static char* new_password(const struct passwd *pw, uid_t myuid, const char *algo)
{
char salt[MAX_PW_SALT_LEN];
char *orig = (char*)"";
char *newp = NULL;
char *cp = NULL;
char *ret = NULL; /* failure so far */
if (myuid != 0 && pw->pw_passwd[0]) {
char *encrypted;
orig = bb_ask_stdin("Old password: "******"incorrect password for %s", pw->pw_name);
bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
puts("Incorrect password");
goto err_ret;
}
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP)
free(encrypted);
}
orig = xstrdup(orig); /* or else bb_ask_stdin() will destroy it */
newp = bb_ask_stdin("New password: "******"Retype password: "******"Passwords don't match");
goto err_ret;
}
crypt_make_pw_salt(salt, algo);
/* pw_encrypt returns malloced str */
ret = pw_encrypt(newp, salt, 1);
/* whee, success! */
err_ret:
nuke_str(orig);
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) free(orig);
nuke_str(newp);
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) free(newp);
nuke_str(cp);
return ret;
}
int vlock_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
#ifdef __linux__
struct vt_mode vtm;
struct vt_mode ovtm;
#endif
struct termios term;
struct termios oterm;
struct passwd *pw;
pw = xgetpwuid(getuid());
opt_complementary = "=0"; /* no params! */
getopt32(argv, "a");
/* Ignore some signals so that we don't get killed by them */
bb_signals(0
+ (1 << SIGTSTP)
+ (1 << SIGTTIN)
+ (1 << SIGTTOU)
+ (1 << SIGHUP )
+ (1 << SIGCHLD) /* paranoia :) */
+ (1 << SIGQUIT)
+ (1 << SIGINT )
, SIG_IGN);
#ifdef __linux__
/* We will use SIGUSRx for console switch control: */
/* 1: set handlers */
signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR1, release_vt);
signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR2, acquire_vt);
/* 2: unmask them */
sig_unblock(SIGUSR1);
sig_unblock(SIGUSR2);
#endif
/* Revert stdin/out to our controlling tty
* (or die if we have none) */
xmove_fd(xopen(CURRENT_TTY, O_RDWR), STDIN_FILENO);
xdup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
#ifdef __linux__
xioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_GETMODE, &vtm);
ovtm = vtm;
/* "console switches are controlled by us, not kernel!" */
vtm.mode = VT_PROCESS;
vtm.relsig = SIGUSR1;
vtm.acqsig = SIGUSR2;
ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &vtm);
#endif
//TODO: use set_termios_to_raw()
tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &oterm);
term = oterm;
term.c_iflag |= IGNBRK; /* ignore serial break (why? VTs don't have breaks, right?) */
term.c_iflag &= ~BRKINT; /* redundant? "dont translate break to SIGINT" */
term.c_lflag &= ~(ISIG | ECHO | ECHOCTL); /* ignore ^C ^Z, echo off */
tcsetattr_stdin_TCSANOW(&term);
while (1) {
printf("Virtual console%s locked by %s.\n",
/* "s" if -a, else "": */ "s" + !option_mask32,
pw->pw_name
);
if (ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
puts("Incorrect password");
}
#ifdef __linux__
ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &ovtm);
#endif
tcsetattr_stdin_TCSANOW(&oterm);
fflush_stdout_and_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *cp;
char *device = NULL;
const char *name = "root";
int timeout = 0;
#define pass bb_common_bufsiz1
struct passwd pwent;
struct passwd *pwd;
const char * const *p;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
#endif
openlog("sulogin", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_AUTH);
if (argc > 1) {
if (strncmp(argv[1], "-t", 2) == 0) {
if (argv[1][2] == '\0') { /* -t NN */
if (argc > 2) {
timeout = atoi(argv[2]);
if (argc > 3) {
device = argv[3];
}
}
} else { /* -tNNN */
timeout = atoi(&argv[1][2]);
if (argc > 2) {
device = argv[2];
}
}
} else {
device = argv[1];
}
if (device) {
close(0);
close(1);
close(2);
if (open(device, O_RDWR) == 0) {
dup(0);
dup(0);
} else {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "cannot open %s\n", device);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
}
