static CURLcode gskit_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
const gsk_cert_data_elem *cdev;
int cdec;
const gsk_cert_data_elem *p;
const char *cert = (const char *) NULL;
const char *certend;
const char *ptr;
int i;
CURLcode result;
/* SSL handshake done: gather certificate info and verify host. */
if(gskit_status(data, gsk_attribute_get_cert_info(connssl->handle,
GSK_PARTNER_CERT_INFO,
&cdev, &cdec),
"gsk_attribute_get_cert_info()", CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR) ==
CURLE_OK) {
infof(data, "Server certificate:\n");
p = cdev;
for(i = 0; i++ < cdec; p++)
switch (p->cert_data_id) {
case CERT_BODY_DER:
cert = p->cert_data_p;
certend = cert + cdev->cert_data_l;
break;
case CERT_DN_PRINTABLE:
infof(data, "\t subject: %.*s\n", p->cert_data_l, p->cert_data_p);
break;
case CERT_ISSUER_DN_PRINTABLE:
infof(data, "\t issuer: %.*s\n", p->cert_data_l, p->cert_data_p);
break;
case CERT_VALID_FROM:
infof(data, "\t start date: %.*s\n", p->cert_data_l, p->cert_data_p);
break;
case CERT_VALID_TO:
infof(data, "\t expire date: %.*s\n", p->cert_data_l, p->cert_data_p);
break;
}
}
/* Verify host. */
result = Curl_verifyhost(conn, cert, certend);
if(result)
return result;
/* The only place GSKit can get the whole CA chain is a validation
callback where no user data pointer is available. Therefore it's not
possible to copy this chain into our structures for CAINFO.
However the server certificate may be available, thus we can return
info about it. */
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) {
result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, 1);
if(result)
return result;
if(cert) {
result = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, 0, cert, certend);
if(result)
return result;
}
}
/* Check pinned public key. */
ptr = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
if(!result && ptr) {
curl_X509certificate x509;
curl_asn1Element *p;
if(!cert)
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
Curl_parseX509(&x509, cert, certend);
p = &x509.subjectPublicKeyInfo;
result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, ptr, p->header, p->end - p->header);
if(result) {
failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
return result;
}
}
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode Curl_qsossl_handshake(struct connectdata * conn, int sockindex)
{
int rc;
struct SessionHandle * data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data * connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
SSLHandle * h = connssl->handle;
long timeout_ms;
h->exitPgm = data->set.ssl.verifypeer? NULL: Curl_qsossl_trap_cert;
/* figure out how long time we should wait at maximum */
timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* time-out, bail out, go home */
failf(data, "Connection time-out");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
/* SSL_Handshake() timeout resolution is second, so round up. */
h->timeout = (timeout_ms + 1000 - 1) / 1000;
/* Set-up protocol. */
switch (data->set.ssl.version) {
default:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
h->protocol = SSL_VERSION_CURRENT; /* TLSV1 compat. SSLV[23]. */
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
h->protocol = TLS_VERSION_1;
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
h->protocol = SSL_VERSION_2;
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
h->protocol = SSL_VERSION_3;
break;
}
h->peerCert = NULL;
h->peerCertLen = 0;
rc = SSL_Handshake(h, SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT);
switch (rc) {
case 0: /* No error. */
break;
case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_SIG:
case SSL_ERROR_NOT_TRUSTED_ROOT:
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE:
case SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS:
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
case SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_REJECTED:
case SSL_ERROR_CERT_EXPIRED:
case SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE:
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
case SSL_ERROR_IO:
failf(data, "SSL_Handshake() I/O error: %s", strerror(errno));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
default:
failf(data, "SSL_Handshake(): %s", SSL_Strerror(rc, NULL));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* Verify host. */
rc = Curl_verifyhost(conn, h->peerCert, h->peerCert + h->peerCertLen);
if(rc != CURLE_OK)
return rc;
/* Gather certificate info. */
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) {
if(Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, 1))
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
if(h->peerCert) {
rc = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, 0, h->peerCert,
h->peerCert + h->peerCertLen);
if(rc != CURLE_OK)
return rc;
}
}
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode gskit_connect_step3(struct connectdata * conn, int sockindex)
{
struct SessionHandle * data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data * connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
const gsk_cert_data_elem * cdev;
int cdec;
const gsk_cert_data_elem * p;
const char * cert = (const char *) NULL;
const char * certend;
int i;
CURLcode cc;
/* SSL handshake done: gather certificate info and verify host. */
