void __certificate_properties_fill_cert_version(GtkTreeStore *store, GtkTreeIter *parent, gnutls_x509_crt_t *certificate)
{
gint result;
gchar value[4];
GtkTreeIter j;
result = gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(*certificate);
sprintf(value, "v%d", result);
gtk_tree_store_append(store, &j, parent);
gtk_tree_store_set(store, &j, CERTIFICATE_PROPERTIES_COL_NAME, _("Version"), CERTIFICATE_PROPERTIES_COL_VALUE, value, -1);
}
/*-
* gnutls_x509_extract_certificate_version - This function returns the certificate's version
* @cert: is an X.509 DER encoded certificate
*
* This function will return the X.509 certificate's version (1, 2, 3). This is obtained by the X509 Certificate
* Version field. Returns a negative value in case of an error.
*
-*/
int
gnutls_x509_extract_certificate_version (const gnutls_datum_t * cert)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t xcert;
int result;
result = gnutls_x509_crt_init (&xcert);
if (result < 0)
return result;
result = gnutls_x509_crt_import (xcert, cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if (result < 0)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (xcert);
return result;
}
result = gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (xcert);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (xcert);
return result;
}
/*
* Verifies the given certificate again a certificate list of
* trusted CAs.
*
* Returns only 0 or 1. If 1 it means that the certificate
* was successfuly verified.
*
* 'flags': an OR of the gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumeration.
*
* Output will hold some extra information about the verification
* procedure. Issuer will hold the actual issuer from the trusted list.
*/
static int
_gnutls_verify_certificate2 (gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
const gnutls_x509_crt_t * trusted_cas,
int tcas_size, unsigned int flags,
unsigned int *output,
gnutls_x509_crt_t * _issuer,
time_t now,
gnutls_verify_output_function func)
{
gnutls_datum_t cert_signed_data = { NULL, 0 };
gnutls_datum_t cert_signature = { NULL, 0 };
gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer = NULL;
int issuer_version, result, hash_algo;
unsigned int out = 0;
if (output)
*output = 0;
if (tcas_size >= 1)
issuer = find_issuer (cert, trusted_cas, tcas_size);
else
{
gnutls_assert ();
out = GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
if (output)
*output |= out;
result = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
/* issuer is not in trusted certificate
* authorities.
*/
if (issuer == NULL)
{
out = GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
if (output)
*output |= out;
gnutls_assert ();
result = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
if (_issuer != NULL)
*_issuer = issuer;
issuer_version = gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (issuer);
if (issuer_version < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return issuer_version;
}
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN) &&
((flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DO_NOT_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT)
|| issuer_version != 1))
{
if (check_if_ca (cert, issuer, flags) == 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
out = GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
if (output)
*output |= out;
result = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
}
result =
_gnutls_x509_get_signed_data (cert->cert, "tbsCertificate",
&cert_signed_data);
if (result < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
result =
_gnutls_x509_get_signature (cert->cert, "signature", &cert_signature);
if (result < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
result = _gnutls_x509_get_signature_algorithm(cert->cert, "signatureAlgorithm.algorithm");
if (result < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
hash_algo = gnutls_sign_get_hash_algorithm(result);
result =
_gnutls_x509_verify_data (hash_algo, &cert_signed_data, &cert_signature,
issuer);
if (result == GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED)
{
gnutls_assert ();
out |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID | GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
/* error. ignore it */
if (output)
*output |= out;
result = 0;
}
else if (result < 0)
{
gnutls_assert();
goto cleanup;
}
/* If the certificate is not self signed check if the algorithms
* used are secure. If the certificate is self signed it doesn't
* really matter.
*/
if (is_issuer (cert, cert) == 0)
{
int sigalg;
sigalg = gnutls_x509_crt_get_signature_algorithm (cert);
if (((sigalg == GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD2) &&
!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD2)) ||
((sigalg == GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD5) &&
!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD5)))
{
out = GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
if (output)
*output |= out;
result = 0;
}
}
/* Check activation/expiration times
*/
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TIME_CHECKS))
{
/* check the time of the issuer first */
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TRUSTED_TIME_CHECKS))
{
out |= check_time (issuer, now);
if (out != 0)
{
result = 0;
if (output) *output |= out;
}
}
out |= check_time (cert, now);
if (out != 0)
{
result = 0;
if (output) *output |= out;
}
}
cleanup:
if (result >= 0 && func) func(cert, issuer, NULL, out);
_gnutls_free_datum (&cert_signed_data);
_gnutls_free_datum (&cert_signature);
return result;
}
uschar *
tls_cert_version(void * cert, uschar * mod)
{
return string_sprintf("%d", gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(cert));
}
/*
* Verifies the given certificate against a certificate list of
* trusted CAs.
*
* Returns only 0 or 1. If 1 it means that the certificate
* was successfuly verified.
*
* 'flags': an OR of the gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumeration.
*
* Output will hold some extra information about the verification
* procedure.
*/
static unsigned
verify_crt(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
const gnutls_x509_crt_t * trusted_cas,
int tcas_size, unsigned int flags,
unsigned int *output,
verify_state_st *vparams,
unsigned end_cert)
{
gnutls_datum_t cert_signed_data = { NULL, 0 };
gnutls_datum_t cert_signature = { NULL, 0 };
gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer = NULL;
int issuer_version, hash_algo;
unsigned result = 1;
const mac_entry_st * me;
unsigned int out = 0, usage;
int sigalg, ret;
if (output)
*output = 0;
if (vparams->max_path == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
/* bail immediately, to avoid inconistency */
goto cleanup;
}
vparams->max_path--;
if (tcas_size >= 1)
issuer = find_issuer(cert, trusted_cas, tcas_size);
ret =
_gnutls_x509_get_signed_data(cert->cert, &cert->der, "tbsCertificate",
&cert_signed_data);
if (ret < 0) {
MARK_INVALID(0);
cert_signed_data.data = NULL;
}
ret =
_gnutls_x509_get_signature(cert->cert, "signature",
&cert_signature);
if (ret < 0) {
MARK_INVALID(0);
cert_signature.data = NULL;
}
ret =
_gnutls_x509_get_signature_algorithm(cert->cert,
"signatureAlgorithm.algorithm");
if (ret < 0) {
MARK_INVALID(0);
}
sigalg = ret;
/* issuer is not in trusted certificate
* authorities.