if (access(bb_path_passwd_file, 0) == -1) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "No password file\n");
bb_error_msg_and_die("No password file\n");
}
if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* Clear out anything dangerous from the environment */
for (p = forbid; *p; p++)
unsetenv(*p);
signal(SIGALRM, catchalarm);
if (!(pwd = getpwnam(name))) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "No password entry for `root'\n");
bb_error_msg_and_die("No password entry for `root'\n");
}
pwent = *pwd;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
spwd = NULL;
if (pwd && ((strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0)
|| (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "*") == 0))) {
endspent();
spwd = getspnam(name);
if (spwd) {
pwent.pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp;
}
}
#endif
while (1) {
cp = bb_askpass(timeout, SULOGIN_PROMPT);
if (!cp || !*cp) {
puts("\n");
fflush(stdout);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Normal startup\n");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} else {
safe_strncpy(pass, cp, sizeof(pass));
memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
}
if (strcmp(pw_encrypt(pass, pwent.pw_passwd), pwent.pw_passwd) == 0) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
puts("Login incorrect");
fflush(stdout);
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Incorrect root password\n");
}
memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
puts("Entering System Maintenance Mode\n");
fflush(stdout);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "System Maintenance Mode\n");
#if ENABLE_SELINUX
renew_current_security_context();
#endif
run_shell(pwent.pw_shell, 1, 0, 0);
return (0);
}
int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *cp;
int timeout = 0;
char *timeout_arg;
const char * const *p;
struct passwd *pwd;
const char *shell;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
/* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
char buffer[256];
struct spwd spw;
struct spwd *result;
#endif
logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
if (getopt32(argc, argv, "t:", &timeout_arg)) {
timeout = xatoi_u(timeout_arg);
}
if (argv[optind]) {
close(0);
close(1);
dup(xopen(argv[optind], O_RDWR));
close(2);
dup(0);
}
if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
logmode = LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
bb_error_msg_and_die("not a tty");
}
/* Clear out anything dangerous from the environment */
for (p = forbid; *p; p++)
unsetenv(*p);
signal(SIGALRM, catchalarm);
pwd = getpwuid(0);
if (!pwd) {
goto auth_error;
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
if (getspnam_r(pwd->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result)) {
goto auth_error;
}
pwd->pw_passwd = spw.sp_pwdp;
#endif
while (1) {
/* cp points to a static buffer that is zeroed every time */
cp = bb_askpass(timeout,
"Give root password for system maintenance\n"
"(or type Control-D for normal startup):");
if (!cp || !*cp) {
bb_info_msg("Normal startup");
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(pw_encrypt(cp, pwd->pw_passwd), pwd->pw_passwd) == 0) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
bb_error_msg("login incorrect");
}
memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
bb_info_msg("System Maintenance Mode");
USE_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());
shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
if (!shell) shell = getenv("sushell");
if (!shell) {
shell = "/bin/sh";
if (pwd->pw_shell[0])
shell = pwd->pw_shell;
}
run_shell(shell, 1, 0, 0);
/* never returns */
auth_error:
bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for 'root'");
}
int vlock_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
sigset_t sig;
struct sigaction sa;
struct vt_mode vtm;
struct termios term;
uid_t uid = getuid();
pw = getpwuid(uid);
if (pw == NULL)
bb_error_msg_and_die("unknown uid %d", uid);
if (argc > 2) {
bb_show_usage();
}
o_lock_all = getopt32(argc, argv, "a");