if(gskit_status(data, gsk_attribute_get_cert_info(connssl->handle,
GSK_PARTNER_CERT_INFO,
&cdev, &cdec),
"gsk_attribute_get_cert_info()", CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR) ==
CURLE_OK) {
infof(data, "Server certificate:\n");
p = cdev;
for(i = 0; i++ < cdec; p++)
switch (p->cert_data_id) {
case CERT_BODY_DER:
cert = p->cert_data_p;
certend = cert + cdev->cert_data_l;
break;
case CERT_DN_PRINTABLE:
infof(data, "\t subject: %.*s\n", p->cert_data_l, p->cert_data_p);
break;
case CERT_ISSUER_DN_PRINTABLE:
infof(data, "\t issuer: %.*s\n", p->cert_data_l, p->cert_data_p);
break;
case CERT_VALID_FROM:
infof(data, "\t start date: %.*s\n", p->cert_data_l, p->cert_data_p);
break;
case CERT_VALID_TO:
infof(data, "\t expire date: %.*s\n", p->cert_data_l, p->cert_data_p);
break;
}
}
/* Verify host. */
cc = Curl_verifyhost(conn, cert, certend);
if(cc != CURLE_OK)
return cc;
/* The only place GSKit can get the whole CA chain is a validation
callback where no user data pointer is available. Therefore it's not
possible to copy this chain into our structures for CAINFO.
However the server certificate may be available, thus we can return
info about it. */
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) {
if(Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, 1))
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
if(cert) {
cc = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, 0, cert, certend);
if(cc != CURLE_OK)
return cc;
}
}
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode
gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
unsigned int cert_list_size;
const gnutls_datum_t *chainp;
unsigned int verify_status = 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_t x509_cert, x509_issuer;
gnutls_datum_t issuerp;
char certbuf[256] = ""; /* big enough? */
size_t size;
unsigned int algo;
unsigned int bits;
time_t certclock;
const char *ptr;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
gnutls_session_t session = conn->ssl[sockindex].session;
int rc;
bool incache;
void *ssl_sessionid;
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
gnutls_datum_t proto;
#endif
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
gnutls_protocol_t version = gnutls_protocol_get_version(session);
/* the name of the cipher suite used, e.g. ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. */
ptr = gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(gnutls_kx_get(session),
gnutls_cipher_get(session),
gnutls_mac_get(session));
infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n",
gnutls_protocol_get_name(version), ptr);
/* This function will return the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by
the peer. These certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for
X.509). In case of a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The
first certificate in the list is the peer's certificate, following the
issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. */
chainp = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if(!chainp) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer ||
data->set.ssl.verifyhost ||
data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
&& data->set.ssl.username != NULL
&& !data->set.ssl.verifypeer
&& gnutls_cipher_get(session)) {
/* no peer cert, but auth is ok if we have SRP user and cipher and no
peer verify */
}
else {
#endif
failf(data, "failed to get server cert");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
}
#endif
}
infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
}
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo && chainp) {
unsigned int i;
result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, cert_list_size);
if(result)
return result;
for(i = 0; i < cert_list_size; i++) {
const char *beg = (const char *) chainp[i].data;
const char *end = beg + chainp[i].size;
result = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, i, beg, end);
if(result)
return result;
}
}
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its
status (trusted, invalid etc.). The value of status should be one or
more of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements bitwise
or'd. To avoid denial of service attacks some default upper limits
regarding the certificate key size and chain size are set. To override
them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). */
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify_status);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "server cert verify failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* verify_status is a bitmask of gnutls_certificate_status bits */
if(verify_status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate verification failed. CAfile: %s "
"CRLfile: %s", data->set.ssl.CAfile?data->set.ssl.CAfile:"none",
data->set.ssl.CRLfile?data->set.ssl.CRLfile:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification OK\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification SKIPPED\n");
#ifdef HAS_OCSP
if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
if(gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(session, 0) == 0) {
gnutls_datum_t status_request;
gnutls_ocsp_resp_t ocsp_resp;
gnutls_ocsp_cert_status_t status;
gnutls_x509_crl_reason_t reason;
rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(session, &status_request);
