static bool check_client_passwd(PgSocket *client, const char *passwd)
{
char md5[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
const char *correct;
PgUser *user = client->auth_user;
/* disallow empty passwords */
if (!*passwd || !*user->passwd)
return false;
switch (cf_auth_type) {
case AUTH_PLAIN:
return strcmp(user->passwd, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_CRYPT:
correct = crypt(user->passwd, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt);
return correct && strcmp(correct, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_MD5:
if (strlen(passwd) != MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
return false;
if (!isMD5(user->passwd))
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd, user->name, strlen(user->name), user->passwd);
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd + 3, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt, 4, md5);
return strcmp(md5, passwd) == 0;
}
return false;
}
static int
pg_password_sendauth(PGconn *conn, const char *password, AuthRequest areq)
{
int ret;
char *crypt_pwd = NULL;
const char *pwd_to_send;
/* Encrypt the password if needed. */
switch (areq)
{
case AUTH_REQ_MD5:
{
char *crypt_pwd2;
/* Allocate enough space for two MD5 hashes */
crypt_pwd = malloc(2 * (MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1));
if (!crypt_pwd)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
crypt_pwd2 = crypt_pwd + MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1;
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(password, conn->pguser,
strlen(conn->pguser), crypt_pwd2))
{
free(crypt_pwd);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"), conn->md5Salt,
sizeof(conn->md5Salt), crypt_pwd))
{
free(crypt_pwd);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
pwd_to_send = crypt_pwd;
break;
}
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD:
pwd_to_send = password;
break;
default:
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/* Packet has a message type as of protocol 3.0 */
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(conn->pversion) >= 3)
ret = pqPacketSend(conn, 'p', pwd_to_send, strlen(pwd_to_send) + 1);
else
ret = pqPacketSend(conn, 0, pwd_to_send, strlen(pwd_to_send) + 1);
if (crypt_pwd)
free(crypt_pwd);
return ret;
}
static void update_pool_passwd(char *conf_file, char *username, char *password)
{
struct passwd *pw;
char md5[POOL_PASSWD_LEN+1];
char pool_passwd[POOLMAXPATHLEN+1];
char dirnamebuf[POOLMAXPATHLEN+1];
char *dirp;
if (pool_init_config())
{
fprintf(stderr, "pool_init_config() failed\n\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (pool_get_config(conf_file, INIT_CONFIG))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to get configuration. Exiting...");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
strlcpy(dirnamebuf, conf_file, sizeof(dirnamebuf));
dirp = dirname(dirnamebuf);
snprintf(pool_passwd, sizeof(pool_passwd), "%s/%s",
dirp, pool_config->pool_passwd);
pool_init_pool_passwd(pool_passwd);
if (strlen(username))
{
/* generate the hash for the given username */
pg_md5_encrypt(password, username, strlen(username), md5);
pool_create_passwdent(username, md5);
}
else
{
/* get the user information from the current uid */
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (!pw)
{
fprintf(stderr, "getpwuid() failed\n\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
pg_md5_encrypt(password, pw->pw_name, strlen(pw->pw_name), md5);
pool_create_passwdent(pw->pw_name, md5);
}
pool_finish_pool_passwd();
}
/*
* PQencryptPassword -- exported routine to encrypt a password
*
* This is intended to be used by client applications that wish to send
* commands like ALTER USER joe PASSWORD 'pwd'. The password need not
* be sent in cleartext if it is encrypted on the client side. This is
* good because it ensures the cleartext password won't end up in logs,
* pg_stat displays, etc. We export the function so that clients won't
* be dependent on low-level details like whether the enceyption is MD5
* or something else.
*
* Arguments are the cleartext password, and the SQL name of the user it
* is for.
*
* Return value is a malloc'd string, or NULL if out-of-memory. The client
* may assume the string doesn't contain any special characters that would
* require escaping.
*/
char *
PQencryptPassword(const char *passwd, const char *user)
{
char *crypt_pwd;
crypt_pwd = malloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (!crypt_pwd)
return NULL;
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(passwd, user, strlen(user), crypt_pwd))
{
free(crypt_pwd);
return NULL;
}
return crypt_pwd;
}
/*
* Check MD5 authentication response, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
*
* 'shadow_pass' is the user's correct password or password hash, as stored
* in pg_authid.rolpassword.
* 'client_pass' is the response given by the remote user to the MD5 challenge.
* 'md5_salt' is the salt used in the MD5 authentication challenge.
*
* In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
* that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
*/
int
md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass,
const char *client_pass,
const char *md5_salt, int md5_salt_len,
char **logdetail)
{
int retval;
char crypt_pwd[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
Assert(md5_salt_len > 0);
if (get_password_type(shadow_pass) != PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5)
{
/* incompatible password hash format. */
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has a password that cannot be used with MD5 authentication."),
role);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Compute the correct answer for the MD5 challenge.