*/
if (issuer == NULL) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND);
} else {
if (vparams->nc != NULL) {
/* append the issuer's constraints */
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_name_constraints(issuer, vparams->nc,
GNUTLS_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_FLAG_APPEND, NULL);
if (ret < 0 && ret != GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
goto nc_done;
}
/* only check name constraints in server certificates, not CAs */
if (end_cert != 0) {
ret = gnutls_x509_name_constraints_check_crt(vparams->nc, GNUTLS_SAN_DNSNAME, cert);
if (ret == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
goto nc_done;
}
ret = gnutls_x509_name_constraints_check_crt(vparams->nc, GNUTLS_SAN_RFC822NAME, cert);
if (ret == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
goto nc_done;
}
ret = gnutls_x509_name_constraints_check_crt(vparams->nc, GNUTLS_SAN_DN, cert);
if (ret == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
goto nc_done;
}
ret = gnutls_x509_name_constraints_check_crt(vparams->nc, GNUTLS_SAN_URI, cert);
if (ret == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
goto nc_done;
}
ret = gnutls_x509_name_constraints_check_crt(vparams->nc, GNUTLS_SAN_IPADDRESS, cert);
if (ret == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
goto nc_done;
}
}
}
nc_done:
if (vparams->tls_feat != NULL) {
/* append the issuer's constraints */
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_tlsfeatures(issuer, vparams->tls_feat, GNUTLS_EXT_FLAG_APPEND, NULL);
if (ret < 0 && ret != GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
goto feat_done;
}
ret = gnutls_x509_tlsfeatures_check_crt(vparams->tls_feat, cert);
if (ret == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
goto feat_done;
}
}
feat_done:
issuer_version = gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(issuer);
if (issuer_version < 0) {
MARK_INVALID(0);
} else if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN) &&
((flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DO_NOT_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT)
|| issuer_version != 1)) {
if (check_if_ca(cert, issuer, &vparams->max_path, flags) != 1) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA);
}
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_usage(issuer, &usage, NULL);
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
if (ret < 0) {
MARK_INVALID(0);
} else if (!(usage & GNUTLS_KEY_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE);
}
}
}
if (sigalg >= 0) {
hash_algo = gnutls_sign_get_hash_algorithm(sigalg);
me = mac_to_entry(hash_algo);
} else {
me = NULL;
}
if (me == NULL) {
MARK_INVALID(0);
} else if (cert_signed_data.data != NULL &&
cert_signature.data != NULL) {
ret =
_gnutls_x509_verify_data(me,
&cert_signed_data,
&cert_signature,
issuer);
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
} else if (ret < 0) {
MARK_INVALID(0);
}
}
}
/* we always check the issuer for unsupported critical extensions */
if (issuer && check_for_unknown_exts(issuer) != 0) {
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CRIT_EXTENSIONS)) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_UNKNOWN_CRIT_EXTENSIONS);
}
}
/* we only check the end-certificate for critical extensions; that
* way do not perform this check twice on the certificates when
* verifying a large list */
if (end_cert && check_for_unknown_exts(cert) != 0) {
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CRIT_EXTENSIONS)) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_UNKNOWN_CRIT_EXTENSIONS);
}
}
if (sigalg >= 0) {
if (is_level_acceptable(cert, issuer, sigalg, flags) == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM);
}
/* If the certificate is not self signed check if the algorithms
* used are secure. If the certificate is self signed it doesn't
* really matter.
*/
if (gnutls_sign_is_secure(sigalg) == 0 &&
_gnutls_is_broken_sig_allowed(sigalg, flags) == 0 &&
is_issuer(cert, cert) == 0) {
MARK_INVALID(GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM);
}
}
/* Check activation/expiration times
*/
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TIME_CHECKS)) {
/* check the time of the issuer first */
if (issuer != NULL &&
!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TRUSTED_TIME_CHECKS)) {
out |= check_time_status(issuer, vparams->now);
if (out != 0) {
gnutls_assert();
result = 0;
}
}
out |= check_time_status(cert, vparams->now);
if (out != 0) {
gnutls_assert();
result = 0;
}
}
cleanup:
if (output)
*output |= out;
if (vparams->func) {
if (result == 0) {
out |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
}
vparams->func(cert, issuer, NULL, out);
}
_gnutls_free_datum(&cert_signed_data);
_gnutls_free_datum(&cert_signature);
return result;
}
/* Checks whether the provided certificates are acceptable
* according to verification profile specified.
*
* @crt: a certificate
* @issuer: the certificates issuer (allowed to be NULL)
* @sigalg: the signature algorithm used
* @flags: the specified verification flags
*/
static unsigned is_level_acceptable(
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt, gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer,
gnutls_sign_algorithm_t sigalg, unsigned flags)
{
gnutls_certificate_verification_profiles_t profile = GNUTLS_VFLAGS_TO_PROFILE(flags);
const mac_entry_st *entry;
int issuer_pkalg = 0, pkalg, ret;
unsigned bits = 0, issuer_bits = 0, sym_bits = 0;
gnutls_pk_params_st params;
gnutls_sec_param_t sp;
int hash;
if (profile == 0)
return 1;
pkalg = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(crt, &bits);
if (pkalg < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
if (issuer) {
issuer_pkalg = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(issuer, &issuer_bits);
if (issuer_pkalg < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
switch (profile) {
CASE_SEC_PARAM(GNUTLS_PROFILE_VERY_WEAK, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_VERY_WEAK);
CASE_SEC_PARAM(GNUTLS_PROFILE_LOW, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_LOW);
CASE_SEC_PARAM(GNUTLS_PROFILE_LEGACY, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_LEGACY);
CASE_SEC_PARAM(GNUTLS_PROFILE_MEDIUM, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_MEDIUM);
CASE_SEC_PARAM(GNUTLS_PROFILE_HIGH, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_HIGH);
CASE_SEC_PARAM(GNUTLS_PROFILE_ULTRA, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_ULTRA);
case GNUTLS_PROFILE_SUITEB128:
case GNUTLS_PROFILE_SUITEB192: {
unsigned curve, issuer_curve;
/* check suiteB params validity: rfc5759 */
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(crt) != 3) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: certificate uses an unacceptable version number\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
if (sigalg != GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA256 && sigalg != GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA384) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: certificate is not signed using ECDSA-SHA256 or ECDSA-SHA384\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
if (pkalg != GNUTLS_PK_EC) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: certificate does not contain ECC parameters\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
if (issuer_pkalg != GNUTLS_PK_EC) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: certificate's issuer does not have ECC parameters\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
ret = _gnutls_x509_crt_get_mpis(crt, ¶ms);
if (ret < 0) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: cannot read certificate params\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
curve = params.flags;
gnutls_pk_params_release(¶ms);
if (curve != GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 &&
curve != GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: certificate's ECC params do not contain SECP256R1 or SECP384R1\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
if (profile == GNUTLS_PROFILE_SUITEB192) {
if (curve != GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB192: certificate does not use SECP384R1\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
}
if (issuer != NULL) {
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(issuer) != 3) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: certificate's issuer uses an unacceptable version number\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
ret = _gnutls_x509_crt_get_mpis(issuer, ¶ms);
if (ret < 0) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: cannot read certificate params\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
issuer_curve = params.flags;
gnutls_pk_params_release(¶ms);
if (issuer_curve != GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 &&
issuer_curve != GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: certificate's issuer ECC params do not contain SECP256R1 or SECP384R1\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
if (issuer_curve < curve) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: certificate's issuer ECC params are weaker than the certificate's\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
if (sigalg == GNUTLS_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA256 &&
issuer_curve == GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1) {
_gnutls_debug_log("SUITEB: certificate is signed with ECDSA-SHA256 when using SECP384R1\n");
return gnutls_assert_val(0);
}
}
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
