/*
* Run a virtual server auth and postauth
*
*/
int rad_virtual_server(REQUEST *request)
{
VALUE_PAIR *vp;
int result;
RDEBUG("server %s {", request->server);
RDEBUG(" Request:");
debug_pair_list(request->packet->vps);
/*
* We currently only handle AUTH packets here.
* This could be expanded to handle other packets as well if required.
*/
rad_assert(request->packet->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST);
result = rad_authenticate(request);
if (request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT) {
pairdelete(&request->config_items, PW_POST_AUTH_TYPE, 0, TAG_ANY);
vp = pairmake_config("Post-Auth-Type", "Reject", T_OP_SET);
if (vp) rad_postauth(request);
}
if (request->reply->code == PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT) {
rad_postauth(request);
}
RDEBUG(" Reply:");
debug_pair_list(request->reply->vps);
RDEBUG("} # server %s", request->server);
return result;
}
/*
* Do authentication, by letting EAP-TLS do most of the work.
*/
static int mod_authenticate(void *arg, eap_handler_t *handler)
{
int rcode;
fr_tls_status_t status;
rlm_eap_peap_t *inst = (rlm_eap_peap_t *) arg;
tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) handler->opaque;
peap_tunnel_t *peap = tls_session->opaque;
REQUEST *request = handler->request;
/*
* Session resumption requires the storage of data, so
* allocate it if it doesn't already exist.
*/
if (!tls_session->opaque) {
peap = tls_session->opaque = peap_alloc(tls_session, inst);
}
status = eaptls_process(handler);
RDEBUG2("eaptls_process returned %d\n", status);
switch (status) {
/*
* EAP-TLS handshake was successful, tell the
* client to keep talking.
*
* If this was EAP-TLS, we would just return
* an EAP-TLS-Success packet here.
*/
case FR_TLS_SUCCESS:
RDEBUG2("FR_TLS_SUCCESS");
peap->status = PEAP_STATUS_TUNNEL_ESTABLISHED;
break;
/*
* The TLS code is still working on the TLS
* exchange, and it's a valid TLS request.
* do nothing.
*/
case FR_TLS_HANDLED:
/*
* FIXME: If the SSL session is established, grab the state
* and EAP id from the inner tunnel, and update it with
* the expected EAP id!
*/
RDEBUG2("FR_TLS_HANDLED");
return 1;
/*
* Handshake is done, proceed with decoding tunneled
* data.
*/
case FR_TLS_OK:
RDEBUG2("FR_TLS_OK");
break;
/*
* Anything else: fail.
*/
default:
RDEBUG2("FR_TLS_OTHERS");
return 0;
}
/*
* Session is established, proceed with decoding
* tunneled data.
*/
RDEBUG2("Session established. Decoding tunneled attributes");
/*
* We may need PEAP data associated with the session, so
* allocate it here, if it wasn't already alloacted.
*/
if (!tls_session->opaque) {
tls_session->opaque = peap_alloc(tls_session, inst);
}
/*
* Process the PEAP portion of the request.
*/
rcode = eappeap_process(handler, tls_session);
switch (rcode) {
case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
return 0;
case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
return 1;
case RLM_MODULE_OK:
/*
* Move the saved VP's from the Access-Accept to
* our Access-Accept.
*/
peap = tls_session->opaque;
if (peap->soh_reply_vps) {
RDEBUG2("Using saved attributes from the SoH reply");
debug_pair_list(peap->soh_reply_vps);
pairfilter(handler->request->reply,
&handler->request->reply->vps,
&peap->soh_reply_vps, 0, 0, TAG_ANY);
}
if (peap->accept_vps) {
RDEBUG2("Using saved attributes from the original Access-Accept");
debug_pair_list(peap->accept_vps);
pairfilter(handler->request->reply,
&handler->request->reply->vps,
&peap->accept_vps, 0, 0, TAG_ANY);
}
/*
* Success: Automatically return MPPE keys.
*/
return eaptls_success(handler, 0);
/*
* No response packet, MUST be proxying it.
* The main EAP module will take care of discovering
* that the request now has a "proxy" packet, and
* will proxy it, rather than returning an EAP packet.
*/
case RLM_MODULE_UPDATED:
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
rad_assert(handler->request->proxy != NULL);
#endif
return 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
return 0;
}
/*
* Do authentication, by letting EAP-TLS do most of the work.
*/
static int eapttls_authenticate(void *arg, EAP_HANDLER *handler)
{
int rcode;
fr_tls_status_t status;
rlm_eap_ttls_t *inst = (rlm_eap_ttls_t *) arg;
tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) handler->opaque;
ttls_tunnel_t *t = (ttls_tunnel_t *) tls_session->opaque;
REQUEST *request = handler->request;
RDEBUG2("Authenticate");
tls_session->length_flag = inst->include_length;
/*
* Process TLS layer until done.
*/
status = eaptls_process(handler);
RDEBUG2("eaptls_process returned %d\n", status);
switch (status) {
/*
* EAP-TLS handshake was successful, tell the
* client to keep talking.
*
* If this was EAP-TLS, we would just return
* an EAP-TLS-Success packet here.
*/
case FR_TLS_SUCCESS:
if (SSL_session_reused(tls_session->ssl)) {
RDEBUG("Skipping Phase2 due to session resumption");
goto do_keys;
}
if (t && t->authenticated) {
RDEBUG2("Using saved attributes from the original Access-Accept");
debug_pair_list(t->accept_vps);
pairadd(&handler->request->reply->vps,
t->accept_vps);
t->accept_vps = NULL;
do_keys:
/*
* Success: Automatically return MPPE keys.
*/
return eaptls_success(handler, 0);
} else {
eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
}
return 1;
/*
* The TLS code is still working on the TLS
* exchange, and it's a valid TLS request.
* do nothing.
*/
case FR_TLS_HANDLED:
return 1;
/*
* Handshake is done, proceed with decoding tunneled
* data.
*/
case FR_TLS_OK:
break;
/*
* Anything else: fail.
*/
default:
return 0;
}
/*
* Session is established, proceed with decoding
* tunneled data.
*/
RDEBUG2("Session established. Proceeding to decode tunneled attributes.");
/*
* We may need TTLS data associated with the session, so
* allocate it here, if it wasn't already alloacted.
*/
if (!tls_session->opaque) {
tls_session->opaque = ttls_alloc(inst);
tls_session->free_opaque = ttls_free;
}
/*
* Process the TTLS portion of the request.
*/
rcode = eapttls_process(handler, tls_session);
switch (rcode) {
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
return 0;
/*
* Access-Challenge, continue tunneled conversation.
*/
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
return 1;
/*
* Success: Automatically return MPPE keys.
*/
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
return eaptls_success(handler, 0);
/*
* No response packet, MUST be proxying it.