*
* We do not bother setting logdetail for any pg_md5_encrypt failure
* below: the only possible error is out-of-memory, which is unlikely, and
* if it did happen adding a psprintf call would only make things worse.
*/
/* stored password already encrypted, only do salt */
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass + strlen("md5"),
md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
crypt_pwd))
{
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (strcmp(client_pass, crypt_pwd) == 0)
retval = STATUS_OK;
else
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
role);
retval = STATUS_ERROR;
}
return retval;
}
/*
* Given a user-supplied password, convert it into a verifier of
* 'target_type' kind.
*
* If the password is already in encrypted form, we cannot reverse the
* hash, so it is stored as it is regardless of the requested type.
*/
char *
encrypt_password(PasswordType target_type, const char *role,
const char *password)
{
PasswordType guessed_type = get_password_type(password);
char *encrypted_password;
if (guessed_type != PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT)
{
/*
* Cannot convert an already-encrypted password from one format to
* another, so return it as it is.
*/
return pstrdup(password);
}
switch (target_type)
{
case PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5:
encrypted_password = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(password, role, strlen(role),
encrypted_password))
elog(ERROR, "password encryption failed");
return encrypted_password;
case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256:
return pg_be_scram_build_verifier(password);
case PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT:
elog(ERROR, "cannot encrypt password with 'plaintext'");
}
/*
* This shouldn't happen, because the above switch statements should
* handle every combination of source and target password types.
*/
elog(ERROR, "cannot encrypt password to requested type");
return NULL; /* keep compiler quiet */
}
/*
* Check given password for given user, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
*
* 'client_pass' is the password response given by the remote user. If
* 'md5_salt' is not NULL, it is a response to an MD5 authentication
* challenge, with the given salt. Otherwise, it is a plaintext password.
*
* In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
* that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
*/
int
md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, char *client_pass,
char *md5_salt, int md5_salt_len, char **logdetail)
{
int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
char *shadow_pass,
*crypt_pwd;
TimestampTz vuntil = 0;
char *crypt_client_pass = client_pass;
HeapTuple roleTup;
Datum datum;
bool isnull;
/* Get role info from pg_authid */
roleTup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(roleTup))
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("Role \"%s\" does not exist."),
role);
return STATUS_ERROR; /* no such user */
}
datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup,
Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword, &isnull);
if (isnull)
{
ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has no password assigned."),
role);
return STATUS_ERROR; /* user has no password */
}
shadow_pass = TextDatumGetCString(datum);
datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup,
Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil, &isnull);
if (!isnull)
vuntil = DatumGetTimestampTz(datum);
ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
if (*shadow_pass == '\0')
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has an empty password."),
role);
return STATUS_ERROR; /* empty password */
}
/*
* Compare with the encrypted or plain password depending on the
* authentication method being used for this connection. (We do not
* bother setting logdetail for pg_md5_encrypt failure: the only possible
* error is out-of-memory, which is unlikely, and if it did happen adding
* a psprintf call would only make things worse.)
*/
if (md5_salt)
{
/* MD5 authentication */
Assert(md5_salt_len > 0);
crypt_pwd = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* stored password already encrypted, only do salt */
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass + strlen("md5"),
md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
else
{
/* stored password is plain, double-encrypt */
char *crypt_pwd2 = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass,
role,
strlen(role),
crypt_pwd2))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"),
md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
}
}
else
{
/* Client sent password in plaintext */
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* Encrypt user-supplied password to match stored MD5 */
crypt_client_pass = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(client_pass,
role,
strlen(role),
crypt_client_pass))
{
pfree(crypt_client_pass);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
crypt_pwd = shadow_pass;
}
if (strcmp(crypt_client_pass, crypt_pwd) == 0)
{
/*
* Password OK, now check to be sure we are not past rolvaliduntil
*/
if (isnull)
retval = STATUS_OK;
else if (vuntil < GetCurrentTimestamp())
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has an expired password."),
role);
retval = STATUS_ERROR;
}
else
retval = STATUS_OK;
}
else
*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
role);
if (crypt_pwd != shadow_pass)
pfree(crypt_pwd);
if (crypt_client_pass != client_pass)
pfree(crypt_client_pass);
return retval;
}
/*
* Check given password for given user, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
* In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
* that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
*/
int
md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *role, char *client_pass,
char **logdetail)
{
int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
char *shadow_pass,
*crypt_pwd;
TimestampTz vuntil = 0;
char *crypt_client_pass = client_pass;
HeapTuple roleTup;
Datum datum;
bool isnull;
/*
* Disable immediate interrupts while doing database access. (Note we
* don't bother to turn this back on if we hit one of the failure
* conditions, since we can expect we'll just exit right away anyway.)