static CURLcode
gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
unsigned int cert_list_size;
const gnutls_datum *chainp;
unsigned int verify_status;
gnutls_x509_crt x509_cert,x509_issuer;
gnutls_datum issuerp;
char certbuf[256]; /* big enough? */
size_t size;
unsigned int algo;
unsigned int bits;
time_t certclock;
const char *ptr;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
gnutls_session session = conn->ssl[sockindex].session;
int rc;
int incache;
void *ssl_sessionid;
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
/* This function will return the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by
the peer. These certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for
X.509). In case of a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The
first certificate in the list is the peer's certificate, following the
issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. */
chainp = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if(!chainp) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer ||
data->set.ssl.verifyhost ||
data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
&& data->set.ssl.username != NULL
&& !data->set.ssl.verifypeer
&& gnutls_cipher_get(session)) {
/* no peer cert, but auth is ok if we have SRP user and cipher and no
peer verify */
}
else {
#endif
failf(data, "failed to get server cert");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
}
#endif
}
infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
}
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its
status (trusted, invalid etc.). The value of status should be one or
more of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements bitwise
or'd. To avoid denial of service attacks some default upper limits
regarding the certificate key size and chain size are set. To override
them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). */
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify_status);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "server cert verify failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* verify_status is a bitmask of gnutls_certificate_status bits */
if(verify_status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate verification failed. CAfile: %s "
"CRLfile: %s", data->set.ssl.CAfile?data->set.ssl.CAfile:"none",
data->set.ssl.CRLfile?data->set.ssl.CRLfile:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification OK\n");
}
else {
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification SKIPPED\n");
goto after_server_cert_verification;
}
/* initialize an X.509 certificate structure. */
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_cert);
/* convert the given DER or PEM encoded Certificate to the native
gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if(data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_issuer);
issuerp = load_file(data->set.ssl.issuercert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_issuer, &issuerp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(x509_cert,x509_issuer);
unload_file(issuerp);
if(rc <= 0) {
failf(data, "server certificate issuer check failed (IssuerCert: %s)",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
infof(data,"\t server certificate issuer check OK (Issuer Cert: %s)\n",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
}
size=sizeof(certbuf);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(x509_cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME,
0, /* the first and only one */
FALSE,
certbuf,
&size);
if(rc) {
infof(data, "error fetching CN from cert:%s\n",
gnutls_strerror(rc));
}
/* This function will check if the given certificate's subject matches the
given hostname. This is a basic implementation of the matching described
in RFC2818 (HTTPS), which takes into account wildcards, and the subject
alternative name PKIX extension. Returns non zero on success, and zero on
failure. */
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509_cert, conn->host.name);
if(!rc) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name (%s) does not match "
"target host name '%s'", certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", certbuf);
/* Check for time-based validity */
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
failf(data, "server cert expiration date verify failed");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
if(certclock < time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate expiration date has passed.");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date OK\n");
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
failf(data, "server cert activation date verify failed");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
if(certclock > time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate not activated yet.");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date OK\n");
/* Show:
- ciphers used
- subject
- start date
- expire date
- common name
- issuer
*/
/* public key algorithm's parameters */
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(x509_cert, &bits);
infof(data, "\t certificate public key: %s\n",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name(algo));
/* version of the X.509 certificate. */
infof(data, "\t certificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(x509_cert));
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", certbuf);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "start date", certclock);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "expire date", certclock);
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
after_server_cert_verification:
/* compression algorithm (if any) */
ptr = gnutls_compression_get_name(gnutls_compression_get(session));
/* the *_get_name() says "NULL" if GNUTLS_COMP_NULL is returned */
infof(data, "\t compression: %s\n", ptr);
/* the name of the cipher used. ie 3DES. */
ptr = gnutls_cipher_get_name(gnutls_cipher_get(session));
infof(data, "\t cipher: %s\n", ptr);
/* the MAC algorithms name. ie SHA1 */
ptr = gnutls_mac_get_name(gnutls_mac_get(session));
infof(data, "\t MAC: %s\n", ptr);
conn->ssl[sockindex].state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = gtls_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = gtls_send;
{
/* we always unconditionally get the session id here, as even if we
already got it from the cache and asked to use it in the connection, it
might've been rejected and then a new one is in use now and we need to
detect that. */
void *connect_sessionid;
size_t connect_idsize;
/* get the session ID data size */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &connect_idsize);
connect_sessionid = malloc(connect_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */
if(connect_sessionid) {
/* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize);
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL));
if(incache) {
/* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the
previous one was rejected, we just kill that and store the new */
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid);
}
/* store this session id */
result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, connect_sessionid, connect_idsize);
if(result) {
free(connect_sessionid);
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
else
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return result;
}
int X509Certificate::getVersion() const
{
return gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(m_data->cert);
}
/* This function will print information about this session's peer
* certificate.
*/
void
print_x509_certificate_info (gnutls_session_t session)
{
char serial[40];
char dn[256];
size_t size;
unsigned int algo, bits;
time_t expiration_time, activation_time;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
gnutls_datum_t cinfo;
/* This function only works for X.509 certificates.
*/
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (session) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
return;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (session, &cert_list_size);
printf ("Peer provided %d certificates.\n", cert_list_size);
if (cert_list_size > 0)
{
int ret;
/* we only print information about the first certificate.
*/
gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
printf ("Certificate info:\n");
/* This is the preferred way of printing short information about
a certificate. */
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_print (cert, GNUTLS_CRT_PRINT_ONELINE, &cinfo);
if (ret == 0)
{
printf ("\t%s\n", cinfo.data);
gnutls_free (cinfo.data);
}
/* If you want to extract fields manually for some other reason,
below are popular example calls. */
expiration_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert);
activation_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (cert);
printf ("\tCertificate is valid since: %s", ctime (&activation_time));
printf ("\tCertificate expires: %s", ctime (&expiration_time));
/* Print the serial number of the certificate.
*/
size = sizeof (serial);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_serial (cert, serial, &size);
printf ("\tCertificate serial number: %s\n", bin2hex (serial, size));
/* Extract some of the public key algorithm's parameters
*/
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm (cert, &bits);
printf ("Certificate public key: %s",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name (algo));
/* Print the version of the X.509
* certificate.
