static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
int ret;
if (event->attr.type != bts_pmu.type)
return -ENOENT;
if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
return -EBUSY;
/*
* BTS leaks kernel addresses even when CPL0 tracing is
* disabled, so disallow intel_bts driver for unprivileged
* users on paranoid systems since it provides trace data
* to the user in a zero-copy fashion.
*
* Note that the default paranoia setting permits unprivileged
* users to profile the kernel.
*/
if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
ret = x86_reserve_hardware();
if (ret) {
x86_del_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts);
return ret;
}
event->destroy = bts_event_destroy;
return 0;
}
static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
int ret;
if (event->attr.type != bts_pmu.type)
return -ENOENT;
if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
return -EBUSY;
ret = x86_reserve_hardware();
if (ret) {
x86_del_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts);
return ret;
}
event->destroy = bts_event_destroy;
return 0;
}
static void bts_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
x86_del_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts);
}
static void bts_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
x86_release_hardware();
x86_del_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts);
}