Exemplo n.º 1
0
bool CTxLockRequest::IsValid() const
{
    if(tx->vout.size() < 1) return false;

    if(tx->vin.size() > WARN_MANY_INPUTS) {
        LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockRequest::IsValid -- WARNING: Too many inputs: tx=%s", ToString());
    }

	LOCK(cs_main);
    if(!CheckFinalTx(*tx)) {
        LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockRequest::IsValid -- Transaction is not final: tx=%s", ToString());
        return false;
    }

    CAmount nValueIn = 0;

    int nInstantSendConfirmationsRequired = Params().GetConsensus().nInstantSendConfirmationsRequired;

    for (const auto& txin : tx->vin) {

        Coin coin;

        if(!GetUTXOCoin(txin.prevout, coin)) {
            LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockRequest::IsValid -- Failed to find UTXO %s\n", txin.prevout.ToStringShort());
            return false;
        }

        int nTxAge = chainActive.Height() - coin.nHeight + 1;
        // 1 less than the "send IX" gui requires, in case of a block propagating the network at the time
        int nConfirmationsRequired = nInstantSendConfirmationsRequired - 1;

        if(nTxAge < nConfirmationsRequired) {
            LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockRequest::IsValid -- outpoint %s too new: nTxAge=%d, nConfirmationsRequired=%d, txid=%s\n",
                    txin.prevout.ToStringShort(), nTxAge, nConfirmationsRequired, GetHash().ToString());
            return false;
        }

        nValueIn += coin.out.nValue;
    }

    if(nValueIn > sporkManager.GetSporkValue(SPORK_5_INSTANTSEND_MAX_VALUE)*COIN) {
        LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockRequest::IsValid -- Transaction value too high: nValueIn=%d, tx=%s", nValueIn, ToString());
        return false;
    }

    CAmount nValueOut = tx->GetValueOut();

    if(nValueIn - nValueOut < GetMinFee()) {
        LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockRequest::IsValid -- did not include enough fees in transaction: fees=%d, tx=%s", nValueOut - nValueIn, ToString());
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}
Exemplo n.º 2
0
// check to make sure the collateral provided by the client is valid
bool CPrivateSend::IsCollateralValid(const CTransaction& txCollateral)
{
    if(txCollateral.vout.empty()) return false;
    if(txCollateral.nLockTime != 0) return false;

    CAmount nValueIn = 0;
    CAmount nValueOut = 0;

    for (const auto& txout : txCollateral.vout) {
        nValueOut += txout.nValue;

        bool fAllowData = true;
        if(!txout.scriptPubKey.IsPayToPublicKeyHash() && !(fAllowData && txout.scriptPubKey.IsUnspendable())) {
            LogPrintf ("CPrivateSend::IsCollateralValid -- Invalid Script, txCollateral=%s", txCollateral.ToString());
            return false;
        }
    }

    for (const auto& txin : txCollateral.vin) {
        Coin coin;
        if(!GetUTXOCoin(txin.prevout, coin)) {
            LogPrint("privatesend", "CPrivateSend::IsCollateralValid -- Unknown inputs in collateral transaction, txCollateral=%s", txCollateral.ToString());
            return false;
        }
        nValueIn += coin.out.nValue;
    }

    //collateral transactions are required to pay out a small fee to the miners
    if(nValueIn - nValueOut < GetCollateralAmount()) {
        LogPrint("privatesend", "CPrivateSend::IsCollateralValid -- did not include enough fees in transaction: fees: %d, txCollateral=%s", nValueOut - nValueIn, txCollateral.ToString());
        return false;
    }

    LogPrint("privatesend", "CPrivateSend::IsCollateralValid -- %s", txCollateral.ToString());

    {
        LOCK(cs_main);
        CValidationState validationState;
        if(!AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, validationState, MakeTransactionRef(txCollateral), false, NULL, NULL, false, maxTxFee, true)) {
            LogPrint("privatesend", "CPrivateSend::IsCollateralValid -- didn't pass AcceptToMemoryPool()\n");
            return false;
        }
    }

    return true;
}
CMasternode::CollateralStatus CMasternode::CheckCollateral(const COutPoint& outpoint, const CPubKey& pubkey, int& nHeightRet)
{
    AssertLockHeld(cs_main);