*/
printf ("\tCertificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (cert));
size = sizeof (dn);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn (cert, dn, &size);
printf ("\tDN: %s\n", dn);
size = sizeof (dn);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn (cert, dn, &size);
printf ("\tIssuer's DN: %s\n", dn);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
}
}
static CURLcode
gtls_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
unsigned int cert_list_size;
const gnutls_datum_t *chainp;
unsigned int verify_status = 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_t x509_cert, x509_issuer;
gnutls_datum_t issuerp;
char certbuf[256] = ""; /* big enough? */
size_t size;
unsigned int algo;
unsigned int bits;
time_t certclock;
const char *ptr;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
gnutls_session_t session = conn->ssl[sockindex].session;
int rc;
bool incache;
void *ssl_sessionid;
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
gnutls_datum_t proto;
#endif
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
gnutls_protocol_t version = gnutls_protocol_get_version(session);
/* the name of the cipher suite used, e.g. ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. */
ptr = gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(gnutls_kx_get(session),
gnutls_cipher_get(session),
gnutls_mac_get(session));
infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n",
gnutls_protocol_get_name(version), ptr);
/* This function will return the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by
the peer. These certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for
X.509). In case of a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The
first certificate in the list is the peer's certificate, following the
issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. */
chainp = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if(!chainp) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer ||
data->set.ssl.verifyhost ||
data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP
&& data->set.ssl.username != NULL
&& !data->set.ssl.verifypeer
&& gnutls_cipher_get(session)) {
/* no peer cert, but auth is ok if we have SRP user and cipher and no
peer verify */
}
else {
#endif
failf(data, "failed to get server cert");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
}
#endif
}
infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
}
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo && chainp) {
unsigned int i;
result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, cert_list_size);
if(result)
return result;
for(i = 0; i < cert_list_size; i++) {
const char *beg = (const char *) chainp[i].data;
const char *end = beg + chainp[i].size;
result = Curl_extract_certinfo(conn, i, beg, end);
if(result)
return result;
}
}
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its
status (trusted, invalid etc.). The value of status should be one or
more of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements bitwise
or'd. To avoid denial of service attacks some default upper limits
regarding the certificate key size and chain size are set. To override
them use gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). */
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify_status);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "server cert verify failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* verify_status is a bitmask of gnutls_certificate_status bits */
if(verify_status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate verification failed. CAfile: %s "
"CRLfile: %s", data->set.ssl.CAfile?data->set.ssl.CAfile:"none",
data->set.ssl.CRLfile?data->set.ssl.CRLfile:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification OK\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification SKIPPED\n");
#ifdef HAS_OCSP
if(data->set.ssl.verifystatus) {
if(gnutls_ocsp_status_request_is_checked(session, 0) == 0) {
gnutls_datum_t status_request;
gnutls_ocsp_resp_t ocsp_resp;
gnutls_ocsp_cert_status_t status;
gnutls_x509_crl_reason_t reason;
rc = gnutls_ocsp_status_request_get(session, &status_request);
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification FAILED\n");
if(rc == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
failf(data, "No OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
gnutls_ocsp_resp_init(&ocsp_resp);
rc = gnutls_ocsp_resp_import(ocsp_resp, &status_request);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response received");
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
rc = gnutls_ocsp_resp_get_single(ocsp_resp, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&status, NULL, NULL, NULL, &reason);
switch(status) {
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_GOOD:
break;
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_REVOKED: {
const char *crl_reason;
switch(reason) {
default:
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_UNSPECIFIED:
crl_reason = "unspecified reason";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_KEYCOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "private key compromised";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CACOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "CA compromised";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_AFFILIATIONCHANGED:
crl_reason = "affiliation has changed";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_SUPERSEDED:
crl_reason = "certificate superseded";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CESSATIONOFOPERATION:
crl_reason = "operation has ceased";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_CERTIFICATEHOLD:
crl_reason = "certificate is on hold";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_REMOVEFROMCRL:
crl_reason = "will be removed from delta CRL";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_PRIVILEGEWITHDRAWN:
crl_reason = "privilege withdrawn";
break;
case GNUTLS_X509_CRLREASON_AACOMPROMISE:
crl_reason = "AA compromised";
break;
}
failf(data, "Server certificate was revoked: %s", crl_reason);
break;
}
default:
case GNUTLS_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN:
failf(data, "Server certificate status is unknown");
break;
}
gnutls_ocsp_resp_deinit(ocsp_resp);
return CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification OK\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate status verification SKIPPED\n");
#endif
/* initialize an X.509 certificate structure. */
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_cert);
if(chainp)
/* convert the given DER or PEM encoded Certificate to the native
gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if(data->set.ssl.issuercert) {
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_issuer);
issuerp = load_file(data->set.ssl.issuercert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_issuer, &issuerp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(x509_cert, x509_issuer);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_issuer);
unload_file(issuerp);
if(rc <= 0) {
failf(data, "server certificate issuer check failed (IssuerCert: %s)",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
infof(data, "\t server certificate issuer check OK (Issuer Cert: %s)\n",
data->set.ssl.issuercert?data->set.ssl.issuercert:"none");
}
size=sizeof(certbuf);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(x509_cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME,
0, /* the first and only one */
FALSE,
certbuf,
&size);
if(rc) {
infof(data, "error fetching CN from cert:%s\n",
gnutls_strerror(rc));
}
/* This function will check if the given certificate's subject matches the
given hostname. This is a basic implementation of the matching described
in RFC2818 (HTTPS), which takes into account wildcards, and the subject
alternative name PKIX extension. Returns non zero on success, and zero on
failure. */
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509_cert, conn->host.name);
#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x030306
/* Before 3.3.6, gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname() didn't check IP
addresses. */
if(!rc) {
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
#define use_addr in6_addr
#else
#define use_addr in_addr
#endif
unsigned char addrbuf[sizeof(struct use_addr)];
unsigned char certaddr[sizeof(struct use_addr)];
size_t addrlen = 0, certaddrlen;
int i;
int ret = 0;
if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, addrbuf) > 0)
addrlen = 4;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, addrbuf) > 0)
addrlen = 16;
#endif
if(addrlen) {
for(i=0; ; i++) {
certaddrlen = sizeof(certaddr);
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject_alt_name(x509_cert, i, certaddr,
&certaddrlen, NULL);
/* If this happens, it wasn't an IP address. */
if(ret == GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
continue;
if(ret < 0)
break;
if(ret != GNUTLS_SAN_IPADDRESS)
continue;
if(certaddrlen == addrlen && !memcmp(addrbuf, certaddr, addrlen)) {
rc = 1;
break;
}
}
}
}
#endif
if(!rc) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name (%s) does not match "
"target host name '%s'", certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", certbuf);
/* Check for time-based validity */
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server cert expiration date verify failed");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date verify FAILED\n");
}
else {
if(certclock < time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate expiration date has passed.");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate expiration date OK\n");
}
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
if(certclock == (time_t)-1) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server cert activation date verify failed");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date verify FAILED\n");
}
else {
if(certclock > time(NULL)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate not activated yet.");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate activation date OK\n");
}
ptr = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
if(ptr) {
result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, x509_cert, ptr);
if(result != CURLE_OK) {
failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return result;
}
}
/* Show:
- subject
- start date
- expire date
- common name
- issuer
*/
/* public key algorithm's parameters */
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(x509_cert, &bits);
infof(data, "\t certificate public key: %s\n",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name(algo));
/* version of the X.509 certificate. */
infof(data, "\t certificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(x509_cert));
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", certbuf);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "start date", certclock);
certclock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "expire date", certclock);
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
/* compression algorithm (if any) */
ptr = gnutls_compression_get_name(gnutls_compression_get(session));
/* the *_get_name() says "NULL" if GNUTLS_COMP_NULL is returned */
infof(data, "\t compression: %s\n", ptr);
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
if(data->set.ssl_enable_alpn) {
rc = gnutls_alpn_get_selected_protocol(session, &proto);
if(rc == 0) {
infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", proto.size,
proto.data);
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(proto.size == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
!memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, proto.data,
NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
}
else
#endif
if(proto.size == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
!memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, proto.data, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
}
}
else
infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
}
#endif
conn->ssl[sockindex].state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = gtls_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = gtls_send;
{
/* we always unconditionally get the session id here, as even if we
already got it from the cache and asked to use it in the connection, it
might've been rejected and then a new one is in use now and we need to
detect that. */
void *connect_sessionid;
size_t connect_idsize = 0;
/* get the session ID data size */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &connect_idsize);
connect_sessionid = malloc(connect_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */
if(connect_sessionid) {
/* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize);
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL));
if(incache) {
/* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the
previous one was rejected, we just kill that and store the new */
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid);
}
/* store this session id */
result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, connect_sessionid, connect_idsize);
if(result) {
free(connect_sessionid);
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
else
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return result;
}
/** Determines whether one certificate has been issued and signed by another
*
* @param crt Certificate to check the signature of
* @param issuer Issuer's certificate
*
* @return TRUE if crt was signed and issued by issuer, otherwise FALSE
* @TODO Modify this function to return a reason for invalidity?
