static void pbkdf2_hash(const char *username, size_t username_len, const char *password, size_t password_len, int iterations, unsigned char hash[KDF_HASH_LEN])
{
if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, password_len, (const unsigned char *)username, username_len, iterations, EVP_sha256(), KDF_HASH_LEN, hash))
die("Failed to compute PBKDF2 for %s", username);
}
static int openssl_pbkdf_sha1(unsigned rounds, const void *in, size_t ilen,
const void *salt, size_t slen, void *out, size_t olen)
{
return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(in, ilen, salt, slen, rounds, EVP_sha1(), olen, out) != 1;
}
int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
int rv = 0;
unsigned char *B;
uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
size_t allocsize;
const EVP_MD *md;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
md = EVP_sha256();
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SM3)
md = EVP_sm3();
#else
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT, EVP_R_NO_AVAIABLE_DIGEST);
return 0;
#endif
/* Sanity check parameters */
/* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
return 0;
/* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r)
return 0;
/*
* Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
* automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
*/
if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r)))
return 0;
}
/* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
/*
* B size in section 5 step 1.S
* Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
* p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
*/
Blen = p * 128 * r;
/*
* Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in
* uint64_t and also size_t (their sizes are unrelated).
* This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
*/
i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (N + 2 > i / r)
return 0;
Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
/* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen)
return 0;
/* check total allocated size fits in size_t */
if (Blen > SIZE_MAX - Vlen)
return 0;
allocsize = (size_t)(Blen + Vlen);
if (maxmem == 0)
maxmem = SCRYPT_MAX_MEM;
if (allocsize > maxmem) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
/* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
if (key == NULL)
return 1;
B = OPENSSL_malloc(allocsize);
if (B == NULL)
return 0;
X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
T = X + 32 * r;
V = T + 32 * r;
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, md,
Blen, B) == 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, Blen, 1, md,
keylen, key) == 0)
goto err;
rv = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(B, allocsize);
return rv;
}
int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
int rv = 0;
unsigned char *B;
uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
/* Sanity check parameters */
/* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
return 0;
/* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r)
return 0;
/*
* Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
* automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
*/
if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
if (N >= (1UL << (16 * r)))
return 0;
}
/* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
/*
* B size in section 5 step 1.S
* Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
* p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
*/
Blen = p * 128 * r;
/*
* Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t.
* This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
*/
i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (N + 2 > i / r)
return 0;
Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
/* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen)
return 0;
if (maxmem == 0)
maxmem = SCRYPT_MAX_MEM;
if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
/* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
if (key == NULL)
return 1;
B = OPENSSL_malloc(Blen + Vlen);
if (B == 0)
return 0;
X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
T = X + 32 * r;
V = T + 32 * r;
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
Blen, B) == 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
keylen, key) == 0)
goto err;
rv = 1;
#ifdef SCRYPT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "scrypt parameters:\n");
fprintf(stderr, "N=%lu, p=%lu, r=%lu\n", N, p, r);
fprintf(stderr, "Salt:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)salt, saltlen);
fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)pass, passlen);
fprintf(stderr, "Key:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)key, keylen);
