HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void)
{
HMAC_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
if (ctx != NULL) {
if (!HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx)) {
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
return NULL;
}
}
return ctx;
}
int compute_keys(UNUSED REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *peer_confirm, uint8_t *msk, uint8_t *emsk)
{
HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
uint8_t mk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *cruft;
uint8_t session_id[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1];
uint8_t msk_emsk[128]; /* 64 each */
int offset;
MEM(cruft = talloc_array(session, uint8_t, BN_num_bytes(session->prime)));
MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
/*
* first compute the session-id = TypeCode | H(ciphersuite | scal_p |
* scal_s)
*/
session_id[0] = FR_EAP_METHOD_PWD;
HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&session->ciphersuite, sizeof(session->ciphersuite));
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->peer_scalar);
memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
BN_bn2bin(session->peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->my_scalar);
memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
BN_bn2bin(session->my_scalar, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
pwd_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&session_id[1]);
/* then compute MK = H(k | commit-peer | commit-server) */
HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(session->k);
BN_bn2bin(session->k, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, peer_confirm, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, session->my_confirm, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
pwd_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, mk);
/* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */
eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, (char const *)session_id,
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1, msk_emsk, 1024); /* it's bits, ((64 + 64) * 8) */
memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, 64);
memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + 64, 64);
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
talloc_free(cruft);
return 0;
}
krb5_error_code
_krb5_evp_hmac_iov(krb5_context context,
krb5_crypto crypto,
struct _krb5_key_data *key,
const struct krb5_crypto_iov *iov,
int niov,
void *hmac,
unsigned int *hmaclen,
const EVP_MD *md,
ENGINE *engine)
{
HMAC_CTX *ctx;
krb5_data current = {0, 0};
int i;
if (crypto != NULL) {
if (crypto->hmacctx == NULL)
crypto->hmacctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
ctx = crypto->hmacctx;
} else {
ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
}
if (ctx == NULL)
return krb5_enomem(context);
HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key->key->keyvalue.data, key->key->keyvalue.length,
md, engine);
for (i = 0; i < niov; i++) {
if (_krb5_crypto_iov_should_sign(&iov[i])) {
if ((char *)current.data + current.length == iov[i].data.data) {
current.length += iov[i].data.length;
} else {
if (current.data)
HMAC_Update(ctx, current.data, current.length);
current = iov[i].data;
}
}
}
if (current.data)
HMAC_Update(ctx, current.data, current.length);
HMAC_Final(ctx, hmac, hmaclen);
if (crypto == NULL)
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
unsigned char *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, int key_len,
const unsigned char *d, size_t n, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *md_len)
{
HMAC_CTX *c = NULL;
static unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (md == NULL)
md = m;
if ((c = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(c, key, key_len, evp_md, NULL))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(c, d, n))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Final(c, md, md_len))
goto err;
HMAC_CTX_free(c);
return md;
err:
HMAC_CTX_free(c);
return NULL;
}
static void
xmlSecOpenSSLHmacFinalize(xmlSecTransformPtr transform) {
xmlSecOpenSSLHmacCtxPtr ctx;
xmlSecAssert(xmlSecOpenSSLHmacCheckId(transform));
xmlSecAssert(xmlSecTransformCheckSize(transform, xmlSecOpenSSLHmacSize));
ctx = xmlSecOpenSSLHmacGetCtx(transform);
xmlSecAssert(ctx != NULL);
if(ctx->hmacCtx != NULL) {
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->hmacCtx);
}
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(xmlSecOpenSSLHmacCtx));
}
static int openssl_hmac(lua_State *L)
{
if (lua_istable(L, 1))
{
if (lua_getmetatable(L, 1) && lua_equal(L, 1, -1))
{
lua_pop(L, 1);
lua_remove(L, 1);
}
else
luaL_error(L, "call function with invalid state");
}
{
const EVP_MD *type = get_digest(L, 1);
size_t len;
const char *dat = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &len);
size_t l;
const char *k = luaL_checklstring(L, 3, &l);
int raw = (lua_isnoneornil(L, 4)) ? 0 : lua_toboolean(L, 4);