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification FAILED\n");
if(rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
failf(data, "No OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&ocsp_resp);
rc = gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(ocsp_resp, &status_request);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
rc = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_single(ocsp_resp, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&status, NULL, NULL, NULL, &reason);
switch(status) {
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_GOOD:
break;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_REVOKED: {
const char *crl_reason;
switch(reason) {
default:
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_UNSPECIFIED:
crl_reason = "unspecified reason";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_KEYCOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "private key compromised";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CACOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "CA compromised";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_AFFILIATIONCHANGED:
crl_reason = "affiliation has changed";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_SUPERSEDED:
crl_reason = "certificate superseded";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CESSATIONOFOPERATION:
crl_reason = "operation has ceased";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CERTIFICATEHOLD:
crl_reason = "certificate is on hold";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_REMOVEFROMCRL:
crl_reason = "will be removed from delta CRL";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_PRIVILEGEWITHDRAWN:
crl_reason = "privilege withdrawn";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_AACOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "AA compromised";
break;
}
failf(data, "Server certificate was revoked: %s", crl_reason);
break;
}
default:
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
failf(data, "Server certificate status is unknown");
break;
}
gnutls_ocsp_resp_deinit(ocsp_resp);
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification OK\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification SKIPPED\n");
#endif
/* initialize an X.509 certificate structure. */
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_cert);
if(chainp)
/* convert the given DER or PEM encoded Certificate to the native
gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if(data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_issuer);
issuerp = load_file(data->set.ssl.issuercert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_issuer, &issuerp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(x509_cert, x509_issuer);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_issuer);
unload_file(issuerp);
if(rc <= 0) {
failf(data, "server certificate issuer check failed (IssuerCert: %s)",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
infof(data, "\t server certificate issuer check OK (Issuer Cert: %s)\n",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
}
size=sizeof(certbuf);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(x509_cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME,
0, /* the first and only one */
FALSE,
certbuf,
&size);
if(rc) {
infof(data, "error fetching CN from cert:%s\n",
gnutls_strerror(rc));
}
/* This function will check if the given certificate's subject matches the
given hostname. This is a basic implementation of the matching described
in RFC2818 (HTTPS), which takes into account wildcards, and the subject
alternative name PKIX extension. Returns non zero on success, and zero on
failure. */
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509_cert, conn->host.name);
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x030306
/* Before 3.3.6, gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname() didn't check IP
addresses. */
if(!rc) {
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
#define use_addr in6_addr
#else
#define use_addr in_addr
#endif
unsigned char addrbuf[sizeof(struct use_addr)];
unsigned char certaddr[sizeof(struct use_addr)];
size_t addrlen = 0, certaddrlen;
int i;
int ret = 0;
if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, addrbuf) > 0)
addrlen = 4;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, addrbuf) > 0)
addrlen = 16;
#endif
if(addrlen) {
for(i=0; ; i++) {
certaddrlen = sizeof(certaddr);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject_alt_name(x509_cert, i, certaddr,
&certaddrlen, NULL);
/* If this happens, it wasn't an IP address. */
if(ret == GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
continue;
if(ret < 0)
break;
if(ret != GNUTLS_SAN_IPADDRESS)
continue;
if(certaddrlen == addrlen && !memcmp(addrbuf, certaddr, addrlen)) {
rc = 1;
break;
}
}
}
}
#endif
if(!rc) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name (%s) does not match "
"target host name '%s'", certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", certbuf);
/* Check for time-based validity */
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server cert expiration date verify failed");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date verify FAILED\n");
}
else {