#endif
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(B, Blen + Vlen);
return rv;
}
static int pbkdf2_check(
const struct berval *scheme,
const struct berval *passwd,
const struct berval *cred,
const char **text)
{
int rc;
int iteration;
/* salt_value require PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE + 1 in lutil_b64_pton. */
unsigned char salt_value[PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE + 1];
char salt_b64[LUTIL_BASE64_ENCODE_LEN(PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE) + 1];
/* dk_value require PBKDF2_MAX_DK_SIZE + 1 in lutil_b64_pton. */
unsigned char dk_value[PBKDF2_MAX_DK_SIZE + 1];
char dk_b64[LUTIL_BASE64_ENCODE_LEN(PBKDF2_MAX_DK_SIZE) + 1];
unsigned char input_dk_value[PBKDF2_MAX_DK_SIZE];
size_t dk_len;
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
const EVP_MD *md;
#elif HAVE_GNUTLS
struct hmac_sha1_ctx sha1_ctx;
struct hmac_sha256_ctx sha256_ctx;
struct hmac_sha512_ctx sha512_ctx;
void * current_ctx = NULL;
pbkdf2_hmac_update current_hmac_update = NULL;
pbkdf2_hmac_digest current_hmac_digest = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef SLAPD_PBKDF2_DEBUG
printf("Checking for %s\n", scheme->bv_val);
printf(" Stored Value:\t%s\n", passwd->bv_val);
printf(" Input Cred:\t%s\n", cred->bv_val);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_scheme)){
dk_len = PBKDF2_SHA1_DK_SIZE;
md = EVP_sha1();
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha1_scheme)){
dk_len = PBKDF2_SHA1_DK_SIZE;
md = EVP_sha1();
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha256_scheme)){
dk_len = PBKDF2_SHA256_DK_SIZE;
md = EVP_sha256();
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha512_scheme)){
dk_len = PBKDF2_SHA512_DK_SIZE;
md = EVP_sha512();
}else{
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
#elif HAVE_GNUTLS
if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_scheme)){
dk_len = PBKDF2_SHA1_DK_SIZE;
current_ctx = &sha1_ctx;
current_hmac_update = (pbkdf2_hmac_update) &hmac_sha1_update;
current_hmac_digest = (pbkdf2_hmac_digest) &hmac_sha1_digest;
hmac_sha1_set_key(current_ctx, cred->bv_len, (const uint8_t *) cred->bv_val);
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha1_scheme)){
dk_len = PBKDF2_SHA1_DK_SIZE;
current_ctx = &sha1_ctx;
current_hmac_update = (pbkdf2_hmac_update) &hmac_sha1_update;
current_hmac_digest = (pbkdf2_hmac_digest) &hmac_sha1_digest;
hmac_sha1_set_key(current_ctx, cred->bv_len, (const uint8_t *) cred->bv_val);
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha256_scheme)){
dk_len = PBKDF2_SHA256_DK_SIZE;
current_ctx = &sha256_ctx;
current_hmac_update = (pbkdf2_hmac_update) &hmac_sha256_update;
current_hmac_digest = (pbkdf2_hmac_digest) &hmac_sha256_digest;
hmac_sha256_set_key(current_ctx, cred->bv_len, (const uint8_t *) cred->bv_val);
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha512_scheme)){
dk_len = PBKDF2_SHA512_DK_SIZE;
current_ctx = &sha512_ctx;
current_hmac_update = (pbkdf2_hmac_update) &hmac_sha512_update;
current_hmac_digest = (pbkdf2_hmac_digest) &hmac_sha512_digest;
hmac_sha512_set_key(current_ctx, cred->bv_len, (const uint8_t *) cred->bv_val);
}else{
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
#endif
iteration = atoi(passwd->bv_val);
if(iteration < 1){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
char *ptr;
ptr = strchr(passwd->bv_val, '$');
if(!ptr){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
ptr++; /* skip '$' */
rc = ab64_to_b64(ptr, salt_b64, sizeof(salt_b64));
if(rc < 0){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
ptr = strchr(ptr, '$');
if(!ptr){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
ptr++; /* skip '$' */
rc = ab64_to_b64(ptr, dk_b64, sizeof(dk_b64));
if(rc < 0){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
/* The targetsize require PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE + 1 in lutil_b64_pton. */
rc = lutil_b64_pton(salt_b64, salt_value, PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE + 1);
if(rc < 0){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
/* consistency check */
if(rc != PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
/* The targetsize require PBKDF2_MAX_DK_SIZE + 1 in lutil_b64_pton. */
rc = lutil_b64_pton(dk_b64, dk_value, sizeof(dk_value));
if(rc < 0){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
/* consistency check */
if(rc != dk_len){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
if(!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(cred->bv_val, cred->bv_len,
salt_value, PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE,
iteration, md, dk_len, input_dk_value)){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