ENGINE* e = lua_isnoneornil(L, 5) ? NULL : CHECK_OBJECT(5, ENGINE, "openssl.engine");
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *c = HMAC_CTX_new();
HMAC_Init_ex(c, k, (int)l, type, e);
HMAC_Update(c, (unsigned char *)dat, len);
len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
HMAC_Final(c, digest, (unsigned int*)&len);
HMAC_CTX_free(c);
if (raw)
lua_pushlstring(L, (char *)digest, len);
else
{
char hex[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1];
to_hex((const char*)digest, len, hex);
lua_pushstring(L, hex);
}
}
return 1;
}
/* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
static void eap_pwd_kdf(uint8_t *key, int keylen, char const *label,
int label_len, uint8_t *retult, int retult_bit_len)
{
HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx;
uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
uint16_t i, ctr, L;
int retult_byte_len, len = 0;
unsigned int mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
uint8_t mask = 0xff;
MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
retult_byte_len = (retult_bit_len + 7) / 8;
ctr = 0;
L = htons(retult_bit_len);
while (len < retult_byte_len) {
ctr++; i = htons(ctr);
HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, key, keylen, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
if (ctr > 1) HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, digest, mdlen);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *) &i, sizeof(uint16_t));
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)label, label_len);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *) &L, sizeof(uint16_t));
HMAC_Final(hmac_ctx, digest, &mdlen);
if ((len + (int) mdlen) > retult_byte_len) {
memcpy(retult + len, digest, retult_byte_len - len);
} else {
memcpy(retult + len, digest, mdlen);
}
len += mdlen;
HMAC_CTX_reset(hmac_ctx);
}
/* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
if (retult_bit_len % 8) {
mask <<= (8 - (retult_bit_len % 8));
retult[retult_byte_len - 1] &= mask;
}
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
}
static void kderive_update(struct kderive_context *ctx)
{
uint32_t i;
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010002f)
HMAC_CTX hctx;
#endif
HMAC_CTX *phctx = NULL;
unsigned char *pos = ctx->out;
uint32_t *p_iter = (uint32_t *)ctx->fid;
uint32_t num_iters = ctx->out_len / PRF_OUTPUT_SIZE;
check_prf_iters(num_iters);
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010002f)
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
phctx = &hctx;
#else
phctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
/* I guess we presume it was successful? */
#endif
for (i = 0; i < num_iters; i++) {
/*
* update the iteration number in the fid
*/
*p_iter = htobe32(i);
HMAC_Init_ex(phctx,
ctx->pkey, ctx->pkey_len >> 3,
EVP_sha256(),
NULL);
HMAC_Update(phctx, ctx->fid, ctx->fid_len);
HMAC_Final(phctx, pos, NULL);
pos += PRF_OUTPUT_SIZE;
}
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010002f)
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(phctx);
#else
HMAC_CTX_free(phctx);
#endif
}
void winpr_HMAC_Free(WINPR_HMAC_CTX* ctx)
{
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
HMAC_CTX* hmac = (HMAC_CTX*) ctx;
if (hmac)
{
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmac);
free(hmac);
#else
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
#endif
}
#elif defined(WITH_MBEDTLS)
mbedtls_md_context_t* hmac = (mbedtls_md_context_t*) ctx;
if (hmac)
{
mbedtls_md_free(hmac);
free(hmac);
}
#endif
}
static int sqlcipher_openssl_hmac(void *ctx, int algorithm, unsigned char *hmac_key, int key_sz, unsigned char *in, int in_sz, unsigned char *in2, int in2_sz, unsigned char *out) {
unsigned int outlen;
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
HMAC_CTX* hctx = NULL;
if(in == NULL) goto error;
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if(hctx == NULL) goto error;
switch(algorithm) {
case SQLCIPHER_HMAC_SHA1:
if(!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, hmac_key, key_sz, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) goto error;
break;
case SQLCIPHER_HMAC_SHA256:
if(!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, hmac_key, key_sz, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) goto error;
break;
case SQLCIPHER_HMAC_SHA512:
if(!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, hmac_key, key_sz, EVP_sha512(), NULL)) goto error;
break;
default:
goto error;
}
if(!HMAC_Update(hctx, in, in_sz)) goto error;
if(in2 != NULL) {
if(!HMAC_Update(hctx, in2, in2_sz)) goto error;
}
if(!HMAC_Final(hctx, out, &outlen)) goto error;
goto cleanup;
error:
rc = SQLITE_ERROR;
cleanup:
if(hctx) HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return rc;
}
HMACCTX hmac_init(const void *key, int len, enum ssh_hmac_e type) {
HMACCTX ctx = NULL;
ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
#ifndef OLD_CRYPTO
HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx); // openssl 0.9.7 requires it.
