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t * delegated_cred_handle)
{
krb5_error_code kret;
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
krb5_data indata;
krb5_flags ap_options;
krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
int is_cfx = 0;
const gsskrb5_cred acceptor_cred = (gsskrb5_cred)acceptor_cred_handle;
krb5_boolean is_hostbased_service = FALSE;
/*
* We may, or may not, have an escapsulation.
*/
ret = _gsskrb5_decapsulate (minor_status,
input_token_buffer,
&indata,
"\x01\x00",
ctx->mech);
if (ret) {
/* Assume that there is no OID wrapping. */
indata.length = input_token_buffer->length;
indata.data = input_token_buffer->value;
}
/*
* We need to get our keytab
*/
if (acceptor_cred == NULL) {
if (_gsskrb5_keytab != NULL)
keytab = _gsskrb5_keytab;
} else if (acceptor_cred->keytab != NULL) {
keytab = acceptor_cred->keytab;
}
is_hostbased_service =
(acceptor_cred &&
acceptor_cred->principal &&
krb5_principal_is_gss_hostbased_service(context, acceptor_cred->principal));
/*
* We need to check the ticket and create the AP-REP packet
*/
{
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx in = NULL;
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx out = NULL;
krb5_principal server = NULL;
if (acceptor_cred && !is_hostbased_service)
server = acceptor_cred->principal;
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_alloc(context, &in);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_in_set_keytab(context, in, keytab);
if (kret) {
if (in)
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
kret = krb5_rd_req_ctx(context,
&ctx->auth_context,
&indata,
server,
in, &out);
krb5_rd_req_in_ctx_free(context, in);
if (ret && _gss_mg_log_level(5)) {
const char *e = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
char *s = NULL;
if (server)
(void)krb5_unparse_name(context, server, &s);
_gss_mg_log(5, "gss-asc: rd_req (server: %s) failed with: %d: %s",
s ? s : "<not specified>",
ret, e);
krb5_free_error_message(context, e);
if (s)
krb5_xfree(s);
}
switch (kret) {
case 0:
break;
case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW:
case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV:
/*
* No reply in non-MUTUAL mode, but we don't know that its
* non-MUTUAL mode yet, thats inside the 8003 checksum, so
* lets only send the error token on clock skew, that
* limit when send error token for non-MUTUAL.
*/
return send_error_token(minor_status, context, kret,
server, &indata, ctx->mech, output_token);
case KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED:
case KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND:
case KRB5_KT_END:
/*
* If the error is on the keytab entry missing or bad
* decryption, lets assume that the keytab version was
* wrong and tell the client that.
*/
return send_error_token(minor_status, context, KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED,
server, NULL, ctx->mech, output_token);
default:
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
/*
* we need to remember some data on the context_handle.
*/
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_ap_req_options(context, out,
&ap_options);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_ticket(context, out,
&ctx->ticket);
if (kret == 0)
kret = krb5_rd_req_out_get_keyblock(context, out,
&ctx->service_keyblock);
if (kret == 0) {
int flags;
flags = krb5_rd_req_out_get_flags(context, out);
if (flags & KRB5_RD_REQ_OUT_PAC_VALID)
ctx->more_flags |= PAC_VALID;
}
if (kret == 0 && is_hostbased_service) {
krb5_principal sp = ctx->ticket->server;
if (sp->name.name_string.len < 1 ||
strcmp(sp->name.name_string.val[0], acceptor_cred->principal->name.name_string.val[0]) != 0)
{
kret = KRB5KRB_AP_WRONG_PRINC;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Expecting service %s but got %s",
acceptor_cred->principal->name.name_string.val[0],
sp->name.name_string.val[0]);
}
}
ctx->endtime = ctx->ticket->ticket.endtime;
krb5_rd_req_out_ctx_free(context, out);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
}
/*
* We need to copy the principal names to the context and the
* calling layer.
*/
kret = krb5_copy_principal(context,
ctx->ticket->client,
&ctx->source);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
kret = krb5_copy_principal(context,
ctx->ticket->server,
&ctx->target);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
/*
* We need to setup some compat stuff, this assumes that
* context_handle->target is already set.
*/
ret = _gss_DES3_get_mic_compat(minor_status, ctx, context);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (src_name != NULL) {
kret = krb5_copy_principal (context,
ctx->ticket->client,
(gsskrb5_name*)src_name);
if (kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
}
/*
* We need to get the flags out of the 8003 checksum.