* The main EAP module will take care of discovering
* that the request now has a "proxy" packet, and
* will proxy it, rather than returning an EAP packet.
*/
case PW_STATUS_CLIENT:
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
rad_assert(handler->request->proxy != NULL);
#endif
return 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
/*
* Something we don't understand: Reject it.
*/
eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
return 0;
}
/** Send the challenge itself
*
* Challenges will come from one of three places eventually:
*
* 1 from attributes like PW_EAP_SIM_RANDx
* (these might be retrived from a database)
*
* 2 from internally implemented SIM authenticators
* (a simple one based upon XOR will be provided)
*
* 3 from some kind of SS7 interface.
*
* For now, they only come from attributes.
* It might be that the best way to do 2/3 will be with a different
* module to generate/calculate things.
*
*/
static int eap_sim_sendchallenge(eap_handler_t *handler)
{
REQUEST *request = handler->request;
eap_sim_state_t *ess;
VALUE_PAIR **invps, **outvps, *newvp;
RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
uint8_t *p;
ess = (eap_sim_state_t *)handler->opaque;
rad_assert(handler->request != NULL);
rad_assert(handler->request->reply);
/*
* Invps is the data from the client but this is for non-protocol data here.
* We should already have consumed any client originated data.
*/
invps = &handler->request->packet->vps;
/*
* Outvps is the data to the client
*/
packet = handler->request->reply;
outvps = &packet->vps;
if (RDEBUG_ENABLED2) {
RDEBUG2("EAP-SIM decoded packet:");
debug_pair_list(*invps);
}
/*
* Okay, we got the challenges! Put them into an attribute.
*/
newvp = paircreate(packet, PW_EAP_SIM_RAND, 0);
newvp->length = 2 + (EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE * 3);
newvp->vp_octets = p = talloc_array(newvp, uint8_t, newvp->length);
memset(p, 0, 2); /* clear reserved bytes */
p += 2;
memcpy(p, ess->keys.rand[0], EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE);
p += EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE;
memcpy(p, ess->keys.rand[1], EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE);
p += EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE;
memcpy(p, ess->keys.rand[2], EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE);
pairadd(outvps, newvp);
/*
* Set the EAP_ID - new value
*/
newvp = paircreate(packet, PW_EAP_ID, 0);
newvp->vp_integer = ess->sim_id++;
pairreplace(outvps, newvp);
/*
* Make a copy of the identity
*/
ess->keys.identitylen = strlen(handler->identity);
memcpy(ess->keys.identity, handler->identity, ess->keys.identitylen);
/*
* Use the SIM identity, if available
*/
newvp = pairfind(*invps, PW_EAP_SIM_IDENTITY, 0, TAG_ANY);
if (newvp && newvp->length > 2) {
uint16_t len;
memcpy(&len, newvp->vp_octets, sizeof(uint16_t));
len = ntohs(len);
if (len <= newvp->length - 2 && len <= MAX_STRING_LEN) {
ess->keys.identitylen = len;
memcpy(ess->keys.identity, newvp->vp_octets + 2, ess->keys.identitylen);
}
}
/*
* All set, calculate keys!
*/
eapsim_calculate_keys(&ess->keys);
#ifdef EAP_SIM_DEBUG_PRF
eapsim_dump_mk(&ess->keys);
#endif
/*
* Need to include an AT_MAC attribute so that it will get
* calculated. The NONCE_MT and the MAC are both 16 bytes, so
* We store the NONCE_MT in the MAC for the encoder, which
* will pull it out before it does the operation.
*/
newvp = paircreate(packet, PW_EAP_SIM_MAC, 0);
pairmemcpy(newvp, ess->keys.nonce_mt, 16);
pairreplace(outvps, newvp);
newvp = paircreate(packet, PW_EAP_SIM_KEY, 0);
pairmemcpy(newvp, ess->keys.K_aut, 16);
pairreplace(outvps, newvp);
/* the SUBTYPE, set to challenge. */
newvp = paircreate(packet, PW_EAP_SIM_SUBTYPE, 0);
newvp->vp_integer = EAPSIM_CHALLENGE;
pairreplace(outvps, newvp);
return 1;
}
static int
mod_authenticate (void *arg, eap_handler_t *handler)
{
pwd_session_t *pwd_session;
pwd_hdr *hdr;
pwd_id_packet *id;
eap_packet_t *response;
REQUEST *request, *fake;
VALUE_PAIR *pw, *vp;
EAP_DS *eap_ds;
int len, ret = 0;
eap_pwd_t *inst = (eap_pwd_t *)arg;
uint16_t offset;
uint8_t exch, *buf, *ptr, msk[MSK_EMSK_LEN], emsk[MSK_EMSK_LEN];
uint8_t peer_confirm[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
if ((!handler) ||
((eap_ds = handler->eap_ds) == NULL) ||
(!inst)) {
return 0;
}
pwd_session = (pwd_session_t *)handler->opaque;
request = handler->request;
response = handler->eap_ds->response;
hdr = (pwd_hdr *)response->type.data;
buf = hdr->data;
len = response->type.length - sizeof(pwd_hdr);
/*
* see if we're fragmenting, if so continue until we're done
*/
if (pwd_session->out_buf_pos) {
if (len) {
RDEBUG2("pwd got something more than an ACK for a fragment");
}
return send_pwd_request(pwd_session, eap_ds);
}
/*
* the first fragment will have a total length, make a
* buffer to hold all the fragments
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(hdr)) {
if (pwd_session->in_buf) {
RDEBUG2("pwd already alloced buffer for fragments");
return 0;
}
pwd_session->in_buf_len = ntohs(buf[0] * 256 | buf[1]);
if ((pwd_session->in_buf = talloc_zero_array(pwd_session, uint8_t,
pwd_session->in_buf_len)) == NULL) {
RDEBUG2("pwd cannot allocate %d buffer to hold fragments",
pwd_session->in_buf_len);
return 0;
}
memset(pwd_session->in_buf, 0, pwd_session->in_buf_len);
pwd_session->in_buf_pos = 0;
buf += sizeof(uint16_t);
len -= sizeof(uint16_t);
}
/*
* all fragments, including the 1st will have the M(ore) bit set,
* buffer those fragments!
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(hdr)) {
rad_assert(pwd_session->in_buf != NULL);
if ((pwd_session->in_buf_pos + len) > pwd_session->in_buf_len) {
RDEBUG2("pwd will not overflow a fragment buffer. Nope, not prudent.");
return 0;
}
memcpy(pwd_session->in_buf + pwd_session->in_buf_pos, buf, len);
pwd_session->in_buf_pos += len;
/*
* send back an ACK for this fragment
*/
exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(hdr);
eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_REQUEST;
eap_ds->request->type.num = PW_EAP_PWD;
eap_ds->request->type.length = sizeof(pwd_hdr);
if ((eap_ds->request->type.data = talloc_array(eap_ds->request,
uint8_t, sizeof(pwd_hdr))) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
hdr = (pwd_hdr *)eap_ds->request->type.data;
EAP_PWD_SET_EXCHANGE(hdr, exch);
return 1;
}
if (pwd_session->in_buf) {
/*
* the last fragment...