#elif HAVE_GNUTLS
PBKDF2(current_ctx, current_hmac_update, current_hmac_digest,
dk_len, iteration,
PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE, salt_value,
dk_len, input_dk_value);
#endif
rc = memcmp(dk_value, input_dk_value, dk_len);
#ifdef SLAPD_PBKDF2_DEBUG
printf(" Iteration:\t%d\n", iteration);
printf(" Base64 Salt:\t%s\n", salt_b64);
printf(" Base64 DK:\t%s\n", dk_b64);
int i;
printf(" Stored Salt:\t");
for(i=0; i<PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE; i++){
printf("%02x", salt_value[i]);
}
printf("\n");
printf(" Stored DK:\t");
for(i=0; i<dk_len; i++){
printf("%02x", dk_value[i]);
}
printf("\n");
printf(" Input DK:\t");
for(i=0; i<dk_len; i++){
printf("%02x", input_dk_value[i]);
}
printf("\n");
printf(" Result:\t%d\n", rc);
#endif
return rc?LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR:LUTIL_PASSWD_OK;
}
int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass,
int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param,
const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
{
unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
int saltlen, iter;
int rv = 0;
unsigned int keylen = 0;
int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid;
PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
const EVP_MD *prfmd;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET);
goto err;
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof(key));
/* Decode parameter */
kdf = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM), param);
if (kdf == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
/* Now check the parameters of the kdf */
if (kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (kdf->prf)
prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm);
else
prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, 0)) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
goto err;
}
prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid);
if (prfmd == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF);
goto err;
}
if (kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* it seems that its all OK */
salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data;
saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length;
iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter);
if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
keylen, key))
goto err;
rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de);
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
return rv;
}
static int pbkdf2_encrypt(
const struct berval *scheme,
const struct berval *passwd,
struct berval *msg,
const char **text)
{
unsigned char salt_value[PBKDF2_SALT_SIZE];
struct berval salt;
unsigned char dk_value[PBKDF2_MAX_DK_SIZE];
struct berval dk;
int iteration = PBKDF2_ITERATION;
int rc;
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
const EVP_MD *md;
#elif HAVE_GNUTLS
struct hmac_sha1_ctx sha1_ctx;
struct hmac_sha256_ctx sha256_ctx;
struct hmac_sha512_ctx sha512_ctx;
void * current_ctx = NULL;
pbkdf2_hmac_update current_hmac_update = NULL;
pbkdf2_hmac_digest current_hmac_digest = NULL;
#endif
salt.bv_val = (char *)salt_value;
salt.bv_len = sizeof(salt_value);
dk.bv_val = (char *)dk_value;
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_scheme)){
dk.bv_len = PBKDF2_SHA1_DK_SIZE;
md = EVP_sha1();
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha1_scheme)){
dk.bv_len = PBKDF2_SHA1_DK_SIZE;
md = EVP_sha1();
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha256_scheme)){
dk.bv_len = PBKDF2_SHA256_DK_SIZE;
md = EVP_sha256();
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha512_scheme)){
dk.bv_len = PBKDF2_SHA512_DK_SIZE;
md = EVP_sha512();
}else{
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
#elif HAVE_GNUTLS
if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_scheme)){
dk.bv_len = PBKDF2_SHA1_DK_SIZE;
current_ctx = &sha1_ctx;
current_hmac_update = (pbkdf2_hmac_update) &hmac_sha1_update;
current_hmac_digest = (pbkdf2_hmac_digest) &hmac_sha1_digest;
hmac_sha1_set_key(current_ctx, passwd->bv_len, (const uint8_t *) passwd->bv_val);
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha1_scheme)){
dk.bv_len = PBKDF2_SHA1_DK_SIZE;
current_ctx = &sha1_ctx;
current_hmac_update = (pbkdf2_hmac_update) &hmac_sha1_update;
current_hmac_digest = (pbkdf2_hmac_digest) &hmac_sha1_digest;
hmac_sha1_set_key(current_ctx, passwd->bv_len, (const uint8_t *) passwd->bv_val);
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha256_scheme)){
dk.bv_len = PBKDF2_SHA256_DK_SIZE;
current_ctx = &sha256_ctx;
current_hmac_update = (pbkdf2_hmac_update) &hmac_sha256_update;
