예제 #1
0
static char* new_password(const struct passwd *pw, uid_t myuid, const char *algo)
{
	char salt[MAX_PW_SALT_LEN];
	char *orig = (char*)"";
	char *newp = NULL;
	char *cp = NULL;
	char *ret = NULL; /* failure so far */

	if (myuid != 0 && pw->pw_passwd[0]) {
		char *encrypted;

		orig = bb_ask_stdin("Old password: "******"incorrect password for %s", pw->pw_name);
			bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
			puts("Incorrect password");
			goto err_ret;
		}
		if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP)
			free(encrypted);
	}
	orig = xstrdup(orig); /* or else bb_ask_stdin() will destroy it */
	newp = bb_ask_stdin("New password: "******"Retype password: "******"Passwords don't match");
		goto err_ret;
	}

	crypt_make_pw_salt(salt, algo);

	/* pw_encrypt returns malloced str */
	ret = pw_encrypt(newp, salt, 1);
	/* whee, success! */

 err_ret:
	nuke_str(orig);
	if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) free(orig);

	nuke_str(newp);
	if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) free(newp);

	nuke_str(cp);
	return ret;
}
예제 #2
0
파일: vlock.c 프로젝트: android-ide/busybox
int vlock_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
#ifdef __linux__
	struct vt_mode vtm;
	struct vt_mode ovtm;
#endif
	struct termios term;
	struct termios oterm;
	struct passwd *pw;

	pw = xgetpwuid(getuid());
	opt_complementary = "=0"; /* no params! */
	getopt32(argv, "a");

	/* Ignore some signals so that we don't get killed by them */
	bb_signals(0
		+ (1 << SIGTSTP)
		+ (1 << SIGTTIN)
		+ (1 << SIGTTOU)
		+ (1 << SIGHUP )
		+ (1 << SIGCHLD) /* paranoia :) */
		+ (1 << SIGQUIT)
		+ (1 << SIGINT )
		, SIG_IGN);

#ifdef __linux__
	/* We will use SIGUSRx for console switch control: */
	/* 1: set handlers */
	signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR1, release_vt);
	signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR2, acquire_vt);
	/* 2: unmask them */
	sig_unblock(SIGUSR1);
	sig_unblock(SIGUSR2);
#endif

	/* Revert stdin/out to our controlling tty
	 * (or die if we have none) */
	xmove_fd(xopen(CURRENT_TTY, O_RDWR), STDIN_FILENO);
	xdup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);

#ifdef __linux__
	xioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_GETMODE, &vtm);
	ovtm = vtm;
	/* "console switches are controlled by us, not kernel!" */
	vtm.mode = VT_PROCESS;
	vtm.relsig = SIGUSR1;
	vtm.acqsig = SIGUSR2;
	ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &vtm);
#endif

//TODO: use set_termios_to_raw()
	tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &oterm);
	term = oterm;
	term.c_iflag |= IGNBRK; /* ignore serial break (why? VTs don't have breaks, right?) */
	term.c_iflag &= ~BRKINT; /* redundant? "dont translate break to SIGINT" */
	term.c_lflag &= ~(ISIG | ECHO | ECHOCTL); /* ignore ^C ^Z, echo off */
	tcsetattr_stdin_TCSANOW(&term);

	while (1) {
		printf("Virtual console%s locked by %s.\n",
				/* "s" if -a, else "": */ "s" + !option_mask32,
				pw->pw_name
		);
		if (ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) {
			break;
		}
		bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
		puts("Incorrect password");
	}

#ifdef __linux__
	ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &ovtm);
#endif
	tcsetattr_stdin_TCSANOW(&oterm);
	fflush_stdout_and_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
예제 #3
0
int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	char *cp;
	char *device = NULL;
	const char *name = "root";
	int timeout = 0;