    Coin coin;
    if (!GetUTXOCoin(outpoint, coin)) {
        return COLLATERAL_UTXO_NOT_FOUND;
    }

    if (coin.out.nValue != 25000 * COIN) {
        return COLLATERAL_INVALID_AMOUNT;
    }

    if (pubkey == CPubKey() || coin.out.scriptPubKey != GetScriptForDestination(CScriptID(GetScriptForDestination(WitnessV0KeyHash(pubkey.GetID()))))) {
        return COLLATERAL_INVALID_PUBKEY;
    }

    nHeightRet = coin.nHeight;
    return COLLATERAL_OK;
}
Exemplo n.º 4
0
bool CTxLockVote::IsValid(CNode* pnode, CConnman& connman) const
{
    if(!mnodeman.Has(outpointMasternode)) {
        LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockVote::IsValid -- Unknown masternode %s\n", outpointMasternode.ToStringShort());
        mnodeman.AskForMN(pnode, outpointMasternode, connman);
        return false;
    }

    Coin coin;
    if(!GetUTXOCoin(outpoint, coin)) {
        LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockVote::IsValid -- Failed to find UTXO %s\n", outpoint.ToStringShort());
        return false;
    }

    int nLockInputHeight = coin.nHeight + Params().GetConsensus().nInstantSendConfirmationsRequired - 2;

    int nRank;
    if(!mnodeman.GetMasternodeRank(outpointMasternode, nRank, nLockInputHeight, MIN_INSTANTSEND_PROTO_VERSION)) {
        //can be caused by past versions trying to vote with an invalid protocol
        LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockVote::IsValid -- Can't calculate rank for masternode %s\n", outpointMasternode.ToStringShort());
        return false;
    }
    LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockVote::IsValid -- Masternode %s, rank=%d\n", outpointMasternode.ToStringShort(), nRank);

    int nSignaturesTotal = COutPointLock::SIGNATURES_TOTAL;
    if(nRank > nSignaturesTotal) {
        LogPrint("instantsend", "CTxLockVote::IsValid -- Masternode %s is not in the top %d (%d), vote hash=%s\n",
                outpointMasternode.ToStringShort(), nSignaturesTotal, nRank, GetHash().ToString());
        return false;
    }

    if(!CheckSignature()) {
        LogPrintf("CTxLockVote::IsValid -- Signature invalid\n");
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}
Exemplo n.º 5
0
void CDeterministicMN::ToJson(UniValue& obj) const
{
    obj.clear();
    obj.setObject();

    UniValue stateObj;
    pdmnState->ToJson(stateObj);

    obj.push_back(Pair("proTxHash", proTxHash.ToString()));
    obj.push_back(Pair("collateralHash", collateralOutpoint.hash.ToString()));
    obj.push_back(Pair("collateralIndex", (int)collateralOutpoint.n));

    Coin coin;
    if (GetUTXOCoin(collateralOutpoint, coin)) {
        CTxDestination dest;
        if (ExtractDestination(coin.out.scriptPubKey, dest)) {
            obj.push_back(Pair("collateralAddress", CBitcoinAddress(dest).ToString()));
        }
    }

    obj.push_back(Pair("operatorReward", (double)nOperatorReward / 100));
    obj.push_back(Pair("state", stateObj));
}
Exemplo n.º 6
0
bool CInstantSend::ResolveConflicts(const CTxLockCandidate& txLockCandidate)
{
	LOCK2(cs_main, cs_instantsend);

    uint256 txHash = txLockCandidate.GetHash();

    // make sure the lock is ready
    if(!txLockCandidate.IsAllOutPointsReady()) return false;

    AssertLockHeld(mempool.cs); // protect mempool.mapNextTx

    for (const auto& txin : txLockCandidate.txLockRequest.tx->vin) {
        uint256 hashConflicting;
        if(GetLockedOutPointTxHash(txin.prevout, hashConflicting) && txHash != hashConflicting) {
            // completed lock which conflicts with another completed one?
            // this means that majority of MNs in the quorum for this specific tx input are malicious!
            std::map<uint256, CTxLockCandidate>::iterator itLockCandidate = mapTxLockCandidates.find(txHash);
            std::map<uint256, CTxLockCandidate>::iterator itLockCandidateConflicting = mapTxLockCandidates.find(hashConflicting);
            if(itLockCandidate == mapTxLockCandidates.end() || itLockCandidateConflicting == mapTxLockCandidates.end()) {
                // safety check, should never really happen
                LogPrintf("CInstantSend::ResolveConflicts -- ERROR: Found conflicting completed Transaction Lock, but one of txLockCandidate-s is missing, txid=%s, conflicting txid=%s\n",
                        txHash.ToString(), hashConflicting.ToString());
                return false;
            }
            LogPrintf("CInstantSend::ResolveConflicts -- WARNING: Found conflicting completed Transaction Lock, dropping both, txid=%s, conflicting txid=%s\n",
                    txHash.ToString(), hashConflicting.ToString());
            CTxLockRequest txLockRequest = itLockCandidate->second.txLockRequest;
            CTxLockRequest txLockRequestConflicting = itLockCandidateConflicting->second.txLockRequest;
            itLockCandidate->second.SetConfirmedHeight(0); // expired
            itLockCandidateConflicting->second.SetConfirmedHeight(0); // expired
            CheckAndRemove(); // clean up
            // AlreadyHave should still return "true" for both of them
            mapLockRequestRejected.insert(std::make_pair(txHash, txLockRequest));
            mapLockRequestRejected.insert(std::make_pair(hashConflicting, txLockRequestConflicting));