*/
if ((pwd_session->in_buf_pos + len) > pwd_session->in_buf_len) {
RDEBUG2("pwd will not overflow a fragment buffer. Nope, not prudent.");
return 0;
}
memcpy(pwd_session->in_buf + pwd_session->in_buf_pos, buf, len);
buf = pwd_session->in_buf;
len = pwd_session->in_buf_len;
}
switch (pwd_session->state) {
case PWD_STATE_ID_REQ:
if (EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(hdr) != EAP_PWD_EXCH_ID) {
RDEBUG2("pwd exchange is incorrect: not ID");
return 0;
}
id = (pwd_id_packet *)buf;
if ((id->prf != EAP_PWD_DEF_PRF) ||
(id->random_function != EAP_PWD_DEF_RAND_FUN) ||
(id->prep != EAP_PWD_PREP_NONE) ||
(memcmp(id->token, (char *)&pwd_session->token, 4)) ||
(id->group_num != ntohs(pwd_session->group_num))) {
RDEBUG2("pwd id response is invalid");
return 0;
}
/*
* we've agreed on the ciphersuite, record it...
*/
ptr = (uint8_t *)&pwd_session->ciphersuite;
memcpy(ptr, (char *)&id->group_num, sizeof(uint16_t));
ptr += sizeof(uint16_t);
*ptr = EAP_PWD_DEF_RAND_FUN;
ptr += sizeof(uint8_t);
*ptr = EAP_PWD_DEF_PRF;
pwd_session->peer_id_len = len - sizeof(pwd_id_packet);
if (pwd_session->peer_id_len >= sizeof(pwd_session->peer_id)) {
RDEBUG2("pwd id response is malformed");
return 0;
}
memcpy(pwd_session->peer_id, id->identity,
pwd_session->peer_id_len);
pwd_session->peer_id[pwd_session->peer_id_len] = '\0';
/*
* make fake request to get the password for the usable ID
*/
if ((fake = request_alloc_fake(handler->request)) == NULL) {
RDEBUG("pwd unable to create fake request!");
return 0;
}
fake->username = pairmake_packet("User-Name", "", T_OP_EQ);
if (!fake->username) {
RDEBUG("pwd unanable to create value pair for username!");
request_free(&fake);
return 0;
}
memcpy(fake->username->vp_strvalue, pwd_session->peer_id,
pwd_session->peer_id_len);
fake->username->length = pwd_session->peer_id_len;
fake->username->vp_strvalue[fake->username->length] = 0;
if ((vp = pairfind(request->config_items, PW_VIRTUAL_SERVER, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) {
fake->server = vp->vp_strvalue;
} else if (inst->conf->virtual_server) {
fake->server = inst->conf->virtual_server;
} /* else fake->server == request->server */
if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
RDEBUG("Sending tunneled request");
debug_pair_list(fake->packet->vps);
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "server %s {\n",
(!fake->server) ? "" : fake->server);
}
/*
* Call authorization recursively, which will
* get the password.
*/
process_authorize(0, fake);
/*
* Note that we don't do *anything* with the reply
* attributes.
*/
if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "} # server %s\n",
(!fake->server) ? "" : fake->server);
RDEBUG("Got tunneled reply code %d", fake->reply->code);
debug_pair_list(fake->reply->vps);
}
if ((pw = pairfind(fake->config_items, PW_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD, 0, TAG_ANY)) == NULL) {
DEBUG2("failed to find password for %s to do pwd authentication",
pwd_session->peer_id);
request_free(&fake);
return 0;
}
if (compute_password_element(pwd_session, pwd_session->group_num,
pw->data.strvalue, strlen(pw->data.strvalue),
inst->conf->server_id, strlen(inst->conf->server_id),
pwd_session->peer_id, strlen(pwd_session->peer_id),
&pwd_session->token)) {
DEBUG2("failed to obtain password element :-(");
request_free(&fake);
return 0;
}
request_free(&fake);
/*
* compute our scalar and element
*/
if (compute_scalar_element(pwd_session, inst->bnctx)) {
DEBUG2("failed to compute server's scalar and element");
return 0;
}
if (((x = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((y = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
DEBUG2("server point allocation failed");
return 0;
}
/*
* element is a point, get both coordinates: x and y
*/
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(pwd_session->group,
pwd_session->my_element, x, y,
inst->bnctx)) {
DEBUG2("server point assignment failed");
BN_free(x);
BN_free(y);
return 0;
}
/*
* construct request
*/
pwd_session->out_buf_len = BN_num_bytes(pwd_session->order) +
(2 * BN_num_bytes(pwd_session->prime));
if ((pwd_session->out_buf = talloc_array(pwd_session, uint8_t,
pwd_session->out_buf_len)) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
memset(pwd_session->out_buf, 0, pwd_session->out_buf_len);
ptr = pwd_session->out_buf;
offset = BN_num_bytes(pwd_session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(x);
BN_bn2bin(x, ptr + offset);
ptr += BN_num_bytes(pwd_session->prime);
offset = BN_num_bytes(pwd_session->prime) - BN_num_bytes(y);
BN_bn2bin(y, ptr + offset);
ptr += BN_num_bytes(pwd_session->prime);
offset = BN_num_bytes(pwd_session->order) - BN_num_bytes(pwd_session->my_scalar);
BN_bn2bin(pwd_session->my_scalar, ptr + offset);
pwd_session->state = PWD_STATE_COMMIT;
ret = send_pwd_request(pwd_session, eap_ds);
break;
case PWD_STATE_COMMIT:
if (EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(hdr) != EAP_PWD_EXCH_COMMIT) {
RDEBUG2("pwd exchange is incorrect: not commit!");
return 0;
}
/*
* process the peer's commit and generate the shared key, k
*/
if (process_peer_commit(pwd_session, buf, inst->bnctx)) {
RDEBUG2("failed to process peer's commit");
return 0;
}
/*
* compute our confirm blob
*/
if (compute_server_confirm(pwd_session, pwd_session->my_confirm, inst->bnctx)) {
ERROR("rlm_eap_pwd: failed to compute confirm!");
return 0;
}
/*
* construct a response...which is just our confirm blob
*/
pwd_session->out_buf_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
if ((pwd_session->out_buf = talloc_array(pwd_session, uint8_t,
pwd_session->out_buf_len)) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
memset(pwd_session->out_buf, 0, pwd_session->out_buf_len);
memcpy(pwd_session->out_buf, pwd_session->my_confirm, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
pwd_session->state = PWD_STATE_CONFIRM;
ret = send_pwd_request(pwd_session, eap_ds);
break;
case PWD_STATE_CONFIRM:
if (EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(hdr) != EAP_PWD_EXCH_CONFIRM) {
RDEBUG2("pwd exchange is incorrect: not commit!");
return 0;
}
if (compute_peer_confirm(pwd_session, peer_confirm, inst->bnctx)) {
RDEBUG2("pwd exchange cannot compute peer's confirm");
return 0;
}
if (memcmp(peer_confirm, buf, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
RDEBUG2("pwd exchange fails: peer confirm is incorrect!");
return 0;
}
if (compute_keys(pwd_session, peer_confirm, msk, emsk)) {
RDEBUG2("pwd exchange cannot generate (E)MSK!");
return 0;
}
eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_SUCCESS;
/*
* return the MSK (in halves)
*/
eap_add_reply(handler->request,
"MS-MPPE-Recv-Key", msk, MPPE_KEY_LEN);
eap_add_reply(handler->request,
"MS-MPPE-Send-Key", msk+MPPE_KEY_LEN, MPPE_KEY_LEN);
ret = 1;
break;
default:
RDEBUG2("unknown PWD state");
return 0;
}
/*
* we processed the buffered fragments, get rid of them
*/
if (pwd_session->in_buf) {
talloc_free(pwd_session->in_buf);
pwd_session->in_buf = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Do authentication, by letting EAP-TLS do most of the work.
