static ephemeral_zsd_t *
get_ephemeral_zsd(zone_t *zone)
{
ephemeral_zsd_t *eph_zsd;
eph_zsd = zone_getspecific(ephemeral_zone_key, zone);
if (eph_zsd != NULL) {
return (eph_zsd);
}
mutex_enter(&ephemeral_zone_mutex);
eph_zsd = zone_getspecific(ephemeral_zone_key, zone);
if (eph_zsd == NULL) {
eph_zsd = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (ephemeral_zsd_t), KM_SLEEP);
eph_zsd->min_uid = MAXUID;
eph_zsd->last_uid = IDMAP_WK__MAX_UID;
eph_zsd->min_gid = MAXUID;
eph_zsd->last_gid = IDMAP_WK__MAX_GID;
mutex_init(&eph_zsd->eph_lock, NULL, MUTEX_DEFAULT, NULL);
/*
* nobody is used to map SID containing CRs.
*/
eph_zsd->eph_nobody = crdup(zone->zone_kcred);
(void) crsetugid(eph_zsd->eph_nobody, UID_NOBODY, GID_NOBODY);
CR_FLAGS(eph_zsd->eph_nobody) = 0;
eph_zsd->eph_nobody->cr_zone = zone;
(void) zone_setspecific(ephemeral_zone_key, zone, eph_zsd);
}
mutex_exit(&ephemeral_zone_mutex);
return (eph_zsd);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
void
priv_getinfo(const cred_t *cr, void *buf)
{
struct priv_info_uint *ii;
ii = buf;
ii->val = CR_FLAGS(cr);
ii->info.priv_info_size = (uint32_t)sizeof (*ii);
ii->info.priv_info_type = PRIV_INFO_FLAGS;
}
/*
* Getpflags. Currently only implements single bit flags.
*/
uint_t
getpflags(uint_t flag, const cred_t *cr)
{
if (flag != PRIV_DEBUG && flag != PRIV_AWARE &&
flag != NET_MAC_AWARE && flag != NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT &&
flag != PRIV_XPOLICY && flag != PRIV_PFEXEC &&
flag != PRIV_AWARE_RESET)
return ((uint_t)-1);
return ((CR_FLAGS(cr) & flag) != 0);
}
/*
* Return the nth privilege set
*/
const priv_set_t *
priv_getset(const cred_t *cr, int set)
{
ASSERT(PRIV_VALIDSET(set));
if ((CR_FLAGS(cr) & PRIV_AWARE) == 0)
switch (set) {
case PRIV_EFFECTIVE:
return (&CR_OEPRIV(cr));
case PRIV_PERMITTED:
return (&CR_OPPRIV(cr));
}
return (&CR_PRIVS(cr)->crprivs[set]);
}
/*
* Register the klpd.
* If the pid_t passed in is positive, update the registration for
* the specific process; that is only possible if the process already
* has a registration on it. This change of registration will affect
* all processes which share common ancestry.
*
* MY_PID (pid 0) can be used to create or change the context for
* the current process, typically done after fork().
*
* A negative value can be used to register a klpd globally.
*
* The per-credential klpd needs to be cleaned up when entering
* a zone or unsetting the flag.
*/
int
klpd_reg(int did, idtype_t type, id_t id, priv_set_t *psetbuf)
{
cred_t *cr = CRED();
door_handle_t dh;
klpd_reg_t *kpd;
priv_set_t pset;
door_info_t di;
credklpd_t *ckp = NULL;
pid_t pid = -1;
projid_t proj = -1;
kproject_t *kpp = NULL;
if (CR_FLAGS(cr) & PRIV_XPOLICY)
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
if (copyin(psetbuf, &pset, sizeof (priv_set_t)))
return (set_errno(EFAULT));
if (!priv_issubset(&pset, &CR_OEPRIV(cr)))
return (set_errno(EPERM));
switch (type) {
case P_PID:
pid = (pid_t)id;
if (pid == P_MYPID)
pid = curproc->p_pid;
if (pid == curproc->p_pid)
ckp = crklpd_alloc();
break;
case P_PROJID:
proj = (projid_t)id;
kpp = project_hold_by_id(proj, crgetzone(cr),
PROJECT_HOLD_FIND);
if (kpp == NULL)
return (set_errno(ESRCH));
break;
default:
return (set_errno(ENOTSUP));
}
/*
* Verify the door passed in; it must be a door and we won't
* allow processes to be called on their own behalf.