            // TODO: clean up mapLockRequestRejected later somehow
            //       (not a big issue since we already PoSe ban malicious masternodes
            //        and they won't be able to spam)
            // TODO: ban all malicious masternodes permanently, do not accept anything from them, ever

            // TODO: notify zmq+script about this double-spend attempt
            //       and let merchant cancel/hold the order if it's not too late...

            // can't do anything else, fallback to regular txes
            return false;
        } else if (mempool.mapNextTx.count(txin.prevout)) {
            // check if it's in mempool
            hashConflicting = mempool.mapNextTx.find(txin.prevout)->second->GetHash();
            if(txHash == hashConflicting) continue; // matches current, not a conflict, skip to next txin
            // conflicts with tx in mempool
            LogPrintf("CInstantSend::ResolveConflicts -- ERROR: Failed to complete Transaction Lock, conflicts with mempool, txid=%s\n", txHash.ToString());
            return false;
        }
    } // FOREACH
    // No conflicts were found so far, check to see if it was already included in block
    CTransactionRef txTmp;
    uint256 hashBlock;
    if(GetTransaction(txHash, txTmp, Params().GetConsensus(), hashBlock, true) && hashBlock != uint256()) {
        LogPrint("instantsend", "CInstantSend::ResolveConflicts -- Done, %s is included in block %s\n", txHash.ToString(), hashBlock.ToString());
        return true;
    }
    // Not in block yet, make sure all its inputs are still unspent
    for (const auto& txin : txLockCandidate.txLockRequest.tx->vin) {
        Coin coin;
        if(!GetUTXOCoin(txin.prevout, coin)) {
            // Not in UTXO anymore? A conflicting tx was mined while we were waiting for votes.
            LogPrintf("CInstantSend::ResolveConflicts -- ERROR: Failed to find UTXO %s, can't complete Transaction Lock\n", txin.prevout.ToStringShort());
            return false;
        }
    }
    LogPrint("instantsend", "CInstantSend::ResolveConflicts -- Done, txid=%s\n", txHash.ToString());

    return true;
}
Exemplo n.º 7
0
bool CheckProRegTx(const CTransaction& tx, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev, CValidationState& state)
{
    if (tx.nType != TRANSACTION_PROVIDER_REGISTER) {
        return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-type");
    }

    CProRegTx ptx;
    if (!GetTxPayload(tx, ptx)) {
        return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-payload");
    }

    if (ptx.nVersion == 0 || ptx.nVersion > CProRegTx::CURRENT_VERSION) {
        return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-version");
    }
    if (ptx.nType != 0) {
        return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-type");
    }
    if (ptx.nMode != 0) {
        return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-mode");
    }

    if (ptx.keyIDOwner.IsNull() || !ptx.pubKeyOperator.IsValid() || ptx.keyIDVoting.IsNull()) {
        return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-key-null");
    }
    if (!ptx.scriptPayout.IsPayToPublicKeyHash() && !ptx.scriptPayout.IsPayToScriptHash()) {
        return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-payee");
    }

    CTxDestination payoutDest;
    if (!ExtractDestination(ptx.scriptPayout, payoutDest)) {
        // should not happen as we checked script types before
        return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-payee-dest");
    }
    // don't allow reuse of payout key for other keys (don't allow people to put the payee key onto an online server)
    if (payoutDest == CTxDestination(ptx.keyIDOwner) || payoutDest == CTxDestination(ptx.keyIDVoting)) {
        return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-payee-reuse");
    }

    // It's allowed to set addr to 0, which will put the MN into PoSe-banned state and require a ProUpServTx to be issues later
    // If any of both is set, it must be valid however
    if (ptx.addr != CService() && !CheckService(tx.GetHash(), ptx, state)) {
        return false;
    }

    if (ptx.nOperatorReward > 10000) {
        return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-operator-reward");
    }