*/
static int CC_HINT(nonnull) mod_authenticate(void *type_arg, eap_handler_t *handler)
{
fr_tls_status_t status;
tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) handler->opaque;
REQUEST *request = handler->request;
rlm_eap_tls_t *inst;
inst = type_arg;
RDEBUG2("Authenticate");
status = eaptls_process(handler);
RDEBUG2("eaptls_process returned %d\n", status);
switch (status) {
/*
* EAP-TLS handshake was successful, return an
* EAP-TLS-Success packet here.
*
* If a virtual server was configured, check that
* it accepts the certificates, too.
*/
case FR_TLS_SUCCESS:
if (inst->virtual_server) {
VALUE_PAIR *vp;
REQUEST *fake;
/* create a fake request */
fake = request_alloc_fake(request);
rad_assert(!fake->packet->vps);
fake->packet->vps = paircopy(fake->packet, request->packet->vps);
/* set the virtual server to use */
if ((vp = pairfind(request->config_items, PW_VIRTUAL_SERVER, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) {
fake->server = vp->vp_strvalue;
} else {
fake->server = inst->virtual_server;
}
RDEBUG("Processing EAP-TLS Certificate check:");
debug_pair_list(fake->packet->vps);
RDEBUG("server %s {", fake->server);
rad_virtual_server(fake);
RDEBUG("} # server %s", fake->server);
/* copy the reply vps back to our reply */
pairfilter(request->reply, &request->reply->vps,
&fake->reply->vps, 0, 0, TAG_ANY);
/* reject if virtual server didn't return accept */
if (fake->reply->code != PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_ACK) {
RDEBUG2("Certificates were rejected by the virtual server");
request_free(&fake);
eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
return 0;
}
request_free(&fake);
/* success */
}
break;
/*
* The TLS code is still working on the TLS
* exchange, and it's a valid TLS request.
* do nothing.
*/
case FR_TLS_HANDLED:
return 1;
/*
* Handshake is done, proceed with decoding tunneled
* data.
*/
case FR_TLS_OK:
RDEBUG2("Received unexpected tunneled data after successful handshake");
#ifndef NDEBUG
if ((debug_flag > 2) && fr_log_fp) {
unsigned int i;
unsigned int data_len;
unsigned char buffer[1024];
data_len = (tls_session->record_minus)(&tls_session->dirty_in,
buffer, sizeof(buffer));
DEBUG(" Tunneled data (%u bytes)", data_len);
for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00) fprintf(fr_log_fp, " %x: ", i);
if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", buffer[i]);
}
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
}
#endif
eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
return 0;
break;
/*
* Anything else: fail.
*
* Also, remove the session from the cache so that
* the client can't re-use it.
*/
default:
tls_fail(tls_session);
return 0;
}
/*
* Success: Automatically return MPPE keys.
*/
return eaptls_success(handler, 0);
}
/*
* this code sends the challenge itself.
*
* Challenges will come from one of three places eventually:
*
* 1 from attributes like ATTRIBUTE_EAP_SIM_RANDx
* (these might be retrived from a database)
*
* 2 from internally implemented SIM authenticators
* (a simple one based upon XOR will be provided)
*
* 3 from some kind of SS7 interface.
*
* For now, they only come from attributes.
* It might be that the best way to do 2/3 will be with a different
* module to generate/calculate things.
*
*/
static int eap_sim_sendchallenge(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
{
struct eap_sim_server_state *ess;
VALUE_PAIR **invps, **outvps, *newvp;
ess = (struct eap_sim_server_state *)handler->opaque;
rad_assert(handler->request != NULL);
rad_assert(handler->request->reply);
/* invps is the data from the client.
* but, this is for non-protocol data here. We should
* already have consumed any client originated data.
*/
invps = &handler->request->packet->vps;
/* outvps is the data to the client. */
outvps= &handler->request->reply->vps;
if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "+++> EAP-sim decoded packet:\n");
debug_pair_list(*invps);
}
/* okay, we got the challenges! Put them into an attribute */
newvp = paircreate(ATTRIBUTE_EAP_SIM_BASE+PW_EAP_SIM_RAND,
0, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
memset(newvp->vp_strvalue, 0, 2); /* clear reserved bytes */
memcpy(newvp->vp_strvalue+2+EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE*0, ess->keys.rand[0], EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE);
memcpy(newvp->vp_strvalue+2+EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE*1, ess->keys.rand[1], EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE);
memcpy(newvp->vp_strvalue+2+EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE*2, ess->keys.rand[2], EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE);
newvp->length = 2+EAPSIM_RAND_SIZE*3;
pairadd(outvps, newvp);
/* set the EAP_ID - new value */
newvp = paircreate(ATTRIBUTE_EAP_ID, 0, PW_TYPE_INTEGER);
newvp->vp_integer = ess->sim_id++;
pairreplace(outvps, newvp);
/* make a copy of the identity */
ess->keys.identitylen = strlen(handler->identity);
memcpy(ess->keys.identity, handler->identity, ess->keys.identitylen);
/* use the SIM identity, if available */
newvp = pairfind(*invps, ATTRIBUTE_EAP_SIM_BASE + PW_EAP_SIM_IDENTITY, 0, TAG_ANY);
if (newvp && newvp->length > 2) {
uint16_t len;
memcpy(&len, newvp->vp_octets, sizeof(uint16_t));
len = ntohs(len);
if (len <= newvp->length - 2 && len <= MAX_STRING_LEN) {
ess->keys.identitylen = len;
memcpy(ess->keys.identity, newvp->vp_octets + 2,
ess->keys.identitylen);
}
}
/* all set, calculate keys! */
eapsim_calculate_keys(&ess->keys);
#ifdef EAP_SIM_DEBUG_PRF
eapsim_dump_mk(&ess->keys);
#endif
/*
* need to include an AT_MAC attribute so that it will get
* calculated. The NONCE_MT and the MAC are both 16 bytes, so
* we store the NONCE_MT in the MAC for the encoder, which
* will pull it out before it does the operation.
