/* * SecCmsSignedDataVerifySignerInfo - check the signatures. * * The digests were either calculated during decoding (and are stored in the * signedData itself) or set after decoding using SecCmsSignedDataSetDigests. * * The verification checks if the signing cert is valid and has a trusted chain * for the purpose specified by "policies". * * If trustRef is NULL the cert chain is verified and the VerificationStatus is set accordingly. * Otherwise a SecTrust object is returned for the caller to evaluate using SecTrustEvaluate(). */ OSStatus SecCmsSignedDataVerifySignerInfo(SecCmsSignedDataRef sigd, int i, SecKeychainRef keychainOrArray, CFTypeRef policies, SecTrustRef *trustRef) { SecCmsSignerInfoRef signerinfo; SecCmsContentInfoRef cinfo; SECOidData *algiddata; CSSM_DATA_PTR contentType, digest; OSStatus status, status2; cinfo = &(sigd->contentInfo); signerinfo = sigd->signerInfos[i]; /* Signature or digest level verificationStatus errors should supercede certificate level errors, so check the digest and signature first. */ /* Find digest and contentType for signerinfo */ algiddata = SecCmsSignerInfoGetDigestAlg(signerinfo); if (algiddata == NULL) { return errSecInternalError; // shouldn't have happened, this is likely due to corrupted data } digest = SecCmsSignedDataGetDigestByAlgTag(sigd, algiddata->offset); if(digest == NULL) { /* * No digests; this probably had detached content the caller has to * deal with. * FIXME: need some error return for this (as well as many * other places in this library). */ return errSecDataNotAvailable; } contentType = SecCmsContentInfoGetContentTypeOID(cinfo); /* verify signature */ CFTypeRef timeStampPolicies=SecPolicyCreateAppleTimeStampingAndRevocationPolicies(policies); status = SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyWithPolicy(signerinfo, timeStampPolicies, digest, contentType); CFReleaseSafe(timeStampPolicies); /* Now verify the certificate. We do this even if the signature failed to verify so we can return a trustRef to the caller for display purposes. */ status2 = SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate(signerinfo, keychainOrArray, policies, trustRef); dprintf("SecCmsSignedDataVerifySignerInfo: status %d status2 %d\n", (int) status, (int)status2); /* The error from SecCmsSignerInfoVerify() supercedes error from SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate(). */ if (status) return status; return status2; }
/* * SecCmsSignerInfoSign - sign something * */ OSStatus SecCmsSignerInfoSign(SecCmsSignerInfoRef signerinfo, CSSM_DATA_PTR digest, CSSM_DATA_PTR contentType) { SecCertificateRef cert; SecPrivateKeyRef privkey = NULL; SECOidTag digestalgtag; SECOidTag pubkAlgTag; CSSM_DATA signature = { 0 }; OSStatus rv; PLArenaPool *poolp, *tmppoolp = NULL; const SECAlgorithmID *algID; SECAlgorithmID freeAlgID; //CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki; PORT_Assert (digest != NULL); poolp = signerinfo->cmsg->poolp; switch (signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType) { case SecCmsSignerIDIssuerSN: privkey = signerinfo->signingKey; signerinfo->signingKey = NULL; cert = signerinfo->cert; if (SecCertificateGetAlgorithmID(cert,&algID)) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); goto loser; } break; case SecCmsSignerIDSubjectKeyID: privkey = signerinfo->signingKey; signerinfo->signingKey = NULL; #if 0 spki = SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(signerinfo->pubKey); SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(signerinfo->pubKey); signerinfo->pubKey = NULL; SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(NULL, &freeAlgID, &spki->algorithm); SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spki); algID = &freeAlgID; #else #if (TARGET_OS_MAC && !(TARGET_OS_EMBEDDED || TARGET_OS_IPHONE || TARGET_IPHONE_SIMULATOR)) if (SecKeyGetAlgorithmID(signerinfo->pubKey,&algID)) { #else /* TBD: Unify this code. Currently, iOS has an incompatible * SecKeyGetAlgorithmID implementation. */ if (true) { #endif PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM); goto loser; } CFRelease(signerinfo->pubKey); signerinfo->pubKey = NULL; #endif break; default: PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto loser; } digestalgtag = SecCmsSignerInfoGetDigestAlgTag(signerinfo); /* * XXX I think there should be a cert-level interface for this, * so that I do not have to know about subjectPublicKeyInfo... */ pubkAlgTag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algID); if (signerinfo->signerIdentifier.identifierType == SecCmsSignerIDSubjectKeyID) { SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(&freeAlgID, PR_FALSE); } #if 0 // @@@ Not yet /* Fortezza MISSI have weird signature formats. * Map them to standard DSA formats */ pubkAlgTag = PK11_FortezzaMapSig(pubkAlgTag); #endif if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) { CSSM_DATA