*/
{
krb5_authenticator authenticator;
kret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&authenticator);
if(kret) {
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
if (authenticator->cksum == NULL) {
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
}
if (authenticator->cksum->cksumtype == CKSUMTYPE_GSSAPI) {
krb5_data finished_data;
krb5_crypto crypto = NULL;
if (ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey) {
kret = krb5_crypto_init(context,
ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey,
0, &crypto);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
krb5_data_zero(&finished_data);
ret = _gsskrb5_verify_8003_checksum(minor_status,
context,
crypto,
input_chan_bindings,
authenticator->cksum,
&ctx->flags,
&ctx->fwd_data,
&finished_data);
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
if (ret) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
return ret;
}
if (finished_data.length) {
GSS_KRB5_FINISHED finished;
krb5_data pkt;
memset(&finished, 0, sizeof(finished));
if (ctx->messages == NULL) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
krb5_data_free(&finished_data);
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
kret = krb5_storage_to_data(ctx->messages, &pkt);
if (kret) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
krb5_data_free(&finished_data);
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (ctx->auth_context->remote_subkey == NULL) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
krb5_data_free(&finished_data);
krb5_data_free(&pkt);
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
kret = decode_GSS_KRB5_FINISHED(finished_data.data,
finished_data.length,
&finished, NULL);
krb5_data_free(&finished_data);
if (kret) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
krb5_data_free(&pkt);
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
kret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, crypto,
KRB5_KU_FINISHED,
pkt.data, pkt.length,
&finished.gss_mic);
free_GSS_KRB5_FINISHED(&finished);
krb5_data_free(&pkt);
if (kret) {
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
}
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
} else {
krb5_crypto crypto;
kret = krb5_crypto_init(context,
ctx->auth_context->keyblock,
0, &crypto);
if(kret) {
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
ret = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
/*
* Windows accepts Samba3's use of a kerberos, rather than
* GSSAPI checksum here
*/
kret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
crypto, KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, NULL, 0,
authenticator->cksum);
krb5_free_authenticator(context, &authenticator);
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
if(kret) {
ret = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
*minor_status = kret;
return ret;
}
/*
* Samba style get some flags (but not DCE-STYLE), use
* ap_options to guess the mutual flag.
*/
ctx->flags = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG;
if (ap_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)
ctx->flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
}
}
if(ctx->flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) {
krb5_data outbuf;
int use_subkey = 0;
_gsskrb5i_is_cfx(context, ctx, 1);
is_cfx = (ctx->more_flags & IS_CFX);
if (is_cfx || (ap_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY)) {
use_subkey = 1;
} else {
krb5_keyblock *rkey;
/*
* If there is a initiator subkey, copy that to acceptor
* subkey to match Windows behavior
*/
kret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&rkey);
if (kret == 0) {
kret = krb5_auth_con_setlocalsubkey(context,
ctx->auth_context,
rkey);
if (kret == 0)
use_subkey = 1;
krb5_free_keyblock(context, rkey);
}
}
if (use_subkey) {
ctx->gk5c.flags |= GK5C_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY;
krb5_auth_con_addflags(context, ctx->auth_context,
KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_USE_SUBKEY,
NULL);
}
kret = krb5_mk_rep(context,
ctx->auth_context,
&outbuf);
if (kret) {
*minor_status = kret;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (IS_DCE_STYLE(ctx)) {
output_token->length = outbuf.length;
output_token->value = outbuf.data;
} else {
ret = _gsskrb5_encapsulate(minor_status,
&outbuf,
output_token,
"\x02\x00",
ctx->mech);
krb5_data_free (&outbuf);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
ctx->flags |= GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
/* Remember the flags */
ctx->endtime = ctx->ticket->ticket.endtime;
ctx->more_flags |= OPEN;
if (mech_type)
*mech_type = ctx->mech;
if (time_rec) {
ret = _gsskrb5_lifetime_left(minor_status,
context,
ctx->endtime,
time_rec);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
}
/*
* When GSS_C_DCE_STYLE is in use, we need ask for a AP-REP from
* the client.