    CTxDestination collateralTxDest;
    CKeyID keyForPayloadSig;
    COutPoint collateralOutpoint;

    if (!ptx.collateralOutpoint.hash.IsNull()) {
        Coin coin;
        if (!GetUTXOCoin(ptx.collateralOutpoint, coin) || coin.out.nValue != 1000 * COIN) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral");
        }

        if (!ExtractDestination(coin.out.scriptPubKey, collateralTxDest)) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral-dest");
        }

        // Extract key from collateral. This only works for P2PK and P2PKH collaterals and will fail for P2SH.
        // Issuer of this ProRegTx must prove ownership with this key by signing the ProRegTx
        if (!CBitcoinAddress(collateralTxDest).GetKeyID(keyForPayloadSig)) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral-pkh");
        }

        collateralOutpoint = ptx.collateralOutpoint;
    } else {
        if (ptx.collateralOutpoint.n >= tx.vout.size()) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral-index");
        }
        if (tx.vout[ptx.collateralOutpoint.n].nValue != 1000 * COIN) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral");
        }

        if (!ExtractDestination(tx.vout[ptx.collateralOutpoint.n].scriptPubKey, collateralTxDest)) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral-dest");
        }

        collateralOutpoint = COutPoint(tx.GetHash(), ptx.collateralOutpoint.n);
    }

    // don't allow reuse of collateral key for other keys (don't allow people to put the collateral key onto an online server)
    // this check applies to internal and external collateral, but internal collaterals are not necessarely a P2PKH
    if (collateralTxDest == CTxDestination(ptx.keyIDOwner) || collateralTxDest == CTxDestination(ptx.keyIDVoting)) {
        return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral-reuse");
    }

    if (pindexPrev) {
        auto mnList = deterministicMNManager->GetListForBlock(pindexPrev->GetBlockHash());

        // only allow reusing of addresses when it's for the same collateral (which replaces the old MN)
        if (mnList.HasUniqueProperty(ptx.addr) && mnList.GetUniquePropertyMN(ptx.addr)->collateralOutpoint != collateralOutpoint) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "bad-protx-dup-addr");
        }

        // never allow duplicate keys, even if this ProTx would replace an existing MN
        if (mnList.HasUniqueProperty(ptx.keyIDOwner) || mnList.HasUniqueProperty(ptx.pubKeyOperator)) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "bad-protx-dup-key");
        }

        if (!deterministicMNManager->IsDIP3Enforced(pindexPrev->nHeight)) {
            if (ptx.keyIDOwner != ptx.keyIDVoting) {
                return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-key-not-same");
            }
        }
    }

    if (!CheckInputsHash(tx, ptx, state)) {
        return false;
    }

    if (!keyForPayloadSig.IsNull()) {
        // collateral is not part of this ProRegTx, so we must verify ownership of the collateral
        if (!CheckStringSig(ptx, keyForPayloadSig, state)) {
            return false;
        }
    } else {
        // collateral is part of this ProRegTx, so we know the collateral is owned by the issuer
        if (!ptx.vchSig.empty()) {
            return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-sig");
        }
    }

    return true;
}
Exemplo n.º 8
0
bool CheckProUpRegTx(const CTransaction& tx, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev, CValidationState& state)
{
    if (tx.nType != TRANSACTION_PROVIDER_UPDATE_REGISTRAR) {
        return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-type");
    }

    CProUpRegTx ptx;
    if (!GetTxPayload(tx, ptx)) {
        return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-payload");
    }

    if (ptx.nVersion == 0 || ptx.nVersion > CProRegTx::CURRENT_VERSION) {
        return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-version");
    }
    if (ptx.nMode != 0) {
        return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-mode");
    }

    if (!ptx.pubKeyOperator.IsValid() || ptx.keyIDVoting.IsNull()) {
        return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-key-null");
    }
    if (!ptx.scriptPayout.IsPayToPublicKeyHash() && !ptx.scriptPayout.IsPayToScriptHash()) {
        return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-payee");
    }

    CTxDestination payoutDest;
    if (!ExtractDestination(ptx.scriptPayout, payoutDest)) {
        // should not happen as we checked script types before
        return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-payee-dest");
    }

    if (pindexPrev) {
        auto mnList = deterministicMNManager->GetListForBlock(pindexPrev->GetBlockHash());
        auto dmn = mnList.GetMN(ptx.proTxHash);
        if (!dmn) {
            return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-hash");
        }

