/**
* get_asymetric_start_key - GetAsymetricStartKey() - RFC 3079, Sect. 3.4
* @master_key: 16-octet MasterKey (IN)
* @session_key: 8-to-16 octet SessionKey (OUT)
* @session_key_len: SessionKeyLength (Length of session_key) (IN)
* @is_send: IsSend (IN, BOOLEAN)
* @is_server: IsServer (IN, BOOLEAN)
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
int get_asymetric_start_key(const u8 *master_key, u8 *session_key,
size_t session_key_len, int is_send,
int is_server)
{
static const u8 magic2[84] = {
0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79,
0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73,
0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65,
0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e
};
static const u8 magic3[84] = {
0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73,
0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73,
0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20,
0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e
};
static const u8 shs_pad1[40] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
};
static const u8 shs_pad2[40] = {
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2
};
u8 digest[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
const unsigned char *addr[4];
const size_t len[4] = { 16, 40, 84, 40 };
addr[0] = master_key;
addr[1] = shs_pad1;
if (is_send) {
addr[2] = is_server ? magic3 : magic2;
} else {
addr[2] = is_server ? magic2 : magic3;
}
addr[3] = shs_pad2;
if (sha1_vector(4, addr, len, digest))
return -1;
if (session_key_len > SHA1_MAC_LEN)
session_key_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
os_memcpy(session_key, digest, session_key_len);
return 0;
}
static void eap_aka_add_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data,
struct eap_sim_msg *msg)
{
const u8 *addr;
size_t len;
u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_CHECKCODE");
if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
/*
* No EAP-AKA/Identity packets were exchanged - send empty
* checkcode.
*/
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, NULL, 0);
return;
}
/* Checkcode is SHA1/SHA256 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA: AT_CHECKCODE data", addr, len);
#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)
sha256_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
else
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, hash,
data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ?
EAP_AKA_PRIME_CHECKCODE_LEN : EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN);
}
void uuid_gen_mac_addr(const u8 *mac_addr, u8 *uuid)
{
const u8 *addr[2];
size_t len[2];
u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
u8 nsid[16] = {
0x52, 0x64, 0x80, 0xf8,
0xc9, 0x9b,
0x4b, 0xe5,
0xa6, 0x55,
0x58, 0xed, 0x5f, 0x5d, 0x60, 0x84
};
addr[0] = nsid;
len[0] = sizeof(nsid);
addr[1] = mac_addr;
len[1] = 6;
sha1_vector(2, addr, len, hash);
os_memcpy(uuid, hash, 16);
/* Version: 5 = named-based version using SHA-1 */
uuid[6] = (5 << 4) | (uuid[6] & 0x0f);
/* Variant specified in RFC 4122 */
uuid[8] = 0x80 | (uuid[8] & 0x3f);
}
static int eap_gpsk_gkdf(const u8 *psk /* Y */, size_t psk_len,
const u8 *data /* Z */, size_t data_len,
u8 *buf, size_t len /* X */)
{
u8 *opos;
size_t i, n, hashlen, left, clen;
u8 ibuf[2], hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
const u8 *addr[3];
size_t vlen[3];
hashlen = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
/* M_i = Hash-Function (i || Y || Z); */
addr[0] = ibuf;
vlen[0] = sizeof(ibuf);
addr[1] = psk;
vlen[1] = psk_len;
addr[2] = data;
vlen[2] = data_len;
opos = buf;
left = len;
n = (len + hashlen - 1) / hashlen;
for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
WPA_PUT_BE16(ibuf, i);
sha1_vector(3, addr, vlen, hash);
clen = left > hashlen ? hashlen : left;
os_memcpy(opos, hash, clen);
opos += clen;
left -= clen;
}
return 0;
}
void eap_sim_derive_mk(const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
const u8 *nonce_mt, u16 selected_version,
const u8 *ver_list, size_t ver_list_len,
int num_chal, const u8 *kc, u8 *mk)
{
u8 sel_ver[2];
const unsigned char *addr[5];
size_t len[5];
addr[0] = identity;
len[0] = identity_len;
addr[1] = kc;
len[1] = num_chal * EAP_SIM_KC_LEN;
addr[2] = nonce_mt;
len[2] = EAP_SIM_NONCE_MT_LEN;
addr[3] = ver_list;
len[3] = ver_list_len;
addr[4] = sel_ver;
len[4] = 2;
WPA_PUT_BE16(sel_ver, selected_version);
/* MK = SHA1(Identity|n*Kc|NONCE_MT|Version List|Selected Version) */
sha1_vector(5, addr, len, mk);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: MK", mk, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