*/
static gboolean
x509_certificate_signed_by(PurpleCertificate * crt,
PurpleCertificate * issuer)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_t crt_dat;
gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer_dat;
unsigned int verify; /* used to store result from GnuTLS verifier */
int ret;
gchar *crt_id = NULL;
gchar *issuer_id = NULL;
g_return_val_if_fail(crt, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail(issuer, FALSE);
/* Verify that both certs are the correct scheme */
g_return_val_if_fail(crt->scheme == &x509_gnutls, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail(issuer->scheme == &x509_gnutls, FALSE);
/* TODO: check for more nullness? */
crt_dat = X509_GET_GNUTLS_DATA(crt);
issuer_dat = X509_GET_GNUTLS_DATA(issuer);
/* Ensure crt issuer matches the name on the issuer cert. */
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(crt_dat, issuer_dat);
if (ret <= 0) {
if (ret < 0) {
purple_debug_error("gnutls/x509",
"GnuTLS error %d while checking certificate issuer match.",
ret);
} else {
gchar *crt_id, *issuer_id, *crt_issuer_id;
crt_id = purple_certificate_get_unique_id(crt);
issuer_id = purple_certificate_get_unique_id(issuer);
crt_issuer_id =
purple_certificate_get_issuer_unique_id(crt);
purple_debug_info("gnutls/x509",
"Certificate %s is issued by "
"%s, which does not match %s.\n",
crt_id ? crt_id : "(null)",
crt_issuer_id ? crt_issuer_id : "(null)",
issuer_id ? issuer_id : "(null)");
g_free(crt_id);
g_free(issuer_id);
g_free(crt_issuer_id);
}
/* The issuer is not correct, or there were errors */
return FALSE;
}
/* Check basic constraints extension (if it exists then the CA flag must
be set to true, and it must exist for certs with version 3 or higher. */
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_basic_constraints(issuer_dat, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_REQUESTED_DATA_NOT_AVAILABLE) {
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(issuer_dat) >= 3) {
/* Reject cert (no basic constraints and cert version is >= 3). */
gchar *issuer_id = purple_certificate_get_unique_id(issuer);
purple_debug_info("gnutls/x509", "Rejecting cert because the "
"basic constraints extension is missing from issuer cert "
"for %s. The basic constraints extension is required on "
"all version 3 or higher certs (this cert is version %d).",
issuer_id ? issuer_id : "(null)",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(issuer_dat));
g_free(issuer_id);
return FALSE;
} else {
/* Allow cert (no basic constraints and cert version is < 3). */
purple_debug_info("gnutls/x509", "Basic constraint extension is "
"missing from issuer cert for %s. Allowing this because "
"the cert is version %d and the basic constraints "
"extension is only required for version 3 or higher "
"certs.", issuer_id ? issuer_id : "(null)",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(issuer_dat));
}
} else if (ret <= 0) {
/* Reject cert (CA flag is false in basic constraints). */
gchar *issuer_id = purple_certificate_get_unique_id(issuer);
purple_debug_info("gnutls/x509", "Rejecting cert because the CA flag "
"is set to false in the basic constraints extension for "
"issuer cert %s. ret=%d\n",
issuer_id ? issuer_id : "(null)", ret);
g_free(issuer_id);
return FALSE;
}
/* Now, check the signature */
/* The second argument is a ptr to an array of "trusted" issuer certs,
but we're only using one trusted one */
ret = gnutls_x509_crt_verify(crt_dat, &issuer_dat, 1,
/* Permit signings by X.509v1 certs
(Verisign and possibly others have
root certificates that predate the
current standard) */
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT,
&verify);
if (ret != 0) {
purple_debug_error("gnutls/x509",
"Attempted certificate verification caused a GnuTLS error code %d. I will just say the signature is bad, but you should look into this.\n", ret);
return FALSE;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM
if (verify & GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM) {
/*
* A certificate in the chain is signed with an insecure
* algorithm. Put a warning into the log to make this error
* perfectly clear as soon as someone looks at the debug log is
* generated.
*/
crt_id = purple_certificate_get_unique_id(crt);
issuer_id = purple_certificate_get_issuer_unique_id(crt);
purple_debug_warning("gnutls/x509",
"Insecure hash algorithm used by %s to sign %s\n",
issuer_id, crt_id);
}
#endif
if (verify & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
/* Signature didn't check out, but at least
there were no errors*/
if (!crt_id)
crt_id = purple_certificate_get_unique_id(crt);
if (!issuer_id)
issuer_id = purple_certificate_get_issuer_unique_id(crt);
purple_debug_error("gnutls/x509",
"Bad signature from %s on %s\n",
issuer_id, crt_id);
g_free(crt_id);
g_free(issuer_id);
return FALSE;
} /* if (ret, etc.) */
/* If we got here, the signature is good */
return TRUE;
}
/*
* Verifies the given certificate again a certificate list of
* trusted CAs.
*
* Returns only 0 or 1. If 1 it means that the certificate
* was successfuly verified.
*
* 'flags': an OR of the gnutls_certificate_verify_flags enumeration.
*
* Output will hold some extra information about the verification
* procedure. Issuer will hold the actual issuer from the trusted list.