vfd = xopen(CURRENT_TTY, O_RDWR);
if (ioctl(vfd, VT_GETMODE, &vtm) < 0) {
bb_perror_msg_and_die("VT_GETMODE");
}
/* mask a bunch of signals */
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, NULL, &sig);
sigdelset(&sig, SIGUSR1);
sigdelset(&sig, SIGUSR2);
sigaddset(&sig, SIGTSTP);
sigaddset(&sig, SIGTTIN);
sigaddset(&sig, SIGTTOU);
sigaddset(&sig, SIGHUP);
sigaddset(&sig, SIGCHLD);
sigaddset(&sig, SIGQUIT);
sigaddset(&sig, SIGINT);
sigemptyset(&(sa.sa_mask));
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
sa.sa_handler = release_vt;
sigaction(SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL);
sa.sa_handler = acquire_vt;
sigaction(SIGUSR2, &sa, NULL);
/* need to handle some signals so that we don't get killed by them */
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, NULL);
sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL);
sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL);
ovtm = vtm;
vtm.mode = VT_PROCESS;
vtm.relsig = SIGUSR1;
vtm.acqsig = SIGUSR2;
ioctl(vfd, VT_SETMODE, &vtm);
tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &oterm);
term = oterm;
term.c_iflag &= ~BRKINT;
term.c_iflag |= IGNBRK;
term.c_lflag &= ~ISIG;
term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOCTL);
tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &term);
do {
printf("Virtual Console%s locked by %s.\n", (o_lock_all) ? "s" : "", pw->pw_name);
if (correct_password(pw)) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
puts("Password incorrect");
} while (1);
restore_terminal();
fflush_stdout_and_exit(0);
}
int vlock_main(int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char **argv)
{
struct vt_mode vtm;
struct termios term;
struct termios oterm;
struct vt_mode ovtm;
uid_t uid;
struct passwd *pw;
uid = getuid();
pw = getpwuid(uid);
if (pw == NULL)
bb_error_msg_and_die("unknown uid %d", (int)uid);
opt_complementary = "=0"; /* no params! */
getopt32(argv, "a");
/* Ignore some signals so that we don't get killed by them */
bb_signals(0
+ (1 << SIGTSTP)
+ (1 << SIGTTIN)
+ (1 << SIGTTOU)
+ (1 << SIGHUP )
+ (1 << SIGCHLD) /* paranoia :) */
+ (1 << SIGQUIT)
+ (1 << SIGINT )
, SIG_IGN);
/* We will use SIGUSRx for console switch control: */
/* 1: set handlers */
signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR1, release_vt);
signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR2, acquire_vt);
/* 2: unmask them */
sig_unblock(SIGUSR1);
sig_unblock(SIGUSR2);
/* Revert stdin/out to our controlling tty
* (or die if we have none) */
xmove_fd(xopen(CURRENT_TTY, O_RDWR), STDIN_FILENO);
xdup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
xioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_GETMODE, &vtm);
ovtm = vtm;
/* "console switches are controlled by us, not kernel!" */
vtm.mode = VT_PROCESS;
vtm.relsig = SIGUSR1;
vtm.acqsig = SIGUSR2;
ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &vtm);
tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &oterm);
term = oterm;
term.c_iflag &= ~BRKINT;
term.c_iflag |= IGNBRK;
term.c_lflag &= ~ISIG;
term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOCTL);
tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &term);
do {
printf("Virtual console%s locked by %s.\n",
option_mask32 /*o_lock_all*/ ? "s" : "",
pw->pw_name);
if (correct_password(pw)) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
puts("Password incorrect");
} while (1);
ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &ovtm);
tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &oterm);
fflush_stdout_and_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
int login_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char tty[BUFSIZ];
char full_tty[200];
char fromhost[512];
char username[USERNAME_SIZE];
const char *tmp;
int amroot;
int flag;
int failed;
int count=0;
struct passwd *pw, pw_copy;
#ifdef CONFIG_WHEEL_GROUP
struct group *grp;
#endif
int opt_preserve = 0;
int opt_fflag = 0;
char *opt_host = 0;