current_hmac_digest = (pbkdf2_hmac_digest) &hmac_sha256_digest;
hmac_sha256_set_key(current_ctx, passwd->bv_len, (const uint8_t *) passwd->bv_val);
}else if(!ber_bvcmp(scheme, &pbkdf2_sha512_scheme)){
dk.bv_len = PBKDF2_SHA512_DK_SIZE;
current_ctx = &sha512_ctx;
current_hmac_update = (pbkdf2_hmac_update) &hmac_sha512_update;
current_hmac_digest = (pbkdf2_hmac_digest) &hmac_sha512_digest;
hmac_sha512_set_key(current_ctx, passwd->bv_len, (const uint8_t *) passwd->bv_val);
}else{
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
#endif
if(lutil_entropy((unsigned char *)salt.bv_val, salt.bv_len) < 0){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
if(!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(passwd->bv_val, passwd->bv_len,
(unsigned char *)salt.bv_val, salt.bv_len,
iteration, md, dk.bv_len, dk_value)){
return LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
}
#elif HAVE_GNUTLS
PBKDF2(current_ctx, current_hmac_update, current_hmac_digest,
dk.bv_len, iteration,
salt.bv_len, (const uint8_t *) salt.bv_val,
dk.bv_len, dk_value);
#endif
#ifdef SLAPD_PBKDF2_DEBUG
printf("Encrypt for %s\n", scheme->bv_val);
printf(" Password:\t%s\n", passwd->bv_val);
printf(" Salt:\t\t");
int i;
for(i=0; i<salt.bv_len; i++){
printf("%02x", salt_value[i]);
}
printf("\n");
printf(" Iteration:\t%d\n", iteration);
printf(" DK:\t\t");
for(i=0; i<dk.bv_len; i++){
printf("%02x", dk_value[i]);
}
printf("\n");
#endif
rc = pbkdf2_format(scheme, iteration, &salt, &dk, msg);
#ifdef SLAPD_PBKDF2_DEBUG
printf(" Output:\t%s\n", msg->bv_val);
#endif
return rc;
}
int pbkdf2_check(char *password, char *hash)
{
static char *sha, *salt, *h_pw;
int iterations, saltlen, blen;
char *b64, *keybuf;
unsigned char *out;
int match = FALSE;
const EVP_MD *evpmd;
int keylen, rc;
if (detoken(hash, &sha, &iterations, &salt, &h_pw) != 0)
return match;
/* Determine key length by decoding base64 */
if ((keybuf = malloc(strlen(h_pw) + 1)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory\n");
return FALSE;
}
keylen = base64_decode(h_pw, keybuf);
if (keylen < 1) {
free(keybuf);
return (FALSE);
}
free(keybuf);
if ((out = malloc(keylen)) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot allocate out; out of memory\n");
return (FALSE);
}
#ifdef PWDEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "sha =[%s]\n", sha);
fprintf(stderr, "iterations =%d\n", iterations);
fprintf(stderr, "salt =[%s]\n", salt);
fprintf(stderr, "h_pw =[%s]\n", h_pw);
fprintf(stderr, "kenlen =[%d]\n", keylen);
#endif
saltlen = strlen((char *)salt);
evpmd = EVP_sha256();
if (strcmp(sha, "sha1") == 0) {
evpmd = EVP_sha1();
} else if (strcmp(sha, "sha512") == 0) {
evpmd = EVP_sha512();
}
rc = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, strlen(password),
(unsigned char *)salt, saltlen,
iterations,
evpmd, keylen, out);
if (rc != 1) {
goto out;
}
blen = base64_encode(out, keylen, &b64);
if (blen > 0) {
int i, diff = 0, hlen = strlen(h_pw);
#ifdef PWDEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "HMAC b64 =[%s]\n", b64);
#endif
/* "manual" strcmp() to ensure constant time */
for (i = 0; (i < blen) && (i < hlen); i++) {
diff |= h_pw[i] ^ b64[i];
}
match = diff == 0;
if (hlen != blen)
match = 0;
free(b64);
}
out:
free(sha);
free(salt);
free(h_pw);
free(out);
return match;
}
int
salsa20_init(salsa20_ctx_t *ctx, uchar_t *salt, int saltlen, uchar_t *pwd, int pwd_len,
uchar_t *nonce, int enc)
{
struct timespec tp;
uint64_t tv;
uchar_t num[25];
uchar_t IV[32];
uchar_t *key = ctx->pkey;
#ifndef _USE_PBK
int logN;
uint32_t r, p;
uint64_t N;
if (XSALSA20_CRYPTO_NONCEBYTES % 8) {
log_msg(LOG_ERR, 0, "XSALSA20_CRYPTO_NONCEBYTES is not a multiple of 8!\n");
return (-1);
}
pickparams(&logN, &r, &p);
N = (uint64_t)(1) << logN;
if (crypto_scrypt(pwd, pwd_len, salt, saltlen, N, r, p, key, ctx->keylen)) {
log_msg(LOG_ERR, 0, "Scrypt failed\n");
return (-1);
}
#else
rv = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pwd, pwd_len, salt, saltlen, PBE_ROUNDS, EVP_sha256(),
ctx->keylen, key);
if (rv != ctx->keylen) {
log_msg(LOG_ERR, 0, "Key size is %d bytes - should be %d bits\n", i, ctx->keylen);
return (-1);
}
#endif
/*
* Copy the key. XSalsa20 core cipher always uses a 256-bit key. If we are using a
* 128-bit key then the key value is repeated twice to form a 256-bit value.
* This approach is based on the Salsa20 code submitted to eSTREAM. See the function
* ECRYPT_keysetup() in the Salsa20 submission:
* http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/svn/viewcvs.cgi/ecrypt/trunk/submissions/salsa20/full/ref/salsa20.c?rev=161&view=auto
*
* The input values corresponding to a 256-bit key contain repeated values if key
* length is 128-bit.
