static PK11SymKey *ikev2_prfplus(const struct prf_desc *prf_desc,
PK11SymKey *key, PK11SymKey *seed,
size_t required_keymat)
{
uint8_t count = 1;
/* T1(prfplus) = prf(KEY, SEED|1) */
PK11SymKey *prfplus;
{
struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_symkey("prf+0", DBG_CRYPT,
prf_desc, "key", key);
crypt_prf_update_symkey("seed", prf, seed);
crypt_prf_update_byte("1++", prf, count++);
prfplus = crypt_prf_final(prf);
}
/* make a copy to keep things easy */
PK11SymKey *old_t = key_from_symkey_bytes(prfplus, 0, sizeof_symkey(prfplus));
while (sizeof_symkey(prfplus) < required_keymat) {
/* Tn = prf(KEY, Tn-1|SEED|n) */
struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_symkey("prf+N", DBG_CRYPT,
prf_desc, "key", key);
crypt_prf_update_symkey("old_t", prf, old_t);
crypt_prf_update_symkey("seed", prf, seed);
crypt_prf_update_byte("N++", prf, count++);
PK11SymKey *new_t = crypt_prf_final(prf);
append_symkey_symkey(prf_desc->hasher, &prfplus, new_t);
free_any_symkey("old_t[N]", &old_t);
old_t = new_t;
}
free_any_symkey("old_t[final]", &old_t);
return prfplus;
}
/*
* SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir)
*/
PK11SymKey *ikev2_ike_sa_skeyseed(const struct hash_desc *hasher,
const chunk_t Ni, const chunk_t Nr,
PK11SymKey *dh_secret)
{
struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init("ike sa SKEYSEED",
hasher, dh_secret);
/* key = Ni|Nr */
crypt_prf_init_chunk("Ni", prf, Ni);
crypt_prf_init_chunk("Nr", prf, Nr);
/* seed = g^ir */
crypt_prf_update(prf);
/* generate */
crypt_prf_update_symkey("g^ir", prf, dh_secret);
return crypt_prf_final(prf);
}
/*
* SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d (old), g^ir (new) | Ni | Nr)
*/
PK11SymKey *ikev2_ike_sa_rekey_skeyseed(const struct prf_desc *prf_desc,
PK11SymKey *SK_d_old,
PK11SymKey *new_dh_secret,
const chunk_t Ni, const chunk_t Nr)
{
/* key = SK_d (old) */
struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_symkey("ike sa rekey skeyseed",
DBG_CRYPT, prf_desc,
"SK_d (old)", SK_d_old);
/* seed: g^ir (new) | Ni | Nr) */
crypt_prf_update_symkey("g^ir (new)", prf, new_dh_secret);
crypt_prf_update_chunk("Ni", prf, Ni);
crypt_prf_update_chunk("Nr", prf, Nr);
/* generate */
return crypt_prf_final(prf);
}
/*
* SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir)
*/
PK11SymKey *ikev2_ike_sa_skeyseed(const struct prf_desc *prf_desc,
const chunk_t Ni, const chunk_t Nr,
PK11SymKey *dh_secret)
{
/* key = Ni|Nr */
chunk_t key = concat_chunk_chunk("key = Ni|Nr", Ni, Nr);
struct crypt_prf *prf = crypt_prf_init_chunk("ike sa SKEYSEED",
DBG_CRYPT,
prf_desc,
"Ni|Nr", key);
freeanychunk(key);
/* seed = g^ir */
crypt_prf_update_symkey("g^ir", prf, dh_secret);
/* generate */
return crypt_prf_final(prf);
}
static bool ikev2_calculate_psk_sighash(struct state *st,
enum original_role role,
unsigned char *idhash,
chunk_t firstpacket,
unsigned char *signed_octets)
{
const chunk_t *nonce;
const char *nonce_name;
const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
const chunk_t *pss = &empty_chunk;
const size_t hash_len = st->st_oakley.prf_hasher->hash_digest_len;
if (!(c->policy & POLICY_AUTH_NULL)) {
pss = get_preshared_secret(c);
if (pss == NULL) {
libreswan_log("No matching PSK found for connection:%s",
st->st_connection->name);
return FALSE; /* failure: no PSK to use */
}
DBG(DBG_PRIVATE, DBG_dump_chunk("User PSK:", *pss));
} else {
/*
* draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-02
*
* When using the NULL Authentication Method, the
* content of the AUTH payload is computed using the
* syntax of pre-shared secret authentication,
* described in Section 2.15 of [RFC7296]. The values
* SK_pi and SK_pr are used as shared secrets for the
* content of the AUTH payloads generated by the
* initiator and the responder respectively.
