int s2n_stuffer_resize(struct s2n_stuffer *stuffer, const uint32_t size)
{
if (stuffer->growable == 0) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_RESIZE_STATIC_STUFFER);
}
if (stuffer->tainted == 1) {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_RESIZE_TAINTED_STUFFER);
}
if (size == stuffer->blob.size) {
return 0;
}
if (size < stuffer->blob.size) {
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_wipe_n(stuffer, stuffer->blob.size - size));
}
GUARD(s2n_realloc(&stuffer->blob, size));
stuffer->blob.size = size;
return 0;
}
int s2n_record_write(struct s2n_connection *conn, uint8_t content_type, struct s2n_blob *in)
{
struct s2n_blob out, iv, aad;
uint8_t padding = 0;
uint16_t block_size = 0;
uint8_t aad_gen[S2N_TLS_MAX_AAD_LEN] = { 0 };
uint8_t aad_iv[S2N_TLS_MAX_IV_LEN] = { 0 };
uint8_t *sequence_number = conn->server->server_sequence_number;
struct s2n_hmac_state *mac = &conn->server->server_record_mac;
struct s2n_session_key *session_key = &conn->server->server_key;
const struct s2n_cipher_suite *cipher_suite = conn->server->cipher_suite;
uint8_t *implicit_iv = conn->server->server_implicit_iv;
if (conn->mode == S2N_CLIENT) {
sequence_number = conn->client->client_sequence_number;
mac = &conn->client->client_record_mac;
session_key = &conn->client->client_key;
cipher_suite = conn->client->cipher_suite;
implicit_iv = conn->client->client_implicit_iv;
}
S2N_ERROR_IF(s2n_stuffer_data_available(&conn->out), S2N_ERR_BAD_MESSAGE);
uint8_t mac_digest_size;
GUARD(s2n_hmac_digest_size(mac->alg, &mac_digest_size));
/* Before we do anything, we need to figure out what the length of the
* fragment is going to be.
*/
uint16_t data_bytes_to_take = MIN(in->size, s2n_record_max_write_payload_size(conn));
uint16_t extra = overhead(conn);
/* If we have padding to worry about, figure that out too */
if (cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type == S2N_CBC) {
block_size = cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.cbc.block_size;
if (((data_bytes_to_take + extra) % block_size)) {
padding = block_size - ((data_bytes_to_take + extra) % block_size);
}
} else if (cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type == S2N_COMPOSITE) {
block_size = cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.comp.block_size;
}
/* Start the MAC with the sequence number */
GUARD(s2n_hmac_update(mac, sequence_number, S2N_TLS_SEQUENCE_NUM_LEN));
/* Now that we know the length, start writing the record */
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint8(&conn->out, content_type));
GUARD(s2n_record_write_protocol_version(conn));
/* First write a header that has the payload length, this is for the MAC */
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint16(&conn->out, data_bytes_to_take));
if (conn->actual_protocol_version > S2N_SSLv3) {
GUARD(s2n_hmac_update(mac, conn->out.blob.data, S2N_TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH));
} else {
/* SSLv3 doesn't include the protocol version in the MAC */
GUARD(s2n_hmac_update(mac, conn->out.blob.data, 1));
GUARD(s2n_hmac_update(mac, conn->out.blob.data + 3, 2));
}
/* Compute non-payload parts of the MAC(seq num, type, proto vers, fragment length) for composite ciphers.
* Composite "encrypt" will MAC the payload data and fill in padding.
*/
if (cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type == S2N_COMPOSITE) {
/* Only fragment length is needed for MAC, but the EVP ctrl function needs fragment length + eiv len. */
uint16_t payload_and_eiv_len = data_bytes_to_take;
if (conn->actual_protocol_version > S2N_TLS10) {
payload_and_eiv_len += block_size;
}
/* Outputs number of extra bytes required for MAC and padding */
int pad_and_mac_len;
GUARD(cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.comp.initial_hmac(session_key, sequence_number, content_type, conn->actual_protocol_version,
payload_and_eiv_len, &pad_and_mac_len));
extra += pad_and_mac_len;
}
/* Rewrite the length to be the actual fragment length */
uint16_t actual_fragment_length = data_bytes_to_take + padding + extra;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_wipe_n(&conn->out, 2));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint16(&conn->out, actual_fragment_length));
/* If we're AEAD, write the sequence number as an IV, and generate the AAD */
if (cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type == S2N_AEAD) {
struct s2n_stuffer iv_stuffer = {{0}};
iv.data = aad_iv;
iv.size = sizeof(aad_iv);
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init(&iv_stuffer, &iv));
if (cipher_suite->record_alg->flags & S2N_TLS12_AES_GCM_AEAD_NONCE) {
/* Partially explicit nonce. See RFC 5288 Section 3 */
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_bytes(&conn->out, sequence_number, S2N_TLS_SEQUENCE_NUM_LEN));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_bytes(&iv_stuffer, implicit_iv, cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.aead.fixed_iv_size));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_bytes(&iv_stuffer, sequence_number, S2N_TLS_SEQUENCE_NUM_LEN));