*/
if (IS_DCE_STYLE(ctx)) {
/*
* Return flags to caller, but we haven't processed
* delgations yet
*/
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = (ctx->flags & ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG);
ctx->acceptor_state = acceptor_wait_for_dcestyle;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
ret = gsskrb5_acceptor_ready(minor_status, ctx, context,
delegated_cred_handle);
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = ctx->flags;
return ret;
}
static OM_uint32
kg_unseal_v1_iov(krb5_context context,
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
size_t token_wrapper_len,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
int toktype)
{
OM_uint32 code;
gss_iov_buffer_t header;
gss_iov_buffer_t trailer;
unsigned char *ptr;
int sealalg;
int signalg;
krb5_checksum cksum;
krb5_checksum md5cksum;
size_t cksum_len = 0;
size_t conflen = 0;
int direction;
krb5_ui_4 seqnum;
OM_uint32 retval;
size_t sumlen;
krb5_keyusage sign_usage = KG_USAGE_SIGN;
md5cksum.length = cksum.length = 0;
md5cksum.contents = cksum.contents = NULL;
header = kg_locate_header_iov(iov, iov_count, toktype);
assert(header != NULL);
trailer = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL && trailer->buffer.length != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (header->buffer.length < token_wrapper_len + 14) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ptr = (unsigned char *)header->buffer.value + token_wrapper_len;
signalg = ptr[0];
signalg |= ptr[1] << 8;
sealalg = ptr[2];
sealalg |= ptr[3] << 8;
if (ptr[4] != 0xFF || ptr[5] != 0xFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
!(sealalg == 0xFFFF || sealalg == ctx->sealalg)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if ((ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD)||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4 &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
cksum_len = 8;
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG)
sign_usage = 15;
break;
case SGN_ALG_3:
cksum_len = 16;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
cksum_len = 20;
break;
default:
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
/* get the token parameters */
code = kg_get_seq_num(context, ctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
&seqnum);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
/* decode the message, if SEAL */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
if (sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
if (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4) {
unsigned char bigend_seqnum[4];
krb5_keyblock *enc_key;
size_t i;
store_32_be(seqnum, bigend_seqnum);
code = krb5_k_key_keyblock(context, ctx->enc, &enc_key);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
assert(enc_key->length == 16);
for (i = 0; i < enc_key->length; i++)
((char *)enc_key->contents)[i] ^= 0xF0;
code = kg_arcfour_docrypt_iov(context, enc_key, 0,
&bigend_seqnum[0], 4,
iov, iov_count);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, enc_key);
} else {
code = kg_decrypt_iov(context, 0,
((ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) != 0),
0 /*EC*/, 0 /*RRC*/,
ctx->enc, KG_USAGE_SEAL, NULL,
iov, iov_count);
}
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
}
conflen = kg_confounder_size(context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
}
if (header->buffer.length != token_wrapper_len + 14 + cksum_len + conflen) {
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
/* compute the checksum of the message */
/* initialize the checksum */
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC:
case SGN_ALG_3:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3;
break;
default:
abort();
}
code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, md5cksum.checksum_type, &sumlen);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
md5cksum.length = sumlen;
/* compute the checksum of the message */
code = kg_make_checksum_iov_v1(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
cksum_len, ctx->seq, ctx->enc,
sign_usage, iov, iov_count, toktype,
&md5cksum);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_3:
code = kg_encrypt_inplace(context, ctx->seq, KG_USAGE_SEAL,
(g_OID_equal(ctx->mech_used,
gss_mech_krb5_old) ?
ctx->seq->keyblock.contents : NULL),
md5cksum.contents, 16);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
cksum.length = cksum_len;
cksum.contents = md5cksum.contents + 16 - cksum.length;
code = k5_bcmp(cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum.length);
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
break;
default:
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* For GSS_C_DCE_STYLE, the caller manages the padding, because the
* pad length is in the RPC PDU. The value of the padding may be
* uninitialized. For normal GSS, the last bytes of the decrypted
* data contain the pad length. kg_fixup_padding_iov() will find
* this and fixup the last data IOV appropriately.
