/*
* Initialize the EL3 exception handling.
*/
void ehf_init(void)
{
unsigned int flags = 0;
int ret __unused;
/* Ensure EL3 interrupts are supported */
assert(plat_ic_has_interrupt_type(INTR_TYPE_EL3));
/*
* Make sure that priority water mark has enough bits to represent the
* whole priority array.
*/
assert(exception_data.num_priorities <= (sizeof(ehf_pri_bits_t) * 8));
assert(exception_data.ehf_priorities);
/*
* Bit 7 of GIC priority must be 0 for secure interrupts. This means
* platforms must use at least 1 of the remaining 7 bits.
*/
assert((exception_data.pri_bits >= 1) || (exception_data.pri_bits < 8));
/* Route EL3 interrupts when in Secure and Non-secure. */
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);
/* Register handler for EL3 interrupts */
ret = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_EL3,
ehf_el3_interrupt_handler, flags);
assert(ret == 0);
}
void mvebu_pmu_interrupt_enable(void)
{
unsigned int idx;
uint32_t flags;
int32_t rc;
/* Reset PIC */
mmio_write_32(A7K8K_PIC_CAUSE_REG, A7K8K_PIC_MAX_IRQ_MASK);
/* Unmask PMU overflow IRQ in PIC0 */
mmio_clrbits_32(A7K8K_PIC0_MASK_REG, A7K8K_PIC_PMUOF_IRQ_MASK);
/* Configure ODMI Frame IRQs as edge triggered */
for (idx = 0; idx < PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT; idx++)
gicv2_interrupt_set_cfg(A7K8K_ODMI_PMU_GIC_IRQ(idx),
GIC_INTR_CFG_EDGE);
/*
* Register IRQ handler as INTR_TYPE_S_EL1 as its the only valid type
* for GICv2 in ARM-TF.
*/
flags = 0U;
set_interrupt_rm_flag((flags), (NON_SECURE));
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
a7k8k_pmu_interrupt_handler,
flags);
if (rc != 0)
panic();
}
void bl31_plat_runtime_setup(void)
{
uint64_t flags = 0;
uint64_t rc;
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_EL3,
rdo_el3_interrupt_handler, flags);
if (rc)
panic();
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first
* time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure
* context has already been created by fiqd_setup() which can be directly used.
* It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI
* so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function
* performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control
* back to this routine through a SMC.
******************************************************************************/
int32_t fiqd_init(void)
{
uint32_t flags;
uint64_t rc;
/*
* Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts when generated
* during code executing in the non-secure state.
*/
flags = 0;
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
fiqd_sel1_interrupt_handler,
flags);
if (rc)
panic();
return rc;
}
void configure_tbase(uint64_t x1, uint64_t x2)
{
uint32_t w1 = maskSWdRegister(x1);
DBG_PRINTF( "tbase_fastcall_handler TBASE_SMC_FASTCALL_CONFIG_OK\n\r");
if (TBASE_SMC_FASTCALL_CONFIG_VECTOR==w1) {
tbaseEntryBase = maskSWdRegister(x2);
tbaseInitStatus = TBASE_INIT_CONFIG_OK;
DBG_PRINTF("tbase config ok %llx %x\n\r", tbaseEntryBase, tbaseInitStatus);
// Register an FIQ handler when executing in the non-secure state.
uint32_t flags = 0;
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
uint32_t rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
tbase_fiq_handler,
flags);
if (rc!=0) {
DBG_PRINTF( "tbase_fastcall_setup FIQ register failed.\n\r");
}
} else { // Just to keep compatibility for a minute
tbaseEntryBase = w1;
tbaseInitStatus = TBASE_INIT_CONFIG_OK;
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
* range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention
* Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload
* to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it
* will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the
* work assigned to it.
******************************************************************************/
uint64_t tspd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
uint64_t x1,
uint64_t x2,
uint64_t x3,
uint64_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
uint64_t flags)
{
cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos(), ns;
tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
uint64_t rc;
#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC
entry_point_info_t *next_image_info;
#endif
/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
switch (smc_fid) {
/*
* This function ID is used by TSP to indicate that it was
* preempted by a normal world IRQ.
*
*/
case TSP_PREEMPTED:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
return tspd_handle_sp_preemption(handle);
/*
* This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it has
* finished handling a S-EL1 FIQ interrupt. Execution should resume
* in the normal world.
*/
case TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_FIQ:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/*
* Restore the relevant EL3 state which saved to service
* this SMC.
*/
if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) {
SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
CTX_SPSR_EL3,
tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3);
SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
CTX_ELR_EL3,
tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3);
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Need to restore the previously interrupted
* secure context.
*/
memcpy(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, &tsp_ctx->sp_ctx,
TSPD_SP_CTX_SIZE);
#endif
}
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/*
* Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
* secure system register context since the TSP was supposed
* to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context);
/*
* This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it was
* interrupted due to a EL3 FIQ interrupt. Execution should resume
* in the normal world.
