static void test_rend_cache_decrement_allocation(void *data) { (void)data; // Test when the cache has enough allocations rend_cache_total_allocation = 10; rend_cache_decrement_allocation(3); tt_int_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, 7); // Test when there are not enough allocations rend_cache_total_allocation = 1; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); rend_cache_decrement_allocation(2); tt_int_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, 0); expect_single_log_msg_containing( "Underflow in rend_cache_decrement_allocation"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); // And again rend_cache_decrement_allocation(2); tt_int_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, 0); done: teardown_capture_of_logs(); }
/* Try sending an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell on a circuit that is already an intro * point. Should fail. */ static void test_establish_intro_wrong_purpose(void *arg) { int retval; ssize_t cell_len = 0; char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL); (void)arg; /* Get the auth key of the intro point */ crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce)); memcpy(intro_circ->rend_circ_nonce, circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN); /* Set a bad circuit purpose!! :) */ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT); /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we attempt to parse it. */ cell_len = new_establish_intro_encoded_cell(circ_nonce, cell_body); tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); /* Receive the cell. Should fail. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len); expect_log_msg_containing("Rejecting ESTABLISH_INTRO on non-OR circuit."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1); done: circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)); }
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but slightly change the signature. Should * fail. */ static void test_establish_intro_wrong_sig(void *arg) { int retval; char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; ssize_t cell_len = 0; or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL); (void) arg; /* Get the auth key of the intro point */ crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce)); helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circ_nonce); /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we attempt to parse it. */ cell_len = new_establish_intro_encoded_cell(circ_nonce, cell_body); tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); /* Mutate the last byte (signature)! :) */ cell_body[cell_len - 1]++; /* Receive the cell. Should fail. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, (size_t)cell_len); expect_log_msg_containing("Failed to verify ESTABLISH_INTRO cell."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1); done: circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)); }
static void test_rend_cache_increment_allocation(void *data) { (void)data; // Test when the cache is not overflowing rend_cache_total_allocation = 5; rend_cache_increment_allocation(3); tt_int_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, 8); // Test when there are too many allocations rend_cache_total_allocation = SIZE_MAX-1; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); rend_cache_increment_allocation(2); tt_u64_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, SIZE_MAX); expect_single_log_msg_containing( "Overflow in rend_cache_increment_allocation"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); // And again rend_cache_increment_allocation(2); tt_u64_op(rend_cache_total_allocation, OP_EQ, SIZE_MAX); done: teardown_capture_of_logs(); }
/** We simulate a failure to create an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell */ static void test_gen_establish_intro_cell_bad(void *arg) { (void) arg; ssize_t cell_len = 0; trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL; char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL; MOCK(ed25519_sign_prefixed, mock_ed25519_sign_prefixed); crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce)); setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); /* Easiest way to make that function fail is to mock the ed25519_sign_prefixed() function and make it fail. */ cell = trn_cell_establish_intro_new(); tt_assert(cell); ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL); cell_len = hs_cell_build_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip, NULL); service_intro_point_free(ip); expect_log_msg_containing("Unable to make signature for " "ESTABLISH_INTRO cell."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_EQ, -1); done: trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell); UNMOCK(ed25519_sign_prefixed); }
static void test_halfstream_wrap(void *arg) { origin_circuit_t *circ = helper_create_origin_circuit(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, 0); edge_connection_t *edgeconn; entry_connection_t *entryconn; circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; circ->cpath->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; entryconn = fake_entry_conn(circ, 23); edgeconn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entryconn); (void)arg; /* Suppress the WARN message we generate in this test */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); MOCK(connection_mark_for_close_internal_, mock_mark_for_close); /* Verify that get_unique_stream_id_by_circ() can wrap uint16_t */ circ->next_stream_id = 65530; halfstream_insert(circ, edgeconn, NULL, 7, 0); tt_int_op(circ->next_stream_id, OP_EQ, 2); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(circ->half_streams), OP_EQ, 7); /* Insert full-1 */ halfstream_insert(circ, edgeconn, NULL, 65534-smartlist_len(circ->half_streams), 0); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(circ->half_streams), OP_EQ, 65534); /* Verify that we can get_unique_stream_id_by_circ() successfully */ edgeconn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ); tt_int_op(edgeconn->stream_id, OP_NE, 