#endif
switch(type) {
case SSH_HMAC_SHA1:
HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
break;
case SSH_HMAC_SHA256:
HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
break;
case SSH_HMAC_SHA384:
HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha384(), NULL);
break;
case SSH_HMAC_SHA512:
HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha512(), NULL);
break;
case SSH_HMAC_MD5:
HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_md5(), NULL);
break;
default:
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
SAFE_FREE(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
return ctx;
}
/*
* Private
*/
static void
ossl_hmac_free(void *ctx)
{
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
}
HmacHash<HashCreator, DigestLength>::~HmacHash()
{
HMAC_CTX_free(_ctx);
}
int
res_tsig_sign(u_char * query,
size_t query_length,
struct name_server *ns,
u_char ** signed_query,
size_t *signed_length)
{
int buflen;
u_char *cp, *p;
u_char *hp;
HEADER *header;
struct timeval now;
HMAC_CTX *ctx;
const EVP_MD *md;
u_char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned int len;
u_int16_t arcount;
if (!signed_query || !signed_length)
return SR_TS_FAIL;
*signed_query = NULL;
*signed_length = 0;
if (query && query_length && query_length > sizeof(HEADER)) {
if (!(ns->ns_security_options & ZONE_USE_TSIG)) {
*signed_query = (u_char *) MALLOC(query_length * sizeof(u_char));
if (*signed_query == NULL)
return SR_TS_FAIL;
memcpy(*signed_query, query, query_length * sizeof(u_char));
*signed_length = query_length;
return SR_TS_OK;
} else if (!ns->ns_tsig) {
return SR_TS_FAIL;
}
switch(ns->ns_tsig->alg) {
case TSIG_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
md = EVP_md5();
break;
case TSIG_ALG_HMAC_SHA1:
md = EVP_sha1();
break;
case TSIG_ALG_HMAC_SHA256:
md = EVP_sha256();
break;
default:
return SR_TS_FAIL;
}
ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, ns->ns_tsig->key, ns->ns_tsig->keylen,
md, NULL);
/* Create a TSIG RR and add it to the additional section */
buflen = query_length + ns->ns_tsig->buf_size;
*signed_query = (u_char *) MALLOC(buflen * sizeof(u_char));
if (*signed_query == NULL)
return SR_TS_FAIL;
*signed_length = buflen;
cp = *signed_query;
p = cp;
memcpy(cp, query, query_length * sizeof(u_char));
cp += query_length;
HMAC_Update(ctx, p, cp-p);
/* Bump up the additional section count */
header = (HEADER *) p;
arcount = ntohs(header->arcount);
arcount++;
header->arcount = htons(arcount);;
p = cp;
memcpy(cp, ns->ns_tsig->name_n, wire_name_length(ns->ns_tsig->name_n));
cp += wire_name_length(ns->ns_tsig->name_n);
HMAC_Update(ctx, p, cp-p);
/* don't digest type */
RES_PUT16(ns_t_tsig, cp);
p = cp;
RES_PUT16(ns_t_any, cp);
RES_PUT32(0, cp);
HMAC_Update(ctx, p, cp-p);
/* don't digest rdatalen */
RES_PUT16(ns->ns_tsig->rdatalen, cp);
p = cp;
memcpy(cp, ns->ns_tsig->alg_n, wire_name_length(ns->ns_tsig->alg_n));
cp += wire_name_length(ns->ns_tsig->alg_n);
HMAC_Update(ctx, p, cp-p);
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
p = cp;
RES_PUT48((u_int64_t)now.tv_sec, cp);
RES_PUT16(ns->ns_tsig->fudge, cp);
HMAC_Update(ctx, p, cp-p);
/* don't digest the mac_size */
RES_PUT16(ns->ns_tsig->mac_size, cp);
/* save the location for the hmac */
hp = cp;
cp += ns->ns_tsig->mac_size;
/* don't digest the header ID */
RES_PUT16(ntohs(header->id), cp);
p = cp;
RES_PUT16(0, cp);
RES_PUT16(0, cp);
HMAC_Update(ctx, p, cp-p);
HMAC_Final(ctx, hash, &len);
if (len != ns->ns_tsig->mac_size) {
FREE(*signed_query);
*signed_query = NULL;
return SR_TS_FAIL;
}
memcpy(hp, hash, len);
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
return SR_TS_OK;
} else
return SR_TS_CALL_ERROR;
}
static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
{
HMAC_CTX_free(dctx->d.hmac.hctx);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&dctx->d.hmac, sizeof(DRBG_HMAC_CTX));
return 1;
}
void
hmac_ctx_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
{
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
}
int compute_peer_confirm(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, uint8_t *out, BN_CTX *bn_ctx)
{
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx = NULL;
uint8_t *cruft = NULL;
int offset, req = -1;
/*
* Each component of the cruft will be at most as big as the prime
*/
MEM(cruft = talloc_zero_array(session, uint8_t, BN_num_bytes(session->prime)));
MEM(x = BN_new());
MEM(y = BN_new());
/*
* commit is H(k | server_element | server_scalar | peer_element |
* peer_scalar | ciphersuite)
*/
MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
/*
* Zero the memory each time because this is mod prime math and some
* value may start with a few zeros and the previous one did not.