*/
case TSP_EL3_FIQ:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/* Assert that standard SMC execution has been preempted */
assert(get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state));
/* Save the secure system register state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/* Restore non-secure state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, TSP_EL3_FIQ);
/*
* This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished initialising itself after a cold boot
*/
case TSP_ENTRY_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* Stash the SP entry points information. This is done
* only once on the primary cpu
*/
assert(tsp_vectors == NULL);
tsp_vectors = (tsp_vectors_t *) x1;
if (tsp_vectors) {
set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON);
/*
* TSP has been successfully initialized. Register power
* managemnt hooks with PSCI
*/
psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tspd_pm);
/*
* Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts
* when generated during code executing in the
* non-secure state.
*/
flags = 0;
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler,
flags);
if (rc)
panic();
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Register an interrupt handler for NS interrupts when
* generated during code executing in secure state are
* routed to EL3.
*/
flags = 0;
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_NS,
tspd_ns_interrupt_handler,
flags);
if (rc)
panic();
/*
* Disable the interrupt NS locally since it will be enabled globally
* within cm_init_my_context.
*/
disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);
#endif
}
#if TSP_INIT_ASYNC
/* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */
assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Program EL3 registers to enable entry into the next EL */
next_image_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(NON_SECURE);
assert(next_image_info);
assert(NON_SECURE ==
GET_SECURITY_STATE(next_image_info->h.attr));
cm_init_my_context(next_image_info);
cm_prepare_el3_exit(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET0(cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
#else
/*
* SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated
* the original request through a synchronous entry
* into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime
* context.
*/
tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
#endif
/*
* These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished:
* 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci
* cpu_on request
* 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
*/
case TSP_ON_DONE:
case TSP_RESUME_DONE:
/*
* These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished:
* 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
* 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci
* cpu_off request.
*/
case TSP_OFF_DONE:
case TSP_SUSPEND_DONE:
case TSP_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE:
case TSP_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
/*
* SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated the
* original request through a synchronous entry into the SP.
* Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as
* return value to the caller
*/
tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
/*
* Request from non-secure client to perform an
* arithmetic operation or response from secure
* payload to an earlier request.
*/
case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_ADD):
case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_SUB):
case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_MUL):
case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_DIV):
case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_ADD):
case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_SUB):
case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_MUL):
case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_DIV):
if (ns) {
/*
* This is a fresh request from the non-secure client.
* The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which
* registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure
* state and send the request to the secure payload.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/* Check if we are already preempted */
if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state))
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/* Save x1 and x2 for use by TSP_GET_ARGS call below */
store_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2);
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* secure payload to do the work now.
*/
/*
* Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the
* operation type and parameters to the secure context
* and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure
* payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit
* from this function.
*/
assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/* Set appropriate entry for SMC.
* We expect the TSP to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F
* flags as appropriate.
*/
if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) {
cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
&tsp_vectors->fast_smc_entry);
} else {
set_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state);
cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
&tsp_vectors->std_smc_entry);
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Enable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3
* during STD SMC processing on this core.
*/
enable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);
#endif
}
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
SMC_RET3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2);
} else {
/*
* This is the result from the secure client of an
* earlier request. The results are in x1-x3. Copy it
* into the non-secure context, save the secure state
* and return to the non-secure state.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/* Restore non-secure state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_STD) {
clr_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state);
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Disable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3
* after STD SMC processing is finished on this
* core.
*/
disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);
#endif
}
SMC_RET3(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3);
}
break;
/*
* Request from non secure world to resume the preempted
* Standard SMC call.
*/
case TSP_FID_RESUME:
/* RESUME should be invoked only by normal world */
if (!ns) {
assert(0);
break;
}
/*
* This is a resume request from the non-secure client.
* save the non-secure state and send the request to
* the secure payload.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
/* Check if we are already preempted before resume */
if (!get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state))
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* secure payload to do the work now.
*/
#if TSPD_ROUTE_IRQ_TO_EL3
/*
* Enable the routing of NS interrupts to EL3 during resumption
* of STD SMC call on this core.
*/
enable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);
#endif
/* We just need to return to the preempted point in
* TSP and the execution will resume as normal.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
SMC_RET0(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
/*
* This is a request from the secure payload for more arguments
* for an ongoing arithmetic operation requested by the
* non-secure world. Simply return the arguments from the non-
* secure client in the original call.
*/
case TSP_GET_ARGS:
if (ns)
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
get_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2);
SMC_RET2(handle, x1, x2);
case TOS_CALL_COUNT:
/*
* Return the number of service function IDs implemented to
* provide service to non-secure
*/
SMC_RET1(handle, TSP_NUM_FID);
case TOS_UID:
/* Return TSP UID to the caller */
SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tsp_uuid);
case TOS_CALL_VERSION:
/* Return the version of current implementation */
SMC_RET2(handle, TSP_VERSION_MAJOR, TSP_VERSION_MINOR);
default:
break;
}
SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
}
/*******************************************************************************
* This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
* range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention
* Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure
* payload to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure
* state. Lastly it will also return any information that OPTEE needs to do
* the work assigned to it.