0); /* 0 is failure */ /* Insert an opened stream on the circ with that id */ ENTRY_TO_CONN(entryconn)->marked_for_close = 0; ENTRY_TO_CONN(entryconn)->outbuf_flushlen = 0; edgeconn->base_.state = AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT; circ->p_streams = edgeconn; /* Verify that get_unique_stream_id_by_circ() fails */ tt_int_op(get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ), OP_EQ, 0); /* 0 is failure */ /* eof the one opened stream. Verify it is now in half-closed */ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(circ->half_streams), OP_EQ, 65534); connection_edge_reached_eof(edgeconn); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(circ->half_streams), OP_EQ, 65535); /* Verify get_unique_stream_id_by_circ() fails due to full half-closed */ circ->p_streams = NULL; tt_int_op(get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ), OP_EQ, 0); /* 0 is failure */ done: circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)); connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(entryconn)); UNMOCK(connection_mark_for_close_internal_); }
static void test_halfstream_insertremove(void *arg) { (void)arg; /* Suppress the WARN message we generate in this test */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); /* Test insertion and removal with a few different sizes */ subtest_halfstream_insertremove(10); subtest_halfstream_insertremove(100); subtest_halfstream_insertremove(1000); }
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong sig length. Should * fail. */ static void test_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len(void *arg) { int retval; char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; ssize_t cell_len = 0; size_t bad_sig_len = ED25519_SIG_LEN - 1; trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL; or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL); (void) arg; /* Get the auth key of the intro point */ crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce)); helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circ_nonce); /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we * attempt to parse it. */ cell_len = new_establish_intro_cell(circ_nonce, &cell); tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); tt_assert(cell); /* Mangle the signature length. */ trn_cell_establish_intro_set_sig_len(cell, bad_sig_len); trn_cell_establish_intro_setlen_sig(cell, bad_sig_len); /* Encode cell. */ cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body), cell); tt_int_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); /* Receive the cell. Should fail. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len); expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO sig len is invalid"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1); done: trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell); circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)); }
static void test_address_get_if_addrs6_list_no_internal(void *arg) { smartlist_t *results = NULL; (void)arg; /* We might drop a log_err */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_ERR); results = get_interface_address6_list(LOG_ERR, AF_INET6, 0); tt_int_op(smartlist_len(mock_saved_logs()), OP_LE, 1); if (smartlist_len(mock_saved_logs()) == 1) { expect_log_msg_containing_either4("connect() failed", "unable to create socket", "Address that we determined via UDP " "socket magic is unsuitable for public " "comms.", "getsockname() to determine interface " "failed"); } teardown_capture_of_logs(); tt_ptr_op(results, OP_NE, NULL); /* Work even on systems without IPv6 interfaces */ tt_int_op(smartlist_len(results),OP_GE,0); tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_localhost_tor_addr(results)); tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_multicast_tor_addr(results)); tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_internal_tor_addr(results)); tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_null_tor_addr(results)); /* if there are any addresses, they must be IPv6 */ tt_assert(!smartlist_contains_ipv4_tor_addr(results)); if (smartlist_len(results) > 0) { tt_assert(smartlist_contains_ipv6_tor_addr(results)); } done: teardown_capture_of_logs(); interface_address6_list_free(results); return; }
static void test_util_process_set_waitpid_callback(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; waitpid_callback_t *res1 = NULL, *res2 = NULL; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); pid_t pid = (pid_t)42; res1 = set_waitpid_callback(pid, temp_callback, NULL); tt_assert(res1); res2 = set_waitpid_callback(pid, temp_callback, NULL); tt_assert(res2); expect_single_log_msg( "Replaced a waitpid monitor on pid 42. That should be " "impossible.\n"); done: teardown_capture_of_logs(); clear_waitpid_callback(res1); clear_waitpid_callback(res2); }
/* Send an empty ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. Should fail. */ static void test_establish_intro_wrong_keytype(void *arg) { int retval; or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL); char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; (void) arg; /* Get the auth key of the intro point */ crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce)); helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circ_nonce); /* Receive the cell. Should fail. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, (uint8_t *) "", 0); expect_log_msg_containing("Empty ESTABLISH_INTRO cell."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1); done: circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)); }