}
/**
* generate_authenticator_response_pwhash - GenerateAuthenticatorResponse() - RFC 2759, Sect. 8.7
* @password_hash: 16-octet PasswordHash (IN)
* @nt_response: 24-octet NT-Response (IN)
* @peer_challenge: 16-octet PeerChallenge (IN)
* @auth_challenge: 16-octet AuthenticatorChallenge (IN)
* @username: 0-to-256-char UserName (IN)
* @username_len: Length of username
* @response: 20-octet AuthenticatorResponse (OUT) (note: this value is usually
* encoded as a 42-octet ASCII string (S=hexdump_of_response)
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
int generate_authenticator_response_pwhash(
const u8 *password_hash,
const u8 *peer_challenge, const u8 *auth_challenge,
const u8 *username, size_t username_len,
const u8 *nt_response, u8 *response)
{
static const u8 magic1[39] = {
0x4D, 0x61, 0x67, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76,
0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6C, 0x69, 0x65,
0x6E, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67,
0x20, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x74
};
static const u8 magic2[41] = {
0x50, 0x61, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x61, 0x6B,
0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x6F,
0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x6E,
0x65, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F,
0x6E
};
u8 password_hash_hash[16], challenge[8];
const unsigned char *addr1[3];
const size_t len1[3] = { 16, 24, sizeof(magic1) };
const unsigned char *addr2[3];
const size_t len2[3] = { SHA1_MAC_LEN, 8, sizeof(magic2) };
addr1[0] = password_hash_hash;
addr1[1] = nt_response;
addr1[2] = magic1;
addr2[0] = response;
addr2[1] = challenge;
addr2[2] = magic2;
if (hash_nt_password_hash(password_hash, password_hash_hash))
return -1;
if (sha1_vector(3, addr1, len1, response))
return -1;
if (challenge_hash(peer_challenge, auth_challenge, username,
username_len, challenge))
return -1;
return sha1_vector(3, addr2, len2, response);
}
int eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(u16 _counter,
const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
const u8 *nonce_s, const u8 *mk, u8 *msk,
u8 *emsk)
{
u8 xkey[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
u8 buf[EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN + 32];
u8 counter[2];
const u8 *addr[4];
size_t len[4];
while (identity_len > 0 && identity[identity_len - 1] == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Workaround - drop null "
"character from the end of identity");
identity_len--;
}
addr[0] = identity;
len[0] = identity_len;
addr[1] = counter;
len[1] = 2;
addr[2] = nonce_s;
len[2] = EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN;
addr[3] = mk;
len[3] = EAP_SIM_MK_LEN;
WPA_PUT_BE16(counter, _counter);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Deriving keying data from reauth");
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Identity",
identity, identity_len);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: counter", counter, 2);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: NONCE_S", nonce_s,
EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: MK", mk, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
/* XKEY' = SHA1(Identity|counter|NONCE_S|MK) */
sha1_vector(4, addr, len, xkey);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: XKEY'", xkey, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
if (eap_sim_prf(xkey, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Failed to derive keys");
return -1;
}
if (msk) {
os_memcpy(msk, buf, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: keying material (MSK)",
msk, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
}
if (emsk) {
os_memcpy(emsk, buf + EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: EMSK", emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
}
os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
return 0;
}
static int eap_aka_verify_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data,
const u8 *checkcode, size_t checkcode_len)
{
const u8 *addr;
size_t len;
u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
size_t hash_len;
if (checkcode == NULL)
return -1;
if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
if (checkcode_len != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server "
"indicates that AKA/Identity messages were "
"used, but they were not");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
hash_len = data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ?