*/
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
(ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) == 0) {
retval = kg_fixup_padding_iov(&code, iov, iov_count);
if (retval != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
}
if (conf_state != NULL)
*conf_state = (sealalg != 0xFFFF);
if (qop_state != NULL)
*qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
(!ctx->initiate && direction != 0)) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_DIRECTION;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
code = 0;
retval = g_order_check(&ctx->seqstate, (gssint_uint64)seqnum);
cleanup:
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &md5cksum);
*minor_status = code;
return retval;
}
static void
finish_process_as_req(struct as_req_state *state, krb5_error_code errcode)
{
krb5_key_data *server_key;
krb5_key_data *client_key;
krb5_keyblock *as_encrypting_key = NULL;
krb5_data *response = NULL;
const char *emsg = 0;
int did_log = 0;
register int i;
krb5_enctype useenctype;
loop_respond_fn oldrespond;
void *oldarg;
kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm = state->active_realm;
assert(state);
oldrespond = state->respond;
oldarg = state->arg;
if (errcode)
goto egress;
if ((errcode = validate_forwardable(state->request, *state->client,
*state->server, state->kdc_time,
&state->status))) {
errcode += ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part2 = &state->enc_tkt_reply;
/*
* Find the server key
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->server,
-1, /* ignore keytype */
-1, /* Ignore salttype */
0, /* Get highest kvno */
&server_key))) {
state->status = "FINDING_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Convert server->key into a real key
* (it may be encrypted in the database)
*
* server_keyblock is later used to generate auth data signatures
*/
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
server_key,
&state->server_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_SERVER_KEY";
goto egress;
}
/*
* Find the appropriate client key. We search in the order specified
* by request keytype list.
*/
client_key = NULL;
useenctype = 0;
for (i = 0; i < state->request->nktypes; i++) {
useenctype = state->request->ktype[i];
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(useenctype))
continue;
if (!krb5_dbe_find_enctype(kdc_context, state->client,
useenctype, -1, 0, &client_key))
break;
}
if (!(client_key)) {
/* Cannot find an appropriate key */
state->status = "CANT_FIND_CLIENT_KEY";
errcode = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
goto egress;
}
state->rock.client_key = client_key;
/* convert client.key_data into a real key */
if ((errcode = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(kdc_context, NULL,
client_key,
&state->client_keyblock,
NULL))) {
state->status = "DECRYPT_CLIENT_KEY";
goto egress;
}
state->client_keyblock.enctype = useenctype;
/* Start assembling the response */
state->reply.msg_type = KRB5_AS_REP;
state->reply.client = state->enc_tkt_reply.client; /* post canonization */
state->reply.ticket = &state->ticket_reply;
state->reply_encpart.session = &state->session_key;
if ((errcode = fetch_last_req_info(state->client,
&state->reply_encpart.last_req))) {
state->status = "FETCH_LAST_REQ";
goto egress;
}
state->reply_encpart.nonce = state->request->nonce;
state->reply_encpart.key_exp = get_key_exp(state->client);
state->reply_encpart.flags = state->enc_tkt_reply.flags;
state->reply_encpart.server = state->ticket_reply.server;
/* copy the time fields EXCEPT for authtime; it's location
* is used for ktime
*/
state->reply_encpart.times = state->enc_tkt_reply.times;
state->reply_encpart.times.authtime = state->authtime = state->kdc_time;
state->reply_encpart.caddrs = state->enc_tkt_reply.caddrs;
state->reply_encpart.enc_padata = NULL;
/* Fetch the padata info to be returned (do this before
* authdata to handle possible replacement of reply key
*/
errcode = return_padata(kdc_context, &state->rock, state->req_pkt,
state->request, &state->reply,
&state->client_keyblock, &state->pa_context);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = handle_authdata(kdc_context,
state->c_flags,
state->client,
state->server,
state->server,
&state->client_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
&state->server_keyblock,
state->req_pkt,
state->request,
NULL, /* for_user_princ */
NULL, /* enc_tkt_request */
&state->enc_tkt_reply);
if (errcode) {
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("AS_REQ : handle_authdata (%d)"),
errcode);
state->status = "HANDLE_AUTHDATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock,
&state->ticket_reply);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCRYPTING_TICKET";
goto egress;
}
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.kvno = server_key->key_data_kvno;
errcode = kdc_fast_response_handle_padata(state->rstate,
state->request,
&state->reply,
state->client_keyblock.enctype);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "fast response handling";
goto egress;
}
/* now encode/encrypt the response */
state->reply.enc_part.enctype = state->client_keyblock.enctype;
errcode = kdc_fast_handle_reply_key(state->rstate, &state->client_keyblock,
&as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "generating reply key";