static void test_invalid_service(void *arg) { int ret; (void) arg; /* Try with a missing port configuration. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 1\n"; /* Wrong not supported version. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceVersion must be between 2 and 3"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Bad value of HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 2\n"; /* Should be 0 or 1. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts must be " "between 0 and 1, not 2"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Bad value of HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable 2\n"; /* Should be 0 or 1. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable must be " "between 0 and 1, not 2"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Bad value of HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 2\n"; /* Should be 0 or 1. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit must " "be between 0 and 1, not 2"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Too much max streams. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreams 65536\n"; /* One too many. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceMaxStreams must be between " "0 and 65535, not 65536"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Duplicate directory directive. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 81\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("Another hidden service is already " "configured for directory"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Bad port. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 65536\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("Missing or invalid port"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Bad target addr:port separation. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1 8000\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServicePort parse error: " "invalid port mapping"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Out of order directives. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceVersion with no preceding " "HiddenServiceDir directive"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } done: ; }
static void test_channel_duplicates(void *arg) { channel_t *chan = NULL; routerstatus_t rs; (void) arg; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); /* Try a flat call with channel nor connections. */ channel_check_for_duplicates(); expect_log_msg_containing( "Found 0 connections to 0 relays. Found 0 current canonical " "connections, in 0 of which we were a non-canonical peer. " "0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and " "0 had more than 4 connections."); mock_ns = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*mock_ns)); mock_ns->routerstatus_list = smartlist_new(); MOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus, mock_networkstatus_get_latest_consensus); chan = new_fake_channel(); tt_assert(chan); chan->is_canonical = test_chan_is_canonical; memset(chan->identity_digest, 'A', sizeof(chan->identity_digest)); channel_add_to_digest_map(chan); tt_ptr_op(channel_find_by_remote_identity(chan->identity_digest, NULL), OP_EQ, chan); /* No relay has been associated with this channel. */ channel_check_for_duplicates(); expect_log_msg_containing( "Found 0 connections to 0 relays. Found 0 current canonical " "connections, in 0 of which we were a non-canonical peer. " "0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and " "0 had more than 4 connections."); /* Associate relay to this connection in the consensus. */ memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); memset(rs.identity_digest, 'A', sizeof(rs.identity_digest)); smartlist_add(mock_ns->routerstatus_list, &rs); /* Non opened channel. */ chan->state = CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING; channel_check_for_duplicates(); expect_log_msg_containing( "Found 0 connections to 0 relays. Found 0 current canonical " "connections, in 0 of which we were a non-canonical peer. " "0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and " "0 had more than 4 connections."); chan->state = CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN; channel_check_for_duplicates(); expect_log_msg_containing( "Found 1 connections to 1 relays. Found 0 current canonical " "connections, in 0 of which we were a non-canonical peer. " "0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and " "0 had more than 4 connections."); test_chan_should_be_canonical = 1; channel_check_for_duplicates(); expect_log_msg_containing( "Found 1 connections to 1 relays. Found 1 current canonical " "connections, in 1 of which we were a non-canonical peer. " "0 relays had more than 1 connection, 0 had more than 2, and " "0 had more than 4 connections."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); done: free_fake_channel(chan); smartlist_clear(mock_ns->routerstatus_list); networkstatus_vote_free(mock_ns); UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus); }
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong MAC. Should fail. */ static void test_establish_intro_wrong_mac(void *arg) { int retval; char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; ssize_t cell_len = 0; uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL; or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL); (void) arg; /* Get the auth key of the intro point */ crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce)); helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circ_nonce); /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we * attempt to parse it. */ cell_len = new_establish_intro_cell(circ_nonce, &cell); tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); tt_assert(cell); /* Mangle one byte of the MAC. */ uint8_t *handshake_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_handshake_mac(cell); handshake_ptr[TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN - 1]++; /* We need to resign the payload with that change. */ { ed25519_signature_t sig; ed25519_keypair_t key_struct; /* New keypair for the signature since we don't have access to the private * key material generated earlier when creating the cell. */ retval = ed25519_keypair_generate(&key_struct, 0); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); uint8_t *auth_key_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_auth_key(cell); memcpy(auth_key_ptr, key_struct.pubkey.