EAP_AKA_PRIME_CHECKCODE_LEN : EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN;
if (checkcode_len != hash_len) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server "
"indicates that AKA/Identity message were not "
"used, but they were");
return -1;
}
/* Checkcode is SHA1/SHA256 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)
sha256_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
else
#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
if (os_memcmp(hash, checkcode, hash_len) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Mismatch in AT_CHECKCODE");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void challenge_hash(const u8 *peer_challenge, const u8 *auth_challenge,
const u8 *username, size_t username_len,
u8 *challenge)
{
u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
const unsigned char *addr[3];
size_t len[3];
addr[0] = peer_challenge;
len[0] = 16;
addr[1] = auth_challenge;
len[1] = 16;
addr[2] = username;
len[2] = username_len;
sha1_vector(3, addr, len, hash);
os_memcpy(challenge, hash, 8);
}
void eap_aka_derive_mk(const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
const u8 *ik, const u8 *ck, u8 *mk)
{
const u8 *addr[3];
size_t len[3];
addr[0] = identity;
len[0] = identity_len;
addr[1] = ik;
len[1] = EAP_AKA_IK_LEN;
addr[2] = ck;
len[2] = EAP_AKA_CK_LEN;
/* MK = SHA1(Identity|IK|CK) */
sha1_vector(3, addr, len, mk);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: IK", ik, EAP_AKA_IK_LEN);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: CK", ck, EAP_AKA_CK_LEN);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: MK", mk, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
}
void get_master_key(const u8 *password_hash_hash, const u8 *nt_response,
u8 *master_key)
{
static const u8 magic1[27] = {
0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74,
0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d,
0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79
};
const unsigned char *addr[3];
const size_t len[3] = { 16, 24, sizeof(magic1) };
u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
addr[0] = password_hash_hash;
addr[1] = nt_response;
addr[2] = magic1;
sha1_vector(3, addr, len, hash);
os_memcpy(master_key, hash, 16);
}
static int eap_aka_verify_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data,
const u8 *checkcode, size_t checkcode_len)
{
const u8 *addr;
size_t len;
u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
if (checkcode == NULL)
return -1;
if (data->id_msgs == NULL) {
if (checkcode_len != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server "
"indicates that AKA/Identity messages were "
"used, but they were not");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
if (checkcode_len != EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server "
"indicates that AKA/Identity message were not "
"used, but they were");
return -1;
}
/* Checkcode is SHA1 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
if (os_memcmp(hash, checkcode, EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Mismatch in AT_CHECKCODE");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void eap_sim_derive_mk(struct eap_sim_data *data,
const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len)
{
u8 sel_ver[2];
const unsigned char *addr[5];
size_t len[5];
addr[0] = identity;
len[0] = identity_len;
addr[1] = (u8 *) data->kc;
len[1] = data->num_chal * KC_LEN;
addr[2] = data->nonce_mt;
len[2] = EAP_SIM_NONCE_MT_LEN;
addr[3] = data->ver_list;
len[3] = data->ver_list_len;
addr[4] = sel_ver;
len[4] = 2;
WPA_PUT_BE16(sel_ver, data->selected_version);
/* MK = SHA1(Identity|n*Kc|NONCE_MT|Version List|Selected Version) */
sha1_vector(5, addr, len, data->mk);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: MK", data->mk, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
}
u32 mrvl_sha1_vector(size_t nmsg, const u8 *msg[], const size_t msglen[],
u8 *mac, size_t maclen)
{
sha1_vector(nmsg, msg, msglen, mac);
return 0;
}
/**
* hmac_sha1_vector - HMAC-SHA1 over data vector (RFC 2104)
* @key: Key for HMAC operations
* @key_len: Length of the key in bytes
* @num_elem: Number of elements in the data vector
* @addr: Pointers to the data areas
* @len: Lengths of the data blocks
* @mac: Buffer for the hash (20 bytes)
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
int hmac_sha1_vector(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, size_t num_elem,
const u8 *addr[], const size_t *len, u8 *mac)
{
unsigned char k_pad[64]; /* padding - key XORd with ipad/opad */
unsigned char tk[20];
const u8 *_addr[6];
size_t _len[6], i;
if (num_elem > 5) {
/*
* Fixed limit on the number of fragments to avoid having to
* allocate memory (which could fail).
*/
return -1;
}
/* 大于64字节的计算其20字节的消息认证码 */