int alarmstarted = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
security_context_t stat_sid = NULL, sid = NULL, old_tty_sid=NULL, new_tty_sid=NULL;
#endif
username[0]=0;
amroot = ( getuid ( ) == 0 );
signal ( SIGALRM, alarm_handler );
alarm ( TIMEOUT );
alarmstarted = 1;
while (( flag = getopt(argc, argv, "f:h:p")) != EOF ) {
switch ( flag ) {
case 'p':
opt_preserve = 1;
break;
case 'f':
/*
* username must be a separate token
* (-f root, *NOT* -froot). --marekm
*/
if ( optarg != argv[optind-1] )
bb_show_usage( );
if ( !amroot ) /* Auth bypass only if real UID is zero */
bb_error_msg_and_die ( "-f permission denied" );
safe_strncpy(username, optarg, USERNAME_SIZE);
opt_fflag = 1;
break;
case 'h':
opt_host = optarg;
break;
default:
bb_show_usage( );
}
}
if (optind < argc) // user from command line (getty)
safe_strncpy(username, argv[optind], USERNAME_SIZE);
if ( !isatty ( 0 ) || !isatty ( 1 ) || !isatty ( 2 ))
return EXIT_FAILURE; /* Must be a terminal */
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
checkutmp ( !amroot );
#endif
tmp = ttyname ( 0 );
if ( tmp && ( strncmp ( tmp, "/dev/", 5 ) == 0 ))
safe_strncpy ( tty, tmp + 5, sizeof( tty ));
else if ( tmp && *tmp == '/' )
safe_strncpy ( tty, tmp, sizeof( tty ));
else
safe_strncpy ( tty, "UNKNOWN", sizeof( tty ));
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
if ( amroot )
memset ( utent.ut_host, 0, sizeof utent.ut_host );
#endif
if ( opt_host ) {
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
safe_strncpy ( utent.ut_host, opt_host, sizeof( utent. ut_host ));
#endif
snprintf ( fromhost, sizeof( fromhost ) - 1, " on `%.100s' from `%.200s'", tty, opt_host );
}
else
snprintf ( fromhost, sizeof( fromhost ) - 1, " on `%.100s'", tty );
setpgrp();
openlog ( "login", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_AUTH );
while ( 1 ) {
failed = 0;
if ( !username[0] )
if(!login_prompt ( username ))
return EXIT_FAILURE;
if ( !alarmstarted && ( TIMEOUT > 0 )) {
alarm ( TIMEOUT );
alarmstarted = 1;
}
if (!( pw = getpwnam ( username ))) {
pw_copy.pw_name = "UNKNOWN";
pw_copy.pw_passwd = "!";
opt_fflag = 0;
failed = 1;
} else
pw_copy = *pw;
pw = &pw_copy;
if (( pw-> pw_passwd [0] == '!' ) || ( pw-> pw_passwd[0] == '*' ))
failed = 1;
if ( opt_fflag ) {
opt_fflag = 0;
goto auth_ok;
}
if (!failed && ( pw-> pw_uid == 0 ) && ( !check_tty ( tty )))
failed = 1;
/* Don't check the password if password entry is empty (!) */
if ( !pw-> pw_passwd[0] )
goto auth_ok;
/* authorization takes place here */
if ( correct_password ( pw ))
goto auth_ok;
failed = 1;
auth_ok:
if ( !failed)
break;
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
puts("Login incorrect");
username[0] = 0;
if ( ++count == 3 ) {
syslog ( LOG_WARNING, "invalid password for `%s'%s\n", pw->pw_name, fromhost);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}
alarm ( 0 );
if ( check_nologin ( pw-> pw_uid == 0 ))
return EXIT_FAILURE;
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
setutmp ( username, tty );
#endif
if ( *tty != '/' )
snprintf ( full_tty, sizeof( full_tty ) - 1, "/dev/%s", tty);
else
safe_strncpy ( full_tty, tty, sizeof( full_tty ) - 1 );
#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
if (is_selinux_enabled())
{
struct stat st;
int rc;
if (get_default_context(username, NULL, &sid))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to get SID for %s\n", username);
exit(1);
}
rc = getfilecon(full_tty,&stat_sid);
freecon(stat_sid);
if ((rc<0) || (stat(full_tty, &st)<0))
{
fprintf(stderr, "stat_secure(%.100s) failed: %.100s\n", full_tty, strerror(errno));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (security_compute_relabel (sid, old_tty_sid, SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_sid) != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "security_change_sid(%.100s) failed: %.100s\n", full_tty, strerror(errno));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if(setfilecon(full_tty, new_tty_sid) != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "chsid(%.100s, %s) failed: %.100s\n", full_tty, new_tty_sid, strerror(errno));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