#define pass bb_common_bufsiz1

	struct passwd pwent;
	struct passwd *pwd;
	const char * const *p;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
	struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
#endif

	openlog("sulogin", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_AUTH);
	if (argc > 1) {
		if (strncmp(argv[1], "-t", 2) == 0) {
			if (argv[1][2] == '\0') { /* -t NN */
				if (argc > 2) {
					timeout = atoi(argv[2]);
					if (argc > 3) {
						device = argv[3];
					}
				}
			} else { /* -tNNN */
				timeout = atoi(&argv[1][2]);
				if (argc > 2) {
					device = argv[2];
				}
			}
		} else {
			device = argv[1];
		}
		if (device) {
			close(0);
			close(1);
			close(2);
			if (open(device, O_RDWR) == 0) {
				dup(0);
				dup(0);
			} else {
				syslog(LOG_WARNING, "cannot open %s\n", device);
				exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
			}
		}
	}
	if (access(bb_path_passwd_file, 0) == -1) {
		syslog(LOG_WARNING, "No password file\n");
		bb_error_msg_and_die("No password file\n");
	}
	if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	}


	/* Clear out anything dangerous from the environment */
	for (p = forbid; *p; p++)
		unsetenv(*p);


	signal(SIGALRM, catchalarm);
	if (!(pwd = getpwnam(name))) {
		syslog(LOG_WARNING, "No password entry for `root'\n");
		bb_error_msg_and_die("No password entry for `root'\n");
	}
	pwent = *pwd;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
	spwd = NULL;
	if (pwd && ((strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0)
				|| (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "*") == 0))) {
		endspent();
		spwd = getspnam(name);
		if (spwd) {
			pwent.pw_passwd = spwd->sp_pwdp;
		}
	}
#endif
	while (1) {
		cp = bb_askpass(timeout, SULOGIN_PROMPT);
		if (!cp || !*cp) {
			puts("\n");
			fflush(stdout);
			syslog(LOG_INFO, "Normal startup\n");
			exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
		} else {
			safe_strncpy(pass, cp, sizeof(pass));
			memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
		}
		if (strcmp(pw_encrypt(pass, pwent.pw_passwd), pwent.pw_passwd) == 0) {
			break;
		}
		bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
		puts("Login incorrect");
		fflush(stdout);
		syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Incorrect root password\n");
	}
	memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
	puts("Entering System Maintenance Mode\n");
	fflush(stdout);
	syslog(LOG_INFO, "System Maintenance Mode\n");

#if ENABLE_SELINUX
	renew_current_security_context();
#endif

	run_shell(pwent.pw_shell, 1, 0, 0);

	return (0);
}
예제 #4
0
파일: sulogin.c 프로젝트: AlickHill/Lantern
int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	char *cp;
	int timeout = 0;
	char *timeout_arg;
	const char * const *p;
	struct passwd *pwd;
	const char *shell;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
	/* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
	char buffer[256];
	struct spwd spw;
	struct spwd *result;
#endif

	logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
	openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);

	if (getopt32(argc, argv, "t:", &timeout_arg)) {
		timeout = xatoi_u(timeout_arg);
	}

	if (argv[optind]) {
		close(0);
		close(1);
		dup(xopen(argv[optind], O_RDWR));
		close(2);
		dup(0);
	}

	if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
		logmode = LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
		bb_error_msg_and_die("not a tty");
	}

	/* Clear out anything dangerous from the environment */
	for (p = forbid; *p; p++)
		unsetenv(*p);

	signal(SIGALRM, catchalarm);

	pwd = getpwuid(0);
	if (!pwd) {
		goto auth_error;
	}

#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
	if (getspnam_r(pwd->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result)) {
		goto auth_error;
	}
	pwd->pw_passwd = spw.sp_pwdp;
#endif

	while (1) {
		/* cp points to a static buffer that is zeroed every time */
		cp = bb_askpass(timeout,
				"Give root password for system maintenance\n"
				"(or type Control-D for normal startup):");

		if (!cp || !*cp) {
			bb_info_msg("Normal startup");
			return 0;
		}
		if (strcmp(pw_encrypt(cp, pwd->pw_passwd), pwd->pw_passwd) == 0) {
			break;
		}
		bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
		bb_error_msg("login incorrect");
	}
	memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);

	bb_info_msg("System Maintenance Mode");