*/
dh = door_ki_lookup(did);
if (dh == NULL || door_ki_info(dh, &di) != 0) {
if (ckp != NULL)
crklpd_rele(ckp);
if (kpp != NULL)
project_rele(kpp);
return (set_errno(EBADF));
}
if (type == P_PID && pid == di.di_target) {
if (ckp != NULL)
crklpd_rele(ckp);
ASSERT(kpp == NULL);
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
}
kpd = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (*kpd), KM_SLEEP);
crhold(kpd->klpd_cred = cr);
kpd->klpd_door = dh;
kpd->klpd_door_pid = di.di_target;
kpd->klpd_ref = 1;
kpd->klpd_pset = pset;
if (kpp != NULL) {
mutex_enter(&klpd_mutex);
kpd = klpd_link(kpd, &kpp->kpj_klpd, B_TRUE);
mutex_exit(&klpd_mutex);
if (kpd != NULL)
klpd_rele(kpd);
project_rele(kpp);
} else if ((int)pid < 0) {
/* Global daemon */
mutex_enter(&klpd_mutex);
(void) klpd_link(kpd, &klpd_list, B_FALSE);
mutex_exit(&klpd_mutex);
} else if (pid == curproc->p_pid) {
proc_t *p = curproc;
cred_t *newcr = cralloc();
/* No need to lock, sole reference to ckp */
kpd = klpd_link(kpd, &ckp->crkl_reg, B_TRUE);
if (kpd != NULL)
klpd_rele(kpd);
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
cr = p->p_cred;
crdup_to(cr, newcr);
crsetcrklpd(newcr, ckp);
p->p_cred = newcr; /* Already held for p_cred */
crhold(newcr); /* Hold once for the current thread */
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr); /* One for the p_cred */
crset(p, newcr);
} else {
proc_t *p;
cred_t *pcr;
mutex_enter(&pidlock);
p = prfind(pid);
if (p == NULL || !prochasprocperm(p, curproc, CRED())) {
mutex_exit(&pidlock);
klpd_rele(kpd);
return (set_errno(p == NULL ? ESRCH : EPERM));
}
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
crhold(pcr = p->p_cred);
mutex_exit(&pidlock);
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
/*
* We're going to update the credential's ckp in place;
* this requires that it exists.
*/
ckp = crgetcrklpd(pcr);
if (ckp == NULL) {
crfree(pcr);
klpd_rele(kpd);
return (set_errno(EINVAL));
}
crklpd_setreg(ckp, kpd);
crfree(pcr);
}
return (0);
}
int
setpflags(uint_t flag, uint_t val, cred_t *tcr)
{
cred_t *cr, *pcr;
proc_t *p = curproc;
uint_t newflags;
boolean_t use_curcred = (tcr == NULL);
if (val > 1 || (flag != PRIV_DEBUG && flag != PRIV_AWARE &&
flag != NET_MAC_AWARE && flag != NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT &&
flag != __PROC_PROTECT && flag != PRIV_XPOLICY &&
flag != PRIV_AWARE_RESET && flag != PRIV_PFEXEC)) {
return (EINVAL);
}
if (flag == __PROC_PROTECT) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
if (val == 0)
p->p_flag &= ~SNOCD;
else
p->p_flag |= SNOCD;
mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
return (0);
}
if (use_curcred) {
cr = cralloc();
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
pcr = p->p_cred;
} else {
cr = pcr = tcr;
}
newflags = CR_FLAGS(pcr);
if (val != 0) {
if (flag == PRIV_AWARE)
newflags &= ~PRIV_AWARE_RESET;
newflags |= flag;
} else {
newflags &= ~flag;
}
/* No change */
if (CR_FLAGS(pcr) == newflags) {
if (use_curcred) {
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Setting either the NET_MAC_AWARE or NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT
* flags is a restricted operation.
