/** Extend the introduction circuit <b>circ</b> to another valid
* introduction point for the hidden service it is trying to connect
* to, or mark it and launch a new circuit if we can't extend it.
* Return 0 on success or possible success. Return -1 and mark the
* introduction circuit for close on permanent failure.
*
* On failure, the caller is responsible for marking the associated
* rendezvous circuit for close. */
static int
rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
extend_info_t *extend_info;
int result;
extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_data);
if (!extend_info) {
log_warn(LD_REND,
"No usable introduction points left for %s. Closing.",
safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address));
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return -1;
}
if (circ->remaining_relay_early_cells) {
log_info(LD_REND,
"Re-extending circ %d, this time to %s.",
circ->_base.n_circ_id,
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(extend_info)));
result = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info);
} else {
log_info(LD_REND,
"Closing intro circ %d (out of RELAY_EARLY cells).",
circ->_base.n_circ_id);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
/* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit will launch a new intro circ. */
result = 0;
}
extend_info_free(extend_info);
return result;
}
/** Deallocate space associated with the cpath node <b>victim</b>. */
static void
circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim)
{
if (!victim)
return;
crypto_cipher_free(victim->f_crypto);
crypto_cipher_free(victim->b_crypto);
crypto_digest_free(victim->f_digest);
crypto_digest_free(victim->b_digest);
crypto_dh_free(victim->dh_handshake_state);
extend_info_free(victim->extend_info);
memwipe(victim, 0xBB, sizeof(crypt_path_t)); /* poison memory */
tor_free(victim);
}
/** Deallocate space associated with the cpath node <b>victim</b>. */
static void
circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim)
{
if (victim->f_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(victim->f_crypto);
if (victim->b_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(victim->b_crypto);
if (victim->f_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(victim->f_digest);
if (victim->b_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(victim->b_digest);
if (victim->dh_handshake_state)
crypto_dh_free(victim->dh_handshake_state);
if (victim->extend_info)
extend_info_free(victim->extend_info);
memset(victim, 0xBB, sizeof(crypt_path_t)); /* poison memory */
tor_free(victim);
}
/** Deallocate space associated with circ.
*/
static void
circuit_free(circuit_t *circ)
{
void *mem;
size_t memlen;
tor_assert(circ);
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(origin_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
if (ocirc->build_state) {
if (ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit)
extend_info_free(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit);
if (ocirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath)
circuit_free_cpath_node(ocirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
}
tor_free(ocirc->build_state);
circuit_free_cpath(ocirc->cpath);
if (ocirc->intro_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(ocirc->intro_key);
if (ocirc->rend_data)
rend_data_free(ocirc->rend_data);
} else {
or_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(or_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
if (ocirc->p_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(ocirc->p_crypto);
if (ocirc->p_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(ocirc->p_digest);
if (ocirc->n_crypto)
crypto_free_cipher_env(ocirc->n_crypto);
if (ocirc->n_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(ocirc->n_digest);
if (ocirc->rend_splice) {
or_circuit_t *other = ocirc->rend_splice;
tor_assert(other->_base.magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
other->rend_splice = NULL;
}
/* remove from map. */
circuit_set_p_circid_orconn(ocirc, 0, NULL);
/* Clear cell queue _after_ removing it from the map. Otherwise our
* "active" checks will be violated. */
cell_queue_clear(ô->p_conn_cells);
}
if (circ->n_hop)
extend_info_free(circ->n_hop);
tor_free(circ->n_conn_onionskin);
/* Remove from map. */
circuit_set_n_circid_orconn(circ, 0, NULL);
/* Clear cell queue _after_ removing it from the map. Otherwise our
* "active" checks will be violated. */
cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells);
memset(circ, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */
tor_free(mem);
}
/* For a given service, the ntor onion key and a rendezvous cookie, launch a
* circuit to the rendezvous point specified by the link specifiers. On
* success, a circuit identifier is attached to the circuit with the needed
* data. This function will try to open a circuit for a maximum value of
* MAX_REND_FAILURES then it will give up. */
static void
launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service,
const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
const hs_cell_introduce2_data_t *data)
{
int circ_needs_uptime;
time_t now = time(NULL);
extend_info_t *info = NULL;
origin_circuit_t *circ;
tor_assert(service);
tor_assert(ip);
tor_assert(data);
circ_needs_uptime = hs_service_requires_uptime_circ(service->config.ports);
/* Get the extend info data structure for the chosen rendezvous point
* specified by the given link specifiers. */
info = hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(data->link_specifiers,
&data->onion_pk,
service->config.is_single_onion);
if (info == NULL) {
/* We are done here, we can't extend to the rendezvous point.