*/
static int
_gnutls_verify_certificate2 (gnutls_x509_crt_t cert,
const gnutls_x509_crt_t * trusted_cas,
int tcas_size, unsigned int flags,
unsigned int *output,
gnutls_x509_crt_t * _issuer)
{
gnutls_datum_t cert_signed_data = { NULL, 0 };
gnutls_datum_t cert_signature = { NULL, 0 };
gnutls_x509_crt_t issuer = NULL;
int issuer_version, result;
if (output)
*output = 0;
if (tcas_size >= 1)
issuer = find_issuer (cert, trusted_cas, tcas_size);
else
{
gnutls_assert ();
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
/* issuer is not in trusted certificate
* authorities.
*/
if (issuer == NULL)
{
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
gnutls_assert ();
return 0;
}
if (_issuer != NULL)
*_issuer = issuer;
issuer_version = gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (issuer);
if (issuer_version < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return issuer_version;
}
if (!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_CA_SIGN) &&
((flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_DO_NOT_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT)
|| issuer_version != 1))
{
if (check_if_ca (cert, issuer, flags) == 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
}
result =
_gnutls_x509_get_signed_data (cert->cert, "tbsCertificate",
&cert_signed_data);
if (result < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
result =
_gnutls_x509_get_signature (cert->cert, "signature", &cert_signature);
if (result < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
goto cleanup;
}
result =
_gnutls_x509_verify_signature (&cert_signed_data, NULL, &cert_signature,
issuer);
if (result == GNUTLS_E_PK_SIG_VERIFY_FAILED)
{
gnutls_assert ();
/* error. ignore it */
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
result = 0;
}
else if (result < 0)
{
gnutls_assert();
goto cleanup;
}
/* If the certificate is not self signed check if the algorithms
* used are secure. If the certificate is self signed it doesn't
* really matter.
*/
if (is_issuer (cert, cert) == 0)
{
int sigalg;
sigalg = gnutls_x509_crt_get_signature_algorithm (cert);
if (((sigalg == GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD2) &&
!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD2)) ||
((sigalg == GNUTLS_SIGN_RSA_MD5) &&
!(flags & GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_SIGN_RSA_MD5)))
{
if (output)
*output |= GNUTLS_CERT_INSECURE_ALGORITHM | GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID;
result = 0;
}
}
cleanup:
_gnutls_free_datum (&cert_signed_data);
_gnutls_free_datum (&cert_signature);
return result;
}
/* Like above but it accepts a parsed certificate instead.
*/
int
_gnutls_x509_crt_to_gcert (gnutls_cert * gcert,
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, unsigned int flags)
{
int ret = 0;
memset (gcert, 0, sizeof (gnutls_cert));
gcert->cert_type = GNUTLS_CRT_X509;
if (!(flags & CERT_NO_COPY))
{
#define SMALL_DER 512
opaque *der;
size_t der_size = SMALL_DER;
/* initially allocate a bogus size, just in case the certificate
* fits in it. That way we minimize the DER encodings performed.
*/
der = gnutls_malloc (SMALL_DER);
if (der == NULL)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_export (cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, der, &der_size);
if (ret < 0 && ret != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
{
gnutls_assert ();
gnutls_free (der);
return ret;
}
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
{
der = gnutls_realloc (der, der_size);
if (der == NULL)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
ret =
gnutls_x509_crt_export (cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, der,
&der_size);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
gnutls_free (der);
return ret;
}
}
gcert->raw.data = der;
gcert->raw.size = der_size;
}
else
/* now we have 0 or a bitwise or of things to decode */
flags ^= CERT_NO_COPY;
if (flags & CERT_ONLY_EXTENSIONS || flags == 0)
{
gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_usage (cert, &gcert->key_usage, NULL);
gcert->version = gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (cert);
}
gcert->subject_pk_algorithm = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm (cert, NULL);
if (flags & CERT_ONLY_PUBKEY || flags == 0)
{
gcert->params_size = MAX_PUBLIC_PARAMS_SIZE;
ret =
_gnutls_x509_crt_get_mpis (cert, gcert->params, &gcert->params_size);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
/**
* gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_cas:
* @list: The structure of the list
* @clist: A list of CAs
* @clist_size: The length of the CA list
* @flags: should be 0 or an or'ed sequence of %GNUTLS_TL options.
*
* This function will add the given certificate authorities
* to the trusted list. The list of CAs must not be deinitialized
* during this structure's lifetime.
*
* If the flag %GNUTLS_TL_NO_DUPLICATES is specified, then
* the provided @clist entries that are duplicates will not be
* added to the list and will be deinitialized.
*
* Returns: The number of added elements is returned.
*
* Since: 3.0.0
**/
int
gnutls_x509_trust_list_add_cas(gnutls_x509_trust_list_t list,
const gnutls_x509_crt_t * clist,
unsigned clist_size, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned i, j;
uint32_t hash;
int ret;
unsigned exists;
for (i = 0; i < clist_size; i++) {
exists = 0;
hash =
hash_pjw_bare(clist[i]->raw_dn.data,
clist[i]->raw_dn.size);
hash %= list->size;
/* avoid duplicates */
if (flags & GNUTLS_TL_NO_DUPLICATES || flags & GNUTLS_TL_NO_DUPLICATE_KEY) {
for (j=0;j<list->node[hash].trusted_ca_size;j++) {
if (flags & GNUTLS_TL_NO_DUPLICATES)
ret = _gnutls_check_if_same_cert(list->node[hash].trusted_cas[j], clist[i]);
else
ret = _gnutls_check_if_same_key(list->node[hash].trusted_cas[j], clist[i], 1);
if (ret != 0) {
exists = 1;
break;
}
}
if (exists != 0) {
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(list->node[hash].trusted_cas[j]);
list->node[hash].trusted_cas[j] = clist[i];
continue;
}
}
list->node[hash].trusted_cas =
gnutls_realloc_fast(list->node[hash].trusted_cas,
(list->node[hash].trusted_ca_size +
1) *
sizeof(list->node[hash].
trusted_cas[0]));
if (list->node[hash].trusted_cas == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
return i;
}
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(clist[i]) >= 3 &&
gnutls_x509_crt_get_ca_status(clist[i], NULL) <= 0) {
gnutls_datum_t dn;
gnutls_assert();
if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn2(clist[i], &dn) >= 0) {
_gnutls_audit_log(NULL,
"There was a non-CA certificate in the trusted list: %s.\n",
dn.data);
gnutls_free(dn.data);
}
}
list->node[hash].trusted_cas[list->node[hash].
trusted_ca_size] = clist[i];
list->node[hash].trusted_ca_size++;
if (flags & GNUTLS_TL_USE_IN_TLS) {
ret = add_new_ca_to_rdn_seq(list, clist[i]);
if (ret < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return i;
}
}
}
return i;
}
void gtlsGeneric::logX509CertificateInfo(LogWrapperType _logwrapper,
gnutls_session_t _session)
{
char serial[40];
char dn[128];
size_t size;
unsigned int algo, bits;
time_t expiration_time, activation_time;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
int cert_list_size = 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (_session) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
{
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, "Not a x509 certificate, abort.");
return;
}
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(_session, reinterpret_cast<unsigned int*>(&cert_list_size));
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, "Peer provided " << cert_list_size << " certificates.");
if (cert_list_size > 0)
{
/* we only print information about the first certificate.