	USE_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());

	shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
	if (!shell) shell = getenv("sushell");
	if (!shell) {
		shell = "/bin/sh";
		if (pwd->pw_shell[0])
			shell = pwd->pw_shell;
	}
	run_shell(shell, 1, 0, 0);
	/* never returns */

auth_error:
	bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for 'root'");
}
예제 #5
0
파일: vlock.c 프로젝트: AlickHill/Lantern
int vlock_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	sigset_t sig;
	struct sigaction sa;
	struct vt_mode vtm;
	struct termios term;
	uid_t uid = getuid();

	pw = getpwuid(uid);
	if (pw == NULL)
		bb_error_msg_and_die("unknown uid %d", uid);

	if (argc > 2) {
		bb_show_usage();
	}

	o_lock_all = getopt32(argc, argv, "a");

	vfd = xopen(CURRENT_TTY, O_RDWR);

	if (ioctl(vfd, VT_GETMODE, &vtm) < 0) {
		bb_perror_msg_and_die("VT_GETMODE");
	}

	/* mask a bunch of signals */
	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, NULL, &sig);
	sigdelset(&sig, SIGUSR1);
	sigdelset(&sig, SIGUSR2);
	sigaddset(&sig, SIGTSTP);
	sigaddset(&sig, SIGTTIN);
	sigaddset(&sig, SIGTTOU);
	sigaddset(&sig, SIGHUP);
	sigaddset(&sig, SIGCHLD);
	sigaddset(&sig, SIGQUIT);
	sigaddset(&sig, SIGINT);

	sigemptyset(&(sa.sa_mask));
	sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
	sa.sa_handler = release_vt;
	sigaction(SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL);
	sa.sa_handler = acquire_vt;
	sigaction(SIGUSR2, &sa, NULL);

	/* need to handle some signals so that we don't get killed by them */
	sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
	sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, NULL);
	sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL);
	sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
	sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL);

	ovtm = vtm;
	vtm.mode = VT_PROCESS;
	vtm.relsig = SIGUSR1;
	vtm.acqsig = SIGUSR2;
	ioctl(vfd, VT_SETMODE, &vtm);

	tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &oterm);
	term = oterm;
	term.c_iflag &= ~BRKINT;
	term.c_iflag |= IGNBRK;
	term.c_lflag &= ~ISIG;
	term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOCTL);
	tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &term);

	do {
		printf("Virtual Console%s locked by %s.\n", (o_lock_all) ? "s" : "", pw->pw_name);
		if (correct_password(pw)) {
			break;
		}
		bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
		puts("Password incorrect");
	} while (1);
	restore_terminal();
	fflush_stdout_and_exit(0);
}
예제 #6
0
int vlock_main(int argc ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, char **argv)
{
	struct vt_mode vtm;
	struct termios term;
	struct termios oterm;
	struct vt_mode ovtm;
	uid_t uid;
	struct passwd *pw;

	uid = getuid();
	pw = getpwuid(uid);
	if (pw == NULL)
		bb_error_msg_and_die("unknown uid %d", (int)uid);

	opt_complementary = "=0"; /* no params! */
	getopt32(argv, "a");

	/* Ignore some signals so that we don't get killed by them */
	bb_signals(0
		+ (1 << SIGTSTP)
		+ (1 << SIGTTIN)
		+ (1 << SIGTTOU)
		+ (1 << SIGHUP )
		+ (1 << SIGCHLD) /* paranoia :) */
		+ (1 << SIGQUIT)
		+ (1 << SIGINT )
		, SIG_IGN);

	/* We will use SIGUSRx for console switch control: */
	/* 1: set handlers */
	signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR1, release_vt);
	signal_SA_RESTART_empty_mask(SIGUSR2, acquire_vt);
	/* 2: unmask them */
	sig_unblock(SIGUSR1);
	sig_unblock(SIGUSR2);