} else if (cipher_suite->record_alg->flags & S2N_TLS12_CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_NONCE) {
/* Fully implicit nonce. See RFC7905 Section 2 */
uint8_t four_zeroes[4] = { 0 };
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_bytes(&iv_stuffer, four_zeroes, 4));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_bytes(&iv_stuffer, sequence_number, S2N_TLS_SEQUENCE_NUM_LEN));
for(int i = 0; i < cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.aead.fixed_iv_size; i++) {
aad_iv[i] = aad_iv[i] ^ implicit_iv[i];
}
} else {
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_INVALID_NONCE_TYPE);
}
/* Set the IV size to the amount of data written */
iv.size = s2n_stuffer_data_available(&iv_stuffer);
aad.data = aad_gen;
aad.size = sizeof(aad_gen);
struct s2n_stuffer ad_stuffer = {{0}};
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_init(&ad_stuffer, &aad));
GUARD(s2n_aead_aad_init(conn, sequence_number, content_type, data_bytes_to_take, &ad_stuffer));
} else if (cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type == S2N_CBC || cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type == S2N_COMPOSITE) {
iv.size = block_size;
iv.data = implicit_iv;
/* For TLS1.1/1.2; write the IV with random data */
if (conn->actual_protocol_version > S2N_TLS10) {
GUARD(s2n_get_public_random_data(&iv));
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write(&conn->out, &iv));
}
}
/* We are done with this sequence number, so we can increment it */
struct s2n_blob seq = {.data = sequence_number,.size = S2N_TLS_SEQUENCE_NUM_LEN };
GUARD(s2n_increment_sequence_number(&seq));
/* Write the plaintext data */
out.data = in->data;
out.size = data_bytes_to_take;
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write(&conn->out, &out));
GUARD(s2n_hmac_update(mac, out.data, out.size));
/* Write the digest */
uint8_t *digest = s2n_stuffer_raw_write(&conn->out, mac_digest_size);
notnull_check(digest);
GUARD(s2n_hmac_digest(mac, digest, mac_digest_size));
GUARD(s2n_hmac_reset(mac));
if (cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type == S2N_CBC) {
/* Include padding bytes, each with the value 'p', and
* include an extra padding length byte, also with the value 'p'.
*/
for (int i = 0; i <= padding; i++) {
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_write_uint8(&conn->out, padding));
}
}
/* Rewind to rewrite/encrypt the packet */
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_rewrite(&conn->out));
/* Skip the header */
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_skip_write(&conn->out, S2N_TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH));
uint16_t encrypted_length = data_bytes_to_take + mac_digest_size;
switch (cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type) {
case S2N_AEAD:
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_skip_write(&conn->out, cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.aead.record_iv_size));
encrypted_length += cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.aead.tag_size;
break;
case S2N_CBC:
if (conn->actual_protocol_version > S2N_TLS10) {
/* Leave the IV alone and unencrypted */
GUARD(s2n_stuffer_skip_write(&conn->out, iv.size));
}
/* Encrypt the padding and the padding length byte too */
encrypted_length += padding + 1;
break;
case S2N_COMPOSITE:
/* Composite CBC expects a pointer starting at explicit IV: [Explicit IV | fragment | MAC | padding | padding len ]
* extra will account for the explicit IV len(if applicable), MAC digest len, padding len + padding byte.
*/
encrypted_length += extra;
break;
default:
break;
}
/* Do the encryption */
struct s2n_blob en = {0};
en.size = encrypted_length;
en.data = s2n_stuffer_raw_write(&conn->out, en.size);
notnull_check(en.data);
switch (cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->type) {
case S2N_STREAM:
GUARD(cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.stream.encrypt(session_key, &en, &en));
break;
case S2N_CBC:
GUARD(cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.cbc.encrypt(session_key, &iv, &en, &en));
/* Copy the last encrypted block to be the next IV */
if (conn->actual_protocol_version < S2N_TLS11) {
gte_check(en.size, block_size);
memcpy_check(implicit_iv, en.data + en.size - block_size, block_size);
}
break;
case S2N_AEAD:
GUARD(cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.aead.encrypt(session_key, &iv, &aad, &en, &en));
break;
case S2N_COMPOSITE:
/* This will: compute mac, append padding, append padding length, and encrypt */
GUARD(cipher_suite->record_alg->cipher->io.comp.encrypt(session_key, &iv, &en, &en));
/* Copy the last encrypted block to be the next IV */
gte_check(en.size, block_size);
memcpy_check(implicit_iv, en.data + en.size - block_size, block_size);
break;
default:
S2N_ERROR(S2N_ERR_CIPHER_TYPE);
break;
}
conn->wire_bytes_out += actual_fragment_length + S2N_TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH;
return data_bytes_to_take;
}
int s2n_stuffer_wipe(struct s2n_stuffer *stuffer)
{
stuffer->tainted = 0;
return s2n_stuffer_wipe_n(stuffer, stuffer->write_cursor);
}