freecon(sid);
freecon(old_tty_sid);
freecon(new_tty_sid);
}
#endif
if ( !is_my_tty ( full_tty ))
syslog ( LOG_ERR, "unable to determine TTY name, got %s\n", full_tty );
/* Try these, but don't complain if they fail
* (for example when the root fs is read only) */
chown ( full_tty, pw-> pw_uid, pw-> pw_gid );
chmod ( full_tty, 0600 );
change_identity ( pw );
tmp = pw-> pw_shell;
if(!tmp || !*tmp)
tmp = DEFAULT_SHELL;
setup_environment ( tmp, 1, !opt_preserve, pw );
motd ( );
signal ( SIGALRM, SIG_DFL ); /* default alarm signal */
if ( pw-> pw_uid == 0 )
syslog ( LOG_INFO, "root login %s\n", fromhost );
#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
set_current_security_context(sid);
#endif
run_shell ( tmp, 1, 0, 0); /* exec the shell finally. */
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
char *cp;
int timeout = 0;
struct passwd *pwd;
const char *shell;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
/* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
char buffer[256];
struct spwd spw;
#endif
logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
opt_complementary = "t+"; /* -t N */
getopt32(argv, "t:", &timeout);
argv += optind;
if (argv[0]) {
close(0);
close(1);
dup(xopen(argv[0], O_RDWR));
close(2);
dup(0);
}
/* Malicious use like "sulogin /dev/sda"? */
if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
logmode = LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
bb_error_msg_and_die("not a tty");
}
/* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */
sanitize_env_if_suid();
pwd = getpwuid(0);
if (!pwd) {
goto auth_error;
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
{
/* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
* At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
struct spwd *result = NULL;
int r = getspnam_r(pwd->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result);
if (r || !result) {
goto auth_error;
}
pwd->pw_passwd = result->sp_pwdp;
}
#endif
while (1) {
char *encrypted;
int r;
/* cp points to a static buffer */
cp = bb_ask(STDIN_FILENO, timeout,
"Give root password for system maintenance\n"
"(or type Control-D for normal startup):");
if (!cp) {
/* ^D, ^C, timeout, or read error */
bb_info_msg("Normal startup");
return 0;
}
encrypted = pw_encrypt(cp, pwd->pw_passwd, 1);
r = strcmp(encrypted, pwd->pw_passwd);
free(encrypted);
if (r == 0) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
bb_info_msg("Login incorrect");
}
memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
// signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
bb_info_msg("System Maintenance Mode");
IF_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());
shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
if (!shell)
shell = getenv("sushell");
if (!shell)
shell = pwd->pw_shell;
/* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */
run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL);
auth_error:
bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
}
int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
unsigned flags;
char *opt_shell = NULL;
char *opt_command = NULL;
const char *opt_username = "******";
struct passwd *pw;
uid_t cur_uid = getuid();
const char *tty;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
char user_buf[64];
#endif
const char *old_user;
flags = getopt32(argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell);
//argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argv[0] && LONE_DASH(argv[0])) {
flags |= SU_OPT_l;
argv++;
}
/* get user if specified */
if (argv[0]) {
opt_username = argv[0];
argv++;
}
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
/* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to
* identify the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell.
* But getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry.