*/
newvp = paircreate(ATTRIBUTE_EAP_SIM_BASE+PW_EAP_SIM_MAC,
0, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
memcpy(newvp->vp_strvalue, ess->keys.nonce_mt, 16);
newvp->length = 16;
pairreplace(outvps, newvp);
newvp = paircreate(ATTRIBUTE_EAP_SIM_KEY, 0, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
memcpy(newvp->vp_strvalue, ess->keys.K_aut, 16);
newvp->length = 16;
pairreplace(outvps, newvp);
/* the SUBTYPE, set to challenge. */
newvp = paircreate(ATTRIBUTE_EAP_SIM_SUBTYPE, 0, PW_TYPE_INTEGER);
newvp->vp_integer = eapsim_challenge;
pairreplace(outvps, newvp);
return 1;
}
int eaptls_success(EAP_HANDLER *handler, int peap_flag)
{
EAPTLS_PACKET reply;
VALUE_PAIR *vp, *vps = NULL;
REQUEST *request = handler->request;
tls_session_t *tls_session = handler->opaque;
reply.code = EAPTLS_SUCCESS;
reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
reply.flags = peap_flag;
reply.data = NULL;
reply.dlen = 0;
/*
* If there's no session resumption, delete the entry
* from the cache. This means either it's disabled
* globally for this SSL context, OR we were told to
* disable it for this user.
*
* This also means you can't turn it on just for one
* user.
*/
if ((!tls_session->allow_session_resumption) ||
(((vp = pairfind(request->config_items, 1127)) != NULL) &&
(vp->vp_integer == 0))) {
SSL_CTX_remove_session(tls_session->ctx,
tls_session->ssl->session);
tls_session->allow_session_resumption = 0;
/*
* If we're in a resumed session and it's
* not allowed,
*/
if (SSL_session_reused(tls_session->ssl)) {
RDEBUG("FAIL: Forcibly stopping session resumption as it is not allowed.");
return eaptls_fail(handler, peap_flag);
}
/*
* Else resumption IS allowed, so we store the
* user data in the cache.
*/
} else if (!SSL_session_reused(tls_session->ssl)) {
RDEBUG2("Saving response in the cache");
vp = paircopy2(request->reply->vps, PW_USER_NAME);
pairadd(&vps, vp);
vp = paircopy2(request->packet->vps, PW_STRIPPED_USER_NAME);
pairadd(&vps, vp);
if (vps) {
SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl->session,
eaptls_session_idx, vps);
} else {
RDEBUG2("WARNING: No information to cache: session caching will be disabled for this session.");
SSL_CTX_remove_session(tls_session->ctx,
tls_session->ssl->session);
}
/*
* Else the session WAS allowed. Copy the cached
* reply.
*/
} else {
vp = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(tls_session->ssl->session,
eaptls_session_idx);
if (!vp) {
RDEBUG("WARNING: No information in cached session!");
return eaptls_fail(handler, peap_flag);
} else {
RDEBUG("Adding cached attributes to the reply:");
debug_pair_list(vp);
pairadd(&request->reply->vps, paircopy(vp));
/*
* Mark the request as resumed.
*/
vp = pairmake("EAP-Session-Resumed", "1", T_OP_SET);
if (vp) pairadd(&request->packet->vps, vp);
}
}
/*
* Call compose AFTER checking for cached data.
*/
eaptls_compose(handler->eap_ds, &reply);
/*
* Automatically generate MPPE keying material.
*/
if (tls_session->prf_label) {
eaptls_gen_mppe_keys(&handler->request->reply->vps,
tls_session->ssl, tls_session->prf_label);
} else {
RDEBUG("WARNING: Not adding MPPE keys because there is no PRF label");
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Authenticate a previously sent challenge.
*/
static int mschapv2_authenticate(void *arg, EAP_HANDLER *handler)
{
int rcode, ccode;
mschapv2_opaque_t *data;
EAP_DS *eap_ds = handler->eap_ds;
VALUE_PAIR *challenge, *response, *name;
rlm_eap_mschapv2_t *inst = (rlm_eap_mschapv2_t *) arg;
rad_assert(handler->request != NULL);
rad_assert(handler->stage == AUTHENTICATE);
data = (mschapv2_opaque_t *) handler->opaque;
/*
* Sanity check the response.
*/
if (eap_ds->response->length <= 5) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: corrupted data");
return 0;
}
ccode = eap_ds->response->type.data[0];
switch (data->code) {
case PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_FAILURE:
if (ccode == PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE) {
DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_mschapv2: authentication re-try from client after we sent a failure");
break;
}
/*
* if we sent error 648 (password expired) to the client
* we might get an MSCHAP-CPW packet here; turn it into a
* regular MS-CHAP2-CPW packet and pass it to rlm_mschap
* (or proxy it, I guess)
*/
if (ccode == PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_CHGPASSWD) {
VALUE_PAIR *cpw;
int mschap_id = eap_ds->response->type.data[1];
int copied=0,seq=1;
DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_mschapv2: password change packet received");
challenge = pairmake("MS-CHAP-Challenge", "0x00", T_OP_EQ);
if (!challenge) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: out of memory");
return 0;
}
challenge->length = MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN;
memcpy(challenge->vp_strvalue, data->challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN);
pairadd(&handler->request->packet->vps, challenge);
cpw = pairmake("MS-CHAP2-CPW", "", T_OP_EQ);
cpw->vp_octets[0] = 7;
cpw->vp_octets[1] = mschap_id;
memcpy(cpw->vp_octets+2, eap_ds->response->type.data + 520, 66);
cpw->length = 68;
pairadd(&handler->request->packet->vps, cpw);
/*
* break the encoded password into VPs (3 of them)
*/
while (copied < 516) {
VALUE_PAIR *nt_enc;
int to_copy = 516 - copied;
if (to_copy > 243)
to_copy = 243;
nt_enc = pairmake("MS-CHAP-NT-Enc-PW", "", T_OP_ADD);
nt_enc->vp_octets[0] = 6;
nt_enc->vp_octets[1] = mschap_id;
nt_enc->vp_octets[2] = 0;
nt_enc->vp_octets[3] = seq++;
memcpy(nt_enc->vp_octets + 4, eap_ds->response->type.data + 4 + copied, to_copy);
copied += to_copy;
nt_enc->length = 4 + to_copy;
pairadd(&handler->request->packet->vps, nt_enc);
}
DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_mschapv2: built change password packet");
debug_pair_list(handler->request->packet->vps);
/*
* jump to "authentication"
*/
goto packet_ready;
}
/*
* we sent a failure and are expecting a failure back
*/
if (ccode != PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_FAILURE) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: Sent FAILURE expecting FAILURE but got %d", ccode);
return 0;
}
failure:
handler->request->options &= ~RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP;
eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;
return 1;
case PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS:
/*
* we sent a success to the client; some clients send a
* success back as-per the RFC, some send an ACK. Permit
* both, I guess...