*/
ImmediateInterruptOK = false;
/* Get role info from pg_authid */
roleTup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(roleTup))
return STATUS_ERROR; /* no such user */
datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup,
Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword, &isnull);
if (isnull)
{
ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has no password assigned."),
role);
return STATUS_ERROR; /* user has no password */
}
shadow_pass = TextDatumGetCString(datum);
datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup,
Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil, &isnull);
if (!isnull)
vuntil = DatumGetTimestampTz(datum);
ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
if (*shadow_pass == '\0')
return STATUS_ERROR; /* empty password */
/* Re-enable immediate response to SIGTERM/SIGINT/timeout interrupts */
ImmediateInterruptOK = true;
/* And don't forget to detect one that already arrived */
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
/*
* Compare with the encrypted or plain password depending on the
* authentication method being used for this connection.
*/
switch (port->hba->auth_method)
{
case uaMD5:
crypt_pwd = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* stored password already encrypted, only do salt */
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass + strlen("md5"),
port->md5Salt,
sizeof(port->md5Salt), crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
else
{
/* stored password is plain, double-encrypt */
char *crypt_pwd2 = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass,
port->user_name,
strlen(port->user_name),
crypt_pwd2))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"),
port->md5Salt,
sizeof(port->md5Salt),
crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
}
break;
default:
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* Encrypt user-supplied password to match stored MD5 */
crypt_client_pass = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(client_pass,
port->user_name,
strlen(port->user_name),
crypt_client_pass))
{
pfree(crypt_client_pass);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
crypt_pwd = shadow_pass;
break;
}
if (strcmp(crypt_client_pass, crypt_pwd) == 0)
{
/*
* Password OK, now check to be sure we are not past rolvaliduntil
*/
if (isnull)
retval = STATUS_OK;
else if (vuntil < GetCurrentTimestamp())
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has an expired password."),
role);
retval = STATUS_ERROR;
}
else
retval = STATUS_OK;
}
if (port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5)
pfree(crypt_pwd);
if (crypt_client_pass != client_pass)
pfree(crypt_client_pass);
return retval;
}
/*
* check_password
*
* performs checks on an encrypted or unencrypted password
* ereport's if not acceptable
*
* username: name of role being created or changed
* password: new password (possibly already encrypted)
* password_type: PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT or PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5 (there
* could be other encryption schemes in future)
* validuntil_time: password expiration time, as a timestamptz Datum
* validuntil_null: true if password expiration time is NULL
*
* This sample implementation doesn't pay any attention to the password
* expiration time, but you might wish to insist that it be non-null and
* not too far in the future.
*/
static void
check_password(const char *username,
const char *password,
int password_type,
Datum validuntil_time,
bool validuntil_null)
{
int namelen = strlen(username);
int pwdlen = strlen(password);
char encrypted[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
int i;
bool pwd_has_letter,
pwd_has_nonletter;
switch (password_type)
{
case PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5:
/*
* Unfortunately we cannot perform exhaustive checks on encrypted
* passwords - we are restricted to guessing. (Alternatively, we
* could insist on the password being presented non-encrypted, but
* that has its own security disadvantages.)
*
* We only check for username = password.
*/
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(username, username, namelen, encrypted))
elog(ERROR, "password encryption failed");
if (strcmp(password, encrypted) == 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("password must not contain user name")));
break;
case PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT:
/*
* For unencrypted passwords we can perform better checks
*/
/* enforce minimum length */
if (pwdlen < MIN_PWD_LENGTH)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("password is too short")));
/* check if the password contains the username */
if (strstr(password, username))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("password must not contain user name")));
/* check if the password contains both letters and non-letters */
pwd_has_letter = false;
pwd_has_nonletter = false;
for (i = 0; i < pwdlen; i++)
{
/*
* isalpha() does not work for multibyte encodings but let's
* consider non-ASCII characters non-letters
*/
if (isalpha((unsigned char) password[i]))
pwd_has_letter = true;
else
pwd_has_nonletter = true;
}
if (!pwd_has_letter || !pwd_has_nonletter)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("password must contain both letters and nonletters")));
#ifdef USE_CRACKLIB
/* call cracklib to check password */
if (FascistCheck(password, CRACKLIB_DICTPATH))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("password is easily cracked")));
#endif
break;
default:
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized password type: %d", password_type);
break;
}
/* all checks passed, password is ok */
}
/*
* Check given password for given user, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
* In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
* that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
*/
int
md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *role, char *client_pass,
char **logdetail)
{
int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
char *shadow_pass,
*crypt_pwd;
TimestampTz vuntil = 0;
char *crypt_client_pass = client_pass;
HeapTuple roleTup;
Datum datum;
bool isnull;
/* Get role info from pg_authid */
roleTup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(roleTup))
return STATUS_ERROR; /* no such user */
datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup,
Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword, &isnull);
if (isnull)
{
ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has no password assigned."),
role);
return STATUS_ERROR; /* user has no password */
}
shadow_pass = TextDatumGetCString(datum);
datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup,
Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil, &isnull);
if (!isnull)
vuntil = DatumGetTimestampTz(datum);
ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
if (*shadow_pass == '\0')
return STATUS_ERROR; /* empty password */
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
/*
* Compare with the encrypted or plain password depending on the
* authentication method being used for this connection.