*/
gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, "Certificate info:");
expiration_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert);
activation_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (cert);
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, " Certificate is valid since: " << ctime (&activation_time));
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, " Certificate expires: " << ctime (&expiration_time));
/* Print the serial number of the certificate.
*/
size = sizeof (serial);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_serial (cert, serial, &size);
size = sizeof (serial);
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, " Certificate serial number: " << bin2hex(serial, size));
/* Extract some of the public key algorithm's parameters
*/
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(cert, &bits);
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, "Certificate public key: " << gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name(static_cast<gnutls_pk_algorithm_t>(algo)));
/* Print the version of the X.509
* certificate.
*/
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, " Certificate version: #" << gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(cert));
size = sizeof(dn);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(cert, dn, &size);
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, " DN: " << dn);
size = sizeof(dn);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn (cert, dn, &size);
BTG_NOTICE(_logwrapper, " Issuer's DN: " << dn);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
}
}
/* This function will print information about this session's peer
* certificate.
*/
void
print_x509_certificate_info (gnutls_session_t session)
{
char serial[40];
char dn[128];
size_t size;
unsigned int algo, bits;
time_t expiration_time, activation_time;
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned int cert_list_size = 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
/* This function only works for X.509 certificates.
*/
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (session) != GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
return;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (session, &cert_list_size);
printf ("Peer provided %d certificates.\n", cert_list_size);
if (cert_list_size > 0)
{
/* we only print information about the first certificate.
*/
gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert);
gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, &cert_list[0], GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
printf ("Certificate info:\n");
expiration_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert);
activation_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (cert);
printf ("\tCertificate is valid since: %s", ctime (&activation_time));
printf ("\tCertificate expires: %s", ctime (&expiration_time));
/* Print the serial number of the certificate.
*/
size = sizeof (serial);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_serial (cert, serial, &size);
printf ("\tCertificate serial number: %s\n", bin2hex (serial, size));
/* Extract some of the public key algorithm's parameters
*/
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm (cert, &bits);
printf ("Certificate public key: %s",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name (algo));
/* Print the version of the X.509
* certificate.
*/
printf ("\tCertificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (cert));
size = sizeof (dn);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn (cert, dn, &size);
printf ("\tDN: %s\n", dn);
size = sizeof (dn);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn (cert, dn, &size);
printf ("\tIssuer's DN: %s\n", dn);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
}
}
/*
* This function is called after the TCP connect has completed. Setup the TLS
* layer and do all necessary magic.
*/
CURLcode
Curl_gtls_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
const int cert_type_priority[] = { GNUTLS_CRT_X509, 0 };
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
gnutls_session session;
int rc;
unsigned int cert_list_size;
const gnutls_datum *chainp;
unsigned int verify_status;
gnutls_x509_crt x509_cert;
char certbuf[256]; /* big enough? */
size_t size;
unsigned int algo;
unsigned int bits;
time_t clock;
const char *ptr;
void *ssl_sessionid;
size_t ssl_idsize;
/* GnuTLS only supports TLSv1 (and SSLv3?) */
if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2) {
failf(data, "GnuTLS does not support SSLv2");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* allocate a cred struct */
rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&conn->ssl[sockindex].cred);
if(rc < 0) {
failf(data, "gnutls_cert_all_cred() failed: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
if(data->set.ssl.CAfile) {
/* set the trusted CA cert bundle file */
gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(conn->ssl[sockindex].cred,
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT);
rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(conn->ssl[sockindex].cred,
data->set.ssl.CAfile,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if(rc < 0) {
infof(data, "error reading ca cert file %s (%s)\n",
data->set.ssl.CAfile, gnutls_strerror(rc));
if (data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
else
infof(data, "found %d certificates in %s\n",
rc, data->set.ssl.CAfile);
}
/* Initialize TLS session as a client */
rc = gnutls_init(&conn->ssl[sockindex].session, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
if(rc) {
failf(data, "gnutls_init() failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* convenient assign */
session = conn->ssl[sockindex].session;
/* Use default priorities */
rc = gnutls_set_default_priority(session);
if(rc < 0)
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
/* Sets the priority on the certificate types supported by gnutls. Priority
is higher for types specified before others. After specifying the types
you want, you must append a 0. */
rc = gnutls_certificate_type_set_priority(session, cert_type_priority);
if(rc < 0)
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
if(data->set.cert) {
if( gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(
conn->ssl[sockindex].cred, data->set.cert,
data->set.key != 0 ? data->set.key : data->set.cert,
do_file_type(data->set.cert_type) ) ) {
failf(data, "error reading X.509 key or certificate file");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
/* put the credentials to the current session */
rc = gnutls_credentials_set(session, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE,
conn->ssl[sockindex].cred);
/* set the connection handle (file descriptor for the socket) */
gnutls_transport_set_ptr(session,
(gnutls_transport_ptr)conn->sock[sockindex]);
/* register callback functions to send and receive data. */
gnutls_transport_set_push_function(session, Curl_gtls_push);
gnutls_transport_set_pull_function(session, Curl_gtls_pull);
/* lowat must be set to zero when using custom push and pull functions. */
gnutls_transport_set_lowat(session, 0);
/* This might be a reconnect, so we check for a session ID in the cache
to speed up things */
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize)) {
/* we got a session id, use it! */
gnutls_session_set_data(session, ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize);
/* Informational message */
infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
}
rc = handshake(conn, session, sockindex, TRUE);
if(rc)
/* handshake() sets its own error message with failf() */
return rc;
/* This function will return the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by
the peer. These certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for
X.509). In case of a X.509 then a certificate list may be present. The
first certificate in the list is the peer's certificate, following the
issuer's certificate, then the issuer's issuer etc. */
chainp = gnutls_certificate_get_peers(session, &cert_list_size);
if(!chainp) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
failf(data, "failed to get server cert");
return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
}
infof(data, "\t common name: WARNING couldn't obtain\n");
}
/* This function will try to verify the peer's certificate and return its
status (trusted, invalid etc.). The value of status should be one or more
of the gnutls_certificate_status_t enumerated elements bitwise or'd. To
avoid denial of service attacks some default upper limits regarding the
certificate key size and chain size are set. To override them use
gnutls_certificate_set_verify_limits(). */
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(session, &verify_status);
if (rc < 0) {
failf(data, "server cert verify failed: %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* verify_status is a bitmask of gnutls_certificate_status bits */
if(verify_status & GNUTLS_CERT_INVALID) {
if (data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
failf(data, "server certificate verification failed. CAfile: %s",