******************************************************************************/
uint64_t opteed_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
uint64_t x1,
uint64_t x2,
uint64_t x3,
uint64_t x4,
void *cookie,
void *handle,
uint64_t flags)
{
cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
unsigned long mpidr = read_mpidr();
uint32_t linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr);
optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id];
uint64_t rc;
/*
* Determine which security state this SMC originated from
*/
if (is_caller_non_secure(flags)) {
/*
* This is a fresh request from the non-secure client.
* The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which
* registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure
* state and send the request to the secure payload.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
/*
* We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
* OPTEE to do the work now.
*/
/*
* Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the
* operation type and parameters to the secure context
* and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure
* payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit
* from this function.
*/
assert(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
/* Set appropriate entry for SMC.
* We expect OPTEE to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F
* flags as appropriate.
*/
if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) {
cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
&optee_vectors->fast_smc_entry);
} else {
cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
&optee_vectors->std_smc_entry);
}
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
/* Propagate hypervisor client ID */
write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx),
CTX_GPREG_X7,
read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle),
CTX_GPREG_X7));
SMC_RET4(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2, x3);
}
/*
* Returning from OPTEE
*/
switch (smc_fid) {
/*
* OPTEE has finished initialising itself after a cold boot
*/
case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE:
/*
* Stash the OPTEE entry points information. This is done
* only once on the primary cpu
*/
assert(optee_vectors == NULL);
optee_vectors = (optee_vectors_t *) x1;
if (optee_vectors) {
set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_ON);
/*
* OPTEE has been successfully initialized.
* Register power management hooks with PSCI
*/
psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&opteed_pm);
/*
* Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts
* when generated during code executing in the
* non-secure state.
*/
flags = 0;
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler,
flags);
if (rc)
panic();
}
/*
* OPTEE reports completion. The OPTEED must have initiated
* the original request through a synchronous entry into
* OPTEE. Jump back to the original C runtime context.
*/
opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_ctx, x1);
/*
* These function IDs is used only by OP-TEE to indicate it has
* finished:
* 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci
* cpu_on request
* 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
*/
case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ON_DONE:
case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_RESUME_DONE:
/*
* These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
* finished:
* 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
* request.
* 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci
* cpu_off request.
*/
case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_OFF_DONE:
case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE:
case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE:
case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE:
/*
* OPTEE reports completion. The OPTEED must have initiated the
* original request through a synchronous entry into OPTEE.
* Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as
* return value to the caller
*/
opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_ctx, x1);
/*
* OPTEE is returning from a call or being preempted from a call, in
* either case execution should resume in the normal world.
*/
case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_CALL_DONE:
/*
* This is the result from the secure client of an
* earlier request. The results are in x0-x3. Copy it
* into the non-secure context, save the secure state
* and return to the non-secure state.
*/
assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/* Restore non-secure state */
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET4(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3, x4);
/*
* OPTEE has finished handling a S-EL1 FIQ interrupt. Execution
* should resume in the normal world.
*/
case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_FIQ_DONE:
/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
assert(ns_cpu_context);
/*
* Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
* secure system register context since OPTEE was supposed
* to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
*/
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context);
default:
panic();
}
}
/*******************************************************************************
* Initialize contexts of all Secure Partitions.
******************************************************************************/
int32_t spm_setup(void)
{
int rc;
sp_context_t *ctx;
void *sp_base, *rd_base;
size_t sp_size, rd_size;
uint64_t flags = 0U;
/* Disable MMU at EL1 (initialized by BL2) */
disable_mmu_icache_el1();
/*
* Non-blocking services can be interrupted by Non-secure interrupts.
* Register an interrupt handler for NS interrupts when generated while
* the CPU is in secure state. They are routed to EL3.
*/
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);
uint64_t rc_int = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_NS,
spm_ns_interrupt_handler, flags);
if (rc_int) {
ERROR("SPM: Failed to register NS interrupt handler with rc = %llx\n",
rc_int);
panic();
}
/* Setup shim layer */
spm_exceptions_xlat_init_context();
/*
* Setup all Secure Partitions.
*/
unsigned int i = 0U;
while (1) {
rc = plat_spm_sp_get_next_address(&sp_base, &sp_size,
&rd_base, &rd_size);
if (rc < 0) {
/* Reached the end of the package. */
break;
}
if (i >= PLAT_SPM_MAX_PARTITIONS) {
ERROR("Too many partitions in the package.\n");
panic();
}
ctx = &sp_ctx_array[i];
assert(ctx->is_present == 0);
/* Initialize context of the SP */
INFO("Secure Partition %u context setup start...\n", i);
/* Save location of the image in physical memory */
ctx->image_base = (uintptr_t)sp_base;
ctx->image_size = sp_size;
rc = plat_spm_sp_rd_load(&ctx->rd, rd_base, rd_size);
if (rc < 0) {
ERROR("Error while loading RD blob.\n");
panic();
}
spm_sp_setup(ctx);
ctx->is_present = 1;
INFO("Secure Partition %u setup done.\n", i);
i++;
}
if (i == 0U) {
ERROR("No present partitions in the package.\n");
panic();
}
/* Register init function for deferred init. */
bl31_register_bl32_init(&spm_init);
return 0;
}
