bool XSSFilter::eraseAttributeIfInjected(HTMLToken& token, const QualifiedName& attributeName, const String& replacementValue)
{
size_t indexOfAttribute;
if (findAttributeWithName(token, attributeName, indexOfAttribute)) {
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(indexOfAttribute);
if (isContainedInRequest(snippetForAttribute(token, attribute))) {
if (attributeName == srcAttr && isSameOriginResource(String(attribute.m_value.data(), attribute.m_value.size())))
return false;
token.eraseValueOfAttribute(indexOfAttribute);
if (!replacementValue.isEmpty())
token.appendToAttributeValue(indexOfAttribute, replacementValue);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool XSSAuditor::eraseAttributeIfInjected(HTMLToken& token, const QualifiedName& attributeName, const String& replacementValue, AttributeKind treatment)
{
size_t indexOfAttribute = 0;
if (findAttributeWithName(token, attributeName, indexOfAttribute)) {
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(indexOfAttribute);
if (isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForAttribute(token, attribute, treatment))) {
if (attributeName == srcAttr && isLikelySafeResource(String(attribute.m_value.data(), attribute.m_value.size())))
return false;
if (attributeName == http_equivAttr && !isDangerousHTTPEquiv(String(attribute.m_value.data(), attribute.m_value.size())))
return false;
token.eraseValueOfAttribute(indexOfAttribute);
if (!replacementValue.isEmpty())
token.appendToAttributeValue(indexOfAttribute, replacementValue);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool XSSAuditor::eraseDangerousAttributesIfInjected(HTMLToken& token)
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, safeJavaScriptURL, ("javascript:void(0)"));
bool didBlockScript = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < token.attributes().size(); ++i) {
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(i);
bool isInlineEventHandler = isNameOfInlineEventHandler(attribute.m_name);
bool valueContainsJavaScriptURL = isInlineEventHandler ? false : containsJavaScriptURL(attribute.m_value);
if (!isInlineEventHandler && !valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
continue;
// Beware of trailing characters which came from the page itself, not the
// injected vector. Excluding the terminating character covers common cases
// where the page immediately ends the attribute, but doesn't cover more
// complex cases where there is other page data following the injection.
// Generally, these won't parse as javascript, so the injected vector
// typically excludes them from consideration via a single-line comment or
// by enclosing them in a string literal terminated later by the page's own
// closing punctuation. Since the snippet has not been parsed, the vector
// may also try to introduce these via entities. As a result, we'd like to
// stop before the first "//", the first <!--, the first entity, or the first
// quote not immediately following the first equals sign (taking whitespace
// into consideration). To keep things simpler, we don't try to distinguish
// between entity-introducing amperands vs. other uses, nor do we bother to
// check for a second slash for a comment, nor do we bother to check for
// !-- following a less-than sign. We stop instead on any ampersand
// slash, or less-than sign.
String decodedSnippet = decodedSnippetForAttribute(token, attribute);
size_t position;
if ((position = decodedSnippet.find("=")) != notFound
&& (position = decodedSnippet.find(isNotHTMLSpace, position + 1)) != notFound
&& (position = decodedSnippet.find(isTerminatingCharacter, isHTMLQuote(decodedSnippet[position]) ? position + 1 : position)) != notFound) {
decodedSnippet.truncate(position);
}
if (!isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippet))
continue;
token.eraseValueOfAttribute(i);
if (valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
token.appendToAttributeValue(i, safeJavaScriptURL);
didBlockScript = true;
}
return didBlockScript;
}
bool XSSAuditor::eraseDangerousAttributesIfInjected(HTMLToken& token)
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, safeJavaScriptURL, (ASCIILiteral("javascript:void(0)")));
bool didBlockScript = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < token.attributes().size(); ++i) {
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(i);
bool isInlineEventHandler = isNameOfInlineEventHandler(attribute.m_name);
bool valueContainsJavaScriptURL = !isInlineEventHandler && protocolIsJavaScript(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(String(attribute.m_value.data(), attribute.m_value.size())));
if (!isInlineEventHandler && !valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
continue;
if (!isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForAttribute(token, attribute, ScriptLikeAttribute)))
continue;
token.eraseValueOfAttribute(i);
if (valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
token.appendToAttributeValue(i, safeJavaScriptURL);
didBlockScript = true;
}
return didBlockScript;
}
bool XSSFilter::eraseDangerousAttributesIfInjected(HTMLToken& token)
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, safeJavaScriptURL, ("javascript:void(0)"));
bool didBlockScript = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < token.attributes().size(); ++i) {
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = token.attributes().at(i);
bool isInlineEventHandler = isNameOfInlineEventHandler(attribute.m_name);
bool valueContainsJavaScriptURL = isInlineEventHandler ? false : containsJavaScriptURL(attribute.m_value);
if (!isInlineEventHandler && !valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
continue;
if (!isContainedInRequest(snippetForAttribute(token, attribute)))
continue;
token.eraseValueOfAttribute(i);
if (valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
token.appendToAttributeValue(i, safeJavaScriptURL);
didBlockScript = true;
}
return didBlockScript;
}