u_short
check_um(user_t *cptr, char *um)
{
if (strlen(um) > USERLEN)
return (cptr ? reply(OS, cptr->nick, "The usermask is too long.") : 1);
for (; *um; um++)
if (!IsUserChar(*um) && *um != '*' && *um != '?')
return (cptr ? reply(OS, cptr->nick, "The character '%c' is not allowed in your usermask.", *um) : 1);
return 0;
}
int ValidateUserWild( const char *username )
{
if( username == NULL )
return NS_FAILURE;
while( *username != '\0' )
{
if( !IsUserChar( *username ) && !IsWildChar( *username ) )
return NS_FAILURE;
username++;
}
return NS_SUCCESS;
}
/* clean_user_name()
*
* input - username
* output - none
* side effects - walks through the username, returning 0 if erroneous
*/
static int
clean_user_name(const char *user)
{
const char *p = user;
assert(user && *user);
for (; *p; ++p)
if (!IsUserChar(*p))
return 0;
return p - user <= USERLEN;
}
/*
* valid_username - check username for validity
*
* Inputs - pointer to user
* Output - YES if valid, NO if not
* Side effects - NONE
*
* Absolutely always reject any '*' '!' '?' '@' in an user name
* reject any odd control characters names.
* Allow '.' in username to allow for "first.last"
* style of username
*/
bool
valid_username(const char *username)
{
int dots = 0;
const char *p = username;
s_assert(NULL != p);
if(username == NULL)
return false;
if('~' == *p)
++p;
/* reject usernames that don't start with an alphanum
* i.e. reject jokers who have '-@somehost' or '.@somehost'
* or "-hi-@somehost", "h-----@somehost" would still be accepted.
*/
if(!IsAlNum(*p))
return false;
while(*++p)
{
if((*p == '.') && ConfigFileEntry.dots_in_ident)
{
dots++;
if(dots > ConfigFileEntry.dots_in_ident)
return false;
if(!IsUserChar(p[1]))
return false;
}
else if(!IsUserChar(*p))
return false;
}
return true;
}
/* clean_user_name()
*
* input - username
* output - none
* side effects - walks through the username, returning 0 if erroneous
*/
static int
clean_user_name(char *user)
{
s_assert(user);
if(user == NULL)
return 0;
for (; *user; user++)
{
if(!IsUserChar(*user))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
clean_username(const char *username)
{
int len = 0;
for (; *username; username++) {
len++;
if(!IsUserChar(*username))
return 0;
}
if(len > USERLEN)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* ms_svsident - server message handler
*
* parv[0] = sender prefix
* parv[1] = Target numeric
* parv[2] = New ident
*/
int ms_svsident(struct Client* cptr, struct Client* sptr, int parc, char* parv[])
{
struct Client *acptr;
char *s;
char *newident = NULL;
int legalident=1;
if (parc < 3)
return need_more_params(sptr, "SVSIDENT");
/* Ignore SVSIDENT for a user that has quit */
if (!(acptr = findNUser(parv[1])))
return 0;
if (IsChannelService(acptr))
return 0;
newident = strdup(parv[2]);
if (strlen(newident) > USERLEN)
return protocol_violation(sptr, "Ident too long in SVSIDENT command");
for (s = newident; *s; s++)
{
if (!IsUserChar(*s))
{
legalident = 0;
break;
}
}
if (legalident == 0)
return protocol_violation(sptr, "Illegal characters in SVSIDENT ident");
ircd_strncpy(cli_user(acptr)->username, newident, USERLEN);
ircd_strncpy(cli_username(acptr), newident, USERLEN);
sendcmdto_serv_butone(sptr, CMD_SVSIDENT, cptr, "%s%s %s", acptr->cli_user->server->cli_yxx,
acptr->cli_yxx, newident);
return 0;
}
/*
* valid_username - check username for validity
*
* Inputs - username
* Output - 1 for valid, 0 for invalid
*
* Absolutely always reject any '*' '!' '?' '@' '.' in an user name
* reject any odd control characters names.
*/
int irc_IsValidUsername(const char* username)
{
const char *p = username;
assert(0 != p);
if (*p=='\0')
return 0;
if ('~' == *p)
++p;
while (*p)
{
if (!IsUserChar(*p))
return 0;
++p;
}
return 1;
}
int eval_user_char(char c)
{
return (0 != IsUserChar(c));
}