        // don't allow reuse of payee key for other keys (don't allow people to put the payee key onto an online server)
        if (payoutDest == CTxDestination(dmn->pdmnState->keyIDOwner) || payoutDest == CTxDestination(ptx.keyIDVoting)) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-payee-reuse");
        }

        Coin coin;
        if (!GetUTXOCoin(dmn->collateralOutpoint, coin)) {
            // this should never happen (there would be no dmn otherwise)
            return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral");
        }

        // don't allow reuse of collateral key for other keys (don't allow people to put the collateral key onto an online server)
        CTxDestination collateralTxDest;
        if (!ExtractDestination(coin.out.scriptPubKey, collateralTxDest)) {
            return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral-dest");
        }
        if (collateralTxDest == CTxDestination(dmn->pdmnState->keyIDOwner) || collateralTxDest == CTxDestination(ptx.keyIDVoting)) {
            return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral-reuse");
        }

        if (mnList.HasUniqueProperty(ptx.pubKeyOperator)) {
            auto otherDmn = mnList.GetUniquePropertyMN(ptx.pubKeyOperator);
            if (ptx.proTxHash != otherDmn->proTxHash) {
                return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "bad-protx-dup-key");
            }
        }

        if (!deterministicMNManager->IsDIP3Enforced(pindexPrev->nHeight)) {
            if (dmn->pdmnState->keyIDOwner != ptx.keyIDVoting) {
                return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-key-not-same");
            }
        }

        if (!CheckInputsHash(tx, ptx, state)) {
            return false;
        }
        if (!CheckHashSig(ptx, dmn->pdmnState->keyIDOwner, state)) {
            return false;
        }
    }

    return true;
}
Exemplo n.º 9
0
bool CDeterministicMNManager::BuildNewListFromBlock(const CBlock& block, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev, CValidationState& _state, CDeterministicMNList& mnListRet, bool debugLogs)
{
    AssertLockHeld(cs);

    int nHeight = pindexPrev->nHeight + 1;

    CDeterministicMNList oldList = GetListForBlock(pindexPrev->GetBlockHash());
    CDeterministicMNList newList = oldList;
    newList.SetBlockHash(uint256()); // we can't know the final block hash, so better not return a (invalid) block hash
    newList.SetHeight(nHeight);

    auto payee = oldList.GetMNPayee();

    // we iterate the oldList here and update the newList
    // this is only valid as long these have not diverged at this point, which is the case as long as we don't add
    // code above this loop that modifies newList
    oldList.ForEachMN(false, [&](const CDeterministicMNCPtr& dmn) {
        if (!dmn->pdmnState->confirmedHash.IsNull()) {
            // already confirmed
            return;
        }
        // this works on the previous block, so confirmation will happen one block after nMasternodeMinimumConfirmations
        // has been reached, but the block hash will then point to the block at nMasternodeMinimumConfirmations
        int nConfirmations = pindexPrev->nHeight - dmn->pdmnState->nRegisteredHeight;
        if (nConfirmations >= Params().GetConsensus().nMasternodeMinimumConfirmations) {
            CDeterministicMNState newState = *dmn->pdmnState;
            newState.UpdateConfirmedHash(dmn->proTxHash, pindexPrev->GetBlockHash());
            newList.UpdateMN(dmn->proTxHash, std::make_shared<CDeterministicMNState>(newState));
        }
    });

    DecreasePoSePenalties(newList);

    // we skip the coinbase
    for (int i = 1; i < (int)block.vtx.size(); i++) {
        const CTransaction& tx = *block.vtx[i];

        if (tx.nVersion != 3) {
            // only interested in special TXs
            continue;
        }

        if (tx.nType == TRANSACTION_PROVIDER_REGISTER) {
            CProRegTx proTx;
            if (!GetTxPayload(tx, proTx)) {
                assert(false); // this should have been handled already
            }

            auto dmn = std::make_shared<CDeterministicMN>();
            dmn->proTxHash = tx.GetHash();

            // collateralOutpoint is either pointing to an external collateral or to the ProRegTx itself
            if (proTx.collateralOutpoint.hash.IsNull()) {
                dmn->collateralOutpoint = COutPoint(tx.GetHash(), proTx.collateralOutpoint.n);
            } else {
                dmn->collateralOutpoint = proTx.collateralOutpoint;
            }