*/
switch (ccode) {
case PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS:
eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_SUCCESS;
pairadd(&handler->request->reply->vps, data->mppe_keys);
data->mppe_keys = NULL;
/* fall through... */
case PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_ACK:
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
/*
* It's a success. Don't proxy it.
*/
handler->request->options &= ~RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP;
#endif
pairadd(&handler->request->reply->vps, data->reply);
data->reply = NULL;
return 1;
}
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: Sent SUCCESS expecting SUCCESS (or ACK) but got %d", ccode);
return 0;
case PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE:
if (ccode == PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_FAILURE) goto failure;
/*
* we sent a challenge, expecting a response
*/
if (ccode != PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: Sent CHALLENGE expecting RESPONSE but got %d", ccode);
return 0;
}
/* authentication happens below */
break;
default:
/* should never happen */
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: unknown state %d", data->code);
return 0;
}
/*
* Ensure that we have at least enough data
* to do the following checks.
*
* EAP header (4), EAP type, MS-CHAP opcode,
* MS-CHAP ident, MS-CHAP data length (2),
* MS-CHAP value length.
*/
if (eap_ds->response->length < (4 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 1)) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: Response is too short");
return 0;
}
/*
* The 'value_size' is the size of the response,
* which is supposed to be the response (48
* bytes) plus 1 byte of flags at the end.
*/
if (eap_ds->response->type.data[4] != 49) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: Response is of incorrect length %d", eap_ds->response->type.data[4]);
return 0;
}
/*
* The MS-Length field is 5 + value_size + length
* of name, which is put after the response.
*/
if (((eap_ds->response->type.data[2] << 8) |
eap_ds->response->type.data[3]) < (5 + 49)) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: Response contains contradictory length %d %d",
(eap_ds->response->type.data[2] << 8) |
eap_ds->response->type.data[3], 5 + 49);
return 0;
}
/*
* We now know that the user has sent us a response
* to the challenge. Let's try to authenticate it.
*
* We do this by taking the challenge from 'data',
* the response from the EAP packet, and creating VALUE_PAIR's
* to pass to the 'mschap' module. This is a little wonky,
* but it works.
*/
challenge = pairmake("MS-CHAP-Challenge", "0x00", T_OP_EQ);
if (!challenge) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: out of memory");
return 0;
}
challenge->length = MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN;
memcpy(challenge->vp_strvalue, data->challenge, MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN);
response = pairmake("MS-CHAP2-Response", "0x00", T_OP_EQ);
if (!response) {
pairfree(&challenge);
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: out of memory");
return 0;
}
response->length = MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE_LEN;
memcpy(response->vp_strvalue + 2, &eap_ds->response->type.data[5],
MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE_LEN - 2);
response->vp_strvalue[0] = eap_ds->response->type.data[1];
response->vp_strvalue[1] = eap_ds->response->type.data[5 + MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE_LEN];
name = pairmake("NTLM-User-Name", "", T_OP_EQ);
if (!name) {
pairfree(&challenge);
pairfree(&response);
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: Failed creating NTLM-User-Name: %s", fr_strerror());
return 0;
}
/*
* MS-Length - MS-Value - 5.
*/
name->length = (((eap_ds->response->type.data[2] << 8) |
eap_ds->response->type.data[3]) -
eap_ds->response->type.data[4] - 5);
if (name->length >= sizeof(name->vp_strvalue)) {
name->length = sizeof(name->vp_strvalue) - 1;
}
memcpy(name->vp_strvalue,
&eap_ds->response->type.data[4 + MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE_LEN],
name->length);
name->vp_strvalue[name->length] = '\0';
/*
* Add the pairs to the request, and call the 'mschap'
* module.
*/
pairadd(&handler->request->packet->vps, challenge);
pairadd(&handler->request->packet->vps, response);
pairadd(&handler->request->packet->vps, name);
packet_ready:
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
/*
* If this options is set, then we do NOT authenticate the
* user here. Instead, now that we've added the MS-CHAP
* attributes to the request, we STOP, and let the outer
* tunnel code handle it.
*
* This means that the outer tunnel code will DELETE the
* EAP attributes, and proxy the MS-CHAP attributes to a
* home server.
*/
if (handler->request->options & RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP) {
char *username = NULL;
eap_tunnel_data_t *tunnel;
DEBUG2("rlm_eap_mschapv2: cancelling authentication and letting it be proxied");
/*
* Set up the callbacks for the tunnel
*/
tunnel = rad_malloc(sizeof(*tunnel));
memset(tunnel, 0, sizeof(*tunnel));
tunnel->tls_session = arg;
tunnel->callback = mschap_postproxy;
/*
* Associate the callback with the request.
*/
rcode = request_data_add(handler->request,
handler->request->proxy,
REQUEST_DATA_EAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK,
tunnel, free);
rad_assert(rcode == 0);
/*
* The State attribute is NOT supposed to
* go into the proxied packet, it will confuse
* other RADIUS servers, and they will discard
* the request.
*
* The PEAP module will take care of adding
* the State attribute back, before passing
* the handler & request back into the tunnel.
*/
pairdelete(&handler->request->packet->vps, PW_STATE, 0, TAG_ANY);
/*
* Fix the User-Name when proxying, to strip off
* the NT Domain, if we're told to, and a User-Name
* exists, and there's a \\, meaning an NT-Domain
* in the user name, THEN discard the user name.
*/
if (inst->with_ntdomain_hack &&
((challenge = pairfind(handler->request->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) &&
((username = strchr(challenge->vp_strvalue, '\\')) != NULL)) {
/*
* Wipe out the NT domain.
*
* FIXME: Put it into MS-CHAP-Domain?
*/
username++; /* skip the \\ */
memmove(challenge->vp_strvalue,
username,
strlen(username) + 1); /* include \0 */
challenge->length = strlen(challenge->vp_strvalue);
}
/*
* Remember that in the post-proxy stage, we've got
* to do the work below, AFTER the call to MS-CHAP
* authentication...
