コード例 #1
0
ファイル: XSSFilter.cpp プロジェクト: 13W/phantomjs
bool XSSFilter::eraseAttributeIfInjected(HTMLToken& token, const QualifiedName& attributeName, const String& replacementValue)
{
    size_t indexOfAttribute;
    if (findAttributeWithName(token, attributeName, indexOfAttribute)) {
        const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(indexOfAttribute);
        if (isContainedInRequest(snippetForAttribute(token, attribute))) {
            if (attributeName == srcAttr && isSameOriginResource(String(attribute.m_value.data(), attribute.m_value.size())))
                return false;
            token.eraseValueOfAttribute(indexOfAttribute);
            if (!replacementValue.isEmpty())
                token.appendToAttributeValue(indexOfAttribute, replacementValue);
            return true;
        }
    }
    return false;
}
コード例 #2
0
bool XSSAuditor::eraseAttributeIfInjected(HTMLToken& token, const QualifiedName& attributeName, const String& replacementValue, AttributeKind treatment)
{
    size_t indexOfAttribute = 0;
    if (findAttributeWithName(token, attributeName, indexOfAttribute)) {
        const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(indexOfAttribute);
        if (isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForAttribute(token, attribute, treatment))) {
            if (attributeName == srcAttr && isLikelySafeResource(String(attribute.m_value.data(), attribute.m_value.size())))
                return false;
            if (attributeName == http_equivAttr && !isDangerousHTTPEquiv(String(attribute.m_value.data(), attribute.m_value.size())))
                return false;
            token.eraseValueOfAttribute(indexOfAttribute);
            if (!replacementValue.isEmpty())
                token.appendToAttributeValue(indexOfAttribute, replacementValue);
            return true;
        }
    }
    return false;
}
コード例 #3
0
bool XSSAuditor::eraseDangerousAttributesIfInjected(HTMLToken& token)
{
    DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, safeJavaScriptURL, ("javascript:void(0)"));

    bool didBlockScript = false;
    for (size_t i = 0; i < token.attributes().size(); ++i) {
        const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(i);
        bool isInlineEventHandler = isNameOfInlineEventHandler(attribute.m_name);
        bool valueContainsJavaScriptURL = isInlineEventHandler ? false : containsJavaScriptURL(attribute.m_value);
        if (!isInlineEventHandler && !valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
            continue;
        // Beware of trailing characters which came from the page itself, not the 
        // injected vector. Excluding the terminating character covers common cases
        // where the page immediately ends the attribute, but doesn't cover more
        // complex cases where there is other page data following the injection. 
        // Generally, these won't parse as javascript, so the injected vector
        // typically excludes them from consideration via a single-line comment or
        // by enclosing them in a string literal terminated later by the page's own
        // closing punctuation. Since the snippet has not been parsed, the vector
        // may also try to introduce these via entities. As a result, we'd like to
        // stop before the first "//", the first <!--, the first entity, or the first
        // quote not immediately following the first equals sign (taking whitespace
        // into consideration). To keep things simpler, we don't try to distinguish
        // between entity-introducing amperands vs. other uses, nor do we bother to
        // check for a second slash for a comment, nor do we bother to check for
        // !-- following a less-than sign. We stop instead on any ampersand
        // slash, or less-than sign.
        String decodedSnippet = decodedSnippetForAttribute(token, attribute);
        size_t position;
        if ((position = decodedSnippet.find("=")) != notFound
            && (position = decodedSnippet.find(isNotHTMLSpace, position + 1)) != notFound
            && (position = decodedSnippet.find(isTerminatingCharacter, isHTMLQuote(decodedSnippet[position]) ? position + 1 : position)) != notFound) {
            decodedSnippet.truncate(position);
        }
        if (!isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippet))
            continue;
        token.eraseValueOfAttribute(i);
        if (valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
            token.appendToAttributeValue(i, safeJavaScriptURL);
        didBlockScript = true;
    }
    return didBlockScript;
}
コード例 #4
0
bool XSSAuditor::eraseDangerousAttributesIfInjected(HTMLToken& token)
{
    DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, safeJavaScriptURL, (ASCIILiteral("javascript:void(0)")));

    bool didBlockScript = false;
    for (size_t i = 0; i < token.attributes().size(); ++i) {
        const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(i);
        bool isInlineEventHandler = isNameOfInlineEventHandler(attribute.m_name);
        bool valueContainsJavaScriptURL = !isInlineEventHandler && protocolIsJavaScript(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(String(attribute.m_value.data(), attribute.m_value.size())));
        if (!isInlineEventHandler && !valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
            continue;
        if (!isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForAttribute(token, attribute, ScriptLikeAttribute)))
            continue;
        token.eraseValueOfAttribute(i);
        if (valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
            token.appendToAttributeValue(i, safeJavaScriptURL);
        didBlockScript = true;
    }
    return didBlockScript;
}
コード例 #5
0
ファイル: XSSFilter.cpp プロジェクト: 13W/phantomjs
bool XSSFilter::eraseDangerousAttributesIfInjected(HTMLToken& token)
{
    DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, safeJavaScriptURL, ("javascript:void(0)"));

    bool didBlockScript = false;
    for (size_t i = 0; i < token.attributes().size(); ++i) {
        const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(i);
        bool isInlineEventHandler = isNameOfInlineEventHandler(attribute.m_name);
        bool valueContainsJavaScriptURL = isInlineEventHandler ? false : containsJavaScriptURL(attribute.m_value);
        if (!isInlineEventHandler && !valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
            continue;
        if (!isContainedInRequest(snippetForAttribute(token, attribute)))
            continue;
        token.eraseValueOfAttribute(i);
        if (valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
            token.appendToAttributeValue(i, safeJavaScriptURL);
        didBlockScript = true;
    }
    return didBlockScript;
}