	/* Revert stdin/out to our controlling tty
	 * (or die if we have none) */
	xmove_fd(xopen(CURRENT_TTY, O_RDWR), STDIN_FILENO);
	xdup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);

	xioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_GETMODE, &vtm);
	ovtm = vtm;
	/* "console switches are controlled by us, not kernel!" */
	vtm.mode = VT_PROCESS;
	vtm.relsig = SIGUSR1;
	vtm.acqsig = SIGUSR2;
	ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &vtm);

	tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &oterm);
	term = oterm;
	term.c_iflag &= ~BRKINT;
	term.c_iflag |= IGNBRK;
	term.c_lflag &= ~ISIG;
	term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOCTL);
	tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &term);

	do {
		printf("Virtual console%s locked by %s.\n",
				option_mask32 /*o_lock_all*/ ? "s" : "",
				pw->pw_name);
		if (correct_password(pw)) {
			break;
		}
		bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
		puts("Password incorrect");
	} while (1);

	ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, VT_SETMODE, &ovtm);
	tcsetattr(STDIN_FILENO, TCSANOW, &oterm);
	fflush_stdout_and_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
예제 #7
0
파일: login.c 프로젝트: OpenHMR/Open-HMR600
int login_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	char tty[BUFSIZ];
	char full_tty[200];
	char fromhost[512];
	char username[USERNAME_SIZE];
	const char *tmp;
	int amroot;
	int flag;
	int failed;
	int count=0;
	struct passwd *pw, pw_copy;
#ifdef CONFIG_WHEEL_GROUP
	struct group *grp;
#endif
	int opt_preserve = 0;
	int opt_fflag = 0;
	char *opt_host = 0;
	int alarmstarted = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
	security_context_t stat_sid = NULL, sid = NULL, old_tty_sid=NULL, new_tty_sid=NULL;
#endif

	username[0]=0;
	amroot = ( getuid ( ) == 0 );
	signal ( SIGALRM, alarm_handler );
	alarm ( TIMEOUT );
	alarmstarted = 1;

	while (( flag = getopt(argc, argv, "f:h:p")) != EOF ) {
		switch ( flag ) {
		case 'p':
			opt_preserve = 1;
			break;
		case 'f':
			/*
			 * username must be a separate token
			 * (-f root, *NOT* -froot). --marekm
			 */
			if ( optarg != argv[optind-1] )
				bb_show_usage( );

			if ( !amroot )		/* Auth bypass only if real UID is zero */
				bb_error_msg_and_die ( "-f permission denied" );

			safe_strncpy(username, optarg, USERNAME_SIZE);
			opt_fflag = 1;
			break;
		case 'h':
			opt_host = optarg;
			break;
		default:
			bb_show_usage( );
		}
	}

	if (optind < argc)             // user from command line (getty)
		safe_strncpy(username, argv[optind], USERNAME_SIZE);

	if ( !isatty ( 0 ) || !isatty ( 1 ) || !isatty ( 2 ))
		return EXIT_FAILURE;		/* Must be a terminal */

#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
	checkutmp ( !amroot );
#endif

	tmp = ttyname ( 0 );
	if ( tmp && ( strncmp ( tmp, "/dev/", 5 ) == 0 ))
		safe_strncpy ( tty, tmp + 5, sizeof( tty ));
	else if ( tmp && *tmp == '/' )
		safe_strncpy ( tty, tmp, sizeof( tty ));
	else
		safe_strncpy ( tty, "UNKNOWN", sizeof( tty ));

#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
	if ( amroot )
		memset ( utent.ut_host, 0, sizeof utent.ut_host );
#endif

	if ( opt_host ) {
#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
		safe_strncpy ( utent.ut_host, opt_host, sizeof( utent. ut_host ));
#endif
		snprintf ( fromhost, sizeof( fromhost ) - 1, " on `%.100s' from `%.200s'", tty, opt_host );
	}
	else
		snprintf ( fromhost, sizeof( fromhost ) - 1, " on `%.100s'", tty );

	setpgrp();

	openlog ( "login", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_AUTH );

	while ( 1 ) {
		failed = 0;

		if ( !username[0] )
			if(!login_prompt ( username ))
				return EXIT_FAILURE;

		if ( !alarmstarted && ( TIMEOUT > 0 )) {
			alarm ( TIMEOUT );
			alarmstarted = 1;
		}

		if (!( pw = getpwnam ( username ))) {
			pw_copy.pw_name   = "UNKNOWN";
			pw_copy.pw_passwd = "!";
			opt_fflag = 0;
			failed = 1;
		} else
			pw_copy = *pw;

		pw = &pw_copy;

		if (( pw-> pw_passwd [0] == '!' ) || ( pw-> pw_passwd[0] == '*' ))
			failed = 1;

		if ( opt_fflag ) {
			opt_fflag = 0;
			goto auth_ok;
		}

		if (!failed && ( pw-> pw_uid == 0 ) && ( !check_tty ( tty )))
			failed = 1;