*/
return 1;
}
#endif
/*
* This is a wild & crazy hack.
*/
rcode = module_authenticate(PW_AUTHTYPE_MS_CHAP, handler->request);
/*
* Delete MPPE keys & encryption policy. We don't
* want these here.
*/
fix_mppe_keys(handler, data);
/*
* Take the response from the mschap module, and
* return success or failure, depending on the result.
*/
response = NULL;
if (rcode == RLM_MODULE_OK) {
pairmove2(&response, &handler->request->reply->vps,
PW_MSCHAP2_SUCCESS, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT, TAG_ANY);
data->code = PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_SUCCESS;
} else if (inst->send_error) {
pairmove2(&response, &handler->request->reply->vps,
PW_MSCHAP_ERROR, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT, TAG_ANY);
if (response) {
int n,err,retry;
char buf[34];
DEBUG2(" MSCHAP-Error: %s", response->vp_strvalue);
/*
* Pxarse the new challenge out of the
* MS-CHAP-Error, so that if the client
* issues a re-try, we will know which
* challenge value that they used.
*/
n = sscanf(response->vp_strvalue, "%*cE=%d R=%d C=%32s", &err, &retry, &buf[0]);
if (n == 3) {
DEBUG2(" Found new challenge from MS-CHAP-Error: err=%d retry=%d challenge=%s", err, retry, buf);
fr_hex2bin(buf, data->challenge, 16);
} else {
DEBUG2(" Could not parse new challenge from MS-CHAP-Error: %d", n);
}
}
data->code = PW_EAP_MSCHAPV2_FAILURE;
} else {
eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;
return 1;
}
/*
* No response, die.
*/
if (!response) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_mschapv2: No MS-CHAPv2-Success or MS-CHAP-Error was found.");
return 0;
}
/*
* Compose the response (whatever it is),
* and return it to the over-lying EAP module.
*/
eapmschapv2_compose(handler, response);
pairfree(&response);
return 1;
}
/*
* Process the "diameter" contents of the tunneled data.
*/
int eapttls_process(EAP_HANDLER *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session)
{
int rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
REQUEST *fake;
VALUE_PAIR *vp;
ttls_tunnel_t *t;
const uint8_t *data;
size_t data_len;
REQUEST *request = handler->request;
rad_assert(request != NULL);
/*
* Just look at the buffer directly, without doing
* record_minus.
*/
data_len = tls_session->clean_out.used;
tls_session->clean_out.used = 0;
data = tls_session->clean_out.data;
t = (ttls_tunnel_t *) tls_session->opaque;
/*
* If there's no data, maybe this is an ACK to an
* MS-CHAP2-Success.
*/
if (data_len == 0) {
if (t->authenticated) {
RDEBUG("Got ACK, and the user was already authenticated.");
return PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK;
} /* else no session, no data, die. */
/*
* FIXME: Call SSL_get_error() to see what went
* wrong.
*/
RDEBUG2("SSL_read Error");
return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
}
#ifndef NDEBUG
if ((debug_flag > 2) && fr_log_fp) {
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, " TTLS tunnel data in %04x: ", (int) i);
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", data[i]);
if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
}
if ((data_len & 0x0f) != 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
}
#endif
if (!diameter_verify(request, data, data_len)) {
return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
}
/*
* Allocate a fake REQUEST structe.
*/
fake = request_alloc_fake(request);
rad_assert(fake->packet->vps == NULL);
/*
* Add the tunneled attributes to the fake request.
*/
fake->packet->vps = diameter2vp(request, tls_session->ssl, data, data_len);
if (!fake->packet->vps) {
request_free(&fake);
return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
}
/*
* Tell the request that it's a fake one.
*/
vp = pairmake("Freeradius-Proxied-To", "127.0.0.1", T_OP_EQ);
if (vp) {
pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, vp);
}
if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
RDEBUG("Got tunneled request");
debug_pair_list(fake->packet->vps);
}
/*
* Update other items in the REQUEST data structure.
*/
fake->username = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY);
fake->password = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_USER_PASSWORD, 0, TAG_ANY);
/*
* No User-Name, try to create one from stored data.
*/
if (!fake->username) {
/*
* No User-Name in the stored data, look for
* an EAP-Identity, and pull it out of there.
*/
if (!t->username) {
vp = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, TAG_ANY);
if (vp &&
(vp->length >= EAP_HEADER_LEN + 2) &&
(vp->vp_strvalue[0] == PW_EAP_RESPONSE) &&
(vp->vp_strvalue[EAP_HEADER_LEN] == PW_EAP_IDENTITY) &&
(vp->vp_strvalue[EAP_HEADER_LEN + 1] != 0)) {
/*
* Create & remember a User-Name
*/
t->username = pairmake("User-Name", "", T_OP_EQ);
rad_assert(t->username != NULL);
memcpy(t->username->vp_strvalue, vp->vp_strvalue + 5,
vp->length - 5);
t->username->length = vp->length - 5;
t->username->vp_strvalue[t->username->length] = 0;
RDEBUG("Got tunneled identity of %s",
t->username->vp_strvalue);
/*
* If there's a default EAP type,
* set it here.
*/
if (t->default_eap_type != 0) {
RDEBUG("Setting default EAP type for tunneled EAP session.");
vp = paircreate(PW_EAP_TYPE, 0);
rad_assert(vp != NULL);
vp->vp_integer = t->default_eap_type;
pairadd(&fake->config_items, vp);
}
} else {
/*
* Don't reject the request outright,
* as it's permitted to do EAP without
* user-name.
*/
RDEBUG2W("No EAP-Identity found to start EAP conversation.");
}
} /* else there WAS a t->username */
if (t->username) {
vp = paircopy(t->username);
pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, vp);
fake->username = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, TAG_ANY);
}
} /* else the request ALREADY had a User-Name */
/*
* Add the State attribute, too, if it exists.
*/
if (t->state) {
vp = paircopy(t->state);
if (vp) pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, vp);
}
/*
* If this is set, we copy SOME of the request attributes
* from outside of the tunnel to inside of the tunnel.
*
* We copy ONLY those attributes which do NOT already
* exist in the tunneled request.
*/
if (t->copy_request_to_tunnel) {
VALUE_PAIR *copy;
for (vp = request->packet->vps; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
/*
* The attribute is a server-side thingy,
* don't copy it.
*/
if ((vp->da->attr > 255) &&
(vp->da->vendor == 0)) {
continue;
}
/*
* The outside attribute is already in the
* tunnel, don't copy it.
*
* This works for BOTH attributes which
* are originally in the tunneled request,
* AND attributes which are copied there
* from below.
*/
if (pairfind(fake->packet->vps, vp->da->attr, vp->da->vendor, TAG_ANY)) {
continue;
}
/*
* Some attributes are handled specially.
