/*
* Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session
*/
static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
{
unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
int ret;
ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
return ret;
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
store16(tb, type);
store32(tb, handle);
storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]),
TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
}
/*
* use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob
*/
static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen,
const unsigned char *blobauth,
unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen)
{
unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
uint32_t authhandle1 = 0;
uint32_t authhandle2 = 0;
unsigned char cont = 0;
uint32_t ordinal;
uint32_t keyhndl;
int ret;
/* sessions for unsealing key and data */
ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
&ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
&ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* build and send TPM request packet */
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
store32(tb, keyhandle);
storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen);
store32(tb, authhandle1);
storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
store32(tb, authhandle2);
storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
*datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd,
keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
*datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0,
0);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen);
return 0;
}
/*
* Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on
* Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key.
*/
static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen,
unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen,
const unsigned char *blobauth,
const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize)
{
struct osapsess sess;
struct tpm_digests *td;
unsigned char cont;
uint32_t ordinal;
uint32_t pcrsize;
uint32_t datsize;
int sealinfosize;
int encdatasize;
int storedsize;
int ret;
int i;
/* alloc some work space for all the hashes */
td = kmalloc(sizeof *td, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!td)
return -ENOMEM;
/* get session for sealing key */
ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
dump_sess(&sess);
/* calculate encrypted authorization value */
memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
goto out;
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
datsize = htonl(datalen);
pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
cont = 0;
/* encrypt data authorization key */
for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i)
td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i];
/* calculate authorization HMAC value */
if (pcrinfosize == 0) {
/* no pcr info specified */
ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0,
0);
} else {
/* pcr info specified */
ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t),
&datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0);
}
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
/* build and send the TPM request packet */
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL);
store32(tb, keyhandle);
storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
store32(tb, pcrinfosize);
storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize);
store32(tb, datalen);
storebytes(tb, data, datalen);
store32(tb, sess.handle);
storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
/* calculate the size of the returned Blob */
sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t));
encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize);
storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize +
sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize;
/* check the HMAC in the response */
ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret,
SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0,
0);
/* copy the returned blob to caller */
if (!ret) {
memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize);
*bloblen = storedsize;
}
out:
kfree(td);
return ret;
}
/*
* Load a TPM key from the blob provided by userspace
*/
static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm_buf *tb,
uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth,
const unsigned char *keyblob, int keybloblen,
uint32_t *newhandle)
{
unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char authdata[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
uint32_t authhandle = 0;
unsigned char cont = 0;
uint32_t ordinal;
int ret;
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2);
/* session for loading the key */
ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle, enonce);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
/* generate odd nonce */
ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
/* calculate authorization HMAC value */
ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata, keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, enonce,
nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal,
keybloblen, keyblob, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* build the request buffer */
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_LOADKEY2_SIZE + keybloblen);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2);
store32(tb, keyhandle);
storebytes(tb, keyblob, keybloblen);
store32(tb, authhandle);
storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, keyauth,
SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("TSS_checkhmac1 failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
*newhandle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
return 0;
}
/*
* Sign a blob provided by userspace (that has had the hash function applied)
* using a specific key handle. The handle is assumed to have been previously
* loaded by e.g. LoadKey2.
*
* Note that the key signature scheme of the used key should be set to
* TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_DER. This allows the hashed input to be of any size
* up to key_length_in_bytes - 11 and not be limited to size 20 like the
* TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_SHA1 signature scheme.
*/
static int tpm_sign(struct tpm_buf *tb,
uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth,
const unsigned char *blob, uint32_t bloblen,
void *out, uint32_t outlen)
{
unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char authdata[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
uint32_t authhandle = 0;
unsigned char cont = 0;
uint32_t ordinal;
uint32_t datalen;
int ret;
ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SIGN);
datalen = htonl(bloblen);
/* session for loading the key */
ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle, enonce);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
/* generate odd nonce */
ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
/* calculate authorization HMAC value */
ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata, keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, enonce,
nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal,
sizeof(uint32_t), &datalen,
bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* build the request buffer */
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_SIGN_SIZE + bloblen);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SIGN);
store32(tb, keyhandle);
store32(tb, bloblen);
storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen);
store32(tb, authhandle);
storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd,
keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t),
0, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("TSS_checkhmac1 failed (%d)\n", ret);
return ret;
}
memcpy(out, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t),
min(datalen, outlen));
return datalen;
}