/* if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key = SHA1(key) */
if (key_len > 64) {
if (sha1_vector(1, &key, &key_len, tk))
return -1;
key = tk;
key_len = 20;
}
/* the HMAC_SHA1 transform looks like:
*
* SHA1(K XOR opad, SHA1(K XOR ipad, text))
*
* where K is an n byte key
* ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times
* opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times
* and text is the data being protected */
/* 补齐到64字节 */
/* start out by storing key in ipad */
os_memset(k_pad, 0, sizeof(k_pad));
os_memcpy(k_pad, key, key_len);
/* XOR key with ipad values */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
k_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
/* perform inner SHA1 */
_addr[0] = k_pad;
_len[0] = 64;
for (i = 0; i < num_elem; i++) {
_addr[i + 1] = addr[i];
_len[i + 1] = len[i];
}
/* 第1次计算 */
if (sha1_vector(1 + num_elem, _addr, _len, mac))
return -1;
os_memset(k_pad, 0, sizeof(k_pad));
os_memcpy(k_pad, key, key_len);
/* XOR key with opad values */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
k_pad[i] ^= 0x5c;
/* perform outer SHA1 */
_addr[0] = k_pad;
_len[0] = 64;
_addr[1] = mac;
_len[1] = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
/* 第2次计算 */
return sha1_vector(2, _addr, _len, mac);
}
void kr_hash_sha1_v(size_t num_msgs, const uint8_t *msgs[],
const size_t *msg_lens, uint8_t *digest) {
(void) sha1_vector(num_msgs, msgs, msg_lens, digest);
}
static int cavp_rsa_sig_ver(const char *fname)
{
FILE *f;
int ret = 0;
char buf[15000], *pos, *pos2;
u8 msg[200], n[512], s[512], em[512], e[512];
size_t msg_len = 0, n_len = 0, s_len = 0, em_len, e_len = 0;
size_t tmp_len;
char sha_alg[20];
int ok = 0;
printf("CAVP RSA SigVer test vectors from %s\n", fname);
f = fopen(fname, "r");
if (f == NULL) {
printf("%s does not exist - cannot validate CAVP RSA SigVer test vectors\n",
fname);
return 0;
}
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
pos = os_strchr(buf, '=');
if (pos == NULL)
continue;
pos2 = pos - 1;
while (pos2 >= buf && *pos2 == ' ')
*pos2-- = '\0';
*pos++ = '\0';
while (*pos == ' ')
*pos++ = '\0';
pos2 = os_strchr(pos, '\r');
if (!pos2)
pos2 = os_strchr(pos, '\n');
if (pos2)
*pos2 = '\0';
else
pos2 = pos + os_strlen(pos);
if (os_strcmp(buf, "SHAAlg") == 0) {
os_strlcpy(sha_alg, pos, sizeof(sha_alg));
} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "Msg") == 0) {
tmp_len = os_strlen(pos);
if (tmp_len > sizeof(msg) * 2) {
printf("Too long Msg\n");
return -1;
}
msg_len = tmp_len / 2;
if (hexstr2bin(pos, msg, msg_len) < 0) {
printf("Invalid hex string '%s'\n", pos);
ret++;
break;
}
} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "n") == 0) {
tmp_len = os_strlen(pos);
if (tmp_len > sizeof(n) * 2) {
printf("Too long n\n");
return -1;
}
n_len = tmp_len / 2;
if (hexstr2bin(pos, n, n_len) < 0) {
printf("Invalid hex string '%s'\n", pos);
ret++;
break;
}
} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "e") == 0) {
tmp_len = os_strlen(pos);
if (tmp_len > sizeof(e) * 2) {
printf("Too long e\n");
return -1;
}
e_len = tmp_len / 2;
if (hexstr2bin(pos, e, e_len) < 0) {
printf("Invalid hex string '%s'\n", pos);
ret++;
break;
}
} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "S") == 0) {
tmp_len = os_strlen(pos);
if (tmp_len > sizeof(s) * 2) {
printf("Too long S\n");
return -1;
}
s_len = tmp_len / 2;
if (hexstr2bin(pos, s, s_len) < 0) {
printf("Invalid hex string '%s'\n", pos);
ret++;
break;
}
} else if (os_strncmp(buf, "EM", 2) == 0) {
tmp_len = os_strlen(pos);
if (tmp_len > sizeof(em) * 2)
return -1;
em_len = tmp_len / 2;
if (hexstr2bin(pos, em, em_len) < 0) {
printf("Invalid hex string '%s'\n", pos);
ret++;
break;
}
} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "Result") == 0) {
const u8 *addr[1];
size_t len[1];
struct crypto_public_key *pk;
int res;
u8 hash[32];
size_t hash_len;
const struct asn1_oid *alg;
addr[0] = msg;
len[0] = msg_len;
if (os_strcmp(sha_alg, "SHA1") == 0) {
if (sha1_vector(1, addr, len, hash) < 0)
return -1;
hash_len = 20;
alg = &asn1_sha1_oid;
} else if (os_strcmp(sha_alg, "SHA256") == 0) {
if (sha256_vector(1, addr, len, hash) < 0)
return -1;
hash_len = 32;
alg = &asn1_sha256_oid;
} else {
continue;
}
printf("\nExpected result: %s\n", pos);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_INFO, "Hash(Msg)", hash, hash_len);
pk = crypto_public_key_import_parts(n, n_len,
e, e_len);
if (pk == NULL) {
printf("Failed to import public key\n");
ret++;
continue;
}
res = pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(pk, s, s_len, alg,
hash, hash_len);
crypto_public_key_free(pk);
if ((*pos == 'F' && !res) || (*pos != 'F' && res)) {
printf("FAIL\n");
ret++;
continue;
}
printf("PASS\n");
ok++;
}
}
fclose(f);
if (ret)
printf("Test case failed\n");
else
printf("%d test vectors OK\n", ok);
return ret;
}