encoded_attrs; /* find and fill in the message digest attribute. */ rv = SecCmsAttributeArraySetAttr(poolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST, digest, PR_FALSE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (contentType != NULL) { /* if the caller wants us to, find and fill in the content type attribute. */ rv = SecCmsAttributeArraySetAttr(poolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE, contentType, PR_FALSE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } if ((tmppoolp = PORT_NewArena (1024)) == NULL) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); goto loser; } /* * Before encoding, reorder the attributes so that when they * are encoded, they will be conforming DER, which is required * to have a specific order and that is what must be used for * the hash/signature. We do this here, rather than building * it into EncodeAttributes, because we do not want to do * such reordering on incoming messages (which also uses * EncodeAttributes) or our old signatures (and other "broken" * implementations) will not verify. So, we want to guarantee * that we send out good DER encodings of attributes, but not * to expect to receive them. */ if (SecCmsAttributeArrayReorder(signerinfo->authAttr) != SECSuccess) goto loser; encoded_attrs.Data = NULL; encoded_attrs.Length = 0; if (SecCmsAttributeArrayEncode(tmppoolp, &(signerinfo->authAttr), &encoded_attrs) == NULL) goto loser; rv = SEC_SignData(&signature, encoded_attrs.Data, (int)encoded_attrs.Length, privkey, digestalgtag, pubkAlgTag); PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); /* awkward memory management :-( */ tmppoolp = 0; } else { rv = SGN_Digest(privkey, digestalgtag, pubkAlgTag, &signature, digest); } SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey); privkey = NULL; if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (SECITEM_CopyItem(poolp, &(signerinfo->encDigest), &signature) != SECSuccess) goto loser; SECITEM_FreeItem(&signature, PR_FALSE); if(pubkAlgTag == SEC_OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) { /* * RFC 3278 section section 2.1.1 states that the signatureAlgorithm * field contains the full ecdsa-with-SHA1 OID, not plain old ecPublicKey * as would appear in other forms of signed datas. However Microsoft doesn't * do this, it puts ecPublicKey there, and if we put ecdsa-with-SHA1 there, * MS can't verify - presumably because it takes the digest of the digest * before feeding it to ECDSA. * We handle this with a preference; default if it's not there is * "Microsoft compatibility mode". */ if(!SecCmsMsEcdsaCompatMode()) { pubkAlgTag = SEC_OID_ECDSA_WithSHA1; } /* else violating the spec for compatibility */ } if (SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(signerinfo->digestEncAlg), pubkAlgTag, NULL) != SECSuccess) goto loser; return SECSuccess; loser: if (signature.Length != 0) SECITEM_FreeItem (&signature, PR_FALSE); if (privkey) SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privkey); if (tmppoolp) PORT_FreeArena(tmppoolp, PR_FALSE); return SECFailure; } OSStatus SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate(SecCmsSignerInfoRef signerinfo, SecKeychainRef keychainOrArray, CFTypeRef policies, SecTrustRef *trustRef) { SecCertificateRef cert; CFAbsoluteTime stime; OSStatus rv; CSSM_DATA_PTR *otherCerts; if ((cert = SecCmsSignerInfoGetSigningCertificate(signerinfo, keychainOrArray)) == NULL) { dprintf("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate: no signing cert\n"); signerinfo->verificationStatus = SecCmsVSSigningCertNotFound; return SECFailure; } /* * Get and convert the signing time; if available, it will be used * both on the cert verification and for importing the sender * email profile. */ CFTypeRef timeStampPolicies=SecPolicyCreateAppleTimeStampingAndRevocationPolicies(policies); if (SecCmsSignerInfoGetTimestampTimeWithPolicy(signerinfo, timeStampPolicies, &stime) != SECSuccess) if (SecCmsSignerInfoGetSigningTime(signerinfo, &stime) != SECSuccess) stime = CFAbsoluteTimeGetCurrent(); CFReleaseSafe(timeStampPolicies); rv = SecCmsSignedDataRawCerts(signerinfo->sigd, &otherCerts); if(rv) { return rv; } rv = CERT_VerifyCert(keychainOrArray, cert, otherCerts, policies, stime, trustRef); dprintfRC("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate after vfy: certp %p cert.rc %d\n", cert, (int)CFGetRetainCount(cert)); if (rv || !trustRef) { if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT) { /* Signature or digest level verificationStatus errors should supercede certificate level errors, so only change the verificationStatus if the status was GoodSignature. */ if (signerinfo->verificationStatus == SecCmsVSGoodSignature) signerinfo->verificationStatus = SecCmsVSSigningCertNotTrusted; } } /* FIXME isn't this leaking the cert? */ dprintf("SecCmsSignerInfoVerifyCertificate: CertVerify rtn %d\n", (int)rv); return rv; }