		/* Don't check the password if password entry is empty (!) */
		if ( !pw-> pw_passwd[0] )
			goto auth_ok;

		/* authorization takes place here */
		if ( correct_password ( pw ))
			goto auth_ok;

		failed = 1;

auth_ok:
		if ( !failed)
			break;

		bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
		puts("Login incorrect");
		username[0] = 0;
		if ( ++count == 3 ) {
			syslog ( LOG_WARNING, "invalid password for `%s'%s\n", pw->pw_name, fromhost);
			return EXIT_FAILURE;
	}
	}

	alarm ( 0 );
	if ( check_nologin ( pw-> pw_uid == 0 ))
		return EXIT_FAILURE;

#ifdef CONFIG_FEATURE_UTMP
	setutmp ( username, tty );
#endif

	if ( *tty != '/' )
		snprintf ( full_tty, sizeof( full_tty ) - 1, "/dev/%s", tty);
	else
		safe_strncpy ( full_tty, tty, sizeof( full_tty ) - 1 );

#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
	if (is_selinux_enabled())
	{
		struct stat st;
		int rc;

		if (get_default_context(username, NULL, &sid))
		{
			fprintf(stderr, "Unable to get SID for %s\n", username);
			exit(1);
		}
		rc = getfilecon(full_tty,&stat_sid);
		freecon(stat_sid);
		if ((rc<0) || (stat(full_tty, &st)<0))
		{
			fprintf(stderr, "stat_secure(%.100s) failed: %.100s\n", full_tty, strerror(errno));
			return EXIT_FAILURE;
		}
		if (security_compute_relabel (sid, old_tty_sid, SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_sid) != 0)
		{
			fprintf(stderr, "security_change_sid(%.100s) failed: %.100s\n", full_tty, strerror(errno));
			return EXIT_FAILURE;
		}
		if(setfilecon(full_tty, new_tty_sid) != 0)
		{
			fprintf(stderr, "chsid(%.100s, %s) failed: %.100s\n", full_tty, new_tty_sid, strerror(errno));
			return EXIT_FAILURE;
		}
		freecon(sid);
		freecon(old_tty_sid);
		freecon(new_tty_sid);
	}
#endif
	if ( !is_my_tty ( full_tty ))
		syslog ( LOG_ERR, "unable to determine TTY name, got %s\n", full_tty );

	/* Try these, but don't complain if they fail
	 * (for example when the root fs is read only) */
	chown ( full_tty, pw-> pw_uid, pw-> pw_gid );
	chmod ( full_tty, 0600 );

	change_identity ( pw );
	tmp = pw-> pw_shell;
	if(!tmp || !*tmp)
		tmp = DEFAULT_SHELL;
	setup_environment ( tmp, 1, !opt_preserve, pw );

	motd ( );
	signal ( SIGALRM, SIG_DFL );	/* default alarm signal */

	if ( pw-> pw_uid == 0 )
		syslog ( LOG_INFO, "root login %s\n", fromhost );
#ifdef CONFIG_SELINUX
	set_current_security_context(sid);
#endif
	run_shell ( tmp, 1, 0, 0);	/* exec the shell finally. */

	return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
예제 #8
0
파일: sulogin.c 프로젝트: TemmeR/busybox
int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
	char *cp;
	int timeout = 0;
	struct passwd *pwd;
	const char *shell;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
	/* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
	char buffer[256];
	struct spwd spw;
#endif

	logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
	openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);

	opt_complementary = "t+"; /* -t N */
	getopt32(argv, "t:", &timeout);
	argv += optind;

	if (argv[0]) {
		close(0);
		close(1);
		dup(xopen(argv[0], O_RDWR));
		close(2);
		dup(0);
	}