*
* When invoked via the PRIVSYS_SETPFLAGS syscall
* we require that the current cred has the net_mac_aware
* privilege in its effective set.
*
* When called from within the kernel by label-aware
* services such as NFS, we don't require a privilege check.
*
*/
if ((flag == NET_MAC_AWARE || flag == NET_MAC_AWARE_INHERIT) &&
(val == 1) && use_curcred) {
if (secpolicy_net_mac_aware(pcr) != 0) {
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
return (EPERM);
}
}
/* Trying to unset PA; if we can't, return an error */
if (flag == PRIV_AWARE && val == 0 && !priv_can_clear_PA(pcr)) {
if (use_curcred) {
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(cr);
}
return (EPERM);
}
/* Committed to changing the flag */
if (use_curcred)
crcopy_to(pcr, cr);
if (flag == PRIV_AWARE) {
if (val != 0)
priv_set_PA(cr);
else
priv_adjust_PA(cr);
} else {
CR_FLAGS(cr) = newflags;
}
/*
* Unsetting the flag has as side effect getting rid of
* the per-credential policy.
*/
if (flag == PRIV_XPOLICY && val == 0)
crsetcrklpd(cr, NULL);
if (use_curcred) {
p->p_cred = cr;
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
crset(p, cr);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Guts of pr_spriv:
*
* Set the privileges of a process.
*
* In order to set the privileges, the setting process will need to
* have those privileges in its effective set in order to prevent
* specially privileged processes to easily gain additional privileges.
* Pre-existing privileges can be retained. To change any privileges,
* PRIV_PROC_OWNER needs to be asserted.
*
* In formula:
*
* S' <= S || S' <= S + Ea
*
* the new set must either be subset of the old set or a subset of
* the oldset merged with the effective set of the acting process; or just:
*
* S' <= S + Ea
*
* It's not legal to grow the limit set this way.
*
*/
int
priv_pr_spriv(proc_t *p, prpriv_t *prpriv, const cred_t *cr)
{
cred_t *oldcred;
cred_t *newcred;
int i;
int err = EPERM;
cred_priv_t *cp, *ocp;
priv_set_t eset;
ASSERT(MUTEX_HELD(&p->p_lock));
/*
* Set must have proper dimension; infosize must be absent
* or properly sized.
*/
if (prpriv->pr_nsets != PRIV_NSET ||
prpriv->pr_setsize != PRIV_SETSIZE ||
(prpriv->pr_infosize & (sizeof (uint32_t) - 1)) != 0 ||
prpriv->pr_infosize > priv_info->priv_infosize ||
prpriv->pr_infosize < 0)
return (EINVAL);
mutex_exit(&p->p_lock);
if (priv_proc_cred_perm(cr, p, &oldcred, VWRITE) != 0) {
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
return (EPERM);
}
newcred = crdup(oldcred);
/* Copy the privilege sets from prpriv to newcred */
bcopy(prpriv->pr_sets, CR_PRIVSETS(newcred), PRIV_SETBYTES);
cp = &newcred->cr_priv;
ocp = &oldcred->cr_priv;
eset = CR_OEPRIV(cr);
priv_intersect(&CR_LPRIV(oldcred), &eset);
/*
* Verify the constraints laid out:
* for the limit set, we require that the new set is a subset
* of the old limit set.
* for all other sets, we require that the new set is either a
* subset of the old set or a subset of the intersection of
* the old limit set and the effective set of the acting process.