* If you're running an IPv6-only v3 single onion service on 0.3.2 or with
* 0.3.2 clients, and somehow disable the option check, it will fail here.
*/
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND,
"Not enough info to open a circuit to a rendezvous point for "
"%s service %s.",
get_service_anonymity_string(service),
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
goto end;
}
for (int i = 0; i < MAX_REND_FAILURES; i++) {
int circ_flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
if (circ_needs_uptime) {
circ_flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
}
/* Firewall and policies are checked when getting the extend info. */
if (service->config.is_single_onion) {
circ_flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
}
circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, info,
circ_flags);
if (circ != NULL) {
/* Stop retrying, we have a circuit! */
break;
}
}
if (circ == NULL) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up on launching a rendezvous circuit to %s "
"for %s service %s",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(info)),
get_service_anonymity_string(service),
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
goto end;
}
log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit launched to %s with cookie %s "
"for %s service %s",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(info)),
safe_str_client(hex_str((const char *) data->rendezvous_cookie,
REND_COOKIE_LEN)),
get_service_anonymity_string(service),
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
tor_assert(circ->build_state);
/* Rendezvous circuit have a specific timeout for the time spent on trying
* to connect to the rendezvous point. */
circ->build_state->expiry_time = now + MAX_REND_TIMEOUT;
/* Create circuit identifier and key material. */
{
hs_ntor_rend_cell_keys_t keys;
curve25519_keypair_t ephemeral_kp;
/* No need for extra strong, this is only for this circuit life time. This
* key will be used for the RENDEZVOUS1 cell that will be sent on the
* circuit once opened. */
curve25519_keypair_generate(&ephemeral_kp, 0);
if (hs_ntor_service_get_rendezvous1_keys(&ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey,
&ip->enc_key_kp,
&ephemeral_kp, &data->client_pk,
&keys) < 0) {
/* This should not really happened but just in case, don't make tor
* freak out, close the circuit and move on. */
log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to get RENDEZVOUS1 key material for "
"service %s",
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
goto end;
}
circ->hs_ident = create_rp_circuit_identifier(service,
data->rendezvous_cookie,
&ephemeral_kp.pubkey, &keys);
memwipe(&ephemeral_kp, 0, sizeof(ephemeral_kp));
memwipe(&keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
tor_assert(circ->hs_ident);
}
end:
extend_info_free(info);
}
/** Deallocate space associated with circ.
*/
static void
circuit_free(circuit_t *circ)
{
void *mem;
size_t memlen;
if (!circ)
return;
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(origin_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
if (ocirc->build_state) {
extend_info_free(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit);
circuit_free_cpath_node(ocirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
cpath_ref_decref(ocirc->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref);
}
tor_free(ocirc->build_state);
circuit_free_cpath(ocirc->cpath);
crypto_pk_free(ocirc->intro_key);
rend_data_free(ocirc->rend_data);
tor_free(ocirc->dest_address);
if (ocirc->socks_username) {
memwipe(ocirc->socks_username, 0x12, ocirc->socks_username_len);
tor_free(ocirc->socks_username);
}
if (ocirc->socks_password) {
memwipe(ocirc->socks_password, 0x06, ocirc->socks_password_len);
tor_free(ocirc->socks_password);
}
} else {
or_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
/* Remember cell statistics for this circuit before deallocating. */
if (get_options()->CellStatistics)
rep_hist_buffer_stats_add_circ(circ, time(NULL));
mem = ocirc;
memlen = sizeof(or_circuit_t);
tor_assert(circ->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
crypto_cipher_free(ocirc->p_crypto);
crypto_digest_free(ocirc->p_digest);
crypto_cipher_free(ocirc->n_crypto);
crypto_digest_free(ocirc->n_digest);
if (ocirc->rend_splice) {
or_circuit_t *other = ocirc->rend_splice;
tor_assert(other->_base.magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
other->rend_splice = NULL;
}
/* remove from map. */
circuit_set_p_circid_orconn(ocirc, 0, NULL);
/* Clear cell queue _after_ removing it from the map. Otherwise our
* "active" checks will be violated. */
cell_queue_clear(ô->p_conn_cells);
}
extend_info_free(circ->n_hop);
tor_free(circ->n_conn_onionskin);
/* Remove from map. */
circuit_set_n_circid_orconn(circ, 0, NULL);
/* Clear cell queue _after_ removing it from the map. Otherwise our
* "active" checks will be violated. */
cell_queue_clear(&circ->n_conn_cells);
memwipe(mem, 0xAA, memlen); /* poison memory */
tor_free(mem);
}