// Enforces the given suborigin as part of the security origin for this
// security context. |name| must not be empty, although it may be null. A null
// name represents a lack of a suborigin.
// See: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-suborigins/index.html
void SecurityContext::enforceSuborigin(const Suborigin& suborigin) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::suboriginsEnabled())
return;
DCHECK(!suborigin.name().isEmpty());
DCHECK(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::suboriginsEnabled());
DCHECK(m_securityOrigin.get());
DCHECK(!m_securityOrigin->hasSuborigin() ||
m_securityOrigin->suborigin()->name() == suborigin.name());
m_securityOrigin->addSuborigin(suborigin);
didUpdateSecurityOrigin();
}
void expectParsePolicyFail(const char* message, String header)
{
SCOPED_TRACE(message);
Vector<String> messages;
Suborigin suborigin;
EXPECT_FALSE(parseSuboriginHeader(header, &suborigin, messages));
EXPECT_EQ(String(), suborigin.name());
}
void expectParseNamePass(const char* message, String header, String expectedName)
{
SCOPED_TRACE(message);
Vector<String> messages;
Suborigin suborigin;
EXPECT_TRUE(parseSuboriginHeader(header, &suborigin, messages));
EXPECT_EQ(expectedName, suborigin.name());
}
void SecurityOrigin::addSuborigin(const Suborigin& suborigin)
{
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::suboriginsEnabled());
// Changing suborigins midstream is bad. Very bad. It should not happen.
// This is, in fact, one of the very basic invariants that makes
// suborigins an effective security tool.
RELEASE_ASSERT(m_suborigin.name().isNull() || (m_suborigin.name() == suborigin.name()));
m_suborigin.setTo(suborigin);
}