*/
for (i = 0; i < PRIV_NSET; i++)
if (!priv_issubset(&cp->crprivs[i], &ocp->crprivs[i]) &&
(i == PRIV_LIMIT || !priv_issubset(&cp->crprivs[i], &eset)))
break;
crfree(oldcred);
if (i < PRIV_NSET || !priv_valid(newcred))
goto err;
/* Load the settable privilege information */
if (prpriv->pr_infosize > 0) {
char *x = (char *)prpriv + PRIV_PRPRIV_INFO_OFFSET(prpriv);
char *lastx = x + prpriv->pr_infosize;
while (x < lastx) {
priv_info_t *pi = (priv_info_t *)x;
priv_info_uint_t *pii;
switch (pi->priv_info_type) {
case PRIV_INFO_FLAGS:
pii = (priv_info_uint_t *)x;
if (pii->info.priv_info_size != sizeof (*pii)) {
err = EINVAL;
goto err;
}
CR_FLAGS(newcred) &= ~PRIV_USER;
CR_FLAGS(newcred) |= (pii->val & PRIV_USER);
break;
default:
err = EINVAL;
goto err;
}
/* Guarantee alignment and forward progress */
if ((pi->priv_info_size & (sizeof (uint32_t) - 1)) ||
pi->priv_info_size < sizeof (*pi) ||
lastx - x > pi->priv_info_size) {
err = EINVAL;
goto err;
}
x += pi->priv_info_size;
}
}
/*
* We'll try to copy the privilege aware flag; but since the
* privileges sets are all individually set, they are set
* as if we're privilege aware. If PRIV_AWARE wasn't set
* or was explicitely unset, we need to set the flag and then
* try to get rid of it.
*/
if ((CR_FLAGS(newcred) & PRIV_AWARE) == 0) {
CR_FLAGS(newcred) |= PRIV_AWARE;
priv_adjust_PA(newcred);
}
mutex_enter(&p->p_crlock);
oldcred = p->p_cred;
p->p_cred = newcred;
mutex_exit(&p->p_crlock);
crfree(oldcred);
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
return (0);
err:
crfree(newcred);
mutex_enter(&p->p_lock);
return (err);
}
void
cred_init(void)
{
priv_init();
crsize = sizeof (cred_t);
if (get_c2audit_load() > 0) {
#ifdef _LP64
/* assure audit context is 64-bit aligned */
audoff = (crsize +
sizeof (int64_t) - 1) & ~(sizeof (int64_t) - 1);
#else /* _LP64 */
audoff = crsize;
#endif /* _LP64 */
crsize = audoff + sizeof (auditinfo_addr_t);
crsize = (crsize + sizeof (int) - 1) & ~(sizeof (int) - 1);
}
cred_cache = kmem_cache_create("cred_cache", crsize, 0,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
/*
* dummycr is used to copy initial state for creds.
*/
dummycr = cralloc();
bzero(dummycr, crsize);
dummycr->cr_ref = 1;
dummycr->cr_uid = (uid_t)-1;
dummycr->cr_gid = (gid_t)-1;
dummycr->cr_ruid = (uid_t)-1;
dummycr->cr_rgid = (gid_t)-1;
dummycr->cr_suid = (uid_t)-1;
dummycr->cr_sgid = (gid_t)-1;
/*
* kcred is used by anything that needs all privileges; it's
* also the template used for crget as it has all the compatible
* sets filled in.
*/
kcred = cralloc();
bzero(kcred, crsize);
kcred->cr_ref = 1;
/* kcred is never freed, so we don't need zone_cred_hold here */
kcred->cr_zone = &zone0;
priv_fillset(&CR_LPRIV(kcred));
CR_IPRIV(kcred) = *priv_basic;
/* Not a basic privilege, if chown is not restricted add it to I0 */
if (!rstchown)
priv_addset(&CR_IPRIV(kcred), PRIV_FILE_CHOWN_SELF);
/* Basic privilege, if link is restricted remove it from I0 */
if (rstlink)
priv_delset(&CR_IPRIV(kcred), PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY);
CR_EPRIV(kcred) = CR_PPRIV(kcred) = CR_IPRIV(kcred);
CR_FLAGS(kcred) = NET_MAC_AWARE;
/*
* Set up credentials of p0.
*/
ttoproc(curthread)->p_cred = kcred;
curthread->t_cred = kcred;
ucredsize = UCRED_SIZE;
mutex_init(&ephemeral_zone_mutex, NULL, MUTEX_DEFAULT, NULL);
zone_key_create(&ephemeral_zone_key, NULL, NULL, destroy_ephemeral_zsd);
}