            Coin coin;
            if (!proTx.collateralOutpoint.hash.IsNull() && (!GetUTXOCoin(dmn->collateralOutpoint, coin) || coin.out.nValue != 1000 * COIN)) {
                // should actually never get to this point as CheckProRegTx should have handled this case.
                // We do this additional check nevertheless to be 100% sure
                return _state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-collateral");
            }

            auto replacedDmn = newList.GetMNByCollateral(dmn->collateralOutpoint);
            if (replacedDmn != nullptr) {
                // This might only happen with a ProRegTx that refers an external collateral
                // In that case the new ProRegTx will replace the old one. This means the old one is removed
                // and the new one is added like a completely fresh one, which is also at the bottom of the payment list
                newList.RemoveMN(replacedDmn->proTxHash);
                if (debugLogs) {
                    LogPrintf("CDeterministicMNManager::%s -- MN %s removed from list because collateral was used for a new ProRegTx. collateralOutpoint=%s, nHeight=%d, mapCurMNs.allMNsCount=%d\n",
                              __func__, replacedDmn->proTxHash.ToString(), dmn->collateralOutpoint.ToStringShort(), nHeight, newList.GetAllMNsCount());
                }
            }

            if (newList.HasUniqueProperty(proTx.addr)) {
                return _state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_CONFLICT, "bad-protx-dup-addr");
            }
            if (newList.HasUniqueProperty(proTx.keyIDOwner) || newList.HasUniqueProperty(proTx.pubKeyOperator)) {
                return _state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_CONFLICT, "bad-protx-dup-key");
            }

            dmn->nOperatorReward = proTx.nOperatorReward;
            dmn->pdmnState = std::make_shared<CDeterministicMNState>(proTx);

            CDeterministicMNState dmnState = *dmn->pdmnState;
            dmnState.nRegisteredHeight = nHeight;

            if (proTx.addr == CService()) {
                // start in banned pdmnState as we need to wait for a ProUpServTx
                dmnState.nPoSeBanHeight = nHeight;
            }

            dmn->pdmnState = std::make_shared<CDeterministicMNState>(dmnState);

            newList.AddMN(dmn);

            if (debugLogs) {
                LogPrintf("CDeterministicMNManager::%s -- MN %s added at height %d: %s\n",
                    __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), nHeight, proTx.ToString());
            }
        } else if (tx.nType == TRANSACTION_PROVIDER_UPDATE_SERVICE) {
            CProUpServTx proTx;
            if (!GetTxPayload(tx, proTx)) {
                assert(false); // this should have been handled already
            }

            if (newList.HasUniqueProperty(proTx.addr) && newList.GetUniquePropertyMN(proTx.addr)->proTxHash != proTx.proTxHash) {
                return _state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_CONFLICT, "bad-protx-dup-addr");
            }

            CDeterministicMNCPtr dmn = newList.GetMN(proTx.proTxHash);
            if (!dmn) {
                return _state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-hash");
            }
            auto newState = std::make_shared<CDeterministicMNState>(*dmn->pdmnState);
            newState->addr = proTx.addr;
            newState->scriptOperatorPayout = proTx.scriptOperatorPayout;

            if (newState->nPoSeBanHeight != -1) {
                // only revive when all keys are set
                if (newState->pubKeyOperator.IsValid() && !newState->keyIDVoting.IsNull() && !newState->keyIDOwner.IsNull()) {
                    newState->nPoSePenalty = 0;
                    newState->nPoSeBanHeight = -1;
                    newState->nPoSeRevivedHeight = nHeight;

                    if (debugLogs) {
                        LogPrintf("CDeterministicMNManager::%s -- MN %s revived at height %d\n",
                            __func__, proTx.proTxHash.ToString(), nHeight);
                    }
                }
            }

            newList.UpdateMN(proTx.proTxHash, newState);
            if (debugLogs) {
                LogPrintf("CDeterministicMNManager::%s -- MN %s updated at height %d: %s\n",
                    __func__, proTx.proTxHash.ToString(), nHeight, proTx.ToString());
            }
        } else if (tx.nType == TRANSACTION_PROVIDER_UPDATE_REGISTRAR) {
            CProUpRegTx proTx;
            if (!GetTxPayload(tx, proTx)) {
                assert(false); // this should have been handled already
            }