*/
switch (port->hba->auth_method)
{
case uaMD5:
crypt_pwd = static_cast<char *>(palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1));
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* stored password already encrypted, only do salt */
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass + strlen("md5"),
port->md5Salt,
sizeof(port->md5Salt), crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
else
{
/* stored password is plain, double-encrypt */
char *crypt_pwd2 = static_cast<char *>(palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1));
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass,
port->user_name,
strlen(port->user_name),
crypt_pwd2))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"),
port->md5Salt,
sizeof(port->md5Salt),
crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
}
break;
default:
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* Encrypt user-supplied password to match stored MD5 */
crypt_client_pass = static_cast<char *>(palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1));
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(client_pass,
port->user_name,
strlen(port->user_name),
crypt_client_pass))
{
pfree(crypt_client_pass);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
crypt_pwd = shadow_pass;
break;
}
if (strcmp(crypt_client_pass, crypt_pwd) == 0)
{
/*
* Password OK, now check to be sure we are not past rolvaliduntil
*/
if (isnull)
retval = STATUS_OK;
else if (vuntil < GetCurrentTimestamp())
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has an expired password."),
role);
retval = STATUS_ERROR;
}
else
retval = STATUS_OK;
}
if (port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5)
pfree(crypt_pwd);
if (crypt_client_pass != client_pass)
pfree(crypt_client_pass);
return retval;
}
static int
pg_password_sendauth(PGconn *conn, const char *password, AuthRequest areq)
{
int ret;
char *crypt_pwd;
/* Encrypt the password if needed. */
switch (areq)
{
case AUTH_REQ_MD5:
{
char *crypt_pwd2;
/* Allocate enough space for two MD5 hashes */
crypt_pwd = malloc(2 * (MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1));
if (!crypt_pwd)
{
fprintf(stderr, libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
crypt_pwd2 = crypt_pwd + MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1;
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(password, conn->pguser,
strlen(conn->pguser), crypt_pwd2))
{
free(crypt_pwd);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"), conn->md5Salt,
sizeof(conn->md5Salt), crypt_pwd))
{
free(crypt_pwd);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
break;
}
case AUTH_REQ_CRYPT:
{
char salt[3];
StrNCpy(salt, conn->cryptSalt, 3);
crypt_pwd = crypt(password, salt);
break;
}
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD:
/* discard const so we can assign it */
crypt_pwd = (char *) password;
break;
default:
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/* Packet has a message type as of protocol 3.0 */
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(conn->pversion) >= 3)
ret = pqPacketSend(conn, 'p', crypt_pwd, strlen(crypt_pwd) + 1);
else
ret = pqPacketSend(conn, 0, crypt_pwd, strlen(crypt_pwd) + 1);
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
free(crypt_pwd);
return ret;
}
/*
* Check given password for given user, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
*
* 'shadow_pass' is the user's correct password hash, as stored in
* pg_authid.rolpassword.
* 'client_pass' is the password given by the remote user.
*
* In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
* that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
*/
int
plain_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass,
const char *client_pass,
char **logdetail)
{
char crypt_client_pass[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
/*
* Client sent password in plaintext. If we have an MD5 hash stored, hash
* the password the client sent, and compare the hashes. Otherwise
* compare the plaintext passwords directly.
*/
switch (get_password_type(shadow_pass))
{
case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256:
if (scram_verify_plain_password(role,
client_pass,
shadow_pass))
{
return STATUS_OK;
}
else
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
role);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
break;
case PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5:
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(client_pass,
role,
strlen(role),
crypt_client_pass))
{
/*
* We do not bother setting logdetail for pg_md5_encrypt
* failure: the only possible error is out-of-memory, which is
* unlikely, and if it did happen adding a psprintf call would
* only make things worse.
*/
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (strcmp(crypt_client_pass, shadow_pass) == 0)
return STATUS_OK;
else
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
role);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
break;
case PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT:
/*
* We never store passwords in plaintext, so this shouldn't
* happen.
*/
break;
}
/*
* This shouldn't happen. Plain "password" authentication is possible
* with any kind of stored password hash.
*/
*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password of user \"%s\" is in unrecognized format."),
role);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