if(certclock < time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate expiration date has passed.");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date OK\n");
}
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server cert activation date verify failed");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date verify FAILED\n");
}
else {
if(certclock > time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate not activated yet.");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date OK\n");
}
ptr = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
if(ptr) {
result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, x509_cert, ptr);
if(result != CURLE_OK) {
failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return result;
}
}
/* Show:
- subject
- start date
- expire date
- common name
- issuer
*/
/* public key algorithm's parameters */
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(x509_cert, &bits);
infof(data, "\t certificate public key: %s\n",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name(algo));
/* version of the X.509 certificate. */
infof(data, "\t certificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(x509_cert));
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", certbuf);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "start date", certclock);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "expire date", certclock);
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
/* compression algorithm (if any) */
ptr = gnutls_compression_get_name(gnutls_compression_get(session));
/* the *_get_name() says "NULL" if GNUTLS_COMP_NULL is returned */
infof(data, "\t compression: %s\n", ptr);
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
if(data->set.ssl_enable_alpn) {
rc = gnutls_alpn_get_selected_protocol(session, &proto);
if(rc == 0) {
infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", proto.size,
proto.data);
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(proto.size == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
!memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, proto.data,
NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
}
else
#endif
if(proto.size == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
!memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, proto.data, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
}
}
else
infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
}
#endif
conn->ssl[sockindex].state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = gtls_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = gtls_send;
{
/* we always unconditionally get the session id here, as even if we
already got it from the cache and asked to use it in the connection, it
might've been rejected and then a new one is in use now and we need to
detect that. */
void *connect_sessionid;
size_t connect_idsize = 0;
/* get the session ID data size */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &connect_idsize);
connect_sessionid = malloc(connect_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */
if(connect_sessionid) {
/* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize);
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL));
if(incache) {
/* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the
previous one was rejected, we just kill that and store the new */
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid);
}
/* store this session id */
result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, connect_sessionid, connect_idsize);
if(result) {
free(connect_sessionid);
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
else
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return result;
}
static void display_conn_info(struct connectdata *conn, PRFileDesc *sock)
{
SSLChannelInfo channel;
SSLCipherSuiteInfo suite;
CERTCertificate *cert;
CERTCertificate *cert2;
CERTCertificate *cert3;
PRTime now;
int i;
if(SSL_GetChannelInfo(sock, &channel, sizeof channel) ==
SECSuccess && channel.length == sizeof channel &&
channel.cipherSuite) {
if(SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channel.cipherSuite,
&suite, sizeof suite) == SECSuccess) {
infof(conn->data, "SSL connection using %s\n", suite.cipherSuiteName);
}
}
cert = SSL_PeerCertificate(sock);
if(cert) {
infof(conn->data, "Server certificate:\n");
if(!conn->data->set.ssl.certinfo) {
display_cert_info(conn->data, cert);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
}
else {
/* Count certificates in chain. */
now = PR_Now();
i = 1;
if(!cert->isRoot) {
cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);
while(cert2) {
i++;
if(cert2->isRoot) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
break;
}
cert3 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert2, now, certUsageSSLCA);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);
cert2 = cert3;
}
}
Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(conn->data, i);
for(i = 0; cert; cert = cert2) {
Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, i++, (char *)cert->derCert.data,
(char *)cert->derCert.data + cert->derCert.len);
if(cert->isRoot) {
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
break;
}
cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);
CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
}
}
}
return;
}