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN); /* Encode payload so we can sign it. */ cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body), cell); tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); retval = ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, cell_body, cell_len - (ED25519_SIG_LEN + sizeof(cell->sig_len)), ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX, &key_struct); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); /* And write the signature to the cell */ uint8_t *sig_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_sig(cell); memcpy(sig_ptr, sig.sig, cell->sig_len); /* Re-encode with the new signature. */ cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body), cell); tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); } /* Receive the cell. Should fail because our MAC is wrong. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len); expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO handshake_auth not as expected"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1); done: trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell); circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)); }
static void test_router_check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(void *arg) { (void)arg; routerinfo_t routerinfo; memset(&routerinfo, 0, sizeof(routerinfo)); mock_router_get_my_routerinfo_result = NULL; MOCK(we_are_hibernating, mock_we_are_not_hibernating); MOCK(router_get_my_routerinfo, mock_router_get_my_routerinfo); mock_router_get_my_routerinfo_result = &routerinfo; /* When uptime is less than 24h, no previous bandwidth, no last_changed * Uptime: 10800, last_changed: 0, Previous bw: 0, Current bw: 0 */ routerinfo.bandwidthcapacity = 0; MOCK(get_uptime, mock_get_uptime_3h); setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL)); expect_log_msg_not_containing( "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); /* When uptime is less than 24h, previous bandwidth, * last_changed more than 3h ago * Uptime: 10800, last_changed: 0, Previous bw: 10000, Current bw: 0 */ routerinfo.bandwidthcapacity = 10000; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL)); expect_log_msg_containing( "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); /* When uptime is less than 24h, previous bandwidth, * last_changed more than 3h ago, and hibernating * Uptime: 10800, last_changed: 0, Previous bw: 10000, Current bw: 0 */ UNMOCK(we_are_hibernating); MOCK(we_are_hibernating, mock_we_are_hibernating); routerinfo.bandwidthcapacity = 10000; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL)); expect_log_msg_not_containing( "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); UNMOCK(we_are_hibernating); MOCK(we_are_hibernating, mock_we_are_not_hibernating); /* When uptime is less than 24h, last_changed is not more than 3h ago * Uptime: 10800, last_changed: x, Previous bw: 10000, Current bw: 0 */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL)); expect_log_msg_not_containing( "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); /* When uptime is less than 24h and bandwidthcapacity does not change * Uptime: 10800, last_changed: x, Previous bw: 10000, Current bw: 20001 */ MOCK(rep_hist_bandwidth_assess, mock_rep_hist_bandwidth_assess); setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL) + 6*60*60 + 1); expect_log_msg_containing( "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor."); UNMOCK(get_uptime); UNMOCK(rep_hist_bandwidth_assess); teardown_capture_of_logs(); /* When uptime is more than 24h */ MOCK(get_uptime, mock_get_uptime_1d); setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO); check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time(NULL)); expect_log_msg_not_containing( "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); done: UNMOCK(get_uptime); UNMOCK(router_get_my_routerinfo); UNMOCK(we_are_hibernating); }
static void test_invalid_service_v2(void *arg) { int validate_only = 1, ret; (void) arg; /* Try with a missing port configuration. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("with no ports configured."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Too many introduction points. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 11\n"; /* One too many. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints should " "be between 0 and 10, not 11"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Too little introduction points. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints -1\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints should " "be between 0 and 10, not -1"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Bad authorized client type. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient blah alice,bob\n"; /* blah is no good. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains " "unrecognized auth-type"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } done: ; }
static void test_invalid_service_v3(void *arg) { int validate_only = 1, ret; (void) arg; /* Try with a missing port configuration. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("with no ports configured."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Too many introduction points. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 21\n"; /* One too many. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints must " "be between 3 and 20, not 21."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* Too little introduction points. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 1\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints must " "be between 3 and 20, not 1."); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } /* v2-specific HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient set. */ { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient stealth client1\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); expect_log_msg_containing("Hidden service option " "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible " "with version 3 of service in " "/tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } done: ; }