/*
* send_auth_query - send the ident server a query giving "theirport , ourport"
* The write is only attempted *once* so it is deemed to be a fail if the
* entire write doesn't write all the data given. This shouldnt be a
* problem since the socket should have a write buffer far greater than
* this message to store it in should problems arise. -avalon
*/
void send_auth_query(struct AuthRequest* auth)
{
struct sockaddr_in us;
struct sockaddr_in them;
char authbuf[32];
unsigned int count;
assert(0 != auth);
assert(0 != auth->client);
if (!os_get_sockname(cli_fd(auth->client), &us) ||
!os_get_peername(cli_fd(auth->client), &them)) {
auth_error(auth, 1);
return;
}
ircd_snprintf(0, authbuf, sizeof(authbuf), "%u , %u\r\n",
(unsigned int) ntohs(them.sin_port),
(unsigned int) ntohs(us.sin_port));
if (IO_SUCCESS == os_send_nonb(auth->fd, authbuf, strlen(authbuf), &count)) {
ClearAuthConnect(auth);
SetAuthPending(auth);
}
else
auth_error(auth, 0);
}
void add_connection(struct Listener* listener, int fd, void *ssl) {
#else
void add_connection(struct Listener* listener, int fd) {
#endif
struct irc_sockaddr addr;
struct Client *new_client;
time_t next_target = 0;
#if defined(USE_SSL)
char *sslfp;
#endif
const char* const throttle_message =
"ERROR :Your host is trying to (re)connect too fast -- throttled\r\n";
/* 12345678901234567890123456789012345679012345678901234567890123456 */
const char* const register_message =
"ERROR :Unable to complete your registration\r\n";
assert(0 != listener);
/*
* Removed preliminary access check. Full check is performed in m_server and
* m_user instead. Also connection time out help to get rid of unwanted
* connections.
*/
if (!os_get_peername(fd, &addr) || !os_set_nonblocking(fd)) {
++ServerStats->is_ref;
#if defined(USE_SSL)
ssl_murder(ssl, fd, NULL);
#else
close(fd);
#endif
return;
}
/*
* Disable IP (*not* TCP) options. In particular, this makes it impossible
* to use source routing to connect to the server. If we didn't do this
* (and if intermediate networks didn't drop source-routed packets), an
* attacker could successfully IP spoof us...and even return the anti-spoof
* ping, because the options would cause the packet to be routed back to
* the spoofer's machine. When we disable the IP options, we delete the
* source route, and the normal routing takes over.
*/
os_disable_options(fd);
if (listener_server(listener))
{
new_client = make_client(0, STAT_UNKNOWN_SERVER);
}
else
{
/*
* Add this local client to the IPcheck registry.
*
* If they're throttled, murder them, but tell them why first.
*/
if (!IPcheck_local_connect(&addr.addr, &next_target))
{
++ServerStats->is_ref;
#if defined(USE_SSL)
ssl_murder(ssl, fd, throttle_message);
#else
write(fd, throttle_message, strlen(throttle_message));
close(fd);
#endif
return;
}
new_client = make_client(0, STAT_UNKNOWN_USER);
SetIPChecked(new_client);
}
/*
* Copy ascii address to 'sockhost' just in case. Then we have something
* valid to put into error messages...
*/
ircd_ntoa_r(cli_sock_ip(new_client), &addr.addr);
strcpy(cli_sockhost(new_client), cli_sock_ip(new_client));
memcpy(&cli_ip(new_client), &addr.addr, sizeof(cli_ip(new_client)));
if (next_target)
cli_nexttarget(new_client) = next_target;
cli_fd(new_client) = fd;
if (!socket_add(&(cli_socket(new_client)), client_sock_callback,
(void*) cli_connect(new_client), SS_CONNECTED, 0, fd)) {
++ServerStats->is_ref;
#if defined(USE_SSL)
ssl_murder(ssl, fd, register_message);
#else
write(fd, register_message, strlen(register_message));
close(fd);
#endif
cli_fd(new_client) = -1;
return;
}
#if defined(USE_SSL)
if (ssl) {
cli_socket(new_client).s_ssl = ssl;
sslfp = ssl_get_fingerprint(ssl);
if (sslfp)
ircd_strncpy(cli_sslclifp(new_client), sslfp, BUFSIZE+1);
}
#endif
cli_freeflag(new_client) |= FREEFLAG_SOCKET;
cli_listener(new_client) = listener;
++listener->ref_count;
Count_newunknown(UserStats);
/* if we've made it this far we can put the client on the auth query pile */
start_auth(new_client);
}
/** Determines whether to tell the events engine we're interested in
* writable events.