data->set.ssl.CAfile?data->set.ssl.CAfile:"none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification FAILED\n");
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification OK\n");
/* initialize an X.509 certificate structure. */
gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509_cert);
/* convert the given DER or PEM encoded Certificate to the native
gnutls_x509_crt_t format */
gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509_cert, chainp, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
size=sizeof(certbuf);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(x509_cert, GNUTLS_OID_X520_COMMON_NAME,
0, /* the first and only one */
FALSE,
certbuf,
&size);
if(rc) {
infof(data, "error fetching CN from cert:%s\n",
gnutls_strerror(rc));
}
/* This function will check if the given certificate's subject matches the
given hostname. This is a basic implementation of the matching described
in RFC2818 (HTTPS), which takes into account wildcards, and the subject
alternative name PKIX extension. Returns non zero on success, and zero on
failure. */
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname(x509_cert, conn->host.name);
if(!rc) {
if (data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name (%s) does not match "
"target host name '%s'", certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
return CURLE_SSL_PEER_CERTIFICATE;
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
certbuf, conn->host.dispname);
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", certbuf);
/* Show:
- ciphers used
- subject
- start date
- expire date
- common name
- issuer
*/
/* public key algorithm's parameters */
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(x509_cert, &bits);
infof(data, "\t certificate public key: %s\n",
gnutls_pk_algorithm_get_name(algo));
/* version of the X.509 certificate. */
infof(data, "\t certificate version: #%d\n",
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version(x509_cert));
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", certbuf);
clock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "start date", clock);
clock = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(x509_cert);
showtime(data, "expire date", clock);
size = sizeof(certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn(x509_cert, certbuf, &size);
infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", certbuf);
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509_cert);
/* compression algorithm (if any) */
ptr = gnutls_compression_get_name(gnutls_compression_get(session));
/* the *_get_name() says "NULL" if GNUTLS_COMP_NULL is returned */
infof(data, "\t compression: %s\n", ptr);
/* the name of the cipher used. ie 3DES. */
ptr = gnutls_cipher_get_name(gnutls_cipher_get(session));
infof(data, "\t cipher: %s\n", ptr);
/* the MAC algorithms name. ie SHA1 */
ptr = gnutls_mac_get_name(gnutls_mac_get(session));
infof(data, "\t MAC: %s\n", ptr);
if(!ssl_sessionid) {
/* this session was not previously in the cache, add it now */
/* get the session ID data size */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &ssl_idsize);
ssl_sessionid = malloc(ssl_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */
if(ssl_sessionid) {
/* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */
gnutls_session_get_data(session, ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize);
/* store this session id */
return Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize);
}
}
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* This function will print information about this session's peer
* certificate. */
static void
logcertinfo (gnutls_session_t session)
{
time_t now = time (NULL);
const gnutls_datum_t *cert_list;
unsigned cert_list_size = 0;
gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
size_t i;
int rc;
cert_list = gnutls_certificate_get_peers (session, &cert_list_size);
if (!cert_list)
return;
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init (&cert);
if (rc < 0)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xci failed (%d): %s",
rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
return;
}
if (gnutls_certificate_type_get (session) == GNUTLS_CRT_X509)
for (i = 0; i < cert_list_size; i++)
{
time_t expiration_time, activation_time;
char *expiration_time_str = NULL, *activation_time_str = NULL;
unsigned char *serial = NULL, *serialhex = NULL;
char *issuer = NULL, *subject = NULL;
size_t seriallen, issuerlen, subjectlen;
unsigned char md5fingerprint[16], md5fingerprinthex[3 * 16 + 1];
size_t md5fingerprintlen;
int algo;
unsigned bits;
const char *keytype, *validity;
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import (cert, &cert_list[i],
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
if (rc < 0)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xci[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
md5fingerprintlen = sizeof (md5fingerprint);
rc = gnutls_fingerprint (GNUTLS_DIG_MD5, &cert_list[i],
md5fingerprint, &md5fingerprintlen);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS f[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
for (i = 0; i < md5fingerprintlen; i++)
sprintf ((char *) &md5fingerprinthex[3 * i], "%.2x:",
md5fingerprint[i]);
expiration_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time (cert);
if (expiration_time == (time_t) - 1)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xcget[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
activation_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time (cert);
if (expiration_time == (time_t) - 1)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xcgat[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
expiration_time_str = xstrdup (ctime (&expiration_time));
if (expiration_time_str[strlen (expiration_time_str) - 1] == '\n')
expiration_time_str[strlen (expiration_time_str) - 1] = '\0';
activation_time_str = xstrdup (ctime (&activation_time));
if (activation_time_str[strlen (activation_time_str) - 1] == '\n')
activation_time_str[strlen (activation_time_str) - 1] = '\0';
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn (cert, NULL, &subjectlen);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS && rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xcgd[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
subject = xmalloc (++subjectlen);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn (cert, subject, &subjectlen);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xcgd2[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn (cert, NULL, &issuerlen);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS && rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xcgid[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
issuer = xmalloc (++issuerlen);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_issuer_dn (cert, issuer, &issuerlen);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xcgid2[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
seriallen = 0;
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_serial (cert, NULL, &seriallen);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS && rc != GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xcgs[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
serial = xmalloc (seriallen);
rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_serial (cert, serial, &seriallen);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
{
syslog (LOG_ERR | LOG_DAEMON, "TLS xcgs2[%zu] failed (%d): %s",
i, rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
goto cleanup;
}
serialhex = xmalloc (2 * seriallen + 1);
for (i = 0; i < seriallen; i++)
sprintf ((char *) &serialhex[2 * i], "%.2x", serial[i]);
algo = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm (cert, &bits);
if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA)
keytype = "RSA modulus";
else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA)
keytype = "DSA exponent";
else
keytype = "UNKNOWN";
if (expiration_time < now)
validity = "EXPIRED";
else if (activation_time > now)
validity = "NOT YET ACTIVATED";
else
validity = "valid";
/* This message can arguably belong to LOG_AUTH. */
syslog (LOG_INFO, "TLS client certificate `%s', issued by `%s', "
"serial number `%s', MD5 fingerprint `%s', activated `%s', "
"expires `%s', version #%d, key %s %d bits, currently %s",
subject, issuer, serialhex, md5fingerprinthex,
activation_time_str, expiration_time_str,
gnutls_x509_crt_get_version (cert), keytype, bits, validity);
cleanup:
free (serialhex);
free (serial);
free (expiration_time_str);
free (activation_time_str);
free (issuer);
free (subject);
}
gnutls_x509_crt_deinit (cert);
{
unsigned int status;
/* Accept default syslog facility for these errors.
* They are clearly relevant as audit traces. */
rc = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2 (session, &status);
if (rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS)
syslog (LOG_ERR, "TLS client certificate failed (%d): %s",
rc, gnutls_strerror (rc));
if (status != 0)
syslog (LOG_ERR, "TLS client certificate verify failure (%d)",
status);
}
}