*
* First is k
*/
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(session->k);
BN_bn2bin(session->k, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
/*
* then peer element: x, y
*/
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->peer_element, x, y, bn_ctx)) {
REDEBUG("Unable to get coordinates of peer's element");
goto finish;
}
memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
/*
* and peer scalar
*/
memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->peer_scalar);
BN_bn2bin(session->peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
/*
* then server element: x, y
*/
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->my_element, x, y, bn_ctx)) {
REDEBUG("Unable to get coordinates of server element");
goto finish;
}
memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
BN_bn2bin(x, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
BN_bn2bin(y, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
/*
* and server scalar
*/
memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(session->prime));
offset = BN_num_bytes(session->order) - BN_num_bytes(session->my_scalar);
BN_bn2bin(session->my_scalar, cruft + offset);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(session->order));
/*
* finally, ciphersuite
*/
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&session->ciphersuite, sizeof(session->ciphersuite));
pwd_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, out);
req = 0;
finish:
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
talloc_free(cruft);
BN_free(x);
BN_free(y);
return req;
}
static void mz_crypt_hmac_free(void *handle)
{
mz_crypt_hmac *hmac = (mz_crypt_hmac *)handle;
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac->ctx);
}
static void
__hmac_sha1_cleanup(archive_hmac_sha1_ctx *ctx)
{
HMAC_CTX_free(*ctx);
*ctx = NULL;
}
int compute_password_element(REQUEST *request, pwd_session_t *session, uint16_t grp_num,
char const *password, int password_len,
char const *id_server, int id_server_len,
char const *id_peer, int id_peer_len,
uint32_t *token)
{
BIGNUM *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx = NULL;
uint8_t pwe_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *prf_buf = NULL, ctr;
int nid, is_odd, prime_bit_len, prime_byte_len, ret = 0;
switch (grp_num) { /* from IANA registry for IKE D-H groups */
case 19:
nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
break;
case 20:
nid = NID_secp384r1;
break;
case 21:
nid = NID_secp521r1;
break;
case 25:
nid = NID_X9_62_prime192v1;
break;
case 26:
nid = NID_secp224r1;
break;
default:
REDEBUG("Unknown group %d", grp_num);
error:
ret = -1;
goto finish;
}
session->pwe = NULL;
session->order = NULL;
session->prime = NULL;
session->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
if (!session->group) {
REDEBUG("Unable to create EC_GROUP");
goto error;
}
MEM(session->pwe = EC_POINT_new(session->group));
MEM(session->order = BN_new());
MEM(session->prime = BN_new());
MEM(rnd = BN_new());
MEM(cofactor = BN_new());
MEM(x_candidate = BN_new());
if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(session->group, session->prime, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
REDEBUG("Unable to get prime for GFp curve");
goto error;
}
if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(session->group, session->order, NULL)) {
REDEBUG("Unable to get order for curve");
goto error;
}
if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(session->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
REDEBUG("unable to get cofactor for curve");
goto error;
}
prime_bit_len = BN_num_bits(session->prime);
prime_byte_len = BN_num_bytes(session->prime);
MEM(prf_buf = talloc_zero_array(session, uint8_t, prime_byte_len));
MEM(hmac_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new());
ctr = 0;
for (;;) {
if (ctr > 10) {
REDEBUG("Unable to find random point on curve for group %d, something's fishy", grp_num);
goto error;
}
ctr++;
/*
* compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime
* pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
* counter)
*/
HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)token, sizeof(*token));
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_peer, id_peer_len);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)id_server, id_server_len);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t const *)password, password_len);
HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)&ctr, sizeof(ctr));
pwd_hmac_final(hmac_ctx, pwe_digest);
BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, rnd);
eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"), prf_buf, prime_bit_len);
BN_bin2bn(prf_buf, prime_byte_len, x_candidate);
/*
* eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..prime_bit_len but
* BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian
* number. If the prime_bit_len is not an even multiple of 8
* then excessive bits-- those _after_ prime_bit_len-- so now
* we have to shift right the amount we masked off.