            CDeterministicMNCPtr dmn = newList.GetMN(proTx.proTxHash);
            if (!dmn) {
                return _state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-hash");
            }
            auto newState = std::make_shared<CDeterministicMNState>(*dmn->pdmnState);
            if (newState->pubKeyOperator != proTx.pubKeyOperator) {
                // reset all operator related fields and put MN into PoSe-banned state in case the operator key changes
                newState->ResetOperatorFields();
                newState->BanIfNotBanned(nHeight);
            }
            newState->pubKeyOperator = proTx.pubKeyOperator;
            newState->keyIDVoting = proTx.keyIDVoting;
            newState->scriptPayout = proTx.scriptPayout;

            newList.UpdateMN(proTx.proTxHash, newState);

            if (debugLogs) {
                LogPrintf("CDeterministicMNManager::%s -- MN %s updated at height %d: %s\n",
                    __func__, proTx.proTxHash.ToString(), nHeight, proTx.ToString());
            }
        } else if (tx.nType == TRANSACTION_PROVIDER_UPDATE_REVOKE) {
            CProUpRevTx proTx;
            if (!GetTxPayload(tx, proTx)) {
                assert(false); // this should have been handled already
            }

            CDeterministicMNCPtr dmn = newList.GetMN(proTx.proTxHash);
            if (!dmn) {
                return _state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-protx-hash");
            }
            auto newState = std::make_shared<CDeterministicMNState>(*dmn->pdmnState);
            newState->ResetOperatorFields();
            newState->BanIfNotBanned(nHeight);
            newState->nRevocationReason = proTx.nReason;

            newList.UpdateMN(proTx.proTxHash, newState);

            if (debugLogs) {
                LogPrintf("CDeterministicMNManager::%s -- MN %s revoked operator key at height %d: %s\n",
                    __func__, proTx.proTxHash.ToString(), nHeight, proTx.ToString());
            }
        } else if (tx.nType == TRANSACTION_QUORUM_COMMITMENT) {
            llmq::CFinalCommitmentTxPayload qc;
            if (!GetTxPayload(tx, qc)) {
                assert(false); // this should have been handled already
            }
            if (!qc.commitment.IsNull()) {
                HandleQuorumCommitment(qc.commitment, newList, debugLogs);
            }
        }
    }

    // we skip the coinbase
    for (int i = 1; i < (int)block.vtx.size(); i++) {
        const CTransaction& tx = *block.vtx[i];

        // check if any existing MN collateral is spent by this transaction
        for (const auto& in : tx.vin) {
            auto dmn = newList.GetMNByCollateral(in.prevout);
            if (dmn && dmn->collateralOutpoint == in.prevout) {
                newList.RemoveMN(dmn->proTxHash);

                if (debugLogs) {
                    LogPrintf("CDeterministicMNManager::%s -- MN %s removed from list because collateral was spent. collateralOutpoint=%s, nHeight=%d, mapCurMNs.allMNsCount=%d\n",
                              __func__, dmn->proTxHash.ToString(), dmn->collateralOutpoint.ToStringShort(), nHeight, newList.GetAllMNsCount());
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // The payee for the current block was determined by the previous block's list but it might have disappeared in the
    // current block. We still pay that MN one last time however.
    if (payee && newList.HasMN(payee->proTxHash)) {
        auto newState = std::make_shared<CDeterministicMNState>(*newList.GetMN(payee->proTxHash)->pdmnState);
        newState->nLastPaidHeight = nHeight;
        newList.UpdateMN(payee->proTxHash, newState);
    }

    mnListRet = std::move(newList);

    return true;
}
void CMasternode::Check(bool fForce)
{
    AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
    LOCK(cs);

    if (ShutdownRequested()) return;

    if (!fForce && (GetTime() - nTimeLastChecked < MASTERNODE_CHECK_SECONDS)) return;
    nTimeLastChecked = GetTime();

    LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is in %s state\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetStateString());

    //once spent, stop doing the checks
    if (IsOutpointSpent()) return;

    int nHeight = 0;
    if (!fUnitTest) {
        Coin coin;
        if (!GetUTXOCoin(outpoint, coin)) {
            nActiveState = MASTERNODE_OUTPOINT_SPENT;
            LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Failed to find Masternode UTXO, masternode=%s\n", outpoint.ToStringShort());
            return;
        }

        nHeight = chainActive.Height();
    }

    if (IsPoSeBanned()) {
        if (nHeight < nPoSeBanHeight) return; // too early?
        // Otherwise give it a chance to proceed further to do all the usual checks and to change its state.
        // Masternode still will be on the edge and can be banned back easily if it keeps ignoring mnverify
        // or connect attempts. Will require few mnverify messages to strengthen its position in mn list.
        LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is unbanned and back in list now\n", outpoint.ToStringShort());
        DecreasePoSeBanScore();
    } else if (nPoSeBanScore >= MASTERNODE_POSE_BAN_MAX_SCORE) {
        nActiveState = MASTERNODE_POSE_BAN;
        // ban for the whole payment cycle
        nPoSeBanHeight = nHeight + mnodeman.size();
        LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is banned till block %d now\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), nPoSeBanHeight);
        return;
    }

    int nActiveStatePrev = nActiveState;
    bool fOurMasternode = fMasternodeMode && activeMasternode.pubKeyMasternode == pubKeyMasternode;