* in this case resort to getpwuid. */
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
old_user = user_buf;
if (getlogin_r(user_buf, sizeof(user_buf)) != 0)
#endif
{
pw = getpwuid(cur_uid);
old_user = pw ? xstrdup(pw->pw_name) : "";
}
tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2);
if (!tty) {
tty = "none";
}
openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
}
pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username);
if (cur_uid == 0 || ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) {
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
'+', tty, old_user, opt_username);
} else {
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
'-', tty, old_user, opt_username);
bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
bb_error_msg_and_die("incorrect password");
}
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
closelog();
}
if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp)) {
/* -s SHELL is not given, but "preserve env" opt is */
opt_shell = getenv("SHELL");
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS
if (opt_shell && cur_uid != 0 && pw->pw_shell && restricted_shell(pw->pw_shell)) {
/* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is
* probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't
* compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
* shell. */
bb_error_msg("using restricted shell");
opt_shell = NULL; /* ignore -s PROG */
}
/* else: user can run whatever he wants via "su -s PROG USER".
* This is safe since PROG is run under user's uid/gid. */
#endif
if (!opt_shell)
opt_shell = pw->pw_shell;
change_identity(pw);
setup_environment(opt_shell,
((flags & SU_OPT_l) / SU_OPT_l * SETUP_ENV_CLEARENV)
+ (!(flags & SU_OPT_mp) * SETUP_ENV_CHANGEENV)
+ (!(flags & SU_OPT_l) * SETUP_ENV_NO_CHDIR),
pw);
IF_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(NULL);)
int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
int timeout = 0;
struct passwd *pwd;
const char *shell;
/* Note: sulogin is not a suid app. It is meant to be run by init
* for single user / emergency mode. init starts it as root.
* Normal users (potentially malisious ones) can only run it under
* their UID, therefore no paranoia here is warranted:
* $LD_LIBRARY_PATH in env, TTY = /dev/sda
* are no more dangerous here than in e.g. cp applet.
*/
logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
getopt32(argv, "t:+", &timeout);
argv += optind;
if (argv[0]) {
close(0);
close(1);
dup(xopen(argv[0], O_RDWR));
close(2);
dup(0);
}
pwd = getpwuid(0);
if (!pwd) {
bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
}
while (1) {
int r;
r = ask_and_check_password_extended(pwd, timeout,
"Give root password for system maintenance\n"
"(or type Control-D for normal startup):"
);
if (r < 0) {
/* ^D, ^C, timeout, or read error */
bb_error_msg("normal startup");
return 0;
}
if (r > 0) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
bb_error_msg("Login incorrect");
}
bb_error_msg("starting shell for system maintenance");
IF_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());
shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
if (!shell)
shell = getenv("sushell");
if (!shell)
shell = pwd->pw_shell;
/* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */
run_shell(shell, 1, NULL);
}
int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *cp;
int timeout = 0;
char *timeout_arg;
struct passwd *pwd;
const char *shell;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
/* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
char buffer[256];
struct spwd spw;
#endif
logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
if (getopt32(argv, "t:", &timeout_arg)) {
timeout = xatoi_u(timeout_arg);
}
if (argv[optind]) {
close(0);
close(1);
dup(xopen(argv[optind], O_RDWR));
close(2);
dup(0);
}
if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
logmode = LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
bb_error_msg_and_die("not a tty");
}
/* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */
sanitize_env_for_suid();
// bb_askpass() already handles this
// signal(SIGALRM, catchalarm);
pwd = getpwuid(0);
if (!pwd) {
goto auth_error;
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
{
/* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
* At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
struct spwd *result = NULL;
int r = getspnam_r(pwd->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result);
if (r || !result) {
goto auth_error;
}
pwd->pw_passwd = result->sp_pwdp;
}
#endif
while (1) {
/* cp points to a static buffer that is zeroed every time */
cp = bb_askpass(timeout,
"Give root password for system maintenance\n"
"(or type Control-D for normal startup):");
if (!cp || !*cp) {
bb_info_msg("Normal startup");
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(pw_encrypt(cp, pwd->pw_passwd), pwd->pw_passwd) == 0) {
break;
}
bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
bb_error_msg("login incorrect");
}
memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
// signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
bb_info_msg("System Maintenance Mode");
USE_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());
shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
if (!shell)
shell = getenv("sushell");
if (!shell) {
shell = "/bin/sh";
if (pwd->pw_shell[0])
shell = pwd->pw_shell;
}
/* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */
run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL);
auth_error:
bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
}