*/
memcpy(ctx->key, key, ctx->keylen);
if (ctx->keylen < XSALSA20_CRYPTO_KEYBYTES) {
uchar_t *k;
k = ctx->key + ctx->keylen;
memcpy(k, key, XSALSA20_CRYPTO_KEYBYTES - ctx->keylen);
}
if (enc) {
int i;
uint64_t *n, *n1;
// Derive 192-bit nonce
if (RAND_status() != 1 || RAND_bytes(IV, XSALSA20_CRYPTO_NONCEBYTES) != 1) {
if (geturandom_bytes(IV, XSALSA20_CRYPTO_NONCEBYTES) != 0) {
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tp) == -1) {
time((time_t *)&tv);
} else {
tv = tp.tv_sec * 1000UL + tp.tv_nsec;
}
sprintf((char *)num, "%" PRIu64, tv);
PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC((const char *)num, strlen((char *)num), salt,
saltlen, PBE_ROUNDS, EVP_sha256(), 32, IV);
}
}
n = (uint64_t *)IV;
n1 = (uint64_t *)(ctx->nonce);
for (i = 0; i < XSALSA20_CRYPTO_NONCEBYTES/8; i++) {
*n1 = LE64(*n);
n++;
n1++;
}
// Nullify stack components
memset(num, 0, 25);
memset(IV, 0, 32);
memset(&tp, 0, sizeof (tp));
tv = 0;
} else {
memcpy(ctx->nonce, nonce, XSALSA20_CRYPTO_NONCEBYTES);
memset(nonce, 0, XSALSA20_CRYPTO_NONCEBYTES);
}
return (0);
}
static krb5_error_code
AES_SHA2_string_to_key(krb5_context context,
krb5_enctype enctype,
krb5_data password,
krb5_salt salt,
krb5_data opaque,
krb5_keyblock *key)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
uint32_t iter;
struct _krb5_encryption_type *et = NULL;
struct _krb5_key_data kd;
krb5_data saltp;
size_t enctypesz;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
krb5_data_zero(&saltp);
kd.key = NULL;
kd.schedule = NULL;
if (opaque.length == 0) {
iter = _krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator;
} else if (opaque.length == 4) {
unsigned long v;
_krb5_get_int(opaque.data, &v, 4);
iter = ((uint32_t)v);
} else {
ret = KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
goto cleanup;
}
et = _krb5_find_enctype(enctype);
if (et == NULL) {
ret = KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
kd.schedule = NULL;
ALLOC(kd.key, 1);
if (kd.key == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto cleanup;
}
kd.key->keytype = enctype;
ret = krb5_data_alloc(&kd.key->keyvalue, et->keytype->size);
if (ret) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto cleanup;
}
enctypesz = strlen(et->name) + 1;
ret = krb5_data_alloc(&saltp, enctypesz + salt.saltvalue.length);
if (ret) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy(saltp.data, et->name, enctypesz);
memcpy((unsigned char *)saltp.data + enctypesz,
salt.saltvalue.data, salt.saltvalue.length);
ret = _krb5_aes_sha2_md_for_enctype(context, enctype, &md);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password.data, password.length,
saltp.data, saltp.length,
iter, md,
et->keytype->size, kd.key->keyvalue.data);
if (ret != 1) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP,
"Error calculating s2k");
ret = KRB5_PROG_KEYTYPE_NOSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = _krb5_derive_key(context, et, &kd, "kerberos", strlen("kerberos"));
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, kd.key, key);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
krb5_data_free(&saltp);
_krb5_free_key_data(context, &kd, et);
return ret;
}
int EVP_PBE_scrypt(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
int rv = 0;
unsigned char *B;
uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
/* Sanity check parameters */
/* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
return 0;
/* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r)
return 0;
/*
* Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
* automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
*/
if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r)))
return 0;
}
/* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
/*
* B size in section 5 step 1.S
* Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
* p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
*/
Blen = p * 128 * r;
/*
* Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
* have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
*/
if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
* This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
*/
i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (N + 2 > i / r)
return 0;
Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
/* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen)
return 0;
if (maxmem == 0)
maxmem = SCRYPT_MAX_MEM;
/* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_SCRYPT, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
/* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
if (key == NULL)
return 1;
B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
if (B == NULL)
return 0;
X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
T = X + 32 * r;
V = T + 32 * r;
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
(int)Blen, B) == 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
keylen, key) == 0)
goto err;
rv = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
return rv;
}