	/* Malicious use like "sulogin /dev/sda"? */
	if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
		logmode = LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
		bb_error_msg_and_die("not a tty");
	}

	/* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */
	sanitize_env_if_suid();

	pwd = getpwuid(0);
	if (!pwd) {
		goto auth_error;
	}

#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
	{
		/* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
		 * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
		struct spwd *result = NULL;
		int r = getspnam_r(pwd->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result);
		if (r || !result) {
			goto auth_error;
		}
		pwd->pw_passwd = result->sp_pwdp;
	}
#endif

	while (1) {
		char *encrypted;
		int r;

		/* cp points to a static buffer */
		cp = bb_ask(STDIN_FILENO, timeout,
				"Give root password for system maintenance\n"
				"(or type Control-D for normal startup):");
		if (!cp) {
			/* ^D, ^C, timeout, or read error */
			bb_info_msg("Normal startup");
			return 0;
		}
		encrypted = pw_encrypt(cp, pwd->pw_passwd, 1);
		r = strcmp(encrypted, pwd->pw_passwd);
		free(encrypted);
		if (r == 0) {
			break;
		}
		bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
		bb_info_msg("Login incorrect");
	}
	memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
//	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);

	bb_info_msg("System Maintenance Mode");

	IF_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());

	shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
	if (!shell)
		shell = getenv("sushell");
	if (!shell)
		shell = pwd->pw_shell;

	/* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */
	run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL);

 auth_error:
	bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
}
예제 #9
0
파일: su.c 프로젝트: AndrewScull/dizibox
int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
	unsigned flags;
	char *opt_shell = NULL;
	char *opt_command = NULL;
	const char *opt_username = "******";
	struct passwd *pw;
	uid_t cur_uid = getuid();
	const char *tty;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
	char user_buf[64];
#endif
	const char *old_user;

	flags = getopt32(argv, "mplc:s:", &opt_command, &opt_shell);
	//argc -= optind;
	argv += optind;

	if (argv[0] && LONE_DASH(argv[0])) {
		flags |= SU_OPT_l;
		argv++;
	}

	/* get user if specified */
	if (argv[0]) {
		opt_username = argv[0];
		argv++;
	}

	if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
		/* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to
		 * identify the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell.
		 * But getlogin can fail -- usually due to lack of utmp entry.
		 * in this case resort to getpwuid.  */
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
		old_user = user_buf;
		if (getlogin_r(user_buf, sizeof(user_buf)) != 0)
#endif
		{
			pw = getpwuid(cur_uid);
			old_user = pw ? xstrdup(pw->pw_name) : "";
		}
		tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2);
		if (!tty) {
			tty = "none";
		}
		openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
	}

	pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username);

	if (cur_uid == 0 || ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) {
		if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
			syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
				'+', tty, old_user, opt_username);
	} else {
		if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
			syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
				'-', tty, old_user, opt_username);
		bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
		bb_error_msg_and_die("incorrect password");
	}

	if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
		closelog();
	}

	if (!opt_shell && (flags & SU_OPT_mp)) {
		/* -s SHELL is not given, but "preserve env" opt is */
		opt_shell = getenv("SHELL");
	}

#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_CHECKS_SHELLS
	if (opt_shell && cur_uid != 0 && pw->pw_shell && restricted_shell(pw->pw_shell)) {
		/* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is
		 * probably a uucp account or has restricted access.  Don't
		 * compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
		 * shell.  */
		bb_error_msg("using restricted shell");
		opt_shell = NULL; /* ignore -s PROG */
	}
	/* else: user can run whatever he wants via "su -s PROG USER".
	 * This is safe since PROG is run under user's uid/gid. */
#endif
	if (!opt_shell)
		opt_shell = pw->pw_shell;

	change_identity(pw);
	setup_environment(opt_shell,
			((flags & SU_OPT_l) / SU_OPT_l * SETUP_ENV_CLEARENV)
			+ (!(flags & SU_OPT_mp) * SETUP_ENV_CHANGEENV)
			+ (!(flags & SU_OPT_l) * SETUP_ENV_NO_CHDIR),
			pw);
	IF_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(NULL);)
예제 #10
0
파일: sulogin.c 프로젝트: beyond2002/GT813C
int sulogin_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
	int timeout = 0;
	struct passwd *pwd;
	const char *shell;