goto egress;
}
errcode = return_enc_padata(kdc_context, state->req_pkt, state->request,
as_encrypting_key, state->server,
&state->reply_encpart, FALSE);
if (errcode) {
state->status = "KDC_RETURN_ENC_PADATA";
goto egress;
}
errcode = krb5_encode_kdc_rep(kdc_context, KRB5_AS_REP,
&state->reply_encpart, 0,
as_encrypting_key,
&state->reply, &response);
state->reply.enc_part.kvno = client_key->key_data_kvno;
if (errcode) {
state->status = "ENCODE_KDC_REP";
goto egress;
}
/* these parts are left on as a courtesy from krb5_encode_kdc_rep so we
can use them in raw form if needed. But, we don't... */
memset(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data, 0,
state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
log_as_req(kdc_context, state->from, state->request, &state->reply,
state->client, state->cname, state->server,
state->sname, state->authtime, 0, 0, 0);
did_log = 1;
egress:
if (errcode != 0)
assert (state->status != 0);
free_padata_context(kdc_context, state->pa_context);
if (as_encrypting_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(kdc_context, as_encrypting_key);
if (errcode)
emsg = krb5_get_error_message(kdc_context, errcode);
if (state->status) {
log_as_req(kdc_context,
state->from, state->request, &state->reply, state->client,
state->cname, state->server, state->sname, state->authtime,
state->status, errcode, emsg);
did_log = 1;
}
if (errcode) {
if (state->status == 0) {
state->status = emsg;
}
if (errcode != KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD) {
errcode -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5;
if (errcode < 0 || errcode > 128)
errcode = KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
errcode = prepare_error_as(state->rstate, state->request,
errcode, state->e_data,
state->typed_e_data,
((state->client != NULL) ?
state->client->princ : NULL),
&response, state->status);
state->status = 0;
}
}
if (emsg)
krb5_free_error_message(kdc_context, emsg);
if (state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data != NULL)
krb5_free_authdata(kdc_context,
state->enc_tkt_reply.authorization_data);
if (state->server_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->server_keyblock);
if (state->client_keyblock.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->client_keyblock);
if (state->reply.padata != NULL)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply.padata);
if (state->reply_encpart.enc_padata)
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->reply_encpart.enc_padata);
if (state->cname != NULL)
free(state->cname);
if (state->sname != NULL)
free(state->sname);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->client);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, state->server);
if (state->session_key.contents != NULL)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(kdc_context, &state->session_key);
if (state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) {
memset(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data , 0,
state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.length);
free(state->ticket_reply.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
}
krb5_free_pa_data(kdc_context, state->e_data);
krb5_free_data(kdc_context, state->inner_body);
kdc_free_rstate(state->rstate);
krb5_free_kdc_req(kdc_context, state->request);
assert(did_log != 0);
free(state);
(*oldrespond)(oldarg, errcode, response);
}
static krb5_error_code ads_secrets_verify_ticket(krb5_context context,
krb5_auth_context auth_context,
krb5_principal host_princ,
const DATA_BLOB *ticket,
krb5_ticket **pp_tkt,
krb5_keyblock **keyblock,
krb5_error_code *perr)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
bool auth_ok = False;
char *password_s = NULL;
krb5_data password;
krb5_enctype enctypes[] = {
#if defined(ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC)
ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
#endif
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5,
ENCTYPE_NULL
};
krb5_data packet;
int i;
*pp_tkt = NULL;
*keyblock = NULL;
*perr = 0;
if (!secrets_init()) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: secrets_init failed\n"));
*perr = KRB5_CONFIG_CANTOPEN;
return False;
}
password_s = secrets_fetch_machine_password(lp_workgroup(), NULL, NULL);
if (!password_s) {
DEBUG(1,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: failed to fetch machine password\n"));
*perr = KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
return False;
}
password.data = password_s;
password.length = strlen(password_s);
/* CIFS doesn't use addresses in tickets. This would break NAT. JRA */
packet.length = ticket->length;
packet.data = (char *)ticket->data;
/* We need to setup a auth context with each possible encoding type in turn. */
for (i=0;enctypes[i];i++) {
krb5_keyblock *key = NULL;
if (!(key = SMB_MALLOC_P(krb5_keyblock))) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (create_kerberos_key_from_string(context, host_princ, &password, key, enctypes[i], false)) {
SAFE_FREE(key);
continue;
}
krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey(context, auth_context, key);
if (!(ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &packet,
NULL,
NULL, NULL, pp_tkt))) {