*
* We have SK_pi/SK_pr as PK11SymKey in st_skey_pi_nss
* and st_skey_pr_nss
*/
passert(st->hidden_variables.st_skeyid_calculated);
/*
* This is wrong as role - we need to role for THIS exchange
* But verify calls this routine with the role inverted, so we
* cannot juse st->st_state either.
*/
if (role == ORIGINAL_INITIATOR) {
/* we are sending initiator, or verifying responder */
pss = &st->st_skey_chunk_SK_pi;
} else {
/* we are verifying initiator, or sending responder */
pss = &st->st_skey_chunk_SK_pr;
}
DBG(DBG_PRIVATE, DBG_dump_chunk("AUTH_NULL PSK:", *pss));
}
/*
* RFC 4306 2.15:
* AUTH = prf(prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad for IKEv2"), <msg octets>)
*/
/* calculate inner prf */
PK11SymKey *prf_psk;
{
struct crypt_prf *prf =
crypt_prf_init(("<prf-psk>"
" = prf(<psk>,\"Key Pad for IKEv2\")"),
st->st_oakley.prf_hasher,
st->st_shared_nss/*scratch*/);
crypt_prf_init_chunk("shared secret", prf, *pss);
crypt_prf_update(prf);
crypt_prf_update_bytes(psk_key_pad_str/*name*/, prf,
psk_key_pad_str, psk_key_pad_str_len);
prf_psk = crypt_prf_final(prf);
}
/* decide nonce based on the role */
if (role == ORIGINAL_INITIATOR) {
/* on initiator, we need to hash responders nonce */
nonce = &st->st_nr;
nonce_name = "inputs to hash2 (responder nonce)";
} else {
nonce = &st->st_ni;
nonce_name = "inputs to hash2 (initiator nonce)";
}
/* calculate outer prf */
{
struct crypt_prf *prf =
crypt_prf_init(("<signed-octets>"
" = prf(<prf-psk>, <msg octets>)"),
st->st_oakley.prf_hasher,
st->st_shared_nss /*scratch*/);
crypt_prf_init_symkey("<prf-psk>", prf, prf_psk);
/*
* For the responder, the octets to be signed start
* with the first octet of the first SPI in the header
* of the second message and end with the last octet
* of the last payload in the second message.
* Appended to this (for purposes of computing the
* signature) are the initiator's nonce Ni (just the
* value, not the payload containing it), and the
* value prf(SK_pr,IDr') where IDr' is the responder's
* ID payload excluding the fixed header. Note that
* neither the nonce Ni nor the value prf(SK_pr,IDr')
* are transmitted.
*/
crypt_prf_update(prf);
crypt_prf_update_chunk("first-packet", prf, firstpacket);
crypt_prf_update_chunk("nonce", prf, *nonce);
crypt_prf_update_bytes("hash", prf, idhash, hash_len);
crypt_prf_final_bytes(prf, signed_octets, hash_len);
}
free_any_symkey("<prf-psk>", &prf_psk);
DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
DBG_dump_chunk("inputs to hash1 (first packet)", firstpacket);
DBG_dump_chunk(nonce_name, *nonce);
DBG_dump("idhash", idhash, hash_len));
return TRUE;
}