*/
if (prime_bit_len % 8) BN_rshift(x_candidate, x_candidate, (8 - (prime_bit_len % 8)));
if (BN_ucmp(x_candidate, session->prime) >= 0) continue;
/*
* need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
* one...
*/
is_odd = BN_is_odd(rnd) ? 1 : 0;
/*
* solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we
* don't have a point
*/
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(session->group, session->pwe, x_candidate, is_odd, NULL)) {
continue;
}
/*
* If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be
* on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code
* says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't
* hurt just to be sure.
*/
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(session->group, session->pwe, NULL)) {
REDEBUG("Point is not on curve");
continue;
}
if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
/* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(session->group, session->pwe, NULL, session->pwe,
cofactor, NULL)) {
RDEBUG("Cannot multiply generator by order");
continue;
}
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(session->group, session->pwe)) {
REDEBUG("Point is at infinity");
continue;
}
}
/* if we got here then we have a new generator. */
break;
}
session->group_num = grp_num;
finish:
/* cleanliness and order.... */
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac_ctx);
BN_clear_free(cofactor);
BN_clear_free(x_candidate);
BN_clear_free(rnd);
talloc_free(prf_buf);
return ret;
}
static int openssl_hmac_free(lua_State *L)
{
HMAC_CTX *c = CHECK_OBJECT(1, HMAC_CTX, "openssl.hmac_ctx");
HMAC_CTX_free(c);
return 0;
}
HMACAuth::~HMACAuth()
{
HMAC_CTX_free(_hmacContext);
}
static unsigned char *HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
{
HMAC_CTX *hmac;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t done_len = 0, dig_len = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
size_t n = okm_len / dig_len;
if (okm_len % dig_len)
n++;
if (n > 255 || okm == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
size_t copy_len;
const unsigned char ctr = i;
if (i > 1) {
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
goto err;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
goto err;
copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
okm_len - done_len :
dig_len;
memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
done_len += copy_len;
}
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
return okm;
err:
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
return NULL;
}
static bool _cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha(cjose_jws_t *jws, const cjose_jwk_t *jwk, cjose_err *err)
{
bool retval = false;
HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
// make sure we have an alg header
json_t *alg_obj = json_object_get(jws->hdr, CJOSE_HDR_ALG);
if (NULL == alg_obj)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_INVALID_ARG);
return false;
}
const char *alg = json_string_value(alg_obj);
// build digest using SHA-256/384/512 digest algorithm
const EVP_MD *digest_alg = NULL;
if (strcmp(alg, CJOSE_HDR_ALG_HS256) == 0)
digest_alg = EVP_sha256();
else if (strcmp(alg, CJOSE_HDR_ALG_HS384) == 0)
digest_alg = EVP_sha384();
else if (strcmp(alg, CJOSE_HDR_ALG_HS512) == 0)
digest_alg = EVP_sha512();
if (NULL == digest_alg)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_CRYPTO);
goto _cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha_cleanup;
}
// allocate buffer for digest
jws->dig_len = EVP_MD_size(digest_alg);
jws->dig = (uint8_t *)cjose_get_alloc()(jws->dig_len);
if (NULL == jws->dig)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_NO_MEMORY);
goto _cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha_cleanup;
}
// instantiate and initialize a new mac digest context
#if defined(CJOSE_OPENSSL_11X)
ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
#else
ctx = cjose_get_alloc()(sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
#endif
if (NULL == ctx)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_NO_MEMORY);
goto _cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha_cleanup;
}
#if !defined(CJOSE_OPENSSL_11X)
HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
#endif
// create digest as DIGEST(B64U(HEADER).B64U(DATA))
if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, jwk->keydata, jwk->keysize / 8, digest_alg, NULL) != 1)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_CRYPTO);
goto _cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha_cleanup;
}
if (HMAC_Update(ctx, (const unsigned char *)jws->hdr_b64u, jws->hdr_b64u_len) != 1)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_CRYPTO);
goto _cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha_cleanup;
}
if (HMAC_Update(ctx, (const unsigned char *)".", 1) != 1)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_CRYPTO);
goto _cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha_cleanup;
}
if (HMAC_Update(ctx, (const unsigned char *)jws->dat_b64u, jws->dat_b64u_len) != 1)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_CRYPTO);