*/
switch (vp->da->attr) {
/*
* NEVER copy Message-Authenticator,
* EAP-Message, or State. They're
* only for outside of the tunnel.
*/
case PW_USER_NAME:
case PW_USER_PASSWORD:
case PW_CHAP_PASSWORD:
case PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE:
case PW_PROXY_STATE:
case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
case PW_STATE:
continue;
break;
/*
* By default, copy it over.
*/
default:
break;
}
/*
* Don't copy from the head, we've already
* checked it.
*/
copy = paircopy2(vp, vp->da->attr, vp->da->vendor, TAG_ANY);
pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, copy);
}
}
if ((vp = pairfind(request->config_items, PW_VIRTUAL_SERVER, 0, TAG_ANY)) != NULL) {
fake->server = vp->vp_strvalue;
} else if (t->virtual_server) {
fake->server = t->virtual_server;
} /* else fake->server == request->server */
if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
RDEBUG("Sending tunneled request");
debug_pair_list(fake->packet->vps);
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "server %s {\n",
(fake->server == NULL) ? "" : fake->server);
}
/*
* Call authentication recursively, which will
* do PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP, etc.
*/
rad_virtual_server(fake);
/*
* Note that we don't do *anything* with the reply
* attributes.
*/
if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "} # server %s\n",
(fake->server == NULL) ? "" : fake->server);
RDEBUG("Got tunneled reply code %d", fake->reply->code);
debug_pair_list(fake->reply->vps);
}
/*
* Decide what to do with the reply.
*/
switch (fake->reply->code) {
case 0: /* No reply code, must be proxied... */
#ifdef WITH_PROXY
vp = pairfind(fake->config_items, PW_PROXY_TO_REALM, 0, TAG_ANY);
if (vp) {
eap_tunnel_data_t *tunnel;
RDEBUG("Tunneled authentication will be proxied to %s", vp->vp_strvalue);
/*
* Tell the original request that it's going
* to be proxied.
*/
pairmove2(&(request->config_items),
&(fake->config_items),
PW_PROXY_TO_REALM, 0, TAG_ANY);
/*
* Seed the proxy packet with the
* tunneled request.
*/
rad_assert(request->proxy == NULL);
request->proxy = fake->packet;
memset(&request->proxy->src_ipaddr, 0,
sizeof(request->proxy->src_ipaddr));
memset(&request->proxy->src_ipaddr, 0,
sizeof(request->proxy->src_ipaddr));
request->proxy->src_port = 0;
request->proxy->dst_port = 0;
fake->packet = NULL;
rad_free(&fake->reply);
fake->reply = NULL;
/*
* Set up the callbacks for the tunnel
*/
tunnel = rad_malloc(sizeof(*tunnel));
memset(tunnel, 0, sizeof(*tunnel));
tunnel->tls_session = tls_session;
tunnel->callback = eapttls_postproxy;
/*
* Associate the callback with the request.
*/
rcode = request_data_add(request,
request->proxy,
REQUEST_DATA_EAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK,
tunnel, free);
rad_assert(rcode == 0);
/*
* rlm_eap.c has taken care of associating
* the handler with the fake request.
*
* So we associate the fake request with
* this request.
*/
rcode = request_data_add(request,
request->proxy,
REQUEST_DATA_EAP_MSCHAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK,
fake, my_request_free);
rad_assert(rcode == 0);
fake = NULL;
/*
* Didn't authenticate the packet, but
* we're proxying it.
*/
rcode = PW_STATUS_CLIENT;
} else
#endif /* WITH_PROXY */
{
RDEBUG("No tunneled reply was found for request %d , and the request was not proxied: rejecting the user.",
request->number);
rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
}
break;
default:
/*
* Returns RLM_MODULE_FOO, and we want to return
* PW_FOO
*/
rcode = process_reply(handler, tls_session, request,
fake->reply);
switch (rcode) {
case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
break;
case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
rcode = PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE;
break;
case RLM_MODULE_OK:
rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK;
break;
default:
rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
break;
}
break;
}
request_free(&fake);
return rcode;
}
/*
* Do post-proxy processing,
*/
static int eapttls_postproxy(EAP_HANDLER *handler, void *data)
{
int rcode;
tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) data;
REQUEST *fake, *request = handler->request;
rad_assert(request != NULL);
RDEBUG("Passing reply from proxy back into the tunnel.");
/*
* If there was a fake request associated with the proxied
* request, do more processing of it.
*/
fake = (REQUEST *) request_data_get(handler->request,
handler->request->proxy,
REQUEST_DATA_EAP_MSCHAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK);
/*
* Do the callback, if it exists, and if it was a success.
*/
if (fake &&
handler->request->proxy_reply &&
(handler->request->proxy_reply->code == PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK)) {
/*
* Terrible hacks.
*/
rad_assert(fake->packet == NULL);
fake->packet = request->proxy;
fake->packet->src_ipaddr = request->packet->src_ipaddr;
request->proxy = NULL;
rad_assert(fake->reply == NULL);
fake->reply = request->proxy_reply;
request->proxy_reply = NULL;
if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "server %s {\n",
(fake->server == NULL) ? "" : fake->server);
}
/*
* Perform a post-auth stage for the tunneled
* session.
*/
fake->options &= ~RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP;
rcode = rad_postauth(fake);
RDEBUG2("post-auth returns %d", rcode);
if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
fprintf(fr_log_fp, "} # server %s\n",
(fake->server == NULL) ? "" : fake->server);
RDEBUG("Final reply from tunneled session code %d",
fake->reply->code);
debug_pair_list(fake->reply->vps);
}
/*
* Terrible hacks.
*/
request->proxy = fake->packet;
fake->packet = NULL;
request->proxy_reply = fake->reply;
fake->reply = NULL;
/*
* And we're done with this request.
*/
switch (rcode) {
case RLM_MODULE_FAIL:
request_free(&fake);
eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
return 0;
break;
default: /* Don't Do Anything */
RDEBUG2("Got reply %d",
request->proxy_reply->code);
break;
}
}
request_free(&fake); /* robust if fake == NULL */
/*
* Process the reply from the home server.
*/
rcode = process_reply(handler, tls_session, handler->request,
handler->request->proxy_reply);
/*
* The proxy code uses the reply from the home server as
* the basis for the reply to the NAS. We don't want that,
* so we toss it, after we've had our way with it.
*/
pairfree(&handler->request->proxy_reply->vps);
switch (rcode) {
case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
RDEBUG("Reply was rejected");
break;
case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
RDEBUG("Reply was handled");
eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
return 1;
case RLM_MODULE_OK:
RDEBUG("Reply was OK");
/*
* Success: Automatically return MPPE keys.
*/
return eaptls_success(handler, 0);
default:
RDEBUG("Reply was unknown.");
break;
}
eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
return 0;
}