    // masternode doesn't meet payment protocol requirements ...
    bool fRequireUpdate = nProtocolVersion < mnpayments.GetMinMasternodePaymentsProto() ||
                          // or it's our own node and we just updated it to the new protocol but we are still waiting for activation ...
                          (fOurMasternode && nProtocolVersion < PROTOCOL_VERSION);

    if (fRequireUpdate) {
        nActiveState = MASTERNODE_UPDATE_REQUIRED;
        if (nActiveStatePrev != nActiveState) {
            LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is in %s state now\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetStateString());
        }
        return;
    }

    // keep old masternodes on start, give them a chance to receive updates...
    bool fWaitForPing = !masternodeSync.IsMasternodeListSynced() && !IsPingedWithin(MASTERNODE_MIN_MNP_SECONDS);

    if (fWaitForPing && !fOurMasternode) {
        // ...but if it was already expired before the initial check - return right away
        if (IsExpired() || IsSentinelPingExpired() || IsNewStartRequired()) {
            LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is in %s state, waiting for ping\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetStateString());
            return;
        }
    }

    // don't expire if we are still in "waiting for ping" mode unless it's our own masternode
    if (!fWaitForPing || fOurMasternode) {
        if (!IsPingedWithin(MASTERNODE_NEW_START_REQUIRED_SECONDS)) {
            nActiveState = MASTERNODE_NEW_START_REQUIRED;
            if (nActiveStatePrev != nActiveState) {
                LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is in %s state now\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetStateString());
            }
            return;
        }

        if (!IsPingedWithin(MASTERNODE_EXPIRATION_SECONDS)) {
            nActiveState = MASTERNODE_EXPIRED;
            if (nActiveStatePrev != nActiveState) {
                LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is in %s state now\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetStateString());
            }
            return;
        }

        // part 1: expire based on machinecoind ping
        bool fSentinelPingActive = masternodeSync.IsSynced() && mnodeman.IsSentinelPingActive();
        bool fSentinelPingExpired = fSentinelPingActive && !IsPingedWithin(MASTERNODE_SENTINEL_PING_MAX_SECONDS);
        LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- outpoint=%s, GetAdjustedTime()=%d, fSentinelPingExpired=%d\n",
            outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetAdjustedTime(), fSentinelPingExpired);

        if (fSentinelPingExpired) {
            nActiveState = MASTERNODE_SENTINEL_PING_EXPIRED;
            if (nActiveStatePrev != nActiveState) {
                LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is in %s state now\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetStateString());
            }
            return;
        }
    }

    // We require MNs to be in PRE_ENABLED until they either start to expire or receive a ping and go into ENABLED state
    // Works on mainnet/testnet only and not the case on regtest.
    if (Params().NetworkIDString() != CBaseChainParams::REGTEST) {
        if (lastPing.sigTime - sigTime < MASTERNODE_MIN_MNP_SECONDS) {
            nActiveState = MASTERNODE_PRE_ENABLED;
            if (nActiveStatePrev != nActiveState) {
                LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is in %s state now\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetStateString());
            }
            return;
        }
    }

    if (!fWaitForPing || fOurMasternode) {
        // part 2: expire based on sentinel info
        bool fSentinelPingActive = masternodeSync.IsSynced() && mnodeman.IsSentinelPingActive();
        bool fSentinelPingExpired = fSentinelPingActive && !lastPing.fSentinelIsCurrent;

        LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- outpoint=%s, GetAdjustedTime()=%d, fSentinelPingExpired=%d\n",
            outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetAdjustedTime(), fSentinelPingExpired);

        if (fSentinelPingExpired) {
            nActiveState = MASTERNODE_SENTINEL_PING_EXPIRED;
            if (nActiveStatePrev != nActiveState) {
                LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is in %s state now\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetStateString());
            }
            return;
        }
    }

    nActiveState = MASTERNODE_ENABLED; // OK
    if (nActiveStatePrev != nActiveState) {
        LogPrint(MCLog::MN, "CMasternode::Check -- Masternode %s is in %s state now\n", outpoint.ToStringShort(), GetStateString());
    }
}