	/* Note: sulogin is not a suid app. It is meant to be run by init
	 * for single user / emergency mode. init starts it as root.
	 * Normal users (potentially malisious ones) can only run it under
	 * their UID, therefore no paranoia here is warranted:
	 * $LD_LIBRARY_PATH in env, TTY = /dev/sda
	 * are no more dangerous here than in e.g. cp applet.
	 */

	logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
	openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);

	getopt32(argv, "t:+", &timeout);
	argv += optind;

	if (argv[0]) {
		close(0);
		close(1);
		dup(xopen(argv[0], O_RDWR));
		close(2);
		dup(0);
	}

	pwd = getpwuid(0);
	if (!pwd) {
		bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
	}

	while (1) {
		int r;

		r = ask_and_check_password_extended(pwd, timeout,
			"Give root password for system maintenance\n"
			"(or type Control-D for normal startup):"
		);
		if (r < 0) {
			/* ^D, ^C, timeout, or read error */
			bb_error_msg("normal startup");
			return 0;
		}
		if (r > 0) {
			break;
		}
		bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY);
		bb_error_msg("Login incorrect");
	}

	bb_error_msg("starting shell for system maintenance");

	IF_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());

	shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
	if (!shell)
		shell = getenv("sushell");
	if (!shell)
		shell = pwd->pw_shell;

	/* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */
	run_shell(shell, 1, NULL);
}
int sulogin_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	char *cp;
	int timeout = 0;
	char *timeout_arg;
	struct passwd *pwd;
	const char *shell;
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
	/* Using _r function to avoid pulling in static buffers */
	char buffer[256];
	struct spwd spw;
#endif

	logmode = LOGMODE_BOTH;
	openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);

	if (getopt32(argv, "t:", &timeout_arg)) {
		timeout = xatoi_u(timeout_arg);
	}

	if (argv[optind]) {
		close(0);
		close(1);
		dup(xopen(argv[optind], O_RDWR));
		close(2);
		dup(0);
	}

	if (!isatty(0) || !isatty(1) || !isatty(2)) {
		logmode = LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
		bb_error_msg_and_die("not a tty");
	}

	/* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */
	sanitize_env_for_suid();

// bb_askpass() already handles this
//	signal(SIGALRM, catchalarm);

	pwd = getpwuid(0);
	if (!pwd) {
		goto auth_error;
	}

#if ENABLE_FEATURE_SHADOWPASSWDS
	{
		/* getspnam_r may return 0 yet set result to NULL.
		 * At least glibc 2.4 does this. Be extra paranoid here. */
		struct spwd *result = NULL;
		int r = getspnam_r(pwd->pw_name, &spw, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &result);
		if (r || !result) {
			goto auth_error;
		}
		pwd->pw_passwd = result->sp_pwdp;
	}
#endif

	while (1) {
		/* cp points to a static buffer that is zeroed every time */
		cp = bb_askpass(timeout,
				"Give root password for system maintenance\n"
				"(or type Control-D for normal startup):");

		if (!cp || !*cp) {
			bb_info_msg("Normal startup");
			return 0;
		}
		if (strcmp(pw_encrypt(cp, pwd->pw_passwd), pwd->pw_passwd) == 0) {
			break;
		}
		bb_do_delay(FAIL_DELAY);
		bb_error_msg("login incorrect");
	}
	memset(cp, 0, strlen(cp));
//	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);

	bb_info_msg("System Maintenance Mode");

	USE_SELINUX(renew_current_security_context());

	shell = getenv("SUSHELL");
	if (!shell)
		shell = getenv("sushell");
	if (!shell) {
		shell = "/bin/sh";
		if (pwd->pw_shell[0])
			shell = pwd->pw_shell;
	}
	/* Exec login shell with no additional parameters. Never returns. */
	run_shell(shell, 1, NULL, NULL);

 auth_error:
	bb_error_msg_and_die("no password entry for root");
}