/*
* generate_p_q
* Generates two prime numbers of bit_length bit length, p and q
* inputs: int bit_length
* outputs: BIGNUM* p
* BIGNUM* q
*
* return value: 0 if failure
* 1 if success
*/
int generate_p_q(int bit_length, BIGNUM* p, BIGNUM* q){
int res1 = BN_generate_prime_ex(p, bit_length, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
int res2 = BN_generate_prime_ex(q, bit_length + 3, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if ( res1 == 0 || res2 == 0 )
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
BIGNUM *
BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, const BIGNUM *add,
const BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)
{
BN_GENCB cb;
BIGNUM *rnd = NULL;
int found = 0;
BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg);
if (ret == NULL) {
if ((rnd = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
} else
rnd = ret;
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rnd, bits, safe, add, rem, &cb))
goto err;
/* we have a prime :-) */
found = 1;
err:
if (!found && (ret == NULL) && (rnd != NULL))
BN_free(rnd);
return (found ? rnd : NULL);
}
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
# include <stdio.h>
# include <time.h>
# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
# include "bn_lcl.h"
BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe,
const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem,
void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)
{
BN_GENCB cb;
BIGNUM *rnd = NULL;
BN_GENCB_set_old(&cb, callback, cb_arg);
if (ret == NULL) {
if ((rnd = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
} else
rnd = ret;
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rnd, bits, safe, add, rem, &cb))
goto err;
/* we have a prime :-) */
return ret;
err:
BN_free(rnd);
return NULL;
}
/**
* Generate a prime number
*
* The internal CPRNG is seeded using the provided seed value.
*
* @param prime Pointer for storage of prime number
* @param s Secret to share
* @param bits Bit size of prime
* @param rngSeed Seed value for CPRNG
* @param rngSeedLength Length of Seed value for CPRNG
*
*/
static int generatePrime(BIGNUM *prime, const BIGNUM *s, const int bits, unsigned char *rngSeed, const unsigned int rngSeedLength)
{
int max_rounds = 1000;
// Seed the RNG
RAND_seed(rngSeed, rngSeedLength);
// Clear the prime value
BN_clear(prime);
do {
// Generate random prime
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000L /* last parm is BN_GENCB which is null in our case */
BN_generate_prime_ex(prime, bits, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL);
#else
BN_generate_prime(prime, bits, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL );
#endif
} while ((BN_ucmp(prime, s) == -1) && (max_rounds-- > 0)); // If prime < s or not reached 1000 tries
if (max_rounds > 0)
return 0;
else
return -1; // We could not find a prime number
}
extern "C" void Java_java_math_NativeBN_BN_1generate_1prime_1ex(JNIEnv* env, jclass, jlong ret, int bits,
jboolean safe, jlong add, jlong rem, jlong cb) {
if (!oneValidHandle(env, ret)) return;
BN_generate_prime_ex(toBigNum(ret), bits, safe, toBigNum(add), toBigNum(rem),
reinterpret_cast<BN_GENCB*>(cb));
throwExceptionIfNecessary(env);
}
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
BIGNUM local_r0,local_d,local_p;
BIGNUM *pr0,*d,*p;
int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r3 == NULL) goto err;
bitsp=(bits+1)/2;
bitsq=bits-bitsp;
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
if(!rsa->n && ((rsa->n=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->d && ((rsa->d=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->e && ((rsa->e=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->p && ((rsa->p=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->q && ((rsa->q=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value);
/* generate p and q */
for (;;)
{
if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
goto err;
for (;;)
{
/* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
* continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for
* this and bail if it happens 3 times. */
unsigned int degenerate = 0;
do
{
if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
goto err;
} while((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
if(degenerate == 3)
{
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1))
break;
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
goto err;
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
{
tmp=rsa->p;
rsa->p=rsa->q;
rsa->q=tmp;
}
/* calculate n */
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
pr0 = &local_r0;
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
pr0 = r0;
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,pr0,ctx)) goto err; /* d */
/* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
d = rsa->d;
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
p = &local_p;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
p = rsa->p;
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,p,ctx)) goto err;
ok=1;
err:
if (ok == -1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,ERR_LIB_BN);
ok=0;
}
if (ctx != NULL)
{
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
/* Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
* It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
* order-q subgroup.
*/
static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *t1,*t2;
int g,ok= -1;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) goto err;
/* Make sure 'ret' has the necessary elements */
if(!ret->p && ((ret->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!ret->g && ((ret->g = BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if (generator <= 1)
{
DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2)
{
if (!BN_set_word(t1,24)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,11)) goto err;
g=2;
}
#if 0 /* does not work for safe primes */
else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_3)
{
if (!BN_set_word(t1,12)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,5)) goto err;
g=3;
}
#endif
else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5)
{
if (!BN_set_word(t1,10)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,3)) goto err;
/* BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
* out on these ones :-( */
g=5;
}
else
{
/* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
* generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
* it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
* which both is OK */
if (!BN_set_word(t1,2)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(t2,1)) goto err;
g=generator;
}
if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(ret->p,prime_len,1,t1,t2,cb)) goto err;
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) goto err;
if (!BN_set_word(ret->g,g)) goto err;
ok=1;
err:
if (ok == -1)
{
DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
ok=0;
}
if (ctx != NULL)
{
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
int rsa_default_multi_prime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int num_primes,
BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) {
BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
BIGNUM local_r0, local_d, local_p;
BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
int prime_bits, ok = -1, n = 0, i, j;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
STACK_OF(RSA_additional_prime) *additional_primes = NULL;
if (num_primes < 2) {
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_MUST_HAVE_AT_LEAST_TWO_PRIMES);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r0 == NULL || r1 == NULL || r2 == NULL || r3 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (num_primes > 2) {
additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_new_null();
if (additional_primes == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
RSA_additional_prime *ap = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
if (ap == NULL) {
goto err;
}
memset(ap, 0, sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
ap->prime = BN_new();
ap->exp = BN_new();
ap->coeff = BN_new();
ap->r = BN_new();
if (ap->prime == NULL ||
ap->exp == NULL ||
ap->coeff == NULL ||
ap->r == NULL ||
!sk_RSA_additional_prime_push(additional_primes, ap)) {
RSA_additional_prime_free(ap);
goto err;
}
}
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value)) {
goto err;
}
/* generate p and q */
prime_bits = (bits + (num_primes - 1)) / num_primes;
for (;;) {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb) ||
!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
break;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
prime_bits = ((bits - prime_bits) + (num_primes - 2)) / (num_primes - 1);
for (;;) {
/* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
* continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for
* this and bail if it happens 3 times. */
unsigned int degenerate = 0;
do {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) {
goto err;
}
} while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
if (degenerate == 3) {
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
break;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1) ||
!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
RSA_additional_prime *ap =
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
prime_bits = ((bits - BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) + (num_primes - (i + 1))) /
(num_primes - i);
for (;;) {
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ap->prime, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, ap->prime) == 0 ||
BN_cmp(rsa->q, ap->prime) == 0) {
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < i - 2; j++) {
if (BN_cmp(sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, j)->prime,
ap->prime) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (j != i - 2) {
continue;
}
if (!BN_sub(r2, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_is_one(r1)) {
continue;
}
if (i != num_primes - 1) {
break;
}
/* For the last prime we'll check that it makes n large enough. In the
* two prime case this isn't a problem because we generate primes with
* the top two bits set and so the product is always of the expected
* size. In the multi prime case, this doesn't follow. */
if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (BN_num_bits(r1) == (unsigned) bits) {
break;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) {
goto err;
}
}
/* ap->r is is the product of all the primes prior to the current one
* (including p and q). */
if (!BN_copy(ap->r, rsa->n)) {
goto err;
}
if (i == num_primes - 1) {
/* In the case of the last prime, we calculated n as |r1| in the loop
* above. */
if (!BN_copy(rsa->n, r1)) {
goto err;
}
} else if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1)) {
goto err;
}
}
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
tmp = rsa->p;
rsa->p = rsa->q;
rsa->q = tmp;
}
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) {
goto err; /* p-1 */
}
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) {
goto err; /* q-1 */
}
if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) {
goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
}
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
RSA_additional_prime *ap =
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
if (!BN_sub(r3, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_mul(r0, r0, r3, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
}
pr0 = &local_r0;
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
goto err; /* d */
}
/* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
p = &local_p;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++) {
RSA_additional_prime *ap =
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
if (!BN_sub(ap->exp, ap->prime, BN_value_one()) ||
!BN_mod(ap->exp, rsa->d, ap->exp, ctx) ||
!BN_mod_inverse(ap->coeff, ap->r, ap->prime, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
}
ok = 1;
rsa->additional_primes = additional_primes;
additional_primes = NULL;
err:
if (ok == -1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
ok = 0;
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
sk_RSA_additional_prime_pop_free(additional_primes,
RSA_additional_prime_free);
return ok;
}
int generateRandomKeys(paillierKeys *keys, int *key_len, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 1, final_key_l = 0;
BIGNUM *p, *q, *tmp, *n, *n2, *g, *lamda, *mu;
if (key_len != NULL && *key_len == 0)
{
*key_len = DEFAULT_KEY_LEN;
final_key_l = *key_len;
}
else if (key_len != NULL)
{
final_key_l = *key_len;
}
else
{
final_key_l = DEFAULT_KEY_LEN;
}
if (final_key_l < 32)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Key lenght too short. Minimum lenght 32 bits");
goto end;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
// Temp BIGNUMs
p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
q = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
// Part of the keys BIGNUMs
n = BN_new();
n2 = BN_new();
g = BN_new();
lamda = BN_new();
mu = BN_new();
// 1. Choose two large prime numbers
// This numbers have to hold gcd(pq, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1
unsigned char buffer;
do
{
if (!RAND_bytes(&buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
goto end;
srandom((int)buffer);
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(p, final_key_l / 2, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL))
goto end;
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(q, final_key_l / 2, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL))
goto end;
// 2. Compute n = pq
if (!BN_mul(n, p, q, ctx))
goto end;
// Test if primes are ok
if (!BN_sub_word(p, 1))
goto end;
if (!BN_sub_word(q, 1))
goto end;
if (!BN_mul(tmp, p, q, ctx))
goto end;
}
while (BN_cmp(p, q) == 0 || BN_gcd(tmp, tmp, n, ctx) != 1);
// and lamda = lcm(p-1,q-1)
if (!BN_lcm(lamda, p, q, ctx))
goto end;
if (!BN_mul(n2, n, n, ctx))
goto end;
do
{
// 3. Select a random integer g moz n2
do
{
if (!BN_rand_range(g, n2))
goto end;
}
while (BN_is_zero(g));
// 4. Ensure n divides the order of g
if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, g, lamda, n2, ctx))
goto end;
if (L(tmp, tmp, n, ctx) != 0)
goto end;
BN_mod_inverse(mu, tmp, n, ctx);
}
while (mu == NULL);
keys->pub.n = n;
keys->pub.n2 = n2;
keys->pub.g = g;
keys->priv.n = BN_dup(n);
keys->priv.n2 = BN_dup(n2);
keys->priv.lamda = lamda;
keys->priv.mu = mu;
keys->n = BN_dup(n);
keys->n2 = BN_dup(n2);
ret = 0;
end:
if (ret)
{
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
fprintf(stderr, "Error generating keys: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
static int rsa_builtin_multi_prime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int num_primes, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
BIGNUM local_r0,local_d,local_p;
BIGNUM *pr0,*d,*p;
int prime_bits, ok= -1,n=0,i,j;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_CRYPTOCOP
static int cryptocop_count;
#endif
STACK_OF(RSA_additional_prime) *additional_primes = NULL;
if (num_primes < 2)
{
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_MUST_HAVE_AT_LEAST_TWO_PRIMES);
goto err;
}
ctx=BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (r3 == NULL) goto err;
if (num_primes > 2)
{
if ((additional_primes = sk_RSA_additional_prime_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_CRYPTOCOP
if(bits < CRYPTOCOP_MIN_RSA_BITS && cryptocop_count < CRYPTOCOP_COUNT_MAX) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "RSA key generation with %d bits " CRYPTOCOP_INFO, bits);
cryptocop_count++;
}
#endif
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++)
{
RSA_additional_prime *ap = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
if (ap == NULL)
goto err;
memset(ap, 0, sizeof(RSA_additional_prime));
if ((ap->prime = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((ap->exp = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((ap->coeff = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((ap->r = BN_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!sk_RSA_additional_prime_push(additional_primes, ap))
goto err;
}
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
if(!rsa->n && ((rsa->n=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->d && ((rsa->d=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->e && ((rsa->e=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->p && ((rsa->p=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->q && ((rsa->q=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
if(!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp=BN_new()) == NULL)) goto err;
BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value);
/* generate p and q. */
prime_bits = (bits+(num_primes-1))/num_primes;
for (;;)
{
if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1)) break;
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
goto err;
prime_bits = ((bits-prime_bits) + (num_primes-2))/(num_primes-1);
for (;;)
{
/* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
* continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for
* this and bail if it happens 3 times. */
unsigned int degenerate = 0;
do
{
if(!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
goto err;
} while((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
if(degenerate == 3)
{
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err;
if (BN_is_one(r1))
break;
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
goto err;
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q,ctx))
goto err;
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++)
{
RSA_additional_prime *ap = sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
prime_bits = ((bits - BN_num_bits(rsa->n))+(num_primes-(i+1)))/(num_primes-i);
for (;;)
{
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ap->prime, prime_bits, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
goto err;
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, ap->prime) == 0)
continue;
if (BN_cmp(rsa->q, ap->prime) == 0)
continue;
for (j = 0; j < i - 2; j++)
{
if (BN_cmp(sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, j)->prime, ap->prime) == 0)
break;
}
if (j != i - 2)
continue;
if (!BN_sub(r2, ap->prime, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(r1))
continue;
if (i != num_primes - 1)
break;
/* For the last prime we'll check that it makes
* n large enough. In the two prime case this isn't a
* problem because we generate primes with the top two
* bits set and so the product is always of the
* expected size. In the multi prime case, this doesn't
* follow. */
if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx))
goto err;
if (BN_num_bits(r1) == bits)
break;
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
goto err;
}
/* ap->r is is the product of all the primes prior to the
* current one (including p and q). */
if (!BN_copy(ap->r, rsa->n))
goto err;
if (i == num_primes - 1)
{
/* In the case of the last prime, we calculated n in r1
* in the loop above. */
if (!BN_copy(rsa->n, r1))
goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->n, ap->prime, ctx))
goto err;
}
if(!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
goto err;
}
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0)
{
tmp=rsa->p;
rsa->p=rsa->q;
rsa->q=tmp;
}
/* calculate d */
if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++)
{
RSA_additional_prime *ap = sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
if (!BN_sub(r3, ap->prime, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, r3, ctx))
goto err;
}
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
pr0 = &local_r0;
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
pr0 = r0;
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,pr0,ctx)) goto err; /* d */
/* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
d = &local_d;
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
d = rsa->d;
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
p = &local_p;
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
p = rsa->p;
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,p,ctx)) goto err;
for (i = 2; i < num_primes; i++)
{
RSA_additional_prime *ap = sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i - 2);
if (!BN_sub(ap->exp, ap->prime, BN_value_one()))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod(ap->exp, rsa->d, ap->exp, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_inverse(ap->coeff, ap->r, ap->prime, ctx))
goto err;
}
ok=1;
rsa->additional_primes = additional_primes;
additional_primes = NULL;
err:
if (ok == -1)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN,ERR_LIB_BN);
ok=0;
}
if (ctx != NULL)
{
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
if (additional_primes != NULL)
{
for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(additional_primes); i++)
{
RSA_additional_prime *ap = sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(additional_primes, i);
if (ap->prime != NULL)
BN_clear_free(ap->prime);
if (ap->exp != NULL)
BN_clear_free(ap->exp);
if (ap->coeff != NULL)
BN_clear_free(ap->coeff);
if (ap->r != NULL)
BN_clear_free(ap->r);
}
sk_RSA_additional_prime_pop_free(additional_primes, int_rsa_free_additional_prime);
}
return ok;
}
int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
// We generate DH parameters as follows
// find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
// p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
// For this case, g is a generator if
// g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
// Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
// g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
//
// Having said all that,
// there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
// for 2, p mod 24 == 11
// for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
// for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
//
// Thanks to Phil Karn <*****@*****.**> for the pointers about the
// special generators and for answering some of my questions.
//
// I've implemented the second simple method :-).
// Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
// this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
// Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
// It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
// order-q subgroup.
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
// Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements
if (dh->p == NULL) {
dh->p = BN_new();
if (dh->p == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (dh->g == NULL) {
dh->g = BN_new();
if (dh->g == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
// BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
// out on these ones :-(
g = 5;
} else {
// in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
// generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
// it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
// which both is OK
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
int
prime_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
char *prime = NULL;
BIO *bio_out;
char *s;
int ret = 1;
memset(&prime_config, 0, sizeof(prime_config));
/* Default iterations for Miller-Rabin probabilistic primality test. */
prime_config.checks = 20;
if (options_parse(argc, argv, prime_options, &prime, NULL) != 0) {
prime_usage();
return (1);
}
if (prime == NULL && prime_config.generate == 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "No prime specified.\n");
prime_usage();
return (1);
}
if ((bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return (1);
}
BIO_set_fp(bio_out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (prime_config.generate != 0) {
if (prime_config.bits == 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Specify the number of bits.\n");
goto end;
}
bn = BN_new();
if (!bn) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory.\n");
goto end;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(bn, prime_config.bits,
prime_config.safe, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Prime generation error.\n");
goto end;
}