DEBUG(10,("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] decrypted message !\n",
(unsigned int)enctypes[i] ));
auth_ok = True;
krb5_copy_keyblock(context, key, keyblock);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
break;
}
DEBUG((ret != KRB5_BAD_ENCTYPE) ? 3 : 10,
("ads_secrets_verify_ticket: enc type [%u] failed to decrypt with error %s\n",
(unsigned int)enctypes[i], error_message(ret)));
/* successfully decrypted but ticket is just not valid at the moment */
if (ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV ||
ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED ||
ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW) {
krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
break;
}
krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
}
out:
SAFE_FREE(password_s);
*perr = ret;
return auth_ok;
}
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_rd_rep(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context auth_context,
const krb5_data *inbuf, krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **repl)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_ap_rep * reply;
krb5_data scratch;
if (!krb5_is_ap_rep(inbuf))
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE;
/* decode it */
if ((retval = decode_krb5_ap_rep(inbuf, &reply)))
return retval;
/* put together an eblock for this encryption */
scratch.length = reply->enc_part.ciphertext.length;
if (!(scratch.data = malloc(scratch.length))) {
krb5_free_ap_rep(context, reply);
return(ENOMEM);
}
if ((retval = krb5_c_decrypt(context, auth_context->keyblock,
KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REP_ENCPART, 0,
&reply->enc_part, &scratch)))
goto clean_scratch;
/* now decode the decrypted stuff */
retval = decode_krb5_ap_rep_enc_part(&scratch, repl);
if (retval)
goto clean_scratch;
/* Check reply fields */
if (((*repl)->ctime != auth_context->authentp->ctime) ||
((*repl)->cusec != auth_context->authentp->cusec)) {
retval = KRB5_MUTUAL_FAILED;
goto clean_scratch;
}
/* Set auth subkey */
if ((*repl)->subkey) {
if (auth_context->recv_subkey) {
krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->recv_subkey);
auth_context->recv_subkey = NULL;
}
retval = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, (*repl)->subkey,
&auth_context->recv_subkey);
if (retval)
goto clean_scratch;
if (auth_context->send_subkey) {
krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->send_subkey);
auth_context->send_subkey = NULL;
}
retval = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, (*repl)->subkey,
&auth_context->send_subkey);
if (retval) {
krb5_free_keyblock(context, auth_context->send_subkey);
auth_context->send_subkey = NULL;
}
/* not used for anything yet */
auth_context->negotiated_etype = (*repl)->subkey->enctype;
}
/* Get remote sequence number */
auth_context->remote_seq_number = (*repl)->seq_number;
clean_scratch:
memset(scratch.data, 0, scratch.length);
krb5_free_ap_rep(context, reply);
free(scratch.data);
return retval;
}
/* Construct a cookie pa-data item using the cookie values from state, or a
* trivial "MIT" cookie if no values are set. */
krb5_error_code
kdc_fast_make_cookie(krb5_context context, struct kdc_request_state *state,
krb5_db_entry *local_tgt,
krb5_const_principal client_princ,
krb5_pa_data **cookie_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_secure_cookie cookie;
krb5_pa_data **contents = state->out_cookie_padata, *pa;
krb5_keyblock *key = NULL;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_enc_data enc;
krb5_data *der_cookie = NULL;
krb5_kvno kvno;
size_t ctlen;
*cookie_out = NULL;
memset(&enc, 0, sizeof(enc));
/* Make a trivial cookie if there are no contents to marshal or we don't
* have a TGT entry to encrypt them. */
if (contents == NULL || *contents == NULL || local_tgt == NULL)
return make_padata(KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, "MIT", 3, cookie_out);
ret = get_cookie_key(context, local_tgt, 0, client_princ, &key, &kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Encode the cookie. */
ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &now);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
cookie.time = now;
cookie.data = contents;
ret = encode_krb5_secure_cookie(&cookie, &der_cookie);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Encrypt the cookie in key. */
ret = krb5_c_encrypt_length(context, key->enctype, der_cookie->length,
&ctlen);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = alloc_data(&enc.ciphertext, ctlen);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_c_encrypt(context, key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_FX_COOKIE, NULL,
der_cookie, &enc);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Construct the cookie pa-data entry. */
ret = alloc_padata(KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE, 8 + enc.ciphertext.length, &pa);
memcpy(pa->contents, "MIT1", 4);
store_32_be(kvno, pa->contents + 4);
memcpy(pa->contents + 8, enc.ciphertext.data, enc.ciphertext.length);
*cookie_out = pa;
cleanup:
krb5_free_keyblock(context, key);
if (der_cookie != NULL) {
zapfree(der_cookie->data, der_cookie->length);
free(der_cookie);
}
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &enc.ciphertext);
return ret;
}