* @param cptr Client for which to decide this.
*/
void update_write(struct Client* cptr)
{
/* If there are messages that need to be sent along, or if the client
* is in the middle of a /list, then we need to tell the engine that
* we're interested in writable events--otherwise, we need to drop
* that interest.
*/
socket_events(&(cli_socket(cptr)),
((MsgQLength(&cli_sendQ(cptr)) || cli_listing(cptr)) ?
SOCK_ACTION_ADD : SOCK_ACTION_DEL) | SOCK_EVENT_WRITABLE);
}
/** Creates a client which has just connected to us on the given fd.
* The sockhost field is initialized with the ip# of the host.
* The client is not added to the linked list of clients, it is
* passed off to the auth handler for dns and ident queries.
* @param listener Listening socket that received the connection.
* @param fd File descriptor of new connection.
*/
void add_connection(struct Listener* listener, int fd) {
struct irc_sockaddr addr;
struct Client *new_client;
time_t next_target = 0;
const char* const throttle_message =
"ERROR :Your host is trying to (re)connect too fast -- throttled\r\n";
/* 12345678901234567890123456789012345679012345678901234567890123456 */
const char* const register_message =
"ERROR :Unable to complete your registration\r\n";
assert(0 != listener);
/*
* Removed preliminary access check. Full check is performed in m_server and
* m_user instead. Also connection time out help to get rid of unwanted
* connections.
*/
if (!os_get_peername(fd, &addr) || !os_set_nonblocking(fd)) {
++ServerStats->is_ref;
close(fd);
return;
}
/*
* Disable IP (*not* TCP) options. In particular, this makes it impossible
* to use source routing to connect to the server. If we didn't do this
* (and if intermediate networks didn't drop source-routed packets), an
* attacker could successfully IP spoof us...and even return the anti-spoof
* ping, because the options would cause the packet to be routed back to
* the spoofer's machine. When we disable the IP options, we delete the
* source route, and the normal routing takes over.
*/
os_disable_options(fd);
if (listener_server(listener))
{
new_client = make_client(0, STAT_UNKNOWN_SERVER);
}
else
{
/*
* Add this local client to the IPcheck registry.
*
* If they're throttled, murder them, but tell them why first.
*/
if (!IPcheck_local_connect(&addr.addr, &next_target))
{
++ServerStats->is_ref;
write(fd, throttle_message, strlen(throttle_message));
close(fd);
return;
}
new_client = make_client(0, STAT_UNKNOWN_USER);
SetIPChecked(new_client);
}
/*
* Copy ascii address to 'sockhost' just in case. Then we have something
* valid to put into error messages...
*/
ircd_ntoa_r(cli_sock_ip(new_client), &addr.addr);
strcpy(cli_sockhost(new_client), cli_sock_ip(new_client));
memcpy(&cli_ip(new_client), &addr.addr, sizeof(cli_ip(new_client)));
if (next_target)
cli_nexttarget(new_client) = next_target;
cli_fd(new_client) = fd;
if (!socket_add(&(cli_socket(new_client)), client_sock_callback,
(void*) cli_connect(new_client), SS_CONNECTED, 0, fd)) {
++ServerStats->is_ref;
write(fd, register_message, strlen(register_message));
close(fd);
cli_fd(new_client) = -1;
return;
}
cli_freeflag(new_client) |= FREEFLAG_SOCKET;
cli_listener(new_client) = listener;
++listener->ref_count;
Count_newunknown(UserStats);
/* if we've made it this far we can put the client on the auth query pile */
start_auth(new_client);
}