s = prime_config.hex ? BN_bn2hex(bn) : BN_bn2dec(bn);
if (s == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory.\n");
goto end;
}
BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", s);
free(s);
} else {
if (prime_config.hex) {
if (!BN_hex2bn(&bn, prime)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is an invalid hex "
"value.\n", prime);
goto end;
}
} else {
if (!BN_dec2bn(&bn, prime)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is an invalid decimal "
"value.\n", prime);
goto end;
}
}
BN_print(bio_out, bn);
BIO_printf(bio_out, " is %sprime\n",
BN_is_prime_ex(bn, prime_config.checks,
NULL, NULL) ? "" : "not ");
}
ret = 0;
end:
BN_free(bn);
BIO_free_all(bio_out);
return (ret);
}
int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
int hex=0;
int checks=20;
int generate=0;
int bits=0;
int safe=0;
BIGNUM *bn=NULL;
BIO *bio_out;
apps_startup();
if (bio_err == NULL)
if ((bio_err=BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
BIO_set_fp(bio_err,stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE|BIO_FP_TEXT);
--argc;
++argv;
while (argc >= 1 && **argv == '-')
{
if(!strcmp(*argv,"-hex"))
hex=1;
else if(!strcmp(*argv,"-generate"))
generate=1;
else if(!strcmp(*argv,"-bits"))
if(--argc < 1)
goto bad;
else
bits=atoi(*++argv);
else if(!strcmp(*argv,"-safe"))
safe=1;
else if(!strcmp(*argv,"-checks"))
if(--argc < 1)
goto bad;
else
checks=atoi(*++argv);
else
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Unknown option '%s'\n",*argv);
goto bad;
}
--argc;
++argv;
}
if (argv[0] == NULL && !generate)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"No prime specified\n");
goto bad;
}
if ((bio_out=BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) != NULL)
{
BIO_set_fp(bio_out,stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE);
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
{
BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());
bio_out = BIO_push(tmpbio, bio_out);
}
#endif
}
if(generate)
{
char *s;
if(!bits)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Specifiy the number of bits.\n");
return 1;
}
bn=BN_new();
BN_generate_prime_ex(bn,bits,safe,NULL,NULL,NULL);
s=hex ? BN_bn2hex(bn) : BN_bn2dec(bn);
BIO_printf(bio_out,"%s\n",s);
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
else
{
if(hex)
BN_hex2bn(&bn,argv[0]);
else
BN_dec2bn(&bn,argv[0]);
BN_print(bio_out,bn);
BIO_printf(bio_out," is %sprime\n",
BN_is_prime_ex(bn,checks,NULL,NULL) ? "" : "not ");
}
BN_free(bn);
BIO_free_all(bio_out);
return 0;
bad:
BIO_printf(bio_err,"options are\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,"%-14s hex\n","-hex");
BIO_printf(bio_err,"%-14s number of checks\n","-checks <n>");
return 1;
}
/**
* public static native int BN_generate_prime_ex(int, int, boolean, int, int, int)
*/
static jboolean NativeBN_BN_generate_prime_ex(JNIEnv* env, jclass cls, BIGNUM* ret, int bits, jboolean safe,
BIGNUM* add, BIGNUM* rem, jint cb) {
if (!oneValidHandle(env, ret)) return FALSE;
return BN_generate_prime_ex(ret, bits, safe, add, rem, cb);
}
static jboolean NativeBN_BN_generate_prime_ex(JNIEnv* env, jclass, BIGNUM* ret, int bits, jboolean safe,
BIGNUM* add, BIGNUM* rem, jint cb) {
if (!oneValidHandle(env, ret)) return JNI_FALSE;
return BN_generate_prime_ex(ret, bits, safe, add, rem, reinterpret_cast<BN_GENCB*>(cb));
}
int prime_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
int hex = 0, checks = 20, generate = 0, bits = 0, safe = 0, ret = 1;
char *prog;
OPTION_CHOICE o;
prog = opt_init(argc, argv, prime_options);
while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
switch (o) {
case OPT_EOF:
case OPT_ERR:
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog);
goto end;
case OPT_HELP:
opt_help(prime_options);
ret = 0;
goto end;
case OPT_HEX:
hex = 1;
break;
case OPT_GENERATE:
generate = 1;
break;
case OPT_BITS:
bits = atoi(opt_arg());
break;
case OPT_SAFE:
safe = 1;
break;
case OPT_CHECKS:
checks = atoi(opt_arg());
break;
}
}
argc = opt_num_rest();
argv = opt_rest();
if (argc == 0 && !generate) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: No prime specified\n", prog);
goto end;
}
if (generate) {
char *s;
if (!bits) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Specify the number of bits.\n");
goto end;
}
bn = BN_new();
BN_generate_prime_ex(bn, bits, safe, NULL, NULL, NULL);
s = hex ? BN_bn2hex(bn) : BN_bn2dec(bn);
BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", s);
OPENSSL_free(s);
} else {
for ( ; *argv; argv++) {
if (hex)
BN_hex2bn(&bn, argv[0]);
else
BN_dec2bn(&bn, argv[0]);
BN_print(bio_out, bn);
BIO_printf(bio_out, " (%s) %s prime\n",
argv[0],
BN_is_prime_ex(bn, checks, NULL, NULL)
? "is" : "is not");
}
}
BN_free(bn);
end:
return ret;
}