goto _cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha_cleanup;
}
if (HMAC_Final(ctx, jws->dig, NULL) != 1)
{
CJOSE_ERROR(err, CJOSE_ERR_CRYPTO);
goto _cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha_cleanup;
}
// if we got this far - success
retval = true;
_cjose_jws_build_dig_hmac_sha_cleanup:
if (NULL != ctx)
{
#if defined(CJOSE_OPENSSL_11X)
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
#else
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
cjose_get_dealloc()(ctx);
#endif
}
return retval;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
int i;
char *p;
# endif
int err = 0;
HMAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx2 = NULL;
unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int len;
# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
printf("test skipped: MD5 disabled\n");
# else
# ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
ebcdic2ascii(test[0].data, test[0].data, test[0].data_len);
ebcdic2ascii(test[1].data, test[1].data, test[1].data_len);
ebcdic2ascii(test[2].key, test[2].key, test[2].key_len);
ebcdic2ascii(test[2].data, test[2].data, test[2].data_len);
# endif
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
p = pt(HMAC(EVP_md5(),
test[i].key, test[i].key_len,
test[i].data, test[i].data_len, NULL, NULL),
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[i].digest) != 0) {
printf("Error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i);
printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[i].digest);
err++;
} else
printf("test %d ok\n", i);
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_MD5 */
/* test4 */
ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
printf("HMAC malloc failure (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto end;
}
if (HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx) != NULL) {
printf("Message digest not NULL for HMAC (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto test5;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD and key (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto test5;
}
if (HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto test5;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty key (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto test5;
}
if (HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 4)\n");
err++;
goto test5;
}
printf("test 4 ok\n");
test5:
/* Test 5 has empty key; test that single-shot accepts a NULL key. */
p = pt(HMAC(EVP_sha1(), NULL, 0, test[4].data, test[4].data_len,
NULL, NULL), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[4].digest) != 0) {
printf("Error calculating HMAC on %d entry'\n", i);
printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[4].digest);
err++;
}
HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx);
if (HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx) != NULL) {
printf("Message digest not NULL for HMAC (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with empty MD (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
printf("Should fail HMAC_Update with ctx not set up (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[4].key, -1, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
printf("Should fail to initialise HMAC with invalid key len(test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[4].data, test[4].data_len)) {
printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len)) {
printf("Error finalising data (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
p = pt(buf, len);
if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[4].digest) != 0) {
printf("Error calculating interim HMAC on test 5\n");
printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[4].digest);
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
printf("Should disallow changing MD without a new key (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[5].key, test[5].key_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (HMAC_CTX_get_md(ctx) != EVP_sha256()) {
printf("Unexpected message digest for HMAC (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[5].data, test[5].data_len)) {
printf("Error updating HMAC with data (sha256) (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len)) {
printf("Error finalising data (sha256) (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
p = pt(buf, len);
if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[5].digest) != 0) {
printf("Error calculating 2nd interim HMAC on test 5\n");
printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[5].digest);
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[6].key, test[6].key_len, NULL, NULL)) {
printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC with key (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[6].data, test[6].data_len)) {
printf("Error updating HMAC with data (new key) (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
if (!HMAC_Final(ctx, buf, &len)) {
printf("Error finalising data (new key) (test 5)\n");
err++;
goto test6;
}
p = pt(buf, len);
if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[6].digest) != 0) {
printf("error calculating HMAC on test 5\n");
printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[6].digest);
err++;
} else {
printf("test 5 ok\n");
}
test6:
HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx);
ctx2 = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (ctx2 == NULL) {
printf("HMAC malloc failure (test 6)\n");
err++;
goto end;
}
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, test[7].key, test[7].key_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL)) {
printf("Failed to initialise HMAC (test 6)\n");
err++;
goto end;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(ctx, test[7].data, test[7].data_len)) {
printf("Error updating HMAC with data (test 6)\n");
err++;
goto end;
}
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(ctx2, ctx)) {
printf("Failed to copy HMAC_CTX (test 6)\n");
err++;
goto end;
}
if (!HMAC_Final(ctx2, buf, &len)) {
printf("Error finalising data (test 6)\n");
err++;
goto end;
}
p = pt(buf, len);
if (strcmp(p, (char *)test[7].digest) != 0) {
printf("Error calculating HMAC on test 6\n");
printf("got %s instead of %s\n", p, test[7].digest);
err++;
} else {
printf("test 6 ok\n");
}
end:
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx2);
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
EXIT(err);
}
static void _hmac_md5_ctx_free_on_exit(void *arg)
{
HMAC_CTX_free(arg);
}
static int ntlm2_auth(krb5_context context, struct kcrap_auth_req_data *req,
int *errnum,
krb5_data *error_data, struct kcrap_data *extra)
{
int retval;
int nkeys;
struct keyblocks keyblocks[5];
HMAC_CTX *ctx;
unsigned char *tmpbuf;
int i, j;
unsigned char v2hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int v2hlen;
unsigned char resp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int resplen;
if (req->server_challenge.length < 1) {
*errnum = EINVAL;
error_data->data = strdup("Invalid server challenge length");
error_data->length = strlen(error_data->data);
return 0;
}
if (req->client_challenge.length < 1) {
*errnum = EINVAL;
error_data->data = strdup("Invalid client challenge length");
error_data->length = strlen(error_data->data);
return 0;
}
if (req->response.length != 16) {
*errnum = EINVAL;
error_data->data = strdup("Invalid response length");
error_data->length = strlen(error_data->data);
return 0;
}
nkeys = sizeof(keyblocks) / sizeof(struct keyblocks);
if ((retval = kcrap_getkey(context, req->principal, ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
&nkeys,
keyblocks)))
goto fail0;
tmpbuf = malloc((req->principal.length + req->alt_username.length) * 2);
if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
retval = errno;
perror("malloc");
goto fail;
}
j = 0;
for(i = 0; i < req->principal.length; i++) {
tmpbuf[j++] = toupper(req->principal.data[i]);
tmpbuf[j++] = 0;
}
for(i = 0; i < req->alt_username.length; i++) {
tmpbuf[j++] = req->alt_username.data[i];
tmpbuf[j++] = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (keyblocks[i].key.length != 16) continue;
HMAC(EVP_md5(), (unsigned char*)keyblocks[i].key.contents, 16, tmpbuf, j,
v2hash,
&v2hlen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
fprintf(stderr, "principal:\n");
dump_data(tmpbuf, j);
fprintf(stderr, "principal hash:\n");
dump_data(v2hash, v2hlen);
#endif
ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, v2hash, v2hlen, EVP_md5(), NULL);
HMAC_Update(ctx, (unsigned char*)req->server_challenge.data,
req->server_challenge.length);
HMAC_Update(ctx, (unsigned char*)req->client_challenge.data,
req->client_challenge.length);
HMAC_Final(ctx, resp, &resplen);
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
if (resplen != 16) {
if (tmpbuf) free(tmpbuf);
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keyblocks[i].key);
*errnum = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
error_data->data = strdup("Server internal error: NTLMv2 resplen != 16");
error_data->length = strlen(error_data->data);
return 0;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD
fprintf(stderr, "server challenge:\n");
dump_data(req->server_challenge.data, req->server_challenge.length);
fprintf(stderr, "client challenge:\n");
dump_data(req->client_challenge.data, req->client_challenge.length);
fprintf(stderr, "expected response:\n");
dump_data(resp, resplen);
fprintf(stderr, "client response:\n");
dump_data(req->response.data, req->response.length);
#endif
if (memcmp(resp, req->response.data, 16) == 0) {
*errnum = 0;
goto ok;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keyblocks[i].key);
*errnum = 0;
error_data->data = strdup("Invalid response");
error_data->length = strlen(error_data->data);
return 0;
ok:
if (tmpbuf) free(tmpbuf);
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keyblocks[i].key);
return KCRAP_AUTH_OK;
fail:
if (tmpbuf) free(tmpbuf);
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &keyblocks[i].key);
fail0:
*errnum = retval;
error_data->data = strdup(error_message(retval));
error_data->length = strlen(error_data->data);
return 0;
}
HmacHash::~HmacHash()
{
HMAC_CTX